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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
What are the dialectics of the endogenisation of ‘otherness’? This thesis is a study 
into the interaction between social representations, identities and power in relation to 
South Asian, Muslim, male youth in Bradford (UK) within the historical context of 
the ‘Rushdie affair’. The methodology is structured in order to investigate alternative 
locations of the identity-representation interaction. The studies include participant 
observation followed by 18 interviews with ‘specialists’, a rhetorical analysis of five 
television programmes that were aired on national television during and on the 
Rushdie affair, and an examination of the manner of reception of one of these 
programmes through 8 focus group discussions. The findings are that ‘otherness’ and 
difference are central to notions of identity for South Asian Muslim male youth, as 
they are surrounded by representations of themselves as ‘Muslim’ and ‘Paki’. Their 
identities take the form of three ideal-types – ‘coconuts’, ‘rude boys’ and ‘extremists’ 
– which rhetorically engage differentially with the representations. The Rushdie affair 
is interpreted firstly as a moment of subaltern contestation of its representation 
through ‘identity politics’ discourse, and secondly, dialogically as both rhetorical 
positions (hegemonic and subaltern) attempt to psychologically distance themselves 
from each other – through the construction of the ‘Bradford Muslim’ on the 
hegemonic side. However, both positions shared techniques of rhetoric, types of 
discourse, and a common narrative. Furthermore, ‘identity politics’ discourse (for two 
of the ideal-type identities) acted as the interpretative prism through which the 
reception of the programme made sense in relation to, for example, the content and 
manner of reception, the reception of representatives and the call for strategic 
essentialism. The thesis shows that attempts to escape negative evaluation result in 
the incorporation of representations, discourses and rhetorical techniques that position 
identities firmly within the hermeneutics of the hegemonic discourse. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis investigates the interplay between social representations and identity in a 
South Asian, Muslim community in Bradford, United Kingdom. The study of 
difference has been a regular theme in social representations studies as exemplified 
by Marková and Farr (1995) in their study on disability, and Jodelet (1991) in her 
study on madness. This study continues this theme on the social representations of 
difference by studying the social representations of Muslims in Bradford and their 
interaction with identity processes for Bradford Muslim youth.  
 
Is Islam ‘other’? Said (1978/1995) would suggest that Islam was made ‘other’ 
through the practice of British and French orientalism for the purposes of empire. 
This view has been criticised for its leanings towards essentialism (Turner, 1994; 
MacKenzie, 1995). And indeed, it would be difficult to employ such abstractions in 
order to explain a relationship that has lasted for over a thousand years, across several 
continents. Nevertheless, there have been ‘moments’ in the history of this relationship 
when such a ‘self-other’ bifurcation has made sense. Watt (1991) has summarised 
twelfth and thirteenth century Christian views of Islam as, for example, being spread 
by violence and, the converse of this, that Christianity is the religion of peace, and 
that Islam is a religion of self-indulgence, especially in sexual matters. Said 
(1978/1995) provides the example of Cromer who juxtaposed the rational, logical, 
evidence-requiring European to the irrational, self-contradictory and lacking in 
lucidity Oriental. Grosrichard (1998) has examined through Lacanian analysis the 
interpretation of the Ottoman Caliphate as despotic by Montesquieu in contradiction 
to the emerging (European) rational society through, for example, depictions of the 
harem and the seraglio.  
 
To continue this theme, Turner (1994) concludes after examining Weber’s sociology 
of oriental society that “the Orient simply lacks the positive ingredients of Western 
rationality. Oriental society can be defined as a system of absences…” (p. 39). 
Similarly, Woodward (1997a) has noted that a resurgent European identity has “been 
produced against the threat of ‘the Other’. This ‘Other’ often includes workers from 
North Africa… who are construed as representing a threat from Islamic 
fundamentalism” (p. 18). The above examples show that the discourse of Islam as 
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‘other’ ranges from the academic to the popular. This thesis is an examination into 
one such moment when ‘otherness’ became the subject of discussion in the British 
national public sphere: the ‘Rushdie affair’. 
 
The ‘Rushdie affair’ was an event in British social and political history that began as 
a result of the publication of the book The Satanic Verses by Salman Rushdie, an 
award-winning, post-colonial British author of Indian origin who wrote in the style of 
magical realism. The book contained sections which satirised the life of the Prophet 
of Islam. A campaign began against the book initially asking for the book to include a 
note reminding the readers that the book was a work of fiction. The campaigners then 
moved on to burning a copy of the book at public demonstrations. A public book 
burning in Bradford followed by a death threat against Rushdie led to what is 
popularly referred to as the ‘Rushdie affair’. One result of this is that Haroun (1997) 
found in his thesis on the social representations of Islam that the representation of the 
‘Bradford Muslim’ was common in letters to the editors of newspapers during the 
‘Rushdie affair’; it will be suggested in this thesis that a ‘Bradford Muslim’ “carries 
far more associations than merely a geographical reference” (Cottle, 1993, p. 169). 
 
This thesis will be examining the representation of the ‘Bradford Muslim’ as part of a 
study into the dialectics of representation and identity amongst Bradford Muslim 
youth. What does it mean to be represented as ‘other’? What are the effects of such a 
representation on identity? What are the dialectics of the endogenisation of 
‘otherness’? This thesis is a study into such an interaction. I must admit at the outset 
that my interest in these issues is not purely theoretical. I was preparing for my 
GCSE’s at school in Bradford at the time of the ‘Rushdie affair’ and was involved in 
the campaign against the book. And so I was one of those ‘Bradford Muslims’. I was, 
in the words of Hall (1997a), representing a ‘node of difference’, and if I didn’t know 
it, I certainly felt it.  
 
I should also add at the outset that this thesis has a specific empirical focus. It is 
suggested here that the processes for identity assertion are different for three different 
sections of the community. These three sections are the elders, the young Muslim 
men and the young Muslim women. The elders in their assertion of Muslim identity 
have a different history and experience to the younger generations whom have been 
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raised within the British educational system. This means that their representations of 
the world, of themselves and of wider society are different to the representations of 
the younger generations.   
 
The younger generations have similar experiences in terms of the educational system 
but the issue of gender seems to be an additional factor in the processes of identity. 
This is for several inter-connected reasons. First of all, there is a history of identity 
assertion based upon gender differences in British society and this pervades the public 
sphere and British social history. Secondly, the issue of women and Islam is a 
greatly-debated subject focusing on several issues such as the wearing of the 
headscarf, female circumcision, gender-segregated schooling and arranged marriages. 
Thirdly, there seems to be a distinction being made specifically by Muslim women 
between culture and religion (Knott and Khoker, 1993) which is a direct contribution 
to the debate on Muslim identity for young Muslim women. This means that there are 
considerable differences between identity processes for young Muslim men and 
young Muslim women. It is suggested that the representations, the type of anchorings 
and objectifications, and the identity processes involved are sufficiently different for 
young Muslim women as compared to young Muslim men that this study should be 
focused on the study of one or the other. It is also suggested that the insider/outsider 
distinction is pertinent to this issue
1
, so this study will be specific to young, Muslim 
men. 
 
The thesis is divided into three parts: theory, methodology and results. The first part 
of the thesis consists of two chapters that position this thesis within debates in 
Muslim identity and social theory (especially social psychology). The first chapter 
consists of a review of the literature on Muslim identity and the second chapter covers 
the theoretical approach of this thesis. The second methodological part of the thesis 
consists of chapters three and four which provide details on the specific community 
under study and the methodological procedure respectively. The third part of the 
thesis consists of four chapters: three chapters on each of the three empirical studies 
and a conclusion. 
                                                 
1
 The insider/outsider distinction is discussed in chapter four. Generally, the same points mentioned 
there apply to the gender of the researcher and that is why the researcher has focused on young, 
Muslim men. 
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The thesis will examine the representation-identity interaction through examining the 
interplay between the representational field of the South Asian Muslim community 
and the programmes that depicted such a community in the national public sphere. 
Consequently, the three empirical studies are: one study on the representations, 
identities and discourse of Bradford Muslim youth, a second on the actual 
programmes themselves in terms of their rhetorical composition, and thirdly on the 
reception of one such programme by Bradford Muslim youth. 
 
The first chapter is a review of the literature on Muslim identity and the main issues 
that are raised by the literature. The ‘Rushdie affair’, though not the subject of 
extensive analysis itself, has certainly initiated a whole new body of work on what 
can loosely be described as ‘Muslim identity’. Research on Muslim identity has been 
conducted by researchers from several disciplines including anthropology, sociology, 
social psychology and political science. The analysis of Muslim identity literature is 
divided into two sections: the first looking at the outsider representations of the 
community and the second being an examination of some of the social scientific 
explanations of Muslim identity. This incorporates an analysis of the reasons 
suggested by researchers for the rise of Muslim identity, and will include an 
exploration of the global and historical dimensions of local processes of identity.  
 
The second chapter is a discussion of the theoretical approach of this thesis. My 
initial interest in this area of work stemmed from the desire to understand the extent 
to which a theory derived from within a European intellectual framework could help 
explain what I could as an insider to the Muslim community, and a political activist, 
see around me as a rise in Muslim identity. My involvement in, and knowledge of, 
ideological groupings within the Muslim community (and their limited effects) made 
me aware that such a widespread social phenomenon could not be traced to the efforts 
of religious activists, rather it seemed that this widespread social phenomenon was in 
fact due to social processes which were massive in their nature. The theoretical 
approach developed in the second chapter is therefore an elaboration of an 
explanatory tool which will be used later in this thesis. The basic component of such 
an approach is the theory of social representations which is a theory of the sociology 
of knowledge as developed by Serge Moscovici (2000). I relate this theory to other 
 14 
contributions in social theory especially in relation to identity, power and the media in 
order to increase its utility for this particular thesis. 
 
The third chapter provides a history of Muslims in Britain and in Bradford 
specifically. The history of Muslims in Britain has as its major turning point the 
immigration that occurred during the nineteen sixties. Before this, the Muslim 
community in Britain was numerically quite small and tended to be concentrated 
around a few urban areas. The labour shortage following the Second World War led 
to the immigration of hundreds of thousands from the Indian sub-continent and the 
Carribbean. The Muslim community in Britain today is formed mainly of Muslims 
from South Asia. These Pakistani, Indian and Bangladeshi Muslims tended to settle 
around major urban industrial areas such as West Yorkshire and the West Midlands.  
 
One industrial, urbanised area that became a focus for immigration was the city of 
Bradford in West Yorkshire. The wool industry flourished in Bradford and at least 
two major mills, Salt’s Mill and Lister’s Mill, helped to employ thousands for 
decades. Such opportunities for employment, albeit at a low-skilled level, attracted 
economic migrants. The South Asian Muslim community in Bradford is numbered at 
approximately eighty thousand. The community in Bradford has initiated a series of 
political campaigns that have maintained Bradford as a regular focus for exposure and 
analysis, the third chapter includes a review of these events, political and otherwise. 
 
The fourth chapter outlines the methodology employed to investigate Muslim identity 
in Bradford. This is directly linked to the theoretical approach since the methods of 
research have to be, for the sake of consistency, related to the philosophy that 
underpins the approach of the research (Farr, 1993). The three studies that form the 
main empirical work of this thesis are constructed within the framework of 
triangulation (Flick, 1992) and are based upon Morley’s (1992) suggestion that the 
study of the reception of media has to include three aspects: the community, the text, 
and the reception of the text. Particular attention is paid to the nature of insider 
research in terms of its difficulties and benefits. 
 
The fifth chapter provides a detailed study of social psychological processes amongst 
South Asian Muslim youth in Bradford. The study entailed participant observation for 
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nine months in Bradford and interviews with eighteen key informers. The chapter 
analyses both the representations held by outsiders of South Asian Muslim youth (of 
the ‘Paki’ and the ‘Muslim’) and the representations of outsiders by South Asian 
Muslim youth (of ‘white society’). It also examines the variety of identities amongst 
South Asian Muslim youth (‘coconuts’, ‘rude boys’ and ‘extremists’) and relates 
them back to the representations. Finally, the relationship between Muslim identity 
discourse and pervasive stereotyping is explored  
 
The sixth chapter offers a rhetorical analysis of the television coverage of the 
‘Rushdie affair’. Five programmes that were aired during and on the ‘Rushdie affair’ 
were analysed for their rhetorical content to uncover how the argumentative nature of 
the affair affected the social representations of the Bradford Muslim community. The 
campaign against The Satanic Verses had begun in September 1988 and assumed 
national importance after a book burning in Bradford and a fatwa attracted mass 
media coverage. Four of the five television programmes were aired in the months 
after the fatwa. The coverage of the affair raised issues concerning multiculturalism, 
minority rights, international law, the law on blasphemy and freedom of speech. This 
chapter summarises the contents of the argument and shows how the argumentative 
process differs in content and structure. In content, the positions move towards bi-
polarisation as they represented themselves and each other in radically alternative and 
converse forms. However, in structure, the arguments shared rhetorical styles, 
narratives and structures.  
 
The seventh chapter is an analysis of focus group discussions that were conducted 
around one of the television programmes chosen for rhetorical analysis. One 
programme that had been used for rhetorical analysis was a travelogue of a writer that 
had visited Bradford in order to understand the perspective of the Muslim 
community. The programme was shown to groups of young, South Asian males and 
this was followed by a discussion focused around issues of representation. The 
particular use of this programme was pertinent to this thesis because it highlighted the 
difference in access to the national public sphere that was experienced by a minority 
during a crisis. Such that those who control the representation of the minority 
argument in the national public sphere were in fact representatives of the alternative 
viewpoint. The main findings are that the programme was perceived to enhance 
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difference in its representation of the Bradford Muslim community, and the focus 
groups responded to such a representation by adopting an identity politics discourse 
which served to minimise difference. 
 
The main theoretical contributions of this thesis are in three areas. The first is an 
examination of the utility of the theory of social representations. For example, 
Moscovici (2000) has suggested anchoring and objectification as two mechanisms for 
social psychological functioning. This thesis will, therefore, examine the relevance of 
cultural memory and symbolism to the processes of identity and representation in a 
South Asian Muslim youth community. Secondly, this thesis will investigate some of 
the noted absences in social representations theory, especially in relation to power 
and identity. This will mean that the researcher will be investigating the inter group 
nature of representational activity especially in relation to the representations 
themselves and how the groups respond to such representations. Thirdly, this thesis 
will examine the extent to which it is possible for a subaltern identity to distinguish 
itself from hegemonic representations. Such that, even though the subaltern may view 
itself as engaged in an emancipatory strategy, it may in fact be articulating itself 
through hegemonic representations. 
 
The theory of social representations’ understanding of the interaction 
between the media and lay thinkers has the potential to provide a sense 
both of the power of the media, and the creativity of its audience. 
Unfortunately, these two components are seldom integrated by the 
principal proponents of the theory (Rose et al., 1995, p. 154).  
 
The thesis attempts to explore such an interaction and relate it to communication 
through difference. The constant pulling and pushing, “You are different to us!”, “We 
are the same as you!”, the oscillation between the exacerbation and the reduction of 
difference – the dialectics of the endogenisation of ‘otherness’ – and the 
consequences of this upon those who are represented as ‘other’, these are the themes 
that I will attempt to explore throughout this thesis. 
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1.0. THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF MUSLIM IDENTITY: A REVIEW OF 
THE LITERATURE 
 
I will review the major contributions to the literature on Muslim identity in this 
chapter while drawing from a wide variety of disciplines: social psychology, social 
anthropology, sociology, political science, cultural studies, and ethnic and racial 
studies. The literature review is provided for three reasons. Firstly, I will review these 
works here to provide some background to the discussions that are occurring within 
the academic world on the topic of Muslim identity. Secondly, I will identify the 
main themes that inform a social psychological analysis of the Bradford Muslim 
community in terms of social representation and social identity. This will require that 
the literature be interpreted through the language of social psychology, and in so 
doing, I will, where relevant, explain the benefits (as I see them) of using a social 
psychological approach. Thirdly, the literature review should serve to locate my work 
within the body of literature.  
 
The South Asian Muslim community in Britain was understood and explained by 
social scientists through the use of categories such as race and ethnicity and most of 
the research prior to the late eighties was from this perspective. For example, Macey 
(1999) writes: “…until the publication of The Satanic Verses (Rushdie, 1988), 
religion received little attention in the sphere of ethnic relations (Rath et al., 1991)” 
(p. 856). Similarly, Saeed et al. (1999) writes:  
 
During the 1990s interest in the whole Muslim community in the UK 
has increased significantly. Beginning with national issues such as the 
‘Rushdie affair’ and international matters such as the Gulf War, a 
series of events brought Muslims into the media spotlight... (p. 821).  
 
As I review the work, it will become clear that though many pieces of work have 
been published which provide a useful insight, there remains a gap in the literature in 
that there is no theoretically-grounded explanation for the development of Muslim 
identity in a local community like Bradford within the field of social psychology
2
. It 
is my intention that this thesis will contribute towards providing such an explanation. 
                                                 
2
 Jacobson (1996b) has recently finished her doctoral thesis on religious and ethnic identity amongst 
young, British Pakistanis in Walthamstow, North East London. She uses Barth’s theory of boundaries 
and her thesis was submitted to the department of sociology at the LSE. 
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The first section of the review will focus on the issues surrounding the social 
representations of the community by those outside of it. The second section will 
examine various aspects of Muslim identity assertion including its relation to these 
representations. 
  
1.1. Representations of a local community 
 
The social representation of a local community is an integral part of its identity 
process. This representation for a community like the South Asian Muslim 
community in Bradford takes several forms. The first is the approach of the 
government itself. The second is the portrayal of the community in the media, this 
including the relations between the community and the media. Stereotypes of the 
community, in terms of the public and its social representation of the community also 
play a part in the identity process. The nature of these stereotypes and anti-racist 
attempts to respond to them are discussed in this section. 
 
1.1.1. The government and a local community 
 
The government plays an important role in the identity process of a local community 
by the manner in which it seeks to address the community, especially whether this is 
regarded as being interactive or authoritarian, open or closed, understanding or 
rejectionist. This is particularly important in relation to dealing with an ethnic 
minority community which views itself as being marginalised, alienated or 
misunderstood i.e. that it views itself as a minority in statistical, social and political 
terms. This point is of particular importance for the Muslim community as a minority 
community because of its religious nature. The religion of Islam differs from other 
religions especially Christianity with its refusal to acknowledge the distinction 
between the public and the private as defined by secularism. All sectors of society are 
subject to religious guidance for Muslims, including law and government.  
 
This is not true for most European countries since secularism as a result of the 
Enlightenment and the Reformation seeks to distinguish between the public and the 
private especially with regard to law and government. The private domain can be the 
domain for religious activities, however the public domain is to be kept purely secular 
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i.e. non-religious. This is, however, a simplified view towards secularism since there 
are major differences in practice between European countries in terms of how they 
acknowledge the role of religion in their societies. For example, France does not 
accommodate a role for religion in political matters, whereas Britain has a recognised 
Church of England which is officially linked to the political system. 
 
Schnapper (1994) raises this point in reference to the degree of integration on behalf 
of the Muslim community in a western, democratic society. He discusses these 
difficulties as follows, “The practice of Islam goes beyond the strictly religious 
domain, religious laws compel recognition in every aspect of social and personal life. 
Put differently, religious issues are not separated from social and political issues, 
whereas modern societies take freedom of speech as axiomatic” (p. 148). Schnapper 
resolves this problem by later suggesting that:  
 
Given that they have the means of playing an active part in economic 
and social life, Muslims have no reason not to settle in a democracy 
and establish durable relations with government just as other religions 
do, but on the understanding that they agree to redefine Islam as a 
religion on a par with other religions. Whatever the relationship 
between the state and a religious body amounts to in practice, the 
principle of neutrality requires in every instance that Islam is regarded 
as a religion and that it no longer is, whether for community or 
individual, an all-embracing way of life (p. 156).  
 
The overlap between the public (secular) and private (religious) is resolved by 
regarding Islam as a religion that limits itself to the domain of the private. According 
to another researcher: 
 
To impose a single philosophy of religion is to impose a single 
interpretation of what is public and private upon civil society, and this 
is to defeat the very claim that secularism is an entailment of religious 
diversity. It is not clear that there can be an ideologically neutral 
interpretation of what is public and what is private; traditionalists, 
liberals, communitarians and utilitarians have been engaged in 
argument over this for some time, more recently they have been joined 
by feminists bringing with them the view that ‘the personal is the 
political’ (Modood, 1994b, p. 69). 
 
The official recognition of Islam varies across Europe. Belgium offers several 
political and financial rewards to recognised religious communities and in 1974 it 
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recognised the Islamic Cultural Centre as the representative of the Muslim 
community through the unanimous support of its parliament. The Dutch government 
revised its constitution in 1983 and one of its articles called for equal protection for 
religious and non-religious convictions (Rath et al., 1991). Viorst (1996), for 
example, suggests that Germany seeks to repatriate its Muslim population; France 
seeks to integrate its Muslim population; and that Britain is ignoring (sic) its Muslim 
population. For the case of Britain, this was during the period of the Tory 
government. The Labour government which came to power in 1997 has acceded to 
some of the issues which have been raised by the Muslim community. The first is the 
recognition of voluntary aided status for Muslim schools and the second is on the 
issue of whether or not religious discrimination should be incorporated into the Race 
Relations Act.  
 
1.1.2. A variety of stereotypes 
 
Identity processes in a local community are not isolated from other social processes. 
Tajfel and Turner’s theory of social identity (Tajfel and Turner, 1979) proposes that 
in-group identification is related to out-group representations. This is especially true 
for the South Asian Muslim community in Bradford, which is a minority in a 
religious and ethnic sense.  
 
Hutnick (1991) asserts that much of the work on ethnic minority identity in social 
psychology has focused on the minority aspect i.e. the ethnic part of identity has not 
been studied as much as the minority aspect. This is because social psychology has 
studied identity mostly within the paradigm of the laboratory experiment (for 
example, much of the work of Tajfel’s social identity theory has used the 
experimental paradigm). This reduces ethnic minority identity to minority identity. 
More fundamentally, this is because the ‘minority’ status can be defined operationally 
in numerical terms, whereas the ethnic status requires an investigation into political, 
cultural and historical processes. The ethnic aspect of identity requires a cultural-
historical perspective which can be studied by the social representations approach. 
This point is all the more important for the study of identity processes in a South 
Asian Muslim community. 
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The South Asian Muslim community faces three separate types of stereotype: racial, 
cultural and religious. The Muslim community in Bradford is from South Asia and 
South Asians generally tend to have a different skin colour to the English. This 
difference in skin colour means that the South Asian Muslim community can be the 
recipient of racism due to a prejudice based upon stereotypes. The South Asian 
Muslim community in Bradford is not only of a different colour, but also has a 
different culture with a different language. This cultural difference is expressed 
through different clothes, foods and mannerisms. Some of these cultural differences 
are tolerated by the English community and even accepted wholesale such as the 
curry restaurant. Others such as dressing in shalwar kameez
3
 are less accepted and 
can become a focus for prejudice. This research will also ask whether racism remains 
an important factor in local community relations after almost two decades of 
multiculturalism as the official government policy.  
 
A third type of difference is that of a religious nature. The relationship between Islam 
and Christendom has ranged from being mutually beneficial to being directly 
confrontational. A recent report published by the Runnymede Trust (The Runnymede 
Trust, 1997) advocated a new term ‘Islamophobia’ which describes a fear of Islam 
and Muslims. Sociologists and social psychologists, who group these three quite 
different factors under the term ‘ethnicity’, are in danger of confusing several 
culturally and historically distinct issues. A question to be asked by the research will 
be whether prejudiced outsiders distinguish between these three aspects of 
stereotyping. Harba et al. (1989) found on this point that there was a hierarchy of 
discriminatory views towards ethnic groups in the Netherlands, with Islamic groups 
coming below groups from ex-colonies in the hierarchy.  
 
Vertovec (1998) suggests that racism is on the increase in local quarters of British 
society and that an enhanced Muslim identity is a form of resistance to such 
discrimination. This thesis will examine this issue. Ahmad (1992) suggests that the 
resistance to the discrimination faced by the Muslim community may lead to 
excessive reactions. For example, stereotyping by the media may lead to a response 
such that, as Ahmad suggests, the media “may even succeed in changing Muslim 
                                                 
3
 Shalwar kameez is a traditional dress from South Asia. The shalwar is a baggy form of trousers, the 
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character” (p. 48). This highlights the importance of the media in this issue, especially 
with regard to the portrayal of the community within the media. The importance that 
the community attaches to its portrayal in the media can be ascertained by the number 
of media monitoring organisations that have been set up, which are at present six. The 
complaints against the media on behalf of the Muslim community focus around 
Islamophobia, misrepresentation, stereotyping and imbalance. This issue will also be 
examined in this thesis. 
 
The connection between stereotyping and history has been emphasised by Husband 
(1994) who suggests that “historically derived stereotypes of Islam and ‘the Orient’ 
are continuously latent within British popular culture and learning” (p. 80). He quotes 
Watt (1991) who suggests that images of Islam were formed in the twelfth and 
thirteenth century by Christian scholars. The extent to which these stereotypes are 
embedded within European intellectual history has been highlighted by Grosrichard 
(1998)
4, such that the Ottoman despot provides the phantasmic ‘other’ for the 
Enlightenment project. Dolar (1998) writes in the introduction to the book: 
 
It is the time of spectacular endeavours proposing a rationally based 
society, a new concept of state, civil society, democratic liberties, 
citizenship, division of power, and so on; but in a strange counterpoint, 
there was the image of Oriental despotism as the very negative of 
those endeavours, their phantasmic Other (p. xi). 
 
These cultural stereotypes
5
 inform present day interactions (e.g. Said, 1997). This 
thesis will be examining the extent to which the past informs the present in relation to 
these stereotypes. 
 
1.1.3. A forced form of labelling 
 
The South Asian Muslim community found itself defined as ‘black’ during the 
seventies and early eighties. ‘Black’ as a focus of identification came into prominence 
during the civil rights campaign in the sixties in the United States of America. It was 
                                                                                                                                           
kameez is a long shirt, both are usually made from the same material in type and design. 
4
 The book takes the specific example of Montesquieu, and notes that others like Voltaire had an 
alternative opinion. 
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used in preference to ‘negro’ or ‘coloured’ and was an assertion of identity in the face 
of racism. The term was adopted by anti-racists in Britain and all ethnic minority 
communities were asked to define themselves as black, including the communities 
from the Indian sub-continent, so that the anti-racists could unite under one banner. 
However, the situation now in the United States of America is that ‘African-
American’ is preferred to black (Philogène, 1994). This development is related to the 
wider issue of labelling which has assumed controversy in the United States of 
America where a variety of groups are claiming the right to label themselves, this 
being connected to pride and self-esteem. Philogène (1994) writes:  
 
Public debates over naming processes have recently been particularly 
pronounced in the United States. During this past decade alone we 
have witnessed vigorous debates over the most suitable names for a 
variety of groups. One only has to recall the controversies over 
Hispanics preferring Latinos/Latinas or a nationality-specific term; 
Indians becoming Native Americans; Oriental being replaced by Asian 
American; or the most recent struggle over how to call Mexican 
Americans (referred to as the ‘battle of the name’… The switch from 
black to African American is only the latest manifestation of a 
continuous effort by Americans of African descent to find a label that 
will instil pride and self-esteem… (p. 90). 
 
But ‘black’ as an identity had little cultural or historical significance for South Asian 
Muslim communities and eventually they began to call themselves ‘Asian’, and then, 
‘Muslim’6. Hutnick (1991) found that religion was an important means of self-
identification for South Asians with 80% of Muslims identifying themselves as so, 
while only 26% chose the Asian category. She notes, “Probably this category is an 
outside imposition by the host culture; people in it like to think of themselves in more 
specific terms” (p. 302). 
 
Saeed et al. (1999), conducting research on social identities amongst Scottish Asian 
Muslim youth, found that 97% (61 out of 63) identified themselves as Muslim, 
whereas only 8% identified themselves as Pakistani and 26% as black. When asked 
three important statements concerning identity, 85% chose Muslim, 30% chose 
Pakistani, 11% chose Black, 8% chose Scottish and 8% chose Asian. Rath et al. 
                                                                                                                                           
5
 For examples of research into the history of Western views of Islam see Said (1978/1995), Southern 
(1962), Kabbani (1986), Gunny (1996) and Daniel (1993). 
6
 For more on this issue, see Modood (1988) and Modood (1994c).  
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(1991) notes that social researchers are included as amongst those who regarded 
migrants as black or ethnic minorities and the “ideological view held of migrants 
seldom referred to religious attributes” (p. 102) and took little notice of the 
significance of religion in the community’s affairs and in the community itself. 
Nielsen (1987) writes that members of the Muslim community leadership felt that 
“the structures of white British society are, at best, blind to the existence of a Muslim 
community in this country or, at worst, ignoring it by insisting on what are, from a 
Muslim point of view, divisive concepts of ethnicity or assimilationist concepts of 
race” (p. 384). 
 
1.2. The development of Muslim identity 
 
…there has been a growing tendency for Pakistani immigrants in 
Britain to suppress their ‘Pakistani’ identity in the wider, national 
public sphere; instead, Pakistani ethnic leaders and elders evoke a 
singular identity, that of being ‘Muslims’. Increasingly they have 
distanced themselves from the broader ‘Asian’ identification, and they 
also reject an activist ‘black’ self-representation, espoused by some 
anti-racist left-wing groups. On most occasions they insist on being 
labelled ‘British Muslims’ (Werbner, 1996, p. 59). 
 
This section is a discussion on some of the issues concerning Muslim identity 
especially in relation to representations, culture, globalisation and history. The British 
tradition of social science research, specifically in the area of ethnic relations has 
treated religion as a factor of peripheral significance (Beckerlegge, 1991; Knott, 
1986). The concept of ‘ethnicity’ is occasionally used to encompass religious issues 
but, as Christie (1991) points out, there has recently been a revival of a specifically 
Islamic consciousness. Also, Islam as a religion, downplays the significance of ethnic 
identity though it allows for cultural difference. Furthermore, Jacobson (1996b) found 
that the religious and ethnic dimensions of a social group can not only be different but 
can also be contradictory
7
. Jacobson (1996b) provides an analysis of this religion-
ethnic distinction which suggests that young Muslims differentiate religion from 
ethnicity in two ways. The first distinction is the religion-ethnic culture distinction 
which differentiates between the universal applicability of religious teachings and the 
                                                 
7
 Knott and Khoker (1993) found that this was the case with some young Muslim women. Similarly, 
see Shaw (1988), and Mirza (1989). 
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limited relevance on issues based upon culture. The second distinction is the religion-
ethnic origins distinction. This proposes that ethnicity implies attachment to a 
homeland, while religion implies attachment to an ‘ummah’, the global Muslim 
community. This is a useful distinction but it remains incomplete because nationalism 
and ethnicity are understood as one under the religion-ethnic origins distinction. This 
is problematic for the South Asian Muslims originating from Pakistan, India or 
Bangladesh because there are multiple ethnies under one nation in these countries. 
This complicates the ethnic question because two identities are involved, one linked 
to nationalism e.g. Pakistani and one to an ethnie e.g. Sindi. 
 
Jacobson (1996b) uses Barth’s theory of social boundaries to further explain the 
religious-ethnic issue. She proposes that religious boundaries are not permeable, that 
they are clear and fixed since they are derived from religious texts. The ethnic 
boundaries however are permeable and can be crossed, for example in music and 
style of dress. This point can be a possible explanation for the new hybrid Asian 
music bands such as Asian Dub Foundation and Cornershop (though both bands have 
non-Muslim, Asian musicians, there are Muslim Asian bands such as Fun-da-mental 
which began in Bradford). These ethnic boundaries are boundaries of cultural 
expression, they are not ethnic, as Jacobson points out, in the sense of racial 
boundaries since these cannot easily be crossed. Religious boundaries are maintained, 
according to Jacobson, through formal practice such as the five daily prayers and 
fasting during Ramadhan, and through the maintenance of routine behaviour such as 
the avoidance of alcohol and pork. She explains: 
 
What is being argued here is that many actions of the young people 
contribute to the collective construction and maintenance of religious 
boundaries which act to preserve and enhance the integrity of the 
religious community and the internal logic of expressions of religious 
identity (Jacobson, 1996a, p. 12). 
 
The present discussion may seem to present ‘Muslim identity’ as one monolithic, 
homogenous entity. This is not the case. Several writers point to the internal 
heterogeneity of the Muslim community. For example Lewis (1994) specifically 
adopts the phrase ‘Muslim communities’ to “underscore the empirical fact that 
Muslims belong to a variety of linguistic, regional and sectarian groups” (p. 8). 
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Halliday (1995) makes a similar point and asks to what extent the label ‘Islam’ is able 
to help explain how such groups behave socially and politically. He states later that a 
sociology of religion alone cannot provide a complete explanation without an 
investigation of how religion interacts with ethnic, cultural and political forces. It is 
certainly possible to particularise from any specific/particular abstraction, as it is 
similarly possible from any abstraction. The choice of one particular abstraction, 
however, does not make it in itself invalid, except if the employment and analysis of 
such an abstraction ignores possible and important structural contributions towards an 
explanation of the process involved. It is because of this, that it is deemed useful for 
the purposes of this thesis that ‘Muslim identity’ be used, though this does not 
preclude the possibility of later particularisations (or generalisations). 
 
The question of definition and terminology is an important one, especially with 
regards to the use of ‘identifying labels’ such as ‘Asian’ or ‘Muslim’. However, 
reference to the rise of institutions within the South Asian Muslim community reveals 
that institution-building was an important part of identity formation in the early 
seventies, especially in the form of mosques. Halliday (1995) lists the number of 
mosques in Britain as 51 in 1970, this number rising to 329 in 1985. Shaw (1994) 
links this rise to the decreasing relevance of the ‘myth of return’.  
 
Thus at the same time as the myth of return has faded, its role has been 
replaced by concerns about the issue of Muslim identity, with the 
result that the mosque has gradually become an increasingly important 
focus for religious, social and political activity (p. 48). 
  
But this British Muslim identification is a contested issue, especially the suggestion 
of it being multi-ethnic and non-partisan. Numerous attempts to form organisations 
that represent such a British Muslim identity have floundered, including the Muslim 
Parliament, the Union of Muslim Organisations and the UK Action Committee for 
Islamic Affairs. A recent attempt, the Muslim Council of Britain, remains in its 
embryonic stages. The reason for the failure of the previous organisations was their 
inability to create multi-ethnic and non-partisan platforms, and this remains as the 
principal challenge facing the Muslim Council of Britain. It remains to be seen 
whether any one particular organisation will be able to represent the British Muslim 
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identification. Nevertheless, the British Muslim identification seems to be pertinent as 
a social representation
8
. 
 
The term that has come to be associated with Islam is ‘fundamentalism’. The term 
and its usage is an example of Moscovici’s (1984b) concept of anchoring or Bartlett’s 
(1932) conventionalisation. Muslim identity is a foreign and unfamiliar phenomenon 
to British citizens and the knowledge industry. This unfamiliar phenomenon is then 
anchored within the familiar history of ‘Christian fundamentalism’. ‘Christian 
fundamentalism’ arose as the literalist approach of American Protestants to the 
scriptures, meaning that they advocated a return in the practice of the faith (and in the 
derivation of such practice) to the original text. ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ is, 
therefore, an Islamic version of ‘Christian fundamentalism’.  
 
The exact meaning of ‘fundamentalism’ however remains problematic9. If the 
analogy from Christian theology is to provide the location of anchoring, then the 
Salafiya movement would be the closest towards such a hermeneutic appreciation of 
the texts, as this approach advocates a return to the original texts of Islamic law. 
However, even the most sophisticated social scientists seem to use the term 
‘fundamentalism’, and more specifically, ‘Islamic fundamentalism’, to refer to quite 
different phenomena. For example, Bhabha (1994) uses ‘fundamentalism’ as a name 
for those who campaigned against The Satanic Verses (which included 
representatives from most sections of the Muslim community in Britain), while 
Eagleton (1991) begins his introduction to the theory of ideology with “In the Middle 
East, Islamic fundamentalism has emerged as a potent political force” (p. xi).  
 
The first author refers to a political campaign which included many who do not 
interpret the religious texts in a ‘fundamentalist’ manner, and also many who do not 
envisage Islam as a political force. Simultaneously, Middle Eastern Islamic 
fundamentalists (though in itself referring to a huge variety of political organisations 
encompassing vast differences in approach to interpretation and political 
methodology) were absent from the campaign against The Satanic Verses, and are 
                                                 
8
 Popular and established Muslim media such as Q News, Muslim News, Impact and Trends magazine 
assume such an identity. 
9
 See Sayyid (1997) for a dissection of the term ‘Islamic fundamentalism’. 
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either silent on matters of interpretation, or disagree with the ‘fundamentalist’ 
approach to the text.  
 
The term Islamic fundamentalist is therefore used to explain three social phenomena: 
literalist interpreters of religious texts, campaigners against The Satanic Verses (see 
later) and Islamist movements in the Middle East. An acute observer of these three 
social phenomena would know that any term (other than Islamic or Muslim) that 
attempts to incorporate all three has little semantic value. Giddens (1990) (who also 
uses the term ‘fundamentalism’) writes about the term ‘socialism’: “ ‘Socialism’, of 
course, means so many different things that the term is often little more than a cover-
all for whatever putative social order a particular thinker wishes to see created” (p. 
164). Perhaps, to paraphrase Giddens, ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ is similarly little 
more than a cover-all for whatever putative social order a particular thinker wishes 
not to see created. Lewis (1994) writes about this term “…it is almost totally useless 
for either description or analysis. Its pejorative overtones of religious fascism obscure 
the diversity of traditions and groupings within Islam” (p. 5).  
 
1.2.1. ‘Between two cultures’ 
 
The conflicts that the new generation face have often been discussed in the literature 
under the theme of ‘Between Two Cultures’ (e.g. Community Relations Commission, 
1976; Watson, 1977). This view suggests that the youth face a conflict between the 
culture of their parents and the culture of wider society. The home environment 
maintains ethnic traditions and religious interests, while the school offers secular, 
western alternatives (Knott et al., 1993). Gillespie (1995) suggests that cultural 
consumption amongst South Asian second generation youth is hybrid in its extraction 
from ‘parent’ sources. This thesis will examine the manner in which identity and 
culture are related for South Asian Muslim youth in Bradford.  
 
Whether the thesis of ‘Between Two Cultures’ is pertinent or not, there are still 
several options for the new generation and these options are related to contradictory 
pressures, one source being the family, the other being wider society. Hutnick (1986) 
found four distinct coping strategies amongst ethnic minority identities. These were 
assimilation, marginality, acculturation and dissociation. She found, however, that 
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there was little direct association between ethnic identity and type of behaviour. She 
conducted this study using ten identifiers, six of which were extracted from previous 
studies and four which she derived from a pilot study. These were language usage, 
films, arranged marriage, culture preferences, choice of friends, religion, dating 
patterns, preference in clothes, music and food. Kitwood (1983) similarly found that 
there seems to be little reflection on the anomalies of identity and behaviour.  
 
Ballard (1994) offers an almost dramaturgical perspective in that he suggests the 
youth from ethnic minorities have to discover the best ways to behave in any given 
context as long as members of other contexts do not see them behaving in such a 
manner in the first context. This discrepancy between identity and behaviour or 
practice is also true for Muslim identity. Samad (1992) notes that even after the 
‘Rushdie affair’: 
 
It was the perception that they were again humiliated which was 
responsible for making religious consciousness dominant over other 
identities. But there was no increase in religiosity and restaurants still 
served alcohol and attendance for prayer in mosques remained thin (p. 
516).  
 
Similarly, Vertovec (1998) notes that a strong ‘Muslim identity’ does not necessarily 
entail increased participation in religious activity. The discrepancies do not seem to 
provoke a crisis. Gillespie (1995) found a similar discrepancy between identity and 
practice amongst Sikhs in Southall, London. This thesis will examine the extent to 
which there is or there is not a correlation between identity and practice. 
 
The ‘Rushdie affair’ has made a major contribution towards the history and formation 
of the South Asian Muslim community. Samad (1992) suggests that: 
 
The groups which are now designated as British Muslims have also 
been studied by sociologists, anthropologists and political scientists as 
working class, Pakistani, Bangladeshi’s, Mirpuri’s, Sylheti’s etc. (Rex 
et al., 1987, 1991; Saifullah Khan, 1976; Shaw, 1988; Eade, 1989; 
Anwar, 1979). This shift in semantics from ethnic minorities to 
religious groups reflected developments taking place within the 
communities concerned. The Satanic Verses controversy added a new 
claim of authentic identity, a Muslim identity, which challenged the 
other loyalties (p. 508).  
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More recently, Samad (1998) has said that “Islamic identity became the metaphor and 
idiom for social discontent” (p. 68-69) during the ‘Rushdie affair'. 
 
The ‘Rushdie affair’ was an example of a clash between these two cultures. The 
arguments for both sides were central to their notions of identity, but the ‘Rushdie 
affair’ also made a significant contribution towards the development of the South 
Asian Muslim community in Bradford. Even in a small town like Keighley in West 
Yorkshire, Vertovec (1998) writes “The ‘Rushdie affair’ in Keighley, like elsewhere, 
did much to fortify Muslim identity and pride, especially among Muslim youth” (p. 
95). This thesis will further examine the relation between Muslim identity and the 
‘Rushdie affair’. 
 
One important point about the ‘Rushdie affair’ that has not generally been noticed, 
though it was central to the campaign, was the influence of the Barelvis
10
. The 
Barelvis have a special role for the Prophet in their theology and this leads to a 
devotionalism that is centred on the personality of the Prophet, and Rushdie’s novel 
was an attack on the very character of the Prophet. Both Modood (1990) and Samad 
(1992) point out the specific importance of the Barelvi pirs (saints) in the campaign 
against The Satanic Verses.  
 
One result of this is that the ‘Rushdie affair’ made Bradford a laboratory for 
community relations, especially after the book-burning. The continuous focus upon 
Bradford and its Muslim population has lead one researcher to comment:  
 
As a resident of Bradford I have become used to seeing the town 
televisually constructed as ‘alien’, with selective shots of the only 
mosque with a typical ‘oriental’ golden dome, and of women with 
their faces veiled, in order to ‘contextualize’ an interview with a 
Muslim community leader (Husband, 1994, p. 95). 
 
One consequence of this focus on Bradford by the media has been the construction of 
the ‘Bradford Muslim’ – this was noticed in Haroun’s (1997) work on letters sent to 
                                                 
10
 The Barelvis will be described in chapter 3. 
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newspaper editors during the ‘Rushdie affair’. This thesis will investigate the notion 
of a ‘Bradford Muslim’. 
 
1.2.2. Explaining Muslim identity 
 
Several researchers have outlined varying reasons for the development of Muslim 
identity. For example, Jacobson (1996b), providing a sociological perspective, 
suggests that religious identity remains pertinent because of the impermeability of its 
boundaries, and identity assertion is thus maintained through the maintenance of the 
boundaries. Halliday (1995) highlights, as an international relations expert, a number 
of reasons that have led to the assertion of Muslim identity: the non-applicability or 
non-relevance of ‘the myth of return’, the rise of racist attacks on Muslims, 
sponsorship from Muslim governments, and international events such as the Iranian 
revolution, the attacks on Libya, the Palestinian intifada, and the war in Bosnia-
Hercegovina.  
 
Vertovec (1998), a social anthropologist, lists a number of factors such as 
socialisation during a period of ethnic/religious mobilisation, the attraction of Islam 
as a symbol of resistance and a hardening of the distinction between ‘religion’ and 
‘ethnicity’. This thesis will be examining these issues, but from a social psychological 
perspective, especially with reference to identity processes in a local community in 
their relation to media representation. 
 
1.2.2.1. Responses as strategies 
 
The responses that differing parts of the community adapt to the situation of being an 
ethnic, religious minority are varied. The description of such differing responses is 
also variable. Two researchers have suggested differing responses to being an ethnic 
minority community. Hall (1992a) suggests that the defensive retreat from cultural 
racism results in four different strategies. The first of these is the formation of new 
identities around terms chosen and inflected to encompass differences. The second is 
a re-identification with the culture of origin. The third is a construction of strong 
counter-ethnicities as forms of symbolic identification. The fourth is a revival of 
cultural traditionalism, religious orthodoxy and political separation.  
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Hutnick (1991) provides four alternative strategies as responses. These strategies 
differ according to the degree of identification with the majority group and the degree 
of identification with the ethnic minority group. The first strategy is assimilation 
which involves a high level of identification with the majority group and a low level 
of identification with the ethnic minority group. The second strategy is acculturation 
which involves a high level of identification with the majority group and a high level 
of identification with the ethnic minority group. The third strategy is dissociation and 
this involves a high degree of identification with the ethnic minority group and a low 
degree of identification with the majority group. The fourth strategy is marginality, 
which involves a low degree of identification with the majority group and a low 
degree of identification with the ethnic minority group. Hutnick traces three of four of 
her strategies back to Tajfel (1978e), The Social Psychology of Minorities. A clear 
difference can be noticed between Hall’s and Hutnick’s account of the strategies 
adopted by differing sections in the ethnic minority community. Hall’s account 
incorporates the notion of culture, whereas Hutnick’s account focuses on the minority 
aspect of identity. Hutnick’s complaint against some of the work in social psychology 
is that there has been much focus on the minority aspect of identity, at the expense of 
the ethnic aspect of identity. Hall’s work suggests that the cultural component of 
identity needs to be incorporated into an analysis of identity processes. 
 
Several accounts have been offered explaining the responses of the Muslim 
community. Peach and Glebe (1995) state that the Muslim communities have been 
offered three options by rival attempts for leadership of the community: ghettoisation, 
political organisation, and liberalisation. This could reflect different ideological 
responses. Modood (1993) in an analysis of the responses to a commission of a Racial 
Equality Consultative Paper by Muslim organisations, identifies three perspectives: 
conservative, centrist and radical. The first, conservative, is an approach based on the 
call to equal and fair application of human rights. The second, centrist, is based on the 
extension of the anti-racism discourse so that it includes prejudice against Muslims. 
The third, radical, is the advocacy of separation and self-assertion. Modood notes, 
that the responses far from being unfamiliarly Islamic, are familiar types of strategies 
adopted by minorities in modern, secular society. 
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While each of these approaches can in various ways draw upon aspects 
of Muslim thought and practice to vindicate themselves, it cannot be a 
coincidence that these three approaches approximate to a remarkable 
degree the main political approaches of recent decades in American 
and British racial equality perspectives. They reflect not so much 
obscurantist Islamic interventions into a modern, secular discourse, but 
typical minority options in contemporary Anglo-American equality 
politics, and employ the rhetorical, conceptual and institutional 
resources available in that politics (Modood, 1993, p. 518). 
 
Specifically in reference to young, Muslim women, Knott et al. (1993) suggests three 
typical responses. The first of these is cultural synthesis, the second is an anti-
religious feminist strategy and the third is a religious identity strategy. King (1993) 
notes that Muslims will chose different variants of Islam that are not different in their 
interpretation as such of the religious texts, but rather are different in terms of their 
level of concession to modernity and to different degrees of permissable individuality. 
Werbner (1996) similarly identifies three cultural domains: the pan South Asian 
aesthetic, anglicised post-colonial Western culture and Islamic reformist culture. 
Finally, Jacobson (1996b) in her analysis of the persistence of religious and ethnic 
identities notes four main types of responses amongst Muslims. The first is learning 
to be Muslim, the second is prioritising religious identity over ethnic identity, the 
third is protesting as Muslims and the fourth is radical Islam. These are all examples 
of the type of responses that the South Asian Muslim community is experiencing. 
This study will examine whether any of the responses in Bradford resemble the 
responses and strategies outlined above, and it will seek to provide an explanation for 
these strategies from a social psychological point of view. 
 
 
 
 
1.2.3. Global and historical dimensions of identity 
 
The development of Muslim identity in a local community like Bradford can no 
longer remain independent of the influence of globalisation and history. Islam has the 
concept of the ‘ummah’ – the global Muslim community, and the pilgrimage to 
Makkah can in one indirect way be seen as an assertion of the notion of the ummah. 
Muslims from all over the world travel to Makkah for the yearly pilgrimage and the 
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compulsory wearing of two white pieces of cloth for males means that ethnic and 
cultural diversity is reduced as religious identity is asserted. The notion of the 
‘ummah’ has a central place in Islamic teaching. For example, one saying of the 
Prophet is “Believers are all like one body, if one part of it feels pain, then the rest of 
it feels pain as well”. Though there are numerous ethnicities that belong to the Islamic 
faith, this notion of the ‘ummah’ remains significant in identity processes.  
 
Pre-modern society experienced a slow rate of information flow as compared to 
today, and as such interaction across different continents and different countries was 
almost impossible in a social psychological sense. It would be a long time before the 
Muslims of Morocco became aware of events affecting Muslims in Malaysia. Modern 
communication technology, especially with regard to the internet and news 
communication, has meant that events occuring on the other side of the planet can be 
relayed across and around the world almost immediately. On occasion, the whole 
world has been able to follow a ‘live’ political event through the television camera. 
Recent examples include the Gulf war, the Yugoslavia war, the bombings of Iraq and 
the Pakistan nuclear tests. Such rapid information transfer has also narrowed the gap 
between parts of communities such that ethnic, national and religious bonds can be 
strengthened as a direct result of the transmission of information. An ‘ummah’, an 
ethnie or a transnational community all benefit from such technology. This work will 
discuss the relationship between ethnic, national and religious identities, especially in 
relation to the ‘ummah’ and its impact upon a local community.  
 
The influence of history is also an important contribution to identity processes. As an 
example, Beckerlegge (1991) links the South Asian community back to British 
imperialism in India. Nielsen (1991) notes that the restrained anger exhibited in The 
Muslim Manifesto published by the Muslim Parliament is not only due to the 
experiences of a minority, but also as a result of “an older experience of having been 
colonial victims” (p. 474). Modood (1990) deems it necessary to provide a brief 
history of Islam in South Asia in order to explain the ‘Rushdie affair’ and claims that 
an ahistorical sociology or purely materialistic history cannot provide an adequate 
explanation. Ahmad (1995) notes though that this reference to history or 
historiography is ideological in its analysis of past events i.e. that it is selective. This 
shows that the employment of history serves rhetorical ends which then act to 
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strengthen, and on occasion, to polarise group relations. This thesis will examine 
whether history has in important impact on the development of identity processes in 
the local community in Bradford.  
 
1.3. Conclusion 
 
I have attempted to introduce the reader to some of the issues in the literature on 
Muslim identity in this chapter. The analysis is from the perspective of social 
psychology, and I hope that I have demonstrated the benefits of employing a social 
psychological approach. Such an approach will be able to examine the content and 
effects of stereotypes. I have also attempted to demonstrate that the description and 
explanation of a local community, as in this case study, requires a theoretical 
construction that connects between representation, culture, history, rhetoric and 
identity. I intend to derive such a construction from recent developments in social 
psychological theory in the next chapter. The specific issues that have been raised in 
this chapter will be investigated in the empirical studies. 
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2.0. THE DIALECTICS OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS AND SOCIAL 
IDENTITIES 
 
The chapter will provide the intellectual location of this study i.e. to situate my work 
within the theoretical literature while simultaneously developing the theoretical 
apparatus that will be required for the empirical analysis. The aim is therefore 
threefold. Firstly, to argue for the advantages of social representations theory. 
Secondly, to discuss some of the absences in social representations theory especially 
in relation to identity and power, that is an understanding of social representations 
theory within an intergroup context. Thirdly, to articulate a theoretical framework for 
the possibility of subaltern identities to ‘escape’ hegemonic representations. 
 
This chapter will therefore begin with a brief description of the sociological turn in 
social psychology. This will be followed by an introduction to the theory of social 
representations. The chapter will then include an examination of various theories of 
identity and their relation to the theory of social representations. The specific example 
of the identity politics movements, and their social psychology, will be covered. 
Finally, the chapter will examine the relation of social representations to the public 
sphere as a site of contestation. Ultimately, however, the aim of this chapter is to 
develop a theoretical approach that will be able to accomplish one of the aims of 
social psychology as identified in the words of Henri Tajfel in his introduction to The 
Context of Social Psychology: 
  
However one wishes to define or describe social psychology, there is 
no doubt that it is a discipline which, in principle, should be able to 
contribute a great deal to the interpretation of contemporary social 
phenomena; and that its aim is either the ‘explanation’ or the 
‘understanding’ (in the traditional sense of these terms) of the social 
life of individuals and of groups, large or small. (Israel and Tajfel, 
1972, p. 1). 
 
2.1. The sociological turn in social psychology 
 
The history of social psychology is expressive of the philosophical heritage, and its 
associated, derivative tensions, that underlies an understanding of the study of human 
nature (Farr, 1996b); an example is the ‘rise and fall’ of the positivist empire 
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(Manicas, 1987). One consequence of the ‘fall’ of the positivist empire, or at least a 
weakening in its theoretical inviolability, has been that new theories have emerged. 
An example is the theory of social representations as initially expounded by 
Moscovici (1961), which represents in itself a sociological turn in social psychology 
through its elaboration of a view towards a sociology of knowledge which 
emphasises the social nature of knowledge, memory and identity (Flick, 1998b).   
 
The emergence of the theory of social representations was in part possible due to the 
so-called ‘crisis’11 in social psychology during the 1970s. The ‘crisis’ was covered in 
several books and articles
12
 which raised serious questions about the nature of the 
development of social psychology, focusing around the following issues: the use of 
the experimental paradigm, the influence of reductionism and the absence of social 
explanations (especially with reference to communication). Israel and Tajfel’s (1972) 
The Context of Social Psychology is a collection of papers on the crisis in social 
psychology. Moscovici (1972) asked in this book whether social psychology was 
social enough? He suggested that social psychology required an explicitly more social 
theory which could account for and explain the social nature and functioning of man. 
The theory of social representations is an attempt to provide a sociological form of 
social psychology (Farr, 1996b), by drawing upon the work of Durkheim, through the 
adoption and modernisation of Durkhiem’s (1912/1995) ‘collective representations’. 
 
2.1.1. The theory of social representations 
 
The first work on social representations was Moscovici’s analysis of the effects of the 
diffusion of knowledge of psychoanalysis upon French society in La Psychanalyse: 
Son Image et Son Public, published in 1961. Several articles provide useful attempts 
at explaining social representations. These include Moscovici’s (2000) Social 
Representations, the introduction to Jodelet’s (1991) Madness and Social 
                                                 
11
 This ‘crisis’ was so called because it undermined the whole positivist project, but obviously to those 
who were questioning the use of positivism, this was not a ‘crisis’ for social psychology. Instead it was 
a point of liberation for social psychology. The ‘crisis’ according to these social psychologists did not 
occur in the 1970s but the ‘crisis’ in social psychology began with the individualising and mechanising 
of group processes as social psychology fell under the influence of behaviourism in the earlier part of 
this century. 
12
 For examples of crisis literature, see Gilmour and Duck (1980), Harré and Secord (1972), Parker 
(1988) and Strickland et al. (1976). 
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Representations and Farr’s (1987a) article “Social Representations: A French 
Tradition of Research” in The Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. Jodelet and 
Farr are two of a whole variety of social psychologists that have contributed towards 
the development of the theory of and research into social representations, these 
include Marková (e.g. Marková and Farr, 1995), Duveen (e.g. Duveen and Lloyd, 
1990), Wagner (e.g. 1996) and Flick (e.g. 1998b) amongst many others. Studies in 
social representations have flourished, for example, recent theses have examined the 
social representations of death (Bradbury, 1994), public space (Jovchelovitch, 1995a) 
and nature (Gervais, 1997). 
 
So what are social representations? Since his early work on psychoanalysis, 
Moscovici has refused to provide a definition of social representations because he did 
not wish to restrict work in this area. Rather, he felt that clarity in the definition of 
social representations should be an outcome of, rather than a prelude to research. 
Nevertheless, Moscovici (1973) provides a basic description of social representations, 
defining them as “ ‘theories’ or ‘branches of thought’ in their own right, for the 
discovery and organisation of reality” (p. xiii). And their purpose? The purpose of 
“all representations is to make something unfamiliar, or unfamiliarity itself, familiar” 
(Moscovici, 1984b, p. 24). Moscovici (1988) later relates this to Bartlett (1932): 
“…whenever material visually presented purports to be representative of some 
common object, but contains certain features which are unfamiliar in the community 
to which the material is introduced, these features invariably suffer transformation in 
the direction of the familiar” (p. 178). Consequently, the domain of communication is 
one of security, confirmation and corroboration (Moscovici, 1984b). Mosocovici 
(1984b) proceeds to define two roles for social representations: they conventionalise 
and prescribe. The power of convention is due to the dominance of the past over the 
present, such that the representations prescribe the manner and content of social 
thinking (Moscovici, 1984b).  
 
Social representations are generated by two mechanisms. These twin processes are 
central to the whole theory. Anchoring is the process whereby unfamiliar knowledge 
becomes assimilated to and associated with familiar social representations. 
Objectification is the process whereby the abstract (e.g. an idea) becomes transformed 
into a concrete form (e.g. an image). An important function of anchoring is that the 
 39 
present is linked to the past. In this sense, anchoring is the process by which an 
unfamiliar concept is understood by connecting it to a familiar concept, the concept 
being familiar in that it is stored in the memory of society. Remembering, used in this 
manner, is a collective process (Halbwachs, 1950/1980) and occurs through the 
anchoring of unfamiliar concepts by social groups. This is similar to Bartlett’s notion 
of conventionalisation which also advocates the influence of history upon cognitive 
processes. Objectification requires the discovery of “the iconic quality of an 
imprecise idea” (Moscovici, 1984b, p. 38), intensifying “the figurative character of 
representations and their specific nature confirming Wittgenstein’s comment: ‘The 
act of thinking is quite comparable to drawing pictures’ (Wittgenstein, 1980, p. 172)” 
(Moscovici, 1988, p. 238). The consequence of this is that the act of perception 
replaces the act of conception (Moscovici, 1984b).  
 
Moscovici (1988) describes three different types of representations: hegemonic, 
polemical and emancipated. Hegemonic representations are uniform and coercive, 
and inform all symbolic activity. Essentially, they are the modern equivalent of 
collective representations. Polemical representations are associated with antagonistic 
relations between groups within society, as such, they are not shared by society as a 
whole. Emancipated representations are the result of exchange and concordance of 
symbolic representations between sub-groups in society that share close contact.  
 
The nature of consensus and disagreement in the theory of social representations has 
been discussed by Rose et al. (1995) who suggest that though hegemonic 
representations may not seem initially apparent, argumentation and disagreement over 
specifics by a dominant group may conceal an actual consensus in representational 
practice. Rose et al. (1995) aim to distinguish between “the level of immediate social 
interaction which involves disagreement and argumentation” and “the level of 
underlying ground-rules of social representation formation…” (p. 152) which 
possesses a consensual dimension. They write in reference to the work of Jodelet 
(1991) that she found:  
 
…that it was at the level of consensual ritualistic practices… that the 
most exclusionary representations [of the mad] were given form. At 
the same time, there was constant discussion and disagreement 
amongst the villagers concerning their lodgers in respect of who was 
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dangerous and who was harmless. At the level of manifest discourse 
they would agree and disagree. Yet, they would enact the same rituals 
to express the unspeakable. (p. 153). 
 
The sociological turn in social psychology, that is manifested in this case by the 
theory of social representations, can be substantiated through reference to the 
intellectual ancestry of the theory of social representations. For example, Moscovici 
regularly quotes sociologists such as Durkheim, Mead and Lévy-Bruhl (see for 
instance Moscovici, 1984b, 1988, 1998). The link with Durkheim is especially apt as 
Moscovici translates the notion of social representations as a modern equivalent of 
the Durkheimian collective representations, which by way of example, Durkheim 
(1912/1995) employed in order to explain Australian aboriginal religion. According 
to Moscovici (1988), the Durkheimian conception of collective representations is 
useful to those societies which “…shared one and the same representation, gave it 
credence, and celebrated it by rites and sacrifices” (p. 219). However, the nature of 
change that has been instituted by modernity has meant that:  
 
This view does not match or no longer matches the historical reality 
with which we are familiar. It is unlikely that even in communities 
where tradition is still dominant, there would be as much uniformity 
and invariability as anthropologists expected to find… (Moscovici, 
1988, p. 219).  
 
As such, it was Moscovici’s intention, through the introduction of the theory of social 
representations, to initiate an “anthropology of modern culture” (Moscovici, 1984a, p. 
514).  
 
An associated reason for the replacement of ‘collective’ with ‘social’ is that the 
Durkheimian collective representation was coercive by virtue of its universal, almost 
invisible nature. Moscovici (1988) is, however, of the view that there is a creative 
element to representational activity and chooses instead to employ the term ‘social 
representations’. This does not mean that there are no collective representations in the 
modern period. One collective representation in the modern period and in Western 
society (that is relevant to this thesis) is individualism (Farr, 1991a). 
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Social representation researchers have also employed the phrase ‘representational 
field’, this is the semantic matrix within which social representations function. Rose 
et al. (1995) write on this:  
 
Against notions of monolithic and homogenous representations, we 
propose the idea of a representational field, susceptible to 
contradiction, fragmentation, negotiation and debate. In such a 
representational field, there is incoherence, tension and ambivalence. 
Yet, permeating all these disparate elements there is a consensual 
reality, which forms the common ground of historically shared 
meanings within which people discuss and negotiate. (p. 153). 
 
The above is a brief summary of the theory of social representations and some of its 
basic constructs. The question remains, why use the theory of social representations? 
I would suggest that there at least five advantages in using the theory of social 
representations. These advantages, in themselves, are not unique to the theory of 
social representations and simultaneously, they do not preclude the possibility of 
outstanding absences that remain as limiting factors for the explanatory potential of 
the theory. 
 
The first advantage is that the theory permits theoretical orientations, methodological 
analysis, and post-research explanations that incorporate the social nature of 
communication, i.e. that which lies beyond the individual, e.g. media texts, dialogue, 
practice. Secondly, the theory incorporates the importance of history and cultural 
memory into social psychological functioning through the notion of anchoring which 
serves to conventionalise the representation.  
 
Thirdly, the theory allows for a perspectivist approach. There are differences between 
some of the researchers in the field of social representations as to the extent and 
nature of constructionism within the theory (see Gervais, 1997). However, there is 
generally an acceptance of the constructed nature of social reality. And Moscovici 
(1988) asserts the common ground between the theory of social representations and 
the theory of the social construction of reality (Berger and Luckmann, 1966) though 
he says that “…the principle of social reality construction takes on an arbitrary 
meaning and has no empirical prospects, as long as the representations of the 
members of the society are left out of account” (Moscovici, 1988, p. 227).  
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Fourthly, the theory of social representations advocates the study of meaning and 
form. So the analysis and deconstruction of meaning, and its relevance, is related to 
the nature of representational activity. The theory conjoins (and interrogates) the 
dialectics between content and process. Fifthly, the theory highlights the need for 
specificity in the understanding of social representations through accessing the 
semantic relevance of representations. Social representations are not equivalent, and 
their difference is related to the representational field from which they emerge. An 
investigation into the nature of anchoring and objectification of social representations, 
and their relation to representational fields, are the means by which this specificity 
can be established. 
 
There are, however, some theoretical absences
13
 in the theory of social 
representations that are relevant to this study. The first is the issue of power in 
relation to the distribution of representations. Moscovici (1988) rejects the 
determinist nature of Durkheim’s collective representations and concomitantly asserts 
agency through the possibility of a transformation of social representations. If agency 
is to be distributed alongside social representations, then it will be distributed to all. 
However, although representations are distributed universally, some representations 
represent more than others. This aspect of social representations has been explored by 
Joffe (1995) in her work on social representations of AIDS. 
 
The second issue is the connection between social representations and social identity. 
Social representations are shared constellations of knowledge. It is this act of sharing 
and its relation to identity that is of interest here. The act of sharing itself has been 
problematised by, for example Harré (1984) and Potter and Litton (1985), but I wish 
to examine the nature of interaction between social representations and social 
identity. This interaction has previously been investigated by, among others, Duveen 
and Lloyd (1990) and Elejabarrieta (1994).  
 
The theory of social representations incorporates a sociological approach to social 
phenomena, accounts for the weight of history upon contemporary events, allows for 
                                                 
13
 For an elaboration of ‘absence’ in relation to social representations theory, see Gervais et al. (1999).  
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a perspectivist approach which values the social psychological reality of those being 
studied, attempts to grasp the meaning of the representation itself and recognises the 
need for specificity, and therefore, difference. The five advantages are however to be 
counter-balanced by two major absences in the theory which researchers in the field 
have attempted to address. I will examine these attempts in the next section.  
 
2.2. The interdependence of social representations and social identity 
 
Social representations… are the representations of something or of 
someone. (Moscovici, 1984b, p. 67). 
 
The theory of social representations is a theory of the distribution of knowledge. As 
the quote mentions above, these representations are representations of objects and 
people. Those representations which involve people will impact upon their sense of 
identity. As such social representations and social identities are inextricably linked. 
This is, obviously, a crude simplification of the inter-relation. Social identities are, in 
many cases, founded upon a web of connections between objects and people, in 
history and in the present, as symbols and representations thus composing the texture 
of meaning upon which these identities are based. This thesis is an examination into 
the intricacies of such an inter-relation.  
 
To what extent does the act of sharing a constellation of knowledge constitute the act 
of being? That is, what are the implications of social representations, and their shared 
nature, for social identity? This question assumes that there may be a generic answer. 
And so a further question arises: Are all identities the same? Without wishing to 
develop a typology for identity, I would suggest that there are certain differences 
between types of identity and knowledge structures.  
 
The types of identity can be related to social representations depending upon the level 
of consensus. The first type is a collective identity, associated with a collective 
representation (in a Durkheimian sense) and an example could be an identity that is 
derivative of individualism. The second type is a social identity associated with a 
social representation, but one which does not involve contestation. An example of 
this type is pre-feminism gender identity. The third type is a social identity that is 
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politically marked and involves contestation, it is normally associated with polemical 
representations. Examples of this type include those identities that are associated with 
the ‘identity politics’ movements.  
 
An example of the second type of relation between identity and social representations 
can be elaborated through the lead of Elejabarrieta (1994) in suggesting that the 
notion of positioning can act as a useful meeting point for social representations and 
identity. The notion of positioning suggests that knowledge structures locate identity 
and difference. So anchoring and objectification are not only directing specificity in 
knowing, but they also direct specificity in identifying. I will also discuss here 
Duveen and Lloyd’s (1990) suggestion that social identities are embedded within and 
emerge from social representations. 
 
On this relation between identity and knowledge, a question should be asked, are 
some identities valued less than others within certain societies? If there is difference, 
then how is this structured? The answer to this question lies in the uneven distribution 
of representational power. Some social representations are hegemonic: they are 
distributed more widely and are more salient through their connections to wider 
ideological perspectives. Some are polemical i.e. contested, and some are 
emancipated. Polemical representations “must be viewed in the context of an 
opposition or struggle between groups” (Moscovici, 1988, p. 221-222). Those 
identities which are the subject of polemical and negative representations are 
subjugated and there are essentially three actors involved. The first is the producer 
and maintainer of the social representation of the stigmatised identity, the second is 
the represented, and the third is the audience for the representation - the site of 
contestation being the public sphere. This ternary nature of identity has been 
highlighted by Jodelet (1991) in her questioning of a binary approach to group 
identity: 
 
…we have encountered demands for discrimination arising from the 
experience of proximity and the risk of identification. This risk implies 
observation by another, judgement by a party external to the two 
groups involved in the contact. Is this third element not a determining 
factor in the processes delimiting the relationships which form 
between the patients and the population which receives them? We 
think it is. (p. 79). 
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This leads onto a specific type of identity consciousness – one that is related to the 
‘identity politics’ movements that emerged during the sixties and seventies. Centering 
around a single unit of classification and reducing the importance of other categories, 
these movements advocated the emancipation of subjugated identities – for example 
identities based on race and gender. This type of identity and identity assertion is a 
specific category of identity functioning. Its inverse relation to (initially) hegemonic 
representations differentiates it from other types of category which do not involve the 
challenging and ultimately reversal of hegemonic representations. As such, these 
identities assume a political significance, as does their representation.  
 
This challenge highlights the contentious nature of social thinking. In this instance, 
this social phenomenon represents less Moscovici’s (1984b) thinking society than it 
does Billig’s (1996) argumentative society. The ‘identity politics’ movements are 
useful example of this because their rhetoric is dialogically structured against the 
hegemonic representation. Essentially, social representations and identities, in the 
case of the identity politics movements, are counter-positioned through dialogic and 
oppositional forms of rhetoric. I will now proceed, after this short introduction to my 
main theoretical perspective, to elaborate upon these issues below.  
 
2.2.1. Social representations, social identity and positioning theory 
 
Ichheiser (1949a) recognised that representations are linked to identities in a 
reciprocal and symbiotic manner: “The way we are seen by others determines the way 
we see ourselves. And the way we see ourselves determines essentially how we 
‘really’ are…” (p. 10). This quote from Ichheiser emphasises the dependence of 
social identity upon outsider representations. The outsider representation can, in the 
case of hegemonic representations, constitute the fundamentals of social identity (e.g. 
Fanon, 1986), if only to trap identity within a binary logic (Hall, 1997a). Oyserman 
and Markus (1998) similarly found: 
 
In the case of minority ethnicity in the US, representations from the in-
group have to be connected in some way with the social 
representations from larger society and these representations of one’s 
group in larger society, are likely to reflect misunderstandings, 
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inaccuracies, and negative or narrow portrayals of one’s group’s 
capabilities (McLoyd, 1990). (p. 120). 
 
The question is, how are social representations related to social identities? One 
answer which deals with the relation of social identities to knowledge, though not 
social representations specifically, is social identity theory. Social identity theory is a 
theory of inter-group relations and in one of its classic formulations
14
 (Tajfel and 
Turner, 1979), it is directly related to knowledge structures
15
.  
 
Social identity theory states that certain categories are evaluated positively and 
certain others negatively. Those whose group membership includes a negative social 
identity will attempt to change their situation since a negative social identity will lead 
to a lower sense of self-esteem. The type of attempt made to change the situation will 
depend upon the subjective belief structures, this being of two types: social mobility 
and social change. The social mobility subjective belief structure is the individualistic 
approach and holds that group boundaries are permeable and that the individual is 
therefore able to pass from one group to another.  
 
But this is only a strategy for the individual and the individual is not able to take the 
group with him/her. In some cases, it is not possible e.g. skin colour. The social 
change subjective belief structure holds that the boundaries between groups are 
impermeable and that one cannot pass from one group to another. The only option is 
to improve the social status of the in-group. This is a group strategy and there are two 
types: social creativity and social competition. Social creativity is adopted when no 
possible actual alternative is conceivable and here the group can opt for three 
different strategies: it can choose different dimensions of inter-group comparison, or 
it can re-evaluate a previously negative characteristic in a positive manner, or it can 
choose another comparison group against which they can make their comparison.  
 
                                                 
14
 Social identity theory has been developed into self-categorisation theory, I will be only be dealing 
with social identity theory as presented in the paper by Tajfel and Turner (1979). 
15
 The knowledge structures to be introduced below as subjective belief structures and strategies of 
social creativity could be understood as social representations, though this would involve theoretical 
inconsistencies (around the issue of the social and dialogic nature of communication), this will be 
covered later in the chapter. 
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Social competition occurs when the subordinate group is able to conceive of an 
alternative arrangement in society. In such a case, the subordinate group could decide 
to question the status quo and co-ordinate its strategies towards changing that status 
quo so that its identity can be more positively evaluated.  
 
The shared representation (in this case of the group itself which is sharing the 
representation) is related to a classificatory system that imposes a hierarchy upon 
society. This hierarchy is derivative of the representational field within which it is 
located. As groups become situated within this hierarchy, so does their self-esteem. 
Those that suffer from being at the lower end of the hierarchy will attempt to break 
away from the knowledge structures which impose their negative self-esteem upon 
them. This act, being termed ‘social creativity’, is one link between groups and 
constellations of knowledge. So it could theoretically be possible to achieve some 
over-lap between the two theories. However, researchers in the field of social 
representations have raised doubts about such an endeavour.  
 
According to Farr (1996a), social representations theory is a sociological form of 
social psychology (partially through its incorporation of the notions of history and 
culture) and social identity theory is a psychological form of social psychology with 
its emphasis on experimentation in the minimal group paradigm. Elejabarrieta (1994) 
similarly criticises the theory: “Since 1973 the theory has sought methodological 
rigour rather than theoretical explanation…” (p. 247). Duveen (1996) states three 
problems resulting from this type of approach when one attempts a rapprochement 
between social identity theory and social representations theory. The first is that the 
theory of social identity does not explain how the categories are derived, how they are 
used and how they are applied. A second problem is that the theory of social identity 
is an individualist theory and is based upon a theory of individual motivation, 
whereas the theory of social representations cannot be reduced to the individual level 
of explanation. The third problem is that the social identity theory is one that offers a 
general theory of identity which is independent of context and content. There is an 
explanatory mechanism offered but this is at the expense of any content based 
analysis.  
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Elejabarrieta (1994) even questions the notion of category itself and suggests that it 
has to be understood as a social representation:  
 
Several authors… have suggested that it may be wrong to deal with 
social identity, in the form of social-category membership, as realities 
which may be apprehended independently of the social relations and 
social representations by which these categories and their social 
positions are represented in society. (p. 250).  
 
The approach of social identity theory to the relation of social identity with social 
representations suggests that social identities are derivative of processes of 
categorisation which then lead to structure and organise social representations 
through the various types of social creativity. The direction of influence has been 
questioned by Elejabarrieta (1994) asserting that: “Social representations are not the 
ideological condition of defence and maintenance of a given social identity” (p. 250).  
 
But as stated earlier, social representations need to be linked to social identities. This 
has been noted by Jodelet (1991) who, in arguing against a cognitive isolationist 
perspective, writes: “What is more, this kind of cognitive isolationism, which focused 
on the what is known and how it is known, says nothing about the who knows it and 
the perspective from which they know it” (p.10). 
 
Duveen and Lloyd (1986) offer an alternative position to the social identity theory 
approach. They suggest that the notions of individuality and sociality are themselves 
social representations and that “…social identities reflect individuals’ efforts to 
situate themselves in their societies in relation to the social representations of their 
societies”. (p. 220). Duveen and Lloyd (1986) then proceed to provide a definition for 
social identity: “Membership in particular social categories provides individuals with 
both a social location and a value relative to other socially categorized individuals. 
These are among the basic prerequisites for participation in social life, and can be 
described as social identities.” (p. 221). 
 
Elejabarrieta (1994) advances this definition by advocating the notion of positioning 
which he has retrieved from discourse theory (Davies and Harré,1990; Harré and Van 
Langenhove, 1991). Elejabarrieta (1994) suggests that social representations lead to 
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active position taking and the insertion of individuals in groups such that: “If one 
considers social positioning as negotiated expressions of social identities that 
intervene in the communication between individuals and groups, this may open up a 
new way of analysing social representations” (p. 251). 
 
This positioning is derivative of contextual, historical and practical factors and 
evolves out of communication and negotiation. This allows for a multiplicity of 
identity positions. The difference between Duveen and Lloyd (1986) and 
Elejabarrieta (1994) is this multiplicity, in that Elejabarrieta (1994) allows for more 
agency in identity positions: “The negotiable and arguable nature of the contents of 
social representations is derived, to a great extent, from the multitude of strategic 
practical positions that individuals can adopt in everyday life” (p. 246). This notion of 
identity as positioning through language and history has also been advocated by Hall 
(1988) in relation to ethnicity as a form of identification: “The term ethnicity 
acknowledges the place of history, language and culture in the construction of 
subjectivity and identity, as well as the fact that all discourse is placed, positioned, 
situated, and all knowledge is contextual…” (Hall, 1988, p. 29). 
 
But are all representations equivalent in their authority? Are some forms of 
positioning more dominated (or dominant) than others? Does power influence the 
nature of identification? Hall (1990) in the following lengthy passage provides an 
answer to these questions: 
 
The ways in which black people, black experiences were positioned 
and subject-ed in the dominant regimes of representation were the 
effects of a critical exercise of cultural power and normalisation. Not 
only in Said’s ‘Orientalist’, were we constructed as different and other 
within the categories of knowledge of the West by those regimes. 
They had the power to make us see and experience ourselves as 
‘Other’. Every regime of representation is a regime of power formed, 
as Foucault reminds us, by the fatal couplet, ‘power/knowledge’. But 
this kind of knowledge is internal, not external. It is one thing to 
position a subject or set of peoples as the Other of a dominant 
discourse. It is quite another thing to subject them to that ‘knowledge’, 
not only as a matter of imposed will and domination, by the power of 
inner compulsion and subjective confirmation to the norm… (p. 225-
226).  
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Similarly, Rose et al. (1995) write: 
 
A relativist position denies the fact that social representations held by 
certain groups in a society have a greater authority than those of other 
groups. There is power to be found in the symbolic field, in which 
very unequally equipped agents must compete to exert their 
influence… The mass media, for example, is one of the institutions 
which establishes the representational field in which people take up 
their (often contradictory) positions... The theory of social 
representations’ understandings of the interaction between the media 
and lay thinkers has the potential to provide a sense both of the power 
of the media, and of the creativity of its audience. (p. 154).  
 
Power can be included into a discussion on the nature of positioning through 
reference to Harré and Van Langenhove (1991) from whom Elejabarrieta (1994) 
derives the notion of positioning. They distinguish between first order and second 
order positioning as follows:  
 
First order positioning refers to the way persons locate themselves and 
others within an essentially moral space by using several categories 
and story-lines …second order positioning occurs when the first order 
positioning is not taken for granted by one of the persons involved in 
the discussion. (Harré and Van Langenhove, 1991, p. 396). 
 
Second order positioning is therefore related to the act of contestation and includes 
the type of positioning of identity that involves a group rejecting its representation by 
a dominant group.  
 
2.2.2. Representational subjugation and forms of contestation  
 
I would like to relate these two types of positioning to the three identity types which I 
specified earlier. The three identity types were a collective notion of identity, a 
politically marked identity type and a non-politically marked identity type. I would 
like to relate the two forms of positioning to the second two types of identity. The 
politically marked identity is associated with second order positioning and the non-
politically marked identity is associated with first order positioning. The social 
representations that are associated with second order positioning are polemical 
representations and the social representations associated with first order positioning 
are hegemonic.  
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Table 2.1. Types of positioning 
Type of positioning First order positioning Second order positioning 
Social representations Hegemonic representations  Polemical representations 
Nature of identity Politically neutral Politically marked 
 
The dominant representation, if negative, is contested by those that are imprisoned by 
the cage of stigmatisation which descends upon them with the full weight of centuries 
of culture, history and language. This contestation of the dominant representation can 
take a rhetorical and a practical form. The practical form is exemplified in social 
identity theory by the social strategy of social competition. This study will be 
examining the alternative rhetorical form of contestation. The study of rhetoric is 
derived here from Billig’s work (Billig, 1991, 1996) on argumentation in society. 
Billig was Tajfel’s student at Bristol University and wrote his thesis there on 
intergroup processes. He later however moved towards advocating a type of social 
psychology that analysed the contents of social discourse in order to investigate the 
contents and patterns of argumentation. The issue of compatibility between the theory 
of social representations and the rhetorical approach has been discussed by Billig 
(Billig, 1993), in which he concluded that there was no theoretical opposition 
between the two approaches. Moscovici (1984a) has written about the study of the 
thinking society. However, in cases of contestation such as those involving second 
order positioning, the type of social discourse is more akin to argumentation than it is 
to thinking. Billig (1993), though, makes an argument for a universal form of 
communication:  
 
Moscovici (1984) has claimed that the social representations approach 
aims to study ‘the thinking society’ and, in this respect, he emphasises 
both the social nature of thinking and the importance of thinking in 
social life. The rhetorical approach does not dispute either of these two 
assumptions. What it claims is that thinking, which is to be found in 
the thinking society, has a particular characteristic: such thinking is 
essentially rhetorical… the rhetorical approach suggests that such 
rhetorical, or argumentative, skills are integral to thought, for when 
people think they are explicitly or implicitly arguing, whether with 
others or with themselves… there is no theoretical opposition between 
the assumptions of social representation theory and the rhetorical 
approach. (p. 39-40). 
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I, however, would wish to employ Billig’s theory of rhetoric as a form of 
communication that is specific to the subject-matter of this study. Argumentation, 
itself, can be studied from several angles. There is the tension between 
particularisation and generalisation such that “Not only can anchors be dropped, but 
they can also be hauled in.” (Billig, 1993, p. 50). Similarly, criticism can be rebutted 
by justification and vice versa, Billig (1996) relates such argumentation to 
positioning:  
 
…it could be suggested that the meaning of discourse used in an 
argumentative context must be examined in terms of the contest 
between criticism and justification. Therefore, to understand the 
meaning of a sentence or whole discourse in an argumentative context, 
one should not examine merely the words within that discourse or the 
images in the speaker’s mind at the moment of utterance. One should 
also consider the positions which are being criticised or against which 
a justification is being mounted. Without knowing these counter-
positions, the argumentative meaning will be lost. (p. 121). 
 
It is suggested that the subjugated identity (which exemplifies second order 
positioning) will attempt at rhetorical contention of the dominant representation. But 
how, and is there any structure to the rhetoric that subjugated identities employ? Two 
sets of rhetorical strategies have been suggested, the first by Tajfel and Turner (1979) 
and the second by Hall (1997a). Tajfel and Turner advocate the strategy of social 
creativity when no possible actual alternative is conceivable and here the group can 
opt for three different strategies: it can choose different dimensions of inter-group 
comparison, or it can re-evaluate a previously negative characteristic in a positive 
manner: “The classic example is ‘Black is beautiful’” (Tajfel and Turner, 1979, p. 
43), or it can choose another comparison group against which they can make their 
comparison.  
 
Hall (1997a) advocates the practice of trans-coding: “…taking an existing meaning 
and re-appropriating it for new meanings (e.g. ‘Black is beautiful’)” (p. 270). Three 
types of trans-coding are proposed: reversing the stereotypes, substituting positive 
images in contradistinction to negative images by expanding the range and 
complexity of representation, and trying to contest the stereotype from within by 
situating the identity perspective within the complexities and ambivalence of 
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representation. These patterns of contestation establish “a ‘politics of representation’” 
(Hall, 1997a, p. 277). 
 
One difference between Tajfel’s social creativity and Billig’s rhetorical strategy is 
that Tajfel’s social creativity is a strategy employed specifically by representationally 
subjugated groups, whereas Billig suggests that thinking itself is structured 
dialogically through rhetoric and argumentation, and therefore the rhetorical nature of 
identity thinking is only one example of a more universal phenomenon. Using 
rhetoric as opposed to social creativity also allows for bipolarity in representational 
activity. Tajfel does not advocate means by which the dominant group maintains its 
hegemony other than through the stereotype as a negative representation
16
, whereas 
Billig allows for a dialogic appreciation of disputation concerning polemical 
representations. 
 
2.2.3. The social psychology of identity politics  
 
The reader will have noted that the example ‘Black is beautiful’ was used by both 
Tajfel and Turner (1979) and Hall (1997a). I believe that this is significant. The 
slogan ‘Black is beautiful’ was used by the civil rights movement in the United States 
of America during the 1960s and 1970s. Researchers in the area of identity such as 
Tajfel and Hall, through referring to this example, are highlighting the centrality of 
the civil rights movement as a case study in identity processes. Specifically, it is an 
example of what came to be known as the ‘identity politics’ movements. These 
‘identity politics’ movements questioned the hegemonic representations, that had led 
to negative evaluations of their identities and the associated discrimination, through 
the fracture or inversion of the category system that upheld the negative 
representation.  
 
Social science as a whole has “paid only intermittent attention to issues of identity 
and identity politics” (Calhoun, 1994, p. 23). One social psychologist who has written 
specifically about the ‘identity politics’ movements is Gergen (1995). Gergen (1973) 
advocates understanding social psychological research as “primarily the systematic 
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study of contemporary history” (p. 319) and it is this understanding that leads him to 
provide a social psychological analysis of the ‘identity politics’ movements.  
 
On the question of definition Gergen (1995) writes: 
 
Identity politics differs from many social movements, such as left-
wing or fundamentalist Christian activism, in that the constituents of 
the former – such as women, Afro-Americans, gays – are politically 
marked as individuals. Politics and personal being are virtually 
inseparable. This inseparability is owing largely to the natural 
production of the political categories. One may by virtue of reason or 
impulse join the National Rifle Association or the Praise the Lord 
Club. Not so with being a native American or a black Muslim. One 
simply is, by virtue of nature or thrown condition, an Asian American, 
a lesbian, or a member of a lower class.  
 
Calhoun (1994) provides further clarification to the category of ‘identity politics’: 
 
The pursuits labelled ‘identity politics’ are collective, not merely 
individual, and public, not only private. They are struggles, not merely 
groupings; power partially determines outcomes and power relations 
are changed by the struggles. They involve seeking recognition, 
legitimacy (and sometimes power), not only expression or autonomy; 
other people, groups and organisations (including states) are called 
upon to respond… Finally, identity politics movements are political 
because they involve refusing, diminishing or displacing identities 
others wish to recognise in individuals. (p. 21). 
 
Calhoun (1994), however, problematises the commonly assumed definition of 
associating the ‘identity politics’ movements with liberation and lifestyle (sic) 
movements such as the women’s movements, the anti-racist movements, the gay 
movements and the counter-cultural movements. These movements have been termed 
new social movements in some academic writings (e.g. see Melucci, 1989; Touraine, 
1985; Cohen, 1985). Calhoun (1994) questions the scope of this definition: 
 
The new social movements idea is, however, problematic and obscures 
the greater significance of identity politics. Without much theoretical 
rationale, it groups together what seem to the researchers relatively 
‘attractive’ movements, vaguely on the left, but leaves out such other 
                                                                                                                                           
16
 Tajfel and Turner (1979) mention enhanced group distinctiveness as a means of achieving security 
for high status groups when threatened by low status groups. 
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contemporary movements as the new religious right and 
fundamentalism, the resistance of white ethnic communities against 
people of colour, various versions of nationalism, and so forth. Yet 
these are equally manifestations of identity politics and there is no 
principle that clearly explains their exclusion from the lists drawn up 
by NSM theorists. (p. 22). 
 
The width that Calhoun (1994) advocates above can be justified if ‘identity politics’ 
movements are understood as the descendents of western, individualist ideology 
(Gergen, 1995). One consequence of this is that the group is attributed with the 
characteristics of the individual such that the processes of differentiation that lie at the 
heart of individualism now affect group processes. This would be due to similar 
social representations which would, for example, emphasise distinctiveness thus 
signifying alternative positions (one more collective than the other) on the 
‘individual-society’ interface (Duveen and Lloyd, 1986). So the group adopts the 
phenomenology and social psychology of the individual
17
. Consequently, group 
identity shares the same characteristics that are attributed to individuals, the right to 
rights, agency (good and evil) and responsibility (and therefore praise and blame) 
(Gergen, 1995). However, this shift towards the social transfers the antagonistic 
relations that are derivative of individualism to the level of group interaction (Gergen, 
1995). 
 
This antagonistic relation initiates a form of dialogue of claim and counter-claim that 
is rhetorical in nature, deploying criticism against justification (as examples), 
consequently positioning both sides within a dialogic, oppositional frame – a frame 
that is constituted in its very structure by the imbalance of power. The nature of 
communication degenerates and simultaneously identity assertion is substantiated. 
Gergen (1995) describes this in the following passage:  
 
At the outset, the prevailing rhetoric has been of little influence outside 
groups of the already committed. For the targets - those most in need 
of ‘political education’ – such rhetoric has more often been alienating 
or counter-productive. By and large identity politics has depended on a 
rhetoric of blame, the illocutionary effects of which are designed to 
chastise the target (for being unjust, prejudiced, inhumane, selfish, 
oppressive, and/or violent). In western culture we essentially inherit 
                                                 
17
 For an interpretation of the phenomenology and social psychology of the individual, see Ichheiser 
(1949a). 
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two conversational responses to such forms of chastisement – 
incorporation or antagonism. The incorporative mode (“Yes, now I see 
the error of my ways”) requires an extended forestructure of 
understandings (i.e. a history which legitimates the critic’s authority 
and judgement, and which renders the target of critique answerable). 
However, because in the case of identity politics, there is no pre-
established context to situate the target in just these ways, the invited 
response to critique is more typically one of hostility, defence and 
counter-charge.  
  
Such antagonistic replies are additionally invited by virtue of the 
differing discourse worlds of the critic as opposed to the target. What 
are viewed as ‘exploitative wages’ on the one side are branded as ‘just 
earnings’ on the other; ‘prejudicial decisions’ on the one side are 
excoriated as ‘decisions by merit’ on the other; attempts to combat 
‘exclusionary prejudices’ are seen as disruptions of ‘orderly and 
friendly community’; ‘rigid parochialism’ for the critic is understood 
as ‘love of enduring traditions’ by the target. Under such conditions 
those targeted by the critiques are least likely to take heed, and most 
likely to become galvanised in opposition. 
 
This section has explored the interaction between social representations and social 
identities. I have followed Elejabarrieta’s lead in utilising the notion of positioning as 
a means of connecting social identities to social representations. This approach needs 
to integrate the influence of power and this is achieved through the use of 
Moscovici’s (1988) suggestion of hegemonic representations and the relation of this 
to forms of positioning which differ due to the extent of contestation (Harré and Van 
Langenhove, 1991). This contestation is linked to an argumentative form of 
communication (Billig, 1996) and two specific examples of structured rhetoric are 
provided (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Hall, 1997a). The historical experience of the 
‘identity politics’ movements provides a practical space for the employment of the 
theory that has been developed through the chapter. The sites of contestation are 
numerous, I will now examine the public sphere as media as a site for the contestation 
of hegemonic representations. 
 
2.3. The public sphere and the identity-representation dialectic 
 
Moscovici (1984b) traces the origin of the concept of social representations to 
Durkheim’s notion of collective representations. One point of difference between the 
two concepts is that a collective representation is universally accepted and 
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subliminally utilised by a society at a given time and place, so much so that it almost 
becomes coercive in a determinist sense. Social representations permit polysemic 
interpretations as several social representations may be held about a similar idea 
within a given society. 
 
Another point of difference between the two forms of representations is linked to the 
manner in which the technology of information transfer has improved from late 
nineteenth century Europe (i.e. when Durkheim wrote about collective 
representations) to late twentieth century Europe (i.e. when Moscovici wrote about 
social representations). The improvement in the methods of communication through 
newspapers, television, radio, satellite and now the internet has led to a situation in 
which the transfer of knowledge has become much more dynamic. Therefore, ideas 
change and are exchanged across a wider space and shorter time period (Giddens, 
1990). It is in light of this situation that social representations are said to be different 
to collective representations:  
 
…one of the reasons why Moscovici abandoned the Durkheimian 
concept of ‘collective representations’ was precisely because it was 
too static and was appropriate only to a previous era and type of 
society. It could not account for the centrality of representational 
diversity, tension and even conflict in modern life. (Rose et al., 1995, 
p. 152) 
 
The evolution of collective representations to social representations was in part due to 
the “structural transformation of the public sphere” (Habermas, 1984). Indeed, the 
social nature of the theory of social representations anticipates a theoretical affinity 
with the notion of a public sphere. Jovchelovitch (1995b) suggests that the notion of 
the public sphere provides the habitat for social representations: 
  
Public life, with its specific institutions, rituals, and meanings is the 
very locus in which social representations develop and acquire a 
concrete existence. It is in such a space that they incubate, crystallise 
and are transmitted to others. It is when people meet ‘out there’ to talk 
and to make sense of their everyday lives that social representations 
are forged. When that happens social representations themselves 
become part of the fabric of public life. Social representations and 
public life therefore stand in a dialectic relationship to one another. (p. 
94).  
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Habermas has, however, been criticised for several absences within his theory of the 
public sphere which are mainly derivative of an idealised notion of a critical-rational 
discursive potential within the public sphere (e.g. Calhoun, 1997a). He has also been 
criticised for a lack of discussion of identification within and through the public 
sphere (Calhoun, 1997b), though Habermas (1984) does write of identification 
through counselling in the public sphere. Generally, though, there is little discussion 
of identity issues in relation to the public sphere:  
 
Habermas discusses ways in which the literary public sphere helped to 
prepare the kinds of subjects needed for public political discourse, but 
once it has fulfilled its role as precursor to the political public sphere, 
the literary discourse drops out of Habermas’s picture. He does not 
consider the continuing transformations of subjectivity wrought not 
only in literature but in a host of identity-forming public spheres… 
Neither does he consider how identity might be transformed through 
public political activity. (Calhoun, 1994, p. 35-36). 
 
The public sphere as habitat for social representations was mentioned earlier. Fraser 
(1997) advocates the public sphere as habitat for social identities: “public spheres are 
not only arenas for the formation of discursive opinion; in addition, they are arenas 
for the formation and enactment of social identities” (p. 125). I will now elaborate 
upon the media as a site of contestation and then link such a view (covering media 
theory and the public sphere) to the previous section on contestation, positioning and 
polemical representations. I will end by explaining how such theoretical perspectives 
will help in the analysis of the subject-matter of this thesis.  
 
2.3.1. The media as a site of contestation 
 
Hall’s (1980b) encoding/decoding model of media communication is relevant to this 
study because it has an explicitly social rendering of the processes of communication 
and incorporates the notion of ideology (as derived from Gramsci, 1971. in relation 
hegemony) into the processes of encoding and decoding. The encoding/decoding 
model is useful because it incorporates the notion of power into the reception of 
media texts. 
 
The codes of encoding and decoding may not be perfectly 
symmetrical. The degrees of symmetry – that is, the degrees of 
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‘understanding’ and ‘misunderstanding’ in the communicative 
exchange – depend on the degrees of symmetry/asymmetry (relations 
of equivalence) established between the positions of the 
‘personifications’, encoder-producer and decoder-receiver. (Hall, 
1980b, p. 131). 
 
Recently, however, Hall (Morley et al., 1996) argued that the model is not complete 
in that the frameworks of knowledge by which the material is decoded are part of the 
same social world as the frameworks of knowledge from which the programme is 
encoded. Though the frameworks of knowledge, or in the case of this thesis, social 
representations, are connected by being part of the same social world, their 
connection may only be in an oppositional manner. However, such a connection in an 
oppositional manner does not preclude the knowledge of alternative representations, 
Billig (1991) has found that committed royalists are aware of and have articulated 
arguments against anti-royalist rhetoric.  
 
This reception differential is pertinent to a discussion on the identity-representation 
dialectic, especially in relation to the ‘identity politics’ movements. This is primarily 
because media sites are not only habitats for social representations, but also the sites 
for contestation of hegemony. The hegemonic representations are contested by the 
‘identity politics’ movements in several arenas. The arena that is of specific interest to 
this study is the media. The relation between social representations and the public 
sphere has already been stated (Jovchelovitch, 1995b). So how does the notion of the 
public sphere incorporate an understanding of hegemony? And what happens when 
this hegemony is challenged?  
 
Perhaps, one should first problematise the notion of the public sphere, especially in 
the context of late modernity. Technological advancements in the field of 
communications has resulted in repeated structural transformations of the public 
sphere, such that a theory of social communication can become obsolete before it 
gains acceptance in the academy. For example, Thompson (1990) proposed a theory 
of communication in relation in the main to television. However, the introduction of 
digital television, the development of the internet, and the probable combination of 
the two later will affect social life and the ‘practice’ of the public sphere. 
Nevertheless, there are several forms of public sphere. For example, there is a 
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national public sphere, a global public sphere, a local public sphere (at the level of 
municipality), and all are related, in greater or lesser extent, to hegemony.  
 
The lack of conceptualisation of hegemony in Habermas’s formulation of the public 
sphere has been raised by theorists of the public sphere (Eley, 1997). I would like to 
discuss hegemony in the context of identity politics. Calhoun (1997b) states that the 
public sphere is structured according to dominant ideologies, hegemonic powers and 
social movements. The nature of hegemony, however, requires discussion also for 
hegemony is not a universal, all-encompassing category referring to an elusive yet 
elite group, rather it is a term that is binary in its logic. Hegemony is domination. But 
domination of an ‘other’. There can be no hegemony, without a subject of the 
hegemony. The ‘identity politics’ movement are in their existence the obverse and 
proof of hegemony. But the hegemony in each instance is the mirrored reflection of 
the ‘key category’ that is championed by the ‘identity politics’ movement. The 
‘identity politics’ movement is therefore an attempt, at the social psychological level, 
to trans-code a hegemonic representation. This representation positions its designated 
identity in an oppositional manner to the representation itself. The contestation of the 
hegemonic representation in the public sphere has historically precipitated a variety 
of crises. I intend to study one example of this. Gervais et al. (1999) have noted the 
value of studying a crisis because “crises generate a problematisation of what was 
previously taken for granted”. (p. 427). Moscovici (1984b) has outlined some of the 
social psychological phenomena that are associated with a crisis:  
 
…(t)he character of social representations is revealed especially in 
times of crises and upheaval, when a group or its image are 
undergoing a change. People are then more willing to talk, images and 
expressions are livelier, collective memories are stirred and behaviour 
becomes more spontaneous. Individuals are motivated by their desire 
to understand an increasingly unfamiliar and perturbed world. Social 
reconstructions appear unadorned, since the divisions and barriers 
between private and public worlds have become blurred. (p. 54). 
 
The public sphere of Habermas was the centre for critical and rational debate in 
which consensus would be achieved through discussion and argumentation. It has 
already been stated that there is no one single, comprehensive public sphere (Fraser, 
1997). So if we are considering the public sphere, we should consider it at one 
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particular level, say the national public sphere (which is pertinent to this thesis), 
which can be objectified in the case of the media to include, as examples, the national 
newspapers and television channels. However, the above discussion on hegemony 
and crises should highlight the need for an alternative function of the public sphere. 
The national public sphere can be an agent towards the maintenance of hegemony, 
and it can be oppositional or argumentative in its nature. An oppositional or 
negotiation-based public sphere has been suggested by certain researchers of the 
media (Curran, 1991; Fraser, 1990). This definition includes the public sphere as 
subaltern counterpublics as well as an alternative public sphere in which rival sides 
discuss pre-prepared arguments.  
 
I would like to focus on the argumentative aspect of the proposed definition, and 
suggest that some of what occurs in the national public sphere can be deemed as 
belonging to an argumentative public sphere in which rival sides present to each other 
pre-prepared arguments in order to convince the audience. This alternative view 
towards the public sphere corresponds well with a rhetorical perspective in social 
psychology (Billig, 1996). Certainly, the ‘Rushdie affair’ as a media event is an 
example of argumentation in an oppositional type of public sphere in which rival 
sides discuss pre-prepared arguments. It is the challenging of hegemony by the 
‘identity politics’ movements, and the consequent criticism-justification rhetorical 
contest that merits a public sphere as argumentative as opposed to critical-rational. It 
is through this contestation that the hegemony is open to modification, and even, 
according to Eley (1997), transformation.  
 
So how does hegemony relate to representation? Hall (1997b), through referring to 
Foucault, advocates the ‘subject’ and the subject-position. ‘Subjects’ “personify the 
particular forms of knowledge which the discourse produces. These subjects would 
have the attributes we would expect as these are defined by the discourse: the 
madman, the hysterical woman, the homosexual, the individualized criminal, and so 
on.” (p. 56). The subject-position is that position from which the discourse makes 
most sense. But the subject-position can only make sense if the representational 
resources are available. Morley (1992) writes in relation to the reception of a 
television programme:  
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Whether or not a programme succeeds in transmitting the preferred or 
dominant meaning will depend on whether it encounters readers who 
inhabit codes and ideologies derived from other institutional areas 
which correspond to and work in parallel with those of the 
programme, or whether it encounters readers who inhabit codes drawn 
from other areas or institutions which conflict to a greater or lesser 
extent with those of the programme. (p. 87). 
 
So the successful maintenance of hegemony requires the sharing of a representational 
field, and the rejection and even decomposition of hegemony, or rather a hegemonic 
representation, requires the availability of an alternative representational field. It is 
the struggle between hegemonic representations and ‘identity politics’ movements 
that I wish to study.  
 
2.4. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has been an examination into the nature of interaction between social 
representations and social identities. I would suggest that the two absences from the 
theory of social representations as expounded by Moscovici of identity and power 
need to be addressed if the theory is to be related to social identities. The nature of 
interaction differs according to the type of representation involved, hegemonic 
representations can lead to contestation through rhetorical counter-positioning by 
those that are subjected to the representation. The nature of identity expression alters 
in such a circumstance so as to institute a distinctive social phenomenon, that of the 
‘identity politics’ movements. These identity politics movements questioned the 
hegemonic representations that had led to negative evaluations of their identities and 
the associated discrimination. The site of contestation is the public sphere.  
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3.0. THE BRADFORD MUSLIM COMMUNITY AND THE ‘RUSHDIE 
AFFAIR’ – A CASE STUDY  
 
This thesis will be examining the issues raised in the previous chapters through the 
form of a case study. I will be taking the Bradford Muslim community as the location 
for the study, and the ‘Rushdie affair’ as the historical context. It is the purpose of this 
chapter to provide a background to both the Muslim community in Bradford and the 
‘Rushdie affair’. I will begin this chapter with a history of the Muslim community in 
Britain. This will include a review of some of the research on the history of Muslims 
in Britain. Subsequently, I will describe the composition of the Muslim community in 
Bradford and this will be followed by a summary of the recent social and political 
history of Bradford in relation to the South Asian Muslim community. Then, I will 
describe the ‘Rushdie affair’, this will include a short account of its coverage in the 
media. Finally, I will summarise an analysis of the print media’s coverage of the 
‘Rushdie affair’18. This short account should provide some insight into the contents of 
the debate that became the ‘Rushdie affair’.  
 
3.1. Muslims in Britain  
 
The history of Muslims in Britain as communities can be traced back to the mid-
nineteenth century. From 1850 onwards, Yemeni sailors began to settle down and 
start local businesses in South Shields, Cardiff and Liverpool. Traces of these 
communities are still evident today. Other early communities included William 
Quilliam’s English community in Liverpool which centred around the Liverpool 
Mosque and a small community based around Woking mosque near London. 
 
But these communities numbered only in the hundreds. The largest influx of Muslims 
into Britain to date has been due to the immigration policy of Britain during the fifties 
and the sixties which opened the doors to thousands of mainly manual workers. These 
Muslims were predominantly from Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, however, today 
Muslims in Britain represent most of the Muslim world, whether this be from 
Morocco, Algeria, Malaysia, Egypt, Turkey etc. The 1991 census did not ask for 
                                                 
18
 Part of my empirical work will involve the analysis of the televisual coverage of the ‘Rushdie 
affair’. 
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religion as a category for self-identification but it did ask for country of origin and 
from such information, Anwar (1994) suggests the following breakdown: 
 
Table 3.1. Breakdown of Muslim community according to country of origin 
Country/Region of Origin Numbers (000s) 
South Asian                770 
Other Asian                 80 
Turkish Cypriots                 29 
Other Muslim countries                367 
African Muslims                 115 
Total             1,406 
 
Generally, the majority of Muslims from other than South Asia generally live in 
London, whereas the majority of Muslims from South Asia live outside of London in 
large conurbations such as West Midlands, Greater Manchester and West Yorkshire. 
This is because these Muslims were mainly manual workers who found employment 
near large industrial areas e.g. Birmingham, Manchester and Bradford. 
 
3.1.1.  The history of Muslims in Britain 
 
By far the most comprehensive account of the history of the Muslims in Britain is by 
Ally (1981). He charts the history of the Muslims in Britain from 1850-1980. Ally 
distinguishes between pre-migration and post-migration in his account of the history 
of Muslims in Britain. The turning point for the history of the Muslims in Britain 
according to this account was the mass migration of thousands of workers during the 
fifties and the sixties. Prior to this there were very few Muslims in Britain. The 
account below will be similarly divided into pre-migration and post-migration.  
 
3.1.2. Three Muslim communities pre-mass migration 
 
According to Ally, “the number of Muslims resident in Britain during the period 
1850-1949 was quite small” (Ally, 1981, p. 1). He quotes The Islamic Review as 
estimating the number of Muslims in Britain to be approximately 10,000 by 1915. 
The first group of immigrants were known as the Lascars. These were Indian and 
Arab sailors. Since many of these sailors were illiterate, they were employed in 
workhouses, or, some of them tried to open small businesses. The poverty of the 
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Lascars raised concern amongst various Christians and eventually a ‘home’ was 
bought on the West India Dock Road, Limehouse, London. Joseph Salter, a 
missionary, was appointed to look after the home and it was his duty to provide 
temporary residence for those seeking employment. His work would mean travelling 
to cities such as Manchester, Birmingham, Liverpool, Cardiff, Southampton and 
Bristol. Salter worked with the Lascars for 39 years and during this time he helped set 
up an Asiatic Rest which was a meeting place for the Lascars. The Stranger’s Home 
was eventually bought in 1935 by the Stepney Borough Council.  
 
3.1.2.1. The zawiyas 
 
Foreign seamen were initially employed as cheap labour. However, industrial action 
led by Wilson in 1911 succeeded in securing equal pay for foreign seamen. This 
meant that many of the foreign seamen became financially more stable and hence 
coffee houses, delicatessens and spice shops became more visible as the community 
began to prosper. This was especially true for the communities in Cardiff and 
Tyneside. A census in 1948 numbered the Muslims of Tyneside as 850 (Collins, 
1957, p. 152). Many of the Muslims married local English women, and their wives 
began to play an important role as intermediaries between the Muslims and the 
English population. Muslim families began to be housed together as they were 
offered better housing opportunities. Here, the Yemenis began to focus upon their 
cultural and historical roots. They became involved in the Shadhili tariqah (a sufi 
order) led in North Africa by Shaykh Ahmad al-Alawi. One of his pupils, Abdullah 
al-Hakimi, migrated from Yemen to Britain to spread the sufi order. He lived in 
Cardiff and there he established a zawiya. A zawiya was a “complex of religious 
buildings which grew up around the shrine of a local marabout or Muslim saint. 
These buildings would vary in size and number, but would always include a place for 
prayer, a Qur’an school and a room for guests who might come as pilgrims, travellers 
or students” (Ally, 1981, p. 32). The zawiyas became key centres for socialising as 
well as for providing financial assistance, and because of their success, the zawiyas 
spread to other ports around Britain especially Tyneside. The Shaykh
19
 would hold 
classes in religious teachings on a weekly basis as a way of introducing the English 
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 A Shaykh is a spiritual or religious teacher. 
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wives to Islam. Shaykh Ahmed of Tyneside succeeded Shaykh Abdullah al-Hakimi 
after the latter’s death and moved to Cardiff. Shaykh Ahmad was more politically 
active than Shaykh Abdullah and this caused a controversy within the Yemeni 
community in Britain around the issue of the break-up of Yemen, eventually leading 
to a split. The zawiyas as social institutions began to lose their importance with the 
migration of some Yemenis to the munition factories of Sheffield and Birmingham. 
This eventually led to the decline of the zawiyas.  
 
3.1.2.2. The Liverpool mosque and the Muslim institute 
 
Khan’s (1980) work on Islam and the Muslims in Liverpool provides insight into an 
early Liverpool Muslim community. This community centred around the activities of 
a lawyer from Liverpool, William Henry Quilliam. Quilliam was a solicitor and had a 
large advocacy practice, but this caused him to become fatigued and he was 
eventually told by his doctor to retire to the South of France for a temporary break. 
While there, he crossed over to Morocco where he came into contact with the 
Shadhili sufi order. He embraced Islam in 1887 and returned to Liverpool in 1889 
after studying Arabic. He started preaching in Liverpool and soon his sons Ahmad, 
Alfred and Omar, and his mother Harriet all become converts. Others followed 
including a Professor Nasrullah Warren and a Professor Haschem Wilde. Eventually, 
he was able to set up a small prayer room in Mount Vernon Street. In the same year 
he wrote The Faith of Islam and Fanatics and Fanaticism. The first book had three 
editions published and was translated into thirteen languages. In 1891, they 
established a Liverpool Mosque and Institute. In 1896, they established a Medina 
Home for Children which provided accommodation for the growing number of 
illegitimate children in Liverpool. Further to this, the Liverpool community was able 
to develop the facilities at the Institute to establish a Muslim college which conducted 
courses in the pure sciences, history and languages. By 1896, there were estimates of 
approximately 150 people embracing Islam within Liverpool. Quilliam’s political 
views became more and more openly anti-British, and this eventually led to his 
leaving Liverpool in the autumn of 1908
20
. 
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 Khan (1980) suggests that Quilliam went to London and lived amongst the Woking community. He 
suggests that Quilliam changed his name to Professor Marcel Leon, and lived in Bloomsbury. 
Apparently, both names Leon and Quilliam were used in his funeral at Brookwood cemetery.  
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3.1.2.3. The Woking Muslim mission 
 
Another early feature in the history of Muslims in Britain is the Woking Muslim 
Mission. This mosque based upon classical Muslim architecture was built in 1889 and 
was the first mosque to be constructed in Britain. It was paid for mainly through the 
contribution of Shajehan Begum, the ruler of the Indian state of Bhopal. It was built 
according to the design of Dr Leitner. After his death, Khwaja Kamal-ud-Din (who 
arrived in 1912 to Britain as a missionary) assumed responsibility for the mission. 
Kamal ud-Din was a successful lawyer in Peshawar, Pakistan. He came to Britain in 
1912 and in 1913 he took control of the Woking Mission. He had it repaired and 
appointed an Imam, Maulvi Sadr-ud-Din. Another leading personality of the Mission 
was Lord Headley who publicly announced his conversion upon meeting Khwaja 
Kamal ud-Din. Together they attracted a large group of converts mostly from the 
middle classes and the aristocracy of British society. In 1914 a ‘British Muslim 
Society’ was formed with Lord Headley acting as its president. By 1924, the number 
of British Muslims was estimated at about 1000. 
 
3.1.3.  Post-war mass migration 
 
After the second world war, Britain experienced a rise in immigration from 
Commonwealth countries. Muslims were amongst those who came at this time, 
arriving mainly from Pakistan, Bangladesh, Cyprus, the West Indies, West Africa and 
East Africa (Ally, 1981, p. 90). Migration from Pakistan to Britain came mainly from 
the following areas: i) Mirpur district in Azad Kashmir (this was related to the 
displacement of 100,000 Kashmiris due to the Mangla Dam project), ii) Chhacha area 
in Campbellpur, iii) certain villages around Peshawar, and iv) certain villages around 
Rawalpindi, Jhelum and Lyallpur (Ally, 1981, p. 95). Many of the Bangladeshis came 
from a village called Sylhet because of the worsening of agricultural conditions there. 
Turkish Cypriots came to Britain during these times as well, most of whom were 
from rural areas. The Muslims who came from the West Indies were part of an Indian 
community which had migrated to the West Indies in the mid-nineteenth century. The 
Muslims from West Africa were Nigerian Muslims who came as students between 
1961 and 1966, but as Nigeria experienced civil war, their source of funding was 
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withdrawn and they, therefore, had to rely on themselves whilst in the UK. Some of 
these Nigerian Muslims decided to stay as a way of supporting their families in 
Nigeria. Indian Muslims living in East African countries decided to migrate to Britain 
once the African governments decided to nationalise the economic institutions of the 
adopted countries.  
 
3.1.3.1. The influence of Islamic debates in South Asia on the Muslim community in 
Britain 
 
By now the migrants had decided to secure at least a temporary future for themselves 
in Britain, though the initial intention had been that of returning to their land of 
origin. Anwar (1979) calls this the ‘myth of return’. This was exacerbated by the 
arrival of their families, and the subsequent growth of communities. Ethnic minorities 
formed visible communities in many cities including Manchester, Newcastle, 
Birmingham, Blackburn, Leicester, London, Glasgow and Bradford. Community 
formation was accompanied by the emergence of institutions serving the cultural and 
religious needs of the community, foremost amongst these being the mosque.  
 
The Muslims who arrived during these times were predominantly from South Asia 
but the migration to Britain did not serve to sever the links between the migrant 
community and the countries of origin. This was to such an extent that the Islam that 
is predominant amongst Muslims in South Asia is the Islam that is culturally 
reproduced in Britain especially with reference to the specific type of factionalism 
that is present in South Asia. This point will be elaborated further by providing a brief 
history of Islam in South Asia because it will help to explain some of the factors 
affecting the development of Muslim identity in Bradford. Nielsen (1987) states that 
“It is seldom realised among teachers, community workers, and even sociological 
researchers, how deeply involved the history and continuing perspectives of some of 
these movements are in an Islamic ‘revival’ that predates by at least a century the one 
which currently monopolises the headlines” (p. 388). 
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It is in the years following the ‘Indian mutiny’ (sic) that the four main trends in South 
Asian Islam have emerged
21
. These trends are the Deobandi movement, the Barelvi 
movement, the Ahl Hadith movement and the Aligarh movement. In one way or 
another, all claim Shah Waliullah (d. 1762) as one of their own and the method of 
interpretation of Islamic law is a major cause of difference between them. The 
Deobandi movement takes its name from  the town of Deoband which is situated 
North of Delhi in Uttar Pradesh. The Deobandis are strict followers of the hanafi
22
 
school of thought and tend to be involved in Chisti tariqahs
23
. The Barelvi movement 
takes its name from the town of the founder, Ahmad Riza Khan (d. 1921), who came 
from the town of Bareilly in Uttar Pradesh. Ahmad Riza Khan was a charismatic 
scholar/sufi as well as a prolific writer. The Barelvis are also followers of the hanafi 
school of thought and tend to be Qadiri and Naqshbandi sufis. The main division in 
South Asian Islam is between the Deobandis and the Barelvis. It dates back to the 
discussions and disagreements that occurred between Ahmad Riza Khan and certain 
exponents of the Deobandi school especially Ashraf Ali Thanwi centring on the place 
of the Prophet in Muslim theology. A war of fatwas and counter-fatwas ensued and 
this lead to the formation of two distinct group identities. Though the two groups 
share many opinions in that they are both sufis (sometimes from the same tariqah), 
and hanafis, their difference on a number of issues has led to the formation of two 
strong and conflicting identities.  
 
A third movement, the Ahl Hadith, is known as such because of their stress upon 
using the original sources in order to derive legal rulings without reference to the 
intricate workings of a school of thought. The Ahl Hadith are different to both the 
previous movements in that they are opposed to a traditionalist framework and to the 
influence of sufism, claiming that its influence has led to the neglect of the Shariah 
(Islamic law). A fourth school emerged after the ‘mutiny’ as the Aligarh movement. 
The movement takes its name after the town, Aligarh, in India. This town houses the 
                                                 
21
 The four main trends of Islam referred to here are all within the Sunni school of thought. There are 
Shia Muslims in South Asia, and some of them also participated in the migration to Britain and as such 
there are numerous mosques associated with the shia branch of Islam in Britain. There is at least one 
shia mosque in Bradford, the Hussainia Islamic Mission.  
22
 There are four main schools of thought in sunni Islam, the hanafi school is the predominant school 
in the Indian sub-continent. See Metcalf (1982) and Sanyal (1996) for more on Islam in India 
especially in relation to Deobandis and Barelvis. 
23
 ‘Tariqah’ literally means way and describes the spiritual path of the mystic. There are numerous 
tariqahs in South Asia. For more on the varieties of mysticism within Islam, see Nasr (1991). 
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Aligarh Muslim University, formerly known as the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental 
College. The college was founded in 1875 in Aligarh by Sayyid Ahmad Khan and 
was recognised for its modernist leanings. These four main movements became 
prominent in the years following the ‘mutiny’ and represented different strategies on 
the part of Indian Muslims
24
. Two further movements that emerged are the Nadwa 
movement and the Jama'at Islami. The Nadwa movement is based in the educational 
institution Nadwa-tul-Ulama in Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh. The Jama'at Islami is a 
political-religious organisation that was set up by Syed Abul Ala Mawdudi in an 
attempt to revive the practise of the religion. It was formed in 1941, and originally 
intended to be non-partisan, though it eventually became distinct and separate from 
the other movements. 
 
The movements were formed as a result of the historical experience of the Indian 
Muslim community. However, the movements have, contrary to expectation, exerted 
their influence on Muslim identity in Britain. All of these six movements have some 
representation in the British Muslim community. The majority of the mosques in 
Britain are divided between the Barelvis and the Deobandis. The rest are divided 
approximately evenly between the Ahl Hadith and the Jama'at Islami. Much of the 
activity within the Muslim public sphere in Britain, and in Bradford, can be explained 
through reference to these movements
25
.  
 
3.2. The Muslim community in Bradford 
 
The city of Bradford is situated in West Yorkshire towards the South East of the 
Pennines. The Bradford District (according to the City Hall Research section and the 
1991 census estimation) covers a population of approximately 488,000. Of these, 
388,000 are white, 68,000 are Pakistani, 13,500 are Indian, 5,500 are Bangladeshi, 
6,000 are black and 7,000 are other. Assuming that Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are 
predominantly Muslims, this would suggest that there are at least 73,500 Muslims in 
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 There is no clear-cut correlation between these movements and the varying political strategies 
adopted by the Indian Muslims as responses to the collapse of the Ottoman empire and the authority of 
the British in India. For example, amongst the Deobandis, Hussain Ahmad Madani was in favour of 
the Congress Party and a united India whereas Shabbir Ahmad Usmani favoured the Muslim League 
and the Pakistan movement.  
25
 To date, there has been no comprehensive analysis of the extent of these organisations’ influences on 
the many platforms and institutions which have been set up in Britain. 
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Bradford, which is approximately 15% of the population. Many of the Indians are 
probably also Muslim but it is difficult to provide an estimate of just how many. 
 
Bradford was a centre for the wool and textile industry, especially in the mid-
nineteenth century. This industry attracted a whole series of migrants to Bradford: 
Irish immigrants arrived in the early nineteenth century, and approximately a century 
later eastern and central Europeans namely from Poland and the Ukraine arrived to 
work in the textile mills. A labour shortage following the second world war together 
with the economic mobility of the previous migrants meant that manual jobs became 
available again at the textile mills. The decline in the textile industry during the 
eighties reduced employment prospects in the city and unemployment has 
concomitantly risen sharply. This has especially affected those migrant communities 
which had come to work in the textile industry, such that unemployment is high 
amongst the migrant communities, especially the youth.  
 
The majority of Pakistani Muslim migrants in Bradford originate from Mirpur, 
Jhelum and Attock
26
. The Bangladeshi Muslim migrants are mainly from Sylhet and 
the Indian Muslim migrants are mainly from Gujarat. The Bangladeshis from Sylhet 
and the Gujarati Indians are generally associated with the Deobandi movement and 
the Pakistani migrants are divided between the Barelvi and the Deobandi movement.  
 
3.2.1. Institution-building for a local community 
 
The most visible evidence of religious identity is the number of mosques. The 
Muslim Directory lists twenty-eight mosques in Bradford, of which some are 
converted terraced houses. The larger mosques in Bradford number fifteen. These are 
the Abu Bakr mosque on Leeds Road, the Jamia Masjid on Howard Street, Masjid 
Quba on Bundria Court, Nur al Islam on St Margaret’s Road, Jame Masjid Ahl-e-
Hadith on Hastings Street and the Jamiyat Tabligh ul-Islam mosques on Victor Street, 
Shearbridge Road, Toller Lane, Southfield Square and the Roxy Building, Suffat ul 
Islam UK Association on Sunbridge Road, the Jamia Islamiyah on Cross Lane, 
                                                 
26
 For more detail, see Lewis (1993). 
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Hanafia mosque on Carlisle Road, Tawakullia Islamic Society on Cornwall Road and 
the UKIM mosque on Byron Street. 
 
Of these mosques, the first four and the Tawakullia Islamic Society are associated 
with the Deobandi movement. They have close ties with the Markaz masjid based in 
Dewsbury which acts as the main centre in Britain for the Tablighi Jama’at27. The 
UKIM mosque on Byron Street is affiliated with the UK Islamic Mission which is 
ideologically linked to the Jama'at Islami. The Jame Masjid Ahl-e-Hadith is affiliated 
with the Ahl Hadith movement. The Suffat ul Islam mosque and the Jamia Islamiyah 
on Cross Lane are both mosques associated with the Barelvi movement though they 
are independent of the main Barelvi Pir (saint) in Bradford, Pir Maroof Hussain. He 
leads the Jamiyat Tabligh ul Islam mosques in Bradford, which include five major 
mosques. At present, he is responsible for the construction of a central mosque in the 
centre of Bradford, a twenty-year-old project. The Bradford Council of Mosques is a 
committee comprised of representatives from the mosques in the city. 
 
The mosques are used for congregational prayers on Friday and for the five daily 
prayers. Each mosque has an Imam (some have more than one) who leads the prayer 
and the teaching of the religion to the children. Each mosque also has a committee 
which manages the administration of the mosque. Some mosques run weekly study 
circles which focus on topics of religious practice, or understanding of the Qur’an. 
Many of the mosques have madrassahs (or religious schools) affiliated with them. 
Children from around the mosque are taught at the madressa either every morning 
before school or every evening after school for a further two hours. The children are 
taught Arabic with reference to reading the Qur’an, and some madressas also teach 
Urdu. 
 
Other local structures and institutions include youth clubs, youth organisations and 
school societies. There are approximately six main youth centres which cater for 
Asian, ‘Muslim youth’. Generally, youth clubs do not tend to cater for any particular 
religious persuasion. The Pakistan community centre runs a local youth club three 
                                                 
27
 The Tablighi Jama’at is a revivalist organisation that was initiated by Mawlana Muhammad Ilyas 
who was a student at Mazahir Ulum in Sahranpur in Uttar Pradesh, this college being a sister college to 
the Dar al Ulum in Deoband. 
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times a week for approximately three hours. The activities offered include group 
discussions on issues such as drug awareness, and sports such as football, snooker, 
and table tennis. Other youth clubs such as Laisterdyke Community Centre, Karmand 
Community Centre, Thornbury Youth Centre, Girlington Community Centre and 
Grange Interlink offer similar types of activities. 
 
The past decade has seen the proliferation of numerous Islamic youth organisations in 
Bradford including the Young Muslims UK, the Jamiat Ihya Minhaj As-Sunnah, 
Hizb-ut-Tehrir and Minhaj al Qur’an28. This includes activities inside and outside of 
Bradford. Activities inside of Bradford include group discussions, lectures and 
distribution of leaflets and literature. National conventions, conferences and camps 
are held outside of Bradford by those organisations that have a national structure such 
as the Young Muslims UK, the Jamiat Ihya Minhaj as-Sunnah and the Hizb-ut-Tehrir. 
Attendance at such local youth programmes is minimal as it is at the youth clubs with 
five to ten attending Islamic discussions, fifteen to twenty attending the youth clubs. 
Islamic societies have been set up in many of the middle schools over the past decade. 
At the moment, there are between fifteen to twenty Islamic societies in Bradford, 
though again, attendance tends to be minimal. 
 
3.2.2. Episodes in the political history of the Bradford Muslim community 
 
The Bradford community has been at the heart of race relations since the early 
eighties because it has experienced numerous campaigns involving ethnic minorities, 
and over the years this has had the compounding effect of focusing the media’s 
attention on Bradford. The following is a short summary of some of the main events 
in Bradford’s recent history. 
 
                                                 
28
 The Young Muslims UK is the youth wing of the Islamic Society of Britain, an organisation set up 
by sympathisers of the Muslim Brotherhood (in Egypt and other parts of the Arab world) and the 
Jama’at Islami of Pakistan. The Jamiat Ihya Minhaj As-Sunnah is an organisation mainly aimed at 
young people and university students. Though independent, it is aligned with the Ahl Hadith group and 
has connections to Arab Ahl Hadith scholars (the Ahlh hadith are known as salafis in the Arab world). 
Hizb-ut-Tehrir is part of an international organisation focusing on political awareness and revival 
formed in the 1950s by Nabhani, a Palestinian Islamic scholar. Minhaj al Qur’an is a youth orientated 
group whose leader Tahir al-Qadri is a Pakistani scholar and associated with the Barelvi movement. 
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Twelve youth were arrested in 1981 in Bradford for being in possession of incendiary 
devices i.e. dangerous explosives. This incident occurred at the same time as the riots 
in Brixton and Liverpool. The defendants claimed that they were in possession of 
such material for self-defence against racist attacks. The claim was that their 
community had suffered racial and arson attacks and the police had not protected 
them sufficiently. A local campaign was mobilised which called for the release of the 
twelve youth because “self-defence is no offence”. The jury found the twelve not 
guilty
29
 (Taimuri, 1996). This incident occurred within the context of the much more 
serious Brixton riots. Bradford was in this case a footnote to a larger, national 
conversation. The halal meat controversy and the Honeyford affair, however, were 
however both specific to Bradford and consistent national coverage of both issues 
turned the spotlight towards Bradford’s Muslim community.  
 
The halal meat controversy began in 1983 when the Bradford Council started to serve 
halal meat in its schools to Muslim pupils. The Council’s Education Committee had 
met with Muslim community leaders the previous year and had agreed to their 
demands that halal meat should be introduced at schools which contained at least ten 
Muslim pupils. The key issue of this campaign was the right of the Muslim children 
to eat the meat that suited their religious requirements. Animal rights activists 
objected to the Muslim method of slaughter because they viewed it as causing 
unnecessary pain and called for pre-stunning and groups such as the Animal 
Liberation Front and the Royal Society for the Protection of Cruelty to Animals 
began to campaign against the Council’s decision. Some sections of the far right also 
joined in the campaign. The Council agreed to debate the issue and in response the 
Muslim community campaign called for the withdrawal of Muslim children from 
schools on the day of the debate (6
th
 March 1984). 4,000 Muslim protesters staged a 
demonstration outside the City Hall on 6
th
 March 1984. Forty-one speakers debated 
the issue over four hours and the vote was fifty-nine in favour of the introduction of 
halal meat and fifteen against.  
 
Ray Honeyford was the headmaster at Drummond Middle School in which the 
majority of the students came from ethnic minority communities. He wrote a series of 
                                                 
29
 One of the twelve, Aki Nawaz, went on to help establish the popular rap group ‘Fun-da-mental’. 
 75 
articles for the media (including one particular article published in The Salisbury 
Review) which aroused considerable opposition for what was said to be his racist 
views, especially concerning multi-cultural education, Asians and West Indians (sic). 
A lobbying group called the Drummond Parents’ Action Committee was formed and 
a series of protests began mainly organised by the ethnic minority community which 
included the withdrawal of the children from school by their parents and the opening 
of alternative school in a local community centre. The key issue of this campaign was 
that the parents felt that it was unacceptable that the headmaster of their children’s 
school could hold such views which were against the interests of their children’s 
education. The campaign was followed in the national media, and both left wing and 
right wing groupings organised themselves around the campaign, the right wing 
lobby was upholding Honeyford’s right to free speech. The campaign lasted for two 
years and ended with Honeyford’s acceptance of early retirement and a cash 
settlement in late 1985. This was after he had been invited to 10 Downing Street by 
the then Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, for a cup of tea. This was an initial 
example of a local issue assuming national, symbolic significance
30
. 
 
The Bradford riots began on the 9
th
 June 1995 after an incident at Garfield Avenue, 
off Oak Lane in Manningham, Bradford. Police were called after a complaint about a 
“noisy game of football”, and this led to arrests. The police conducted themselves in 
what was seen to be a heavy-handed way through the excessive use of force. This led 
to certain situations which formed the core ‘gossip’ for the riots: the manhandling of a 
young Asian mother, a police car running over the foot of an Asian lad, and the 
arrests of complainants against the police arrests
31
. Fifteen official complaints were 
made against the police that night and crowds started to gather around Lawcroft 
House (a recently built police station, where the arrested youth were being detained) 
demanding the release of those who had been arrested. The arrival of riot police led to 
clashes between the police and the protestors. The following day, Saturday, several 
demands were made by councillors acting on behalf of the youth which were not met 
by the police and clashes resulted again on Saturday evening, and most of the damage 
that occurred to local shops and cars, occurred on this night. The tension died down 
                                                 
30
 For further details of the halal meat issue and the Honeyford affair see Lewis (1994) and Siddique 
(1993). 
31
 Taimuri (1996) provides a full account of the riot and its causes. 
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by Sunday night. There was approximately one million pounds worth of damage. 
Thirty cars and fifty buildings were damaged, six business premises were burgled, 
eight arson attacks took place and two reports were taken of assault and wounding. A 
commission was asked to investigate the causes for the riots and its report was 
published in 1996
32
. The riots were reported in the national media.  
 
3.3. The ‘Rushdie affair’ and Muslims in Britain 
 
The Muslim community had experienced some coverage in the media as a religious 
community before 1988. For example, the media covered an application for state 
funding made by Islamia school in Brent, London and the issue of the two Alvi sisters 
who had been sent home from a school in Manchester because they refused to remove 
their headscarves. The ‘Rushdie affair’33, however, has become one of the largest 
points of exposure for the Muslim community in the national media. It began with the 
publication of The Satanic Verses by Salman Rushdie in September, 1988
34
. An 
organisation The UK Action Committee for Islamic Affairs was formed in the weeks 
following the publication of the book. This was followed by a petition campaign 
which called for its withdrawal made on behalf of the Muslim community.  
 
The book was banned in India, Bangladesh, Sudan, South Africa and Sri Lanka by the 
end of December 1988. A campaign to lobby the British government continued 
including a meeting with a Home Office minister and protest rallies across the 
country. Two events in early 1989 lead to the campaign assuming national and 
international significance. These two events were the book burning in Bradford in 
14
th
 January 1989 and the pronouncement of a fatwa
35
 by Ayatollah Khomeini
36
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 The ‘official’ report into the riots was published by The Bradford Congress authored by Allen and 
Barrett (1996). The third and only South Asian Muslim member of the committee withdrew his name 
from the report and published his own report: Taj (1996).  
33
 The ‘Rushdie affair’ is in itself a social representation, descriptive of a time in British and 
international public history from late 1988 to late 1989. The letters received by the editors of British 
national newspapers show that the affair occupied some part of the public sphere at least until the 
middle of 1989 (Haroun, 1997).  
34
 A full history of the main events leading up to and beyond the ‘Rushdie affair’ is given in the 
Appendix. 
35
 A fatwa is a religious verdict given by a qualified scholar. 
36
 The fatwa read:  “I inform the proud Muslim people of the world that the author of The Satanic 
Verses book, which is against Islam, the Prophet and the Koran, and all those involved in its 
publication who were aware of its content, are sentenced to death. I ask all the Muslims to execute 
them wherever they find them” (Akhtar, 1989). 
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which called for the assassination of Rushdie.  This was met with international 
condemnation. Rushdie had to go into hiding with the protection of the British 
government. Demonstrations and protests continued against the book climaxing with 
a large demonstration in late May 1989 in central London. Writers similarly began to 
campaign for diplomatic pressure to be exerted onto Iran to revoke the fatwa. The 
‘Rushdie affair’ peaked as a media event in the period immediately after the fatwa. 
There were occasions when it again assumed national coverage including on the 
anniversary of the fatwa and during Rushdie’s conversion to Islam in December 
1990, both events receiving prominent coverage in the national media. The main 
emphasis of the campaign against the book was focused on the publication of the 
paperback version of the book and the extension of the blasphemy law. The 
governments of Britain and Iran attempted to restore diplomatic links which were 
severed in the aftermath of the fatwa, this being achieved in late September 1990. I 
would follow Haroun (1997) in his depiction of three phases to the affair though I 
would name them as pre-crisis, immediate post-crisis, and reconciliation, in that 
though the differences remained, the style of language and the manner of engagement 
were both in the direction of reconciliation. An announcement by the Iranian 
government that it would not prosecute the fatwa in September 1998 concluded the 
diplomatic rapprochement. 
 
The Muslim position during the ‘Rushdie affair’ (in its minimalist form of advocating 
the withdrawal of the book) was received with severe opposition and this is for four 
reasons. The first was that the issue in contention at the centre of the ‘Rushdie affair’ 
was the right to freedom of expression which is a central value of secular society - in 
America it is covered by the First Amendment of the Constitution. The restriction of 
this freedom was not considered to be a matter of peripheral importance. The second 
was that the relative importance of religion in British secular society was and has 
been declining. Religious identity and religion generally are associated with a 
traditional, pre-modern period and key classical sociologists such as Marx, Durkheim 
and Weber viewed modernity to be antithetical to religion and therefore religious 
identity as incongruous with late modernity. The third was that the relation between 
Islam (and the East) and Christianity (and the West) has been complex. As Said 
(1997) points out Islam and the East was constructed as a ‘cultural other’ for 
Christianity and the West in a diametrically oppositional manner. The presence and 
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assertion of this ‘cultural other’ within a Christian, western society (i.e. that Muslims 
were living in British society as British citizens) was one of the factors that caused 
the crisis. Fourth, the media which was reporting the crisis had a conflict of interest in 
reporting the affair in that it was in the media’s interest to maintain the standards of 
freedom of speech.  
 
There was considerable discussion on the ‘Rushdie affair’ on the anniversary of the 
fatwa. The ‘Rushdie affair’ continued for approximately one year, and has still not 
been completely resolved. A Japanese translator of The Satanic Verses was 
assassinated, approximately 60 demonstrators were killed in demonstrations around 
the world, the Iranian government has recently stated that it will not act upon the 
fatwa, and The Satanic Verses remains in print and available in libraries and book 
shops. 
 
I have chosen the point of interaction between the ‘Rushdie affair’ and the Bradford 
Muslim community because it represents a cathartic moment in the discussion of 
multiculturalism that has followed the immigration of South Asian Muslim 
communities. This moment captured and expressed the tensions that exist between the 
apparent contradictions of alternative world-views. The argumentation that surfaced 
in the media during this affair expressed simultaneously the anxieties of an immigrant 
community and a national society. The immigrant community witnessed its deeply-
held values being challenged by its own act of migration, whereas the national society 
experienced the challenging of its most cherished qualities: liberty and tolerance. 
 
3.3.1. Coverage of the ‘Rushdie affair’ in the media 
 
The ‘Rushdie affair’ was in many ways a national and international crisis. Many of 
the issues raised by the affair are fundamental to a secular, democratic system e.g. the 
right to freedom of expression, the role of religion within a secular country and 
minority rights. Much of the affair was conducted within the media since there were 
numerous articles in local and national newspapers, some documentaries and 
discussion programmes. Prominent Muslims such as Yusuf Islam and Kalim Siddiqui 
were invited onto chat shows to discuss the affair. The discussions focused on the 
extent of the right to freedom of expression, the rights of one government to sentence 
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a citizen from another government to death, the legality of supporting the fatwa, and 
the extension of the anti-blasphemy law. 
  
The Muslim community became the object of media scrutiny through a variety of 
ways. The most prominent were the front page headlines and first item television 
news reports in the national media. Then, there were the reports, articles, editorials, 
commentaries, discussion programmes and documentaries. There was also the 
feedback mechanisms such as the letters page in newspapers, the Right to Reply 
programmes on the television and the late night radio phone-in programmes. There 
has not been, to this day, a comprehensive analysis of the full media coverage (both 
electronic and print) of the ‘Rushdie affair’. Haroun (1997), however, has analysed 
the print media’s coverage of the ‘Rushdie affair’. His findings are summarised 
below. 
 
3.3.2. A summary of an analysis of the print media’s coverage of the ‘Rushdie affair’ 
 
Haroun (1997) has conducted a content analysis of the letters to the editor that were 
published in the print media between 1
st
 January and 31
st
 December 1989. The letters 
to the editor were used because they were viewed to be an example of Moscovici’s 
notion of the thinking society since they involved debate between the readers and the 
press (and between the readers themselves), though the debate is ultimately controlled 
by the editors.  
 
The sample used for Haroun’s study consisted of tabloid newspapers, middle-sized 
dailies and broadsheets. The tabloid newspapers used were The Sun and The Daily 
Mirror. The two middle-sized dailies were The Daily Mail and The Daily Express. 
The broadsheets used were The Daily Telegraph, The Guardian, The Independent, 
The Times and The Observer, the first four being daily newspapers and the last one 
being a weekly.  
 
A sum total of two hundred and sixty four letters were published. These letters were 
classified into one of four types: pro-Rushdie, anti-Rushdie, mixed and undecided. A 
pro-Rushdie letter was classified as such if it expressed support for Rushdie’s right to 
free speech or for the publication of the book. A letter was classed as anti-Rushdie if 
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the writer expressed some reservation about the book. A letter would be classed as 
mixed if the writer supported Rushdie’s right to freedom of expression while 
regarding the book as damaging to community relations. And a letter was classed as 
undecided if the letter expressed some point of view regarding the issues relating to 
the affair while at the same time remaining ambiguous on the main issues of the 
affair. 
 
Haroun identified three main phases for the debate: pre-fatwa, post-fatwa and legal 
reform. The debate began with a discussion on the issues surrounding the publication 
and withdrawal of the book, this included the issue of the burning of the book. Then 
after the fatwa, the debate focused on the right to freedom of speech and international 
law. This then became a discussion on the nature of British society as multi-faith and 
multi-cultural.  
 
The discussion pre-fatwa centred around the burning of the book in Bradford. 
References were made to “the Bradford Muslims”, “the fanatical Muslims in Britain”, 
“the Bradford incident” and “Bradford Islam” as a backward type of village Islam. 
The anti-Rushdie writers were mostly Muslim community leaders and tended to 
represent themselves as the voice of the Muslim community or even of the Muslims 
world-wide.  
 
The discussion post-fatwa centred around the fatwa itself. References were made here 
to “the death threat”, “the Ayatollah’s incitement to murder” and “the Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s writ”. The majority of the responses to the fatwa were of overwhelming 
opposition because of the breach of the right to freedom of expression. The discussion 
then moved on to cover the issue of the blasphemy law and whether it should be 
extended to cover minority religions. The discussion on the blasphemy law then 
became linked to the discussion on censorship and this led on to a discussion of the 
multicultural nature of British society.  
 
With regards to the distribution of the letters, Haroun notes that over 75% of the 
letters were published within the first three months of the year. There were 44 letters 
printed in the pre-fatwa period, 163 letters in the post-fatwa period and 57 letters in 
the legal reform period. Of the sum total of letters published, 34% appeared in The 
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Independent, 25% appeared in The Times and 20% in The Guardian. The rest were 
distributed at levels below 10% amongst the rest of the newspapers.  
 
The letters were coded according to a manual devised by Haroun. This coding manual 
contained two sections. The first section contained seven points of background 
information. These were the number of the letter, the newspaper in which it appeared, 
the date of publication, the time of publication, the letter history, the type of writer 
(e.g. civil liberty activist, non-Muslim clergy etc.) and the letter classification (as pro-
Rushdie, anti-Rushdie, mixed or neutral). The second section of the coding manual 
contained six salient themes concerning the ‘Rushdie affair’: the British law of 
blasphemy, Bradford Muslims, British society, fatwa, freedom of expression and 
Islam. Haroun then investigated through statistical analysis whether there was any 
significant relationship between letter classifications as pro-Rushdie, anti-Rushdie, 
mixed or neutral and the salient themes in the letters. Haroun found that there was 
little statistical significance between letter classifications and the themes of the 
British law of blasphemy and the nature of British society. However, there were 
significant relationships established between letter classifications and the themes of 
Bradford Muslims, fatwa, freedom of expression and Islam.  
 
Haroun highlights the significance of choice of titles for the letters section. This 
choice of title not only represents the editor’s representation of the letter but it also 
reflects the editorial policy of the newspaper. For example, a sharp contrast is drawn 
between The Daily Express, The Times and The Independent. The Daily Express had 
“Show these Iranians the iron fist” as its title immediately after the fatwa. The Times 
has titles such as The Satanic Verses, “Not simple to test blasphemy” and “Rushdie 
and the freedom of speech”. The Independent chose titles such as “Hard-won 
freedom”, “Rally to Rushdie”, “Rushdie and Galileo” and “No deception by 
Rushdie”. The Times, Haroun notes, observed neutrality in its choice of titles whereas 
the Independent was “conspicuously vocal on freedom – the freedom of expression in 
particular” (Haroun, 1997, p. 214).  
 
This is a summary of an analysis of the some of the print media’s coverage of the 
‘Rushdie affair’. He surveys the main themes in the letters and hence accesses the 
main representations which were involved in the affair at the time. This provides an 
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overview and coverage of the social representations that were involved in the 
‘Rushdie affair’ during that year. I will be doing the same to the electronic media and 
then specifically relating it back to issues of identity for a local community like that 
of the Muslims in Bradford in this thesis. 
 
3.4. Conclusion 
 
The aim of this chapter was to provide a historical context to the subject matter of this 
thesis. I have described the historical development of the Muslim community in 
Britain through three early Muslim communities to the period of mass migration 
during which hundreds of thousands of Muslims of mainly South Asian origin 
migrated to Britain. This led to the establishment of Muslim communities throughout 
Britain, mainly in the inner city areas of major cities. The initial intentions of return 
began to change towards permanent settlement as a second generation was raised 
through the British schooling system. The concern for cultural and religious 
maintenance coupled with an ascending sense of citizen consciousness led to 
participation in public life around issues of recognition. The ‘otherness’ that is 
represented by the South Asian Muslim community meant, however, that a demand 
for recognition was simultaneously a demand for the national society to accept 
difference. This was, and remains, problematic. The ‘Rushdie affair’ is in itself an 
example of the consequences of a breakdown in the tense equilibrium that is the result 
of negotiating these competing, and often contradictory, claims. 
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 4.0. PHILOSOPHY AND METHODS OF RESEARCH 
 
This chapter provides the rationale for the methodology being employed in this study 
as well as describing the methodological procedure of the research itself. The chapter 
begins with a discussion of some of the issues surrounding the type of methodology 
adopted in this thesis. The three studies that have been employed are then described. 
There then follows a discussion on the insider/outsider debate which is relevant to 
this thesis since the researcher is an insider himself to the community that is being 
studied. 
 
4.1. Methodology for a sociological form of social psychology 
 
This study is relevant to a certain time and place. The understanding of social 
psychology as the study of history has been asserted by Gergen (1973), a social 
psychologist involved in the elaboration of an explicitly more social psychology
37
, 
who writes: “In essence, the study of social psychology is primarily an historical 
undertaking. We are essentially engaged in a systematic account of contemporary 
affairs” (p. 316). This discussion can be extended in another direction. If social 
psychology is similar to history in that it is the study of the processes of 
communication and interaction at a particular moment in time, then I would further 
suggest that, in certain circumstances, social psychology is the study of processes and 
interaction at a particular location. In fact, some social processes can only be studied 
at certain places. Jodelet (1991) could only study madness in the way that she did at 
Ainay-le-Château. Similarly, the involvement of the Bradford Muslim community in 
the ‘Rushdie affair’, and its simultaneous projection in the media and the academic 
world as a prototypical community, make it unique for social psychological 
investigation. Therefore, following on from Gergen (1973), social psychology can not 
only be delimited by time, but also by location.  
 
The methods advocated for the study of identity processes amongst Muslims in 
Bradford are in line with methodological assumptions of Hegelian frameworks of 
research. An example of an approach that is derived from the Hegelian framework is 
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symbolic interactionism. Symbolic interactionism has three assumptions according to 
Denzin (1978). The first is that social reality is a social production which interacting 
individuals produce and define through their own definitions of situations. The 
second assumption is that humans are capable of engaging in self-reflexive behaviour, 
and the third assumption is that interaction occurs, is emergent, negotiated and often 
unpredictable. It also involves the use of symbols such as words and signs.   
 
The methodological implications of symbolic interactionism are that symbols and 
interactions must be viewed together. This would highlight the relative merit and 
importance of the symbols and their influence upon social life. Another 
methodological implication is that the social scientist must take the perspective of the 
‘acting other’ and view the world from the subject’s point of view i.e. ‘participate’ in 
his/her symbolic world. The social scientist should also link the subject’s symbols 
and definitions with social relationships. The situated aspects of behaviour should be 
studied and this would include examining the behavioural settings. These are some of 
the methodological implications of symbolic interactionism as advocated by Denzin 
(1978). These Hegelian principles epitomise the background assumptions that 
underlie the methodological approach of this thesis. 
 
The studies in this thesis are based upon the methodological principle of 
triangulation. Triangulation has been defined by Denzin (1978) as a “combination of 
methodologies in the study of the same phenomena” (Denzin, 1978, p. 291). Denzin 
suggests three principles for triangulation. The first requires the method to be relevant 
to the particular research problem. The second is that each method has its own 
strengths and weaknesses. The third is that the methods should be selected according 
to their compatibility with the theory being adopted.  
 
Denzin (1978) also outlines several different types of triangulation. The first is data-
triangulation. This involves the use of different data sources that have been extracted 
from different times, places and people. The second is investigator triangulation, 
which involves the use of different researchers so as to minimise individual bias. The 
third is theory triangulation which involves “approaching data from different multiple 
                                                                                                                                           
37
 For further information on issues of social psychology and methodology from a critical perspective 
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perspectives and hypotheses in mind” (Denzin, 1978, p. 297). The final concept is 
methodological triangulation which involves the use of different methods. 
Methodological triangulation, according to Denzin, “...involves a complex process of 
playing each method off against the other so as to maximise the validity of field 
efforts” (Denzin, 1978, p. 304).  
 
The enhancement of validity is a key reason for the use of triangulation according to 
Denzin (1978). This is questioned by Silverman (1985) who asks whether there is any 
particular master reality that can be objectively studied. Is it not the case, asks 
Silverman, that the way we study a subject affects the subject itself? Silverman 
asserts that different methods highlight different realities. Leading on from a similar 
form of criticism, Fielding and Fielding (1986) suggest that theories and methods 
should be combined for “the intention of adding breadth and depth to our analysis but 
not for the purpose of pursuing ‘objective truth’” (p. 33). Denzin (1989) responds to 
his critics by suggesting that the goal of triangulation is to interpret reality, not to 
arrive at some form of objective reality. By approaching that same reality from 
different angles, the likelihood for error or misperception is reduced. 
 
The methodological procedure of triangulation has been indirectly advocated by two 
researchers, Thompson (1990) and Morley (1992), as a means of studying the 
processes of communication that involve the media. Though they do not actually refer 
to triangulation, these two approaches take triangulation to refer to three separate 
locations of the communication process and advocate a methodology that approaches 
the research topic at these three separate locations. Thompson (1990) proposes a 
‘tripartite approach’ that examines three object domains. The first is the process of the 
production, transmission and distribution of the symbolic forms. The second is the 
construction of the media sign itself. The third is the reception and appropriation of 
this sign. Similarly, Morley (1992) suggests that a complete study of mass 
communications has to examine three aspects of the process: the study of the 
production of media artefacts, the study of the product as a constructed sign, and the 
process of decoding.  
 
                                                                                                                                           
see Farr (1996b), Danziger (1990), Gergen et al. (1984) and Sampson (1987). 
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These two approaches can be related to Hall’s (1980b) encoding/decoding model38 so 
that in the study of interaction
39
 between identities and representations through the 
media, there are five sites of analysis labelled A to E as in the diagram below.  
 
Figure 4.1. Sites of study for media analysis 
 
       C. representation 
 
 
 
 
 
  B. encoding/production                                                         D. decoding/reception 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A. social representations                                                          E. social representations   
of encoding community                                                           of decoding community 
 
The first two sites are situated at the site of production i.e. the construction of the, for 
example, programme/article itself, the third is the content of the programme/article, 
and the fourth and fifth are at the site of reception. These processes of production and 
reception can be related to social representations theory by suggesting that both 
processes can be interpreted through social representations which rely on a 
representational field that acts as the context for the production and the reception of 
the media message. 
 
This thesis will adopt the methodological procedure of triangulation by examining 
three aspects of the identity-representation dialectic. The following are the three 
methods which I intend to use in this thesis. The first study is a study of the 
representational field of the identity processes within the Bradford Muslim 
community. Such a representational field is related to the social representation of 
                                                 
38
 This connection is not unexpected for Morley since he worked with Hall at the Centre for 
Contemporary Cultural Studies at the University of Birmingham. 
39
 The directionality and lack of circularity of influence has been criticised by Hall (Morley et al, 1996) 
himself in that representations across sites of encoding and decoding are inter-connected in the social 
world, however, this thesis would suggest that in this particular case study such a connection takes an 
oppositional form. 
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group identity in the public sphere. The second study is a rhetorical analysis of 
televisual representation of the ‘Rushdie affair’ in order to provide content and 
therefore meaning to the processes being studied. The third study is an examination of 
the reception to one media portrayal of the Bradford Muslim community (during the 
‘Rushdie affair’) by South Asian Muslim youth i.e. it is an examination of how the 
social representation of group identity can affect reception of the media. All three 
studies together provide access and analysis to the processes of representation and 
identity in the community itself, in the media and in the reception to the media. They 
are each described below. 
 
4.1.1. Studying the community 
 
The main method employed for investigating the identity-representation dialectic 
amongst Bradford’s Muslim youth was interviews with ‘specialists’ on the Bradford 
community. Participant observation was used initially, to help formulate the questions 
used in the interviews rather than being used as data in its own right. Denzin (1978) 
lists three assumptions of participant observation. These include the social scientist 
sharing in the subject’s world, having direct participation in the symbolic world and 
finally, playing a role in the subject’s world. Jorgensen (1989) says on this point that 
the methodology of participant observation is especially appropriate when little is 
known about the phenomenon, there are important differences between insiders and 
outsiders and the phenomenon itself is obscured from the view of outsiders. All of 
these points are relevant to the study of identity processes within the Muslim 
community in Bradford.  
 
The researcher visited Islamic societies, mosques, youth clubs
40
 and snooker centres, 
though the most useful form of feedback was provided by participation in everyday 
conversation with groups of friends or casual acquaintances. The researcher’s 
professional identity was made explicit in all scenarios. The researcher, though, found 
that the boundaries around the object of study were sometimes difficult to establish. 
This essentially meant that most if not all activities in the researcher’s life became the 
                                                 
40
 The youth workers that work in the clubs have recently adopted an alternative strategy in which they 
spend more of their time walking around the area local to their youth club instead of waiting to receive 
the youngsters at the youth club itself. 
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object of study. This is not the case for the outsider. The outsider, by definition, in 
their normal life, remain outside the object of study. Entering the world of study 
within a participant observation framework requires the outsider to cross the line that 
actually divides the object of study from other areas of social life. The researcher 
therefore had to objectify the research by using interviews in which the actual issues 
raised by the literature review and the participant observation could be explored.  
 
A related issue which leads to the requirements of alternative means of verification is 
that of bias. If an insider is studying his own community, then he needs to check 
against his perceptual biases in the analysis of the community (Ichheiser, 1949a), 
especially if the only method of research is participant observation. It could be 
argued, as Agar (1980) does, that the process of study and research, especially in 
terms of involvement with a supervisor and an academic community, serves to reduce 
the level of bias. This may be true, but it is not sufficient in itself to provide an 
adequate guarantee of freedom from error due to bias. However, if the researcher 
were to explore the issues raised by the participant observation with other members of 
the community then this could provide alternative forms of verification for the 
researchers’ analysis of the community. 
 
The method used for the exploration and verification of the issues raised by the 
participant observation was interviewing. Six individuals were chosen for each of 
three separate categories. The central object of study was the South Asian, Muslim 
youth scene and this formed one category. The other two categories were two out-
groups to South Asian, Muslim youth. One out-group was that of the South Asian, 
Muslim elders (category 2) and the other out-group were similarly outsiders to the 
youth scene, but from an English background (category 3). Six individuals were 
chosen from each category, the key characteristic of these individuals is that they had 
to be informed of the youth scene from an occupational or vocational perspective i.e. 
that they possessed specialist knowledge of the community. Moscovici (1988) writes 
of those who manufacture social representations, but here I am concerned with those 
whose occupation requires them to specialise on the observation and analysis of the 
subject matter that is of interest to this study. 
 
4.1.1.1. Participating in the Muslim community 
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The researcher attended mosques, weekly study circles, weekly meetings at the 
Islamic Society, private study circles in homes and group discussions at youth clubs. 
The Islamic Relief charity shop, and the two bookshops - the Rolex Trading 
Company and the Book Centre (which sell a wide range of Islamic books as well as 
Asian cultural artefacts and music cassettes) - were also visited on  a regular basis. 
Discussions were held around various dinner invites about the issues facing Bradford 
Muslim youth. Two meetings were also attended for the purposes of research. The 
first was an informal gathering of local youth leaders. The meeting was arranged in 
order to discuss the problems of Bradford Muslim youth. A second, much larger 
meeting was organised in support of a local race relations activist who had recently 
been charged for personal misconduct and was under investigation for financial 
impropriety. The meeting was organised by the Action for Racial Justice and over 
two hundred of Bradford’s prominent leaders of all religious persuasions attended. 
 
A variety of materials were also collected as aids during the period of participant 
observation. The criteria used for the selection of these materials were the following: 
they had to be marketed at least partially towards the group that I was studying, they 
had to be released into the local public sphere at the time of the research (September 
1998 – May 1999) and they should have been aimed at mainstream markets – i.e. they 
should not be too obscure. The materials, therefore, include a series of Islamic book 
catalogues, two issues of the latest Trends magazine, the brochure for the annual 
Bradford Festival, the first three issues of the magazine The Voice of Manningham, 
the first issue of Asian Buzz, the first two newsletters of The Debate (the newsletter 
for the Bradford Racial Equality Council), two issues of Eastern Eye and issues 3-5 of 
Bradford Asian Eye (a monthly newspaper produced for free distribution by the local 
newspaper The Telegraph and Argus). 
 
The participation in events and everyday life in the public sphere combined with a 
review of several magazines which served as examples of local and national media 
provided a broad view of public social life in a local community like Bradford. The 
researcher, by virtue of being an insider, also gained access to backstage discussions 
where the conversations were more intimate. Though, this may have been natural for 
certain encounters in which the researcher was and had been acquainted with the 
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interviewee or discussant for at least a few years, it was not immediately natural for 
other encounters, but this did not prevent the interviewees or discussants adopting a 
tone of intimacy. Several times during the interviews, the researcher was told certain 
pieces of information, though they were “off the record”. An analysis of all this 
information led to the identification of several themes which were used to formulate 
the questions in the interviews. 
 
 
4.1.1.2. Topic guide and analytical framework 
 
The first issue highlighted for investigation is the ‘Between Two Cultures’ model. 
This suggests that young South Asian Muslims are faced with two conflicting 
cultures. The first is that of their parents which is rooted in the tradition, culture and 
religion of their pre-migration home and the second culture is that of British society 
with its liberal values. This issue is raised by numerous researchers in the field (e.g. 
Community Relations Commission, 1976; Watson, 1977; Knott et al., 1993; Hutnick, 
1986; Kitwood, 1983). A question on this issue was asked to the interviewees: “How 
do you think the second and third generations are adapting to living in British society, 
and Bradford in particular?”. 
 
The second question related to the interaction between the South Asian Muslim youth 
with wider English society. Participant observation had revealed that there was a 
feeling of ‘isolation’ on the part of the South Asian Muslim youth, and that this was 
due to the perceived and actual racism and prejudiced behaviour of some of their 
English counterparts. Bradford has been celebrated as a multi-cultural city through its 
annual festival every year for the past decade. Yet, it seemed that communities are 
still living in separation from each other. This was a pertinent issue in relation to 
housing choice since it had been pointed out that when members of the South Asian 
Muslim community moved into an ‘English area’, then the English would slowly and 
eventually move out
41. This issue also provided a question for the interviews: “Do 
you think that there is a sense of isolation amongst the South Asian Muslim 
community in Bradford? Are the communities separated?”. 
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This was related to a third question which was put to the interviewees on the nature 
and context of stereotypes. The interviewees were asked about stereotypes, whether 
there was a stereotype of Muslims and Asians and what are the factors that cause this 
stereotype? For example, Husband (1994) suggests that stereotypes are latent in 
British popular culture, this questioned focused upon this issue. The report on 
Islamophobia by the Runnymede Trust (1997) describes a specific type of prejudice 
which is targeted against Muslims, rather than being targeted at skin colour. This 
issue was also investigated within this category of question. 
 
The fourth topic concerns the range of responses that emerge from South Asian 
Muslim youth as a result of the previous three issues. Several types of responses have 
been offered by researchers in the area (e.g. Hutnick, 1991; Peach and Glebe, 1995; 
Werbner, 1996; Jacobson, 1996b). The range and type of response amongst 
Bradford’s Muslim youth was investigated by asking the interviewees the following 
question: “Do you think that there are differences between the youth in the way that 
they respond, or are they all responding in one way?”. Black culture as exemplified 
by Los Angeles street culture or rap music and the signifiers associated with that 
particular lifestyle has been suggested to be influential on Asian youth culture 
(Gillespie, 1995). The interviewees were asked whether they thought this was also the 
case for the Bradford South Asian, Muslim youth culture. The sixth area of study is 
the question of the rise of Muslim identity (Samad, 1992; Werbner, 1996; Christie, 
1991; Shaw, 1994) and whether the interviewees viewed this to be the case in 
Bradford. This led onto another question, which investigated the apparent discrepancy 
between identity and behaviour as discussed by Samad (1992) and Vertovec (1998).  
 
The relation between global events and local identity is the seventh area of study. The 
recent Gulf War and Yugoslav War are examples of international events that have 
been covered by the world’s media and researchers such as Halliday (1995) have 
suggested that they have a direct effect on Islamic consciousness. The following 
question was asked: “Do you think that international events such as the Gulf War or 
                                                                                                                                           
41
 A situation comedy called Love thy Neighbour based on this idea was shown on national television 
in the seventies. 
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the Yugoslav War have an impact on local youth in the sense that it makes them 
question their own identity?”. 
 
Haroun (1997) referred to a ‘Bradford Muslim’ as a representation in his analysis of 
letters to the editors of newspapers after the book burning of The Satanic Verses and 
the fatwa against Salman Rushdie. The ‘Bradford Muslim’ seemed to be a particular 
type of Muslim as a social representation and the interviewees were asked whether 
they had noticed a representation of the ‘Bradford Muslim’.  A question on the riots 
formed the ninth area of study, examining the explanations given for the riots and the 
possibility of any connection between the riots and identity processes in Bradford. 
This was followed by the presentation of six photographs, all are pictures
42
 of 
buildings in Bradford acting as objectifications. The six pictures were shown in three 
pairs of two. The first pair were pictures of Haq Halal supermarket and Rolex Trading 
Company (a multicultural book shop), the second pair were of Lawcroft House (a 
police station) and Lister Mills, and the third pair were of two mosques, one at 
Carlisle Road and the second at Westgate in the town centre. The pictures were then 
presented to the interviewees and they would then be asked to comment on the 
pictures.  
 
4.1.1.3. Interviewing the specialists 
 
The interviews
43
 were conducted in the first six months of 1999, mostly in formal 
settings and were recorded by dictaphone. The order of interviews was such that 
members of the ‘elder’ category were interviewed first and the youth were 
interviewed later. The interviewees
44
 were chosen specifically because their 
occupation and participation in public life (in a social and political sense) required 
them to specialise on the subject matter of the South Asian Muslim community in 
Bradford. The participants chosen came from amongst the youth themselves. They 
were chosen for their high profile and because they were viewed as key members of 
the youth community. The ‘elders’ were taken from two sections of the Bradford 
community: those who were viewing the youth scene from outside the Muslim 
                                                 
42
 All pictures are in the appendix. 
43
 The interview schedule appears in the appendix. 
44
 A table describing the distribution of the interviewees is in the appendix. 
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community, and those who were viewing the youth scene in Bradford from inside the 
Muslim community. Key members of both communities were chosen for their 
specialist knowledge of the youth scene. Six members were chosen from each 
category.   
 
The non-Muslim interviewees were all contacted by letter, the rest were contacted by 
phone, though an official letter was shown at the beginning of the interview. The use 
of the letter, as opposed to informal contact (i.e. through the phone), was employed 
for non-Muslims because it was deemed necessary in order to arrange the interviews. 
The non-Muslim specialists
45
 chosen for interviewing were a local member of 
Parliament who had served as a local councillor for eight years before he became an 
MP, a head teacher of an inner city primary school, a police inspector involved in 
community and race relations, a businessman who previously owned a famous local 
hotel and now owns a major night club, a senior youth worker and a local reporter for 
a regional newspaper. The Muslim elders chosen for interviewing were a leading 
councillor involved in local politics for over two decades, a leading race relations 
worker also with two decades’ experience, a local businessman, a religious leader and 
businessman, a youth worker for a major community centre, and a bookshop owner 
who specialises in multi-cultural books. The South Asian Muslim youth chosen for 
interviewing were a charity worker, a primary school teacher, a youth worker, a youth 
leader, two businessmen, one owning a pizza takeaway service and another who owns 
a curry take-away service. 
 
4.1.2. Studying the electronic media. 
 
The second area of study is the media text. I conducted a rhetorical analysis of how 
the Muslim community is framed in the media, especially the electronic media. Crises 
such as the ‘Rushdie affair’ lead to more programmes, documentaries and news items 
than normal. A rhetorical analysis of these programmes shows how the Muslim 
community is portrayed in the media, and in turn allows access to the social 
representation of the Muslim community in the media. The study of the media text 
within the theoretical framework of this thesis allows for an opportunity to examine 
                                                 
45
 All interviewees were male for reasons outlined in the introduction. 
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dominant representations. There is, however, a problem in that ideology is, in the 
words of Lewis (1991), like an octopus. It manifests itself across multiple forms of 
media through multiple mechanisms. Hegemonic representations are, therefore, 
heterogeneous in their structure and distribution. The most widely disseminated form 
of hegemonic representations appear on the ‘face’ of the most widely consumed 
media such as ‘The Six O’Clock News’ on BBC1 or the tabloid front page headlines. 
Researching such forms of media provide access to hegemonic representations in 
their clearest forms. I have, however, chosen to study a form of television 
programming that provides access to the argumentation involved in the Rushdie 
affair. The hegemonic representations though present in these programmes are placed 
within a rhetorical context that permits rebuttal and counter-rebuttal (between the 
hegemonic and the subaltern) such that the ideological dilemmas (Billig et al., 1988) 
that essentially constitute the central crux of ‘the Rushdie affair’ become apparent.  
 
The televisual media covered the ‘Rushdie affair’ through a variety of means: news 
broadcasts, late night and early morning discussion programmes and documentaries. 
There does not exist any comprehensive account of the electronic media’s coverage 
of the ‘Rushdie affair’. I surveyed the television schedules for the BBC, ITV and C4 
networks from 1
st
 July 1988 through to 31
st
 December 1990 at the British Library of 
Newspapers at Colindale, London. I surveyed the schedules through scanning the TV 
Times and the Radio Times for this period. These dates were chosen because the 
‘Rushdie affair’ generated national media coverage for over a year after the issuing of 
the fatwa
46
. By doing so, I was able to compile a list of all the television programmes 
that were transmitted during this period that had any relevance to Islam or the 
situation of the Muslim community in Britain. This list is provided in the appendix. 
The list does not include news programmes, though undoubtedly, many of the news 
programmes would have covered the ‘Rushdie affair’, especially around the main 
events such as the book-burning and the issuing of the fatwa.  
 
                                                 
46
 There was much media coverage on the anniversary of the issuing of the fatwa. This included a 
televised lecture, a lengthy article in the Independent, plus many letters of correspondence. 
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From these programmes, I selected five
47
 television programmes which were 
particularly relevant to this thesis. The criteria used for the selection of the television 
programmes were: firstly, whether the programmes covered the issues surrounding 
the ‘Rushdie affair’; and secondly, whether the programmes had a 
rhetorical/argumentative structure, for example in the case of documentaries or 
discussion programmes. The programmes that I finally selected are listed in the table 
below in chronological order:  
 
Table 4.1. Television programmes used for rhetorical analysis 
 
Title and 
number of 
programme 
Channel Date of 
broadcast 
Transmission 
time 
Television genre 
1: The Late Show BBC2 22 Feb 1989 11.15 p.m. Interviews followed 
by group discussion 
2: The Late Show BBC2 8 May 1989 11.15 p.m. Ignatieff on 
Bradford Muslim 
community 
3: Iranian Nights CH4 20 May 1989 10.25 p.m. Play about issues 
raised by RA
48
 
4: Hypotheticals ITV 30 May 1989 10.35 p.m. Structured 
discussion on RA 
5: Everyman BBC1 27 May 1990 10.35 p.m. ‘Mock experiment’  
 
These programmes represent five of eight programmes
49
 broadcast over this eighteen 
month period on the ‘Rushdie affair’. Two of the other three were written pieces read 
out on television representing the writer’s viewpoint, one by Fay Weldon (broadcast 
on 30 March 1989) and the second by Salman Rushdie, though presented and read by 
Harold Pinter (broadcast on 6 February 1990). The third broadcast (31 March 1990) 
was a general programme on the ‘Rushdie affair’ which included an interview with 
Salman Rushdie. These programmes were not selected for the rhetorical analysis 
because they were viewed to have less dialogical content than the other five 
programmes i.e. they were an identity position statement within an argument, though 
this does not preclude their incorporation of social representations associated with the 
                                                 
47
 The programmes can be obtained from the researcher, as can the transcripts of the programmes. The 
transcript of The Late Show programme broadcast on 8 May 1989 is provided in the appendix as an 
example. 
48
 RA is short for the ‘Rushdie affair’. 
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‘Rushdie affair’. In fact such an incorporation would be necessary for a successful 
attempt at argumentation. The five programmes were constructed as dialogic 
argumentation, including the play which provided a dramatised form of the same 
argumentation. 
 
The programmes cover different genres. The first is a series of interviews followed by 
a studio discussion, the second is the ‘travelogue’ of a writer’s visit to Bradford, the 
third is a play, the fourth is a structured, studio discussion enacted as a hypothetical 
scenario and the fifth is a ‘mock experiment’ in which people representing different 
positions live together in a hostel while discussing the issues. Though the genres are 
different for all five programmes, the issue that is being discussed is the same: the 
‘Rushdie affair’. This means that the same issues are highlighted in each programme. 
The programmes are interpreted by audiences across genres, this phenomenon being 
termed ‘intertextuality’ (e.g. Hall, 1997a). Rose (1996) in her examination of social 
representations of madness on British television employs this concept to demonstrate:  
 
…how in reading one television text, the viewer draws on knowledge 
gained, both as content and as form, from a whole range of other 
television texts, films and secondary literature as well. So, in 
interpreting a scene involving a mentally distressed person on a drama 
programme, the viewer might make sense of it by drawing on 
knowledge gleaned from a news programme (p. 108).  
 
The social representations involved in the discussion of the affair are therefore similar 
across the programmes, and this allows for a rhetorical analysis which examines the 
different, opposing views while simultaneously connecting them to the social 
representations with which these arguments are associated.  
 
The programmes were all broadcast late night. The summaries of the programmes can 
be found in the appendix. The five television programmes were transcribed. The 
analysis is based upon these transcripts of the programmes. The transcripts were then 
read and any form of rhetorical content was highlighted, and separated. The entire 
rhetorical content was examined and deconstructed according to three units of 
analysis. Firstly, key argumentative positions were identified according to the 
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 The researcher has one other programme, again The Late Show, but this cannot be dated. It involves 
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argument being presented and the person articulating the argument. So the rhetorical 
element was categorised according to position and the articulator of the rhetoric. 
Secondly, the rhetoric was broken down according to the type of rhetoric since the 
researcher had identified three types of rhetoric depending upon the style and depth of 
argumentation
50
. Thirdly the rhetoric was categorised as either pro-liberal or anti-
liberal, since these were the two main bi-polar positions during the affair. An 
exposition of the results of this study including an exploration of the dialectic 
between rhetorical positioning and social representations will be presented in chapter 
six.  
 
4.1.3. Studying the responses to the media 
 
The third study involves the analysis of a local community’s response to its 
representation in the media as portrayed in one particular programme during the 
‘Rushdie affair’. This decoding of the programme will be examined through the use 
of focus groups. Focus groups have been used before in studies of audience 
interpretation (Morley, 1980b; Liebes and Katz, 1990). Liebes and Katz, for example, 
used naturally occurring social groups
51
 in order to examine the socially negotiated 
interpretation of a soap opera. The theory of social representations would suggest that 
the programme is interpreted through the representational field of the audience. Lunt 
and Livingstone (1996) note the compatibility of the theory of social representations 
and focus group research. They further add that the discussions themselves may take 
an argumentative turn which could allow access to the dialogical dimension of the 
topic being discussed. 
  
What is the relationship between this programme and social representations? Is the 
programme itself a social representation? Does it contain a variety of representations? 
How are they related to the process of encoding? Rose (1996) suggests that: 
 
…television programmes are social representations. No one individual 
produces or authors a television programme. It is multi-authored and 
                                                                                                                                           
academics in a studio discussion on the ‘Rushdie affair’. 
50
 These distinctions will be explained in chapter six. 
51
 Morley (1980b) similarly used focus group discussions as a way of analysing audience 
interpretations of Nationwide, a current affairs programme.  
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manufactured by a panoply of people so that each voice contributes to 
a harmony that is more than the sum of the individuals taking part (p. 
111).  
 
I would suggest that this programme contains a variety of social representations that 
have been encoded or constructed semantically and symbolically by those involved in 
the production of the programme. These social representations are to be understood 
against the back-cloth of a social crisis that involved argumentation in the national 
public sphere. The particular programme used in this study becomes salient to the 
process of argumentation in the public sphere because the construction of the nature 
of the argument (and all the associated consequences) is administered by those who 
represent one side of the argument. Furthermore, in the case of this particular 
programme, the social representation that is being constructed is of those that 
represent the other side of the argument. The dialectics that form the identity-
representation interaction are, in this case, ruptured by an imbalance in access to the 
site of dialogic contestation. This study is therefore an examination into how this 
imbalance affects the nature of reception of a social representation that represents the 
viewer.   
 
The programme to be shown to the focus groups was chosen because of its central 
relevance to this thesis. This thesis is an exploration into the dialectic between social 
identity and social representation through the media, and the programme chosen for 
discussion lies at the centre of this dialectic. The programme was a documentary 
fronted by Michael Ignatieff, a writer, who visited the Muslim community in 
Bradford during the ‘Rushdie affair’. The programme was an edition of the series The 
Late Show, a late night arts programme that devoted a few of its editions to the 
‘Rushdie affair’. A previous edition of The Late Show (the programme broadcast on 
22 February 1989 and used in the rhetorical analysis that forms the second 
methodological component of this thesis) concluded with the following answer of 
Shabbir Akhtar, the representative from the Bradford Council of Mosques, to Michael 
Ignatieff, who was chairing the discussion: 
 
Ignatieff: …I want a quick comment from each of you to sum up, what 
can we do to close this gap between Muslims and non-Muslims in this 
country in practical terms beginning with you, Dr Akhtar? 
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Akhtar: Umm… well, I think that err… what is needed today badly 
and which has not at all appeared in the press is a reasonably 
intellectually adequate defence of what I call the virtues of 
fundamentalism. I think that there has been a complete operative veto 
on allowing funda… the virtues of fundamentalist position to be… I 
mean what has been… what has been happening throughout the media 
has been an unargued assumption on the part of the press and indeed 
of academic writing that fundamentalism has no intellectual basis, that 
it always has certain stereotypical and undesirable features. I think that 
they should be… err… some… people should be allowed to defend the 
better sides of fundamentalism.  
  
One consequence of this answer by Akhtar was that The Late Show decided to 
respond to this challenge by attempting to understand the Muslim side of the debate 
during the ‘Rushdie affair’. Ignatieff begins the programme aired on the 8th of May 
1989:  
 
On February 22
nd
 I hosted The Late Shows debate on the ‘Rushdie 
affair’. On that show, Shabbir Akhtar of the Bradford Council of 
Mosques, a philosopher by training, defended the fundamentalist 
position and argued that Western liberals had never taken the trouble 
to truly understand Islam. I decided to take up this challenge. He had 
been on my home territory, it was time for me to go to his. 
 
The programme itself has been transcribed according to audio and visual content and 
this transcript is in the appendix. A summary of the programme is presented 
alongside the other summaries in the appendix. The following is a brief description. 
The programme lasts for thirty-eight minutes and fifty seconds
52
. There are a total of 
twenty-one scenes. These scenes include a table conversation/dialogue between 
Ignatieff and Akhtar at Akhtar’s home, a group discussion involving Muslim teenage 
girls, an interview with the headteacher of a Muslim girls’ school, an interview with 
the English headteacher of a local comprehensive school, a discussion between 
Ignatieff and a restaurant owner (and later his waiters) and participant observation by 
Ignatieff in a Muslim family. Ignatieff provides a commentary on the issues under 
discussion throughout the programme.  
 
                                                 
52
 The programme was recorded live by the researcher himself. The first few seconds of the 
programme were not recorded. The researcher approached the BBC archives department for the 
programme but was not successful. The British Film Institute also did not stock a copy. 
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The choice of the Bradford Muslim community as the subject matter for this 
documentary (and their views on the ‘Rushdie affair’) relates directly to the aims of 
this thesis. The issues of definition, credibility, objectivity and bias were the source of 
the greatest amount of debate according to Aron (1999) in her focused group 
discussions around the reception of documentary programmes. It was hypothesised 
that these issues would similarly cause debate in the focus group discussions after the 
viewing of this programme. In the case of this particular study, the television 
programme Visit to Bradford was shown to naturally occurring social groups and a 
focus group discussion was conducted around the programme. Eight focus groups 
were conducted over a six week period in August and September 1999. The groups 
ranged in size from four to eleven participants, totalling 52 discussants. The 
following table describes the composition and location of the focus group 
discussions. 
 
Table 4.2. Description of focus groups 
 
Group 
number 
Group typology Number of 
discussants 
Place of 
discussion 
Age range of 
group (approx.) 
One Working men Six Snooker club 30-35 
Two Youth club attendees Eleven Youth club 15-25 
Three Youth club attendees Seven Youth club 15-22 
Four Youth club attendees Seven  Youth club 15-23 
Five A-level students Six House (friend’s) 17-19 
Six Graduates Six House 
(researcher’s) 
22-25 
Seven Working men Five  House (friend’s) 22-28 
Eight  A-level students  Four   House (friend’s) 17-19 
 
All groups were naturally occurring, meaning that the discussants were known to 
each other (with a few exceptions) and so there was a lack of formality within the 
groups. The discussants tended to share the same socio-demographic background and 
identity position
53
. The purpose of the discussion and the presence of the dictaphone 
ensured a sense of formality and structure to the discussion. All but one of the 
discussions were arranged through initial informal contact with acquaintances of the 
researcher. The discussions would last from about twenty-five minutes to over an 
hour.  
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The focus group discussion would begin with a short description of the programme 
by the researcher. The discussants were informed that the discussion would be 
recorded for the purposes of transcription but that their names would not be revealed. 
The programme would then be shown. Any reaction of the audience during the 
viewing of the programme that would aid the analysis was noted later by the 
researcher. The discussion
54
 would begin with an open-ended question about the 
initial response to the programme. This was followed by questions about their 
response to Ignatieff, the questions that he asked, the Muslim representatives on the 
programme, the coverage of the affair itself and the image of the Bradford Muslim 
community. Towards the end of the discussion they were asked if there were any 
specific scenes that they wished to discuss, and if they had anything generally to say 
before the end of the discussion. The researcher would later note any remarks that the 
discussants had made after the formal discussion.  
 
This open-ended conclusion to the discussion was used as a safety mechanism so that 
any views that were held and that had not been expressed could then be allowed such 
an opportunity. Care was taken to ensure that the dynamics of the discussion 
remained as free-flowing as possible, though on occasion, the researcher had to act in 
order to prevent a minimal level of formality from degenerating. Care was also taken 
so as to ensure that any less opinionated discussants had the opportunity to air their 
views towards the programme. Disagreement in the group itself was neither entirely 
encouraged nor discouraged. If however, the group tended towards disagreement, 
then the researcher would probe the causes of disagreement. 
 
The responses of the discussants and the discussion itself are examples of decoding. 
The discussions were transcribed and analysed for semantic content, such that the 
units of semantic themes could be isolated and categorised. The responses to each 
question were categorised under the theme of the question itself. Any part of the 
discussion which was relevant to the subject matter but did not fit under the 
designated categories was also isolated and categorised under a semantic theme. The 
semantic themes were then viewed together to see if social representations could be 
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 The actual identity positions will be discussed in chapter five. 
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identified as the organising mechanism of these semantic themes. The connection 
between social representations and social identities is also examined in the analysis. 
The results of this analysis are presented in chapter seven. 
 
4.2. Insider research 
 
There is another important debate in social psychology and indeed in most other 
social sciences which is relevant to the current study. That is the insider/outsider 
debate. I will argue below for the benefits of insider research. It is standard practice 
across the social sciences for outsiders to study communities, this being regarded as a 
guarantee of objectivity. However, I suggest that the researcher’s status as an outsider 
raises important methodological issues concerning access, data quality and 
interpretation. These are discussed below. This will be followed by an outline of 
some of the benefits of insider research. These benefits are counter-balanced against 
the main criticism against insider research which is bias. Techniques for dealing with 
this bias are discussed. This is then followed by a discussion on the insider/outsider 
debate within the Hegelian framework, and this is then counter-balanced by a 
discussion on the issues of race, culture and religion. This section is then concluded 
with a statement on the researcher’s position on this issue. 
 
4.2.1. Access and knowing the language 
 
Goffman (1959) makes the distinction between the ‘frontstage’ and ‘backstage’ of 
everyday social life. He asserts that social encounters have different levels of 
meaning. Obviously, if the social scientist wishes to study the processes in such social 
encounters, then he/she has to have access to both the frontstage and the backstage 
areas. The outsider, however, may find it difficult to access the backstage areas in 
many cultural settings. This could become quite problematic especially when the 
inaccessible areas include critical pieces of information for the research.  
 
Billig (1996) argues that the researcher cannot access the rhetorical component of 
representations if he/she is only dealing with the frontstage of social life. He refers to 
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actual theatre to point out that all the argumentation occurs backstage, when the 
actors do not have to appear in character anymore. He, therefore, suggests that access 
to the backstage is important for social research if one wishes to investigate the 
rhetorical component of representations. Denzin (1978) makes the point that some 
researchers need access to homes, offices, the confessional etc. and if these places are 
closed to them, then this reduces the quality of their work.  
 
Outsiders may find it difficult both to access and interpret social processes. Hall 
(1959, 1966) says that not knowing the language and culture (and all the associated 
meanings) of the area under study can lead to crude notions of the insider’s world. 
Jorgensen (1989) states that accurate findings are more likely in participatory 
strategies because the researcher can understand the meanings attached to existence 
and he quotes Hall (1976) on what happens when people misunderstand other cultures 
by viewing them from their own cultural perspective. Accessing the meanings 
attached to symbols and ideas becomes more important when one considers how 
dependent actions are upon meanings attached to symbols and ideas. The theory of 
social representations is clear about the importance it accords to language and to 
understanding its function in social processes. 
 
A more relevant example is the ‘Rushdie affair’. The book The Satanic Verses 
received criticism from the Muslim community because of its treatment of the 
Prophet’s character. The reaction to the book was in some ways proportional to the 
importance that is given to the Prophet in Muslim culture
55
. Because historical and 
cultural roots are not immediately accessible, some issues become difficult to access 
even if in some cases they are basic issues. Another example, is that of language. 
Many of the researchers are unable to access the language adopted by Muslims, 
whether this be the language of religion or even a different language altogether. 
Schutz (1944) states on this: 
 
He who wants to use a map successfully has first of all to know his 
standpoint in two respects: its location on the ground and its 
                                                 
55
 It should be remembered that one of the two leading factions amongst British South Asian Muslims 
is the Barelvi faction which places reverence for the Prophet at the centre of its theology. Also, a 
centuries old South Asian musical tradition is partially based around love poems that are devoted to the 
Prophet.  
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representation on the map. Applied to the social world this means that 
only members of the in-group, having a definite status in its hierarchy 
and also being aware of it, can use its cultural pattern as a natural and 
trustworthy scheme of orientation (p. 504). 
 
4.2.2. Distorting effects of the act of observation 
 
Other disadvantages related to the act of observation by an outsider include the 
reliability of the informant, defence mechanisms on the part of the informant, and the 
possibility of distortive effects of the observer’s presence and interpretation. Dean 
and Whyte (1969) highlight four factors which might influence the informant to give 
unreliable information: Are there any ulterior motives? Are there any bars to 
spontaneity? Does he/she have desires to please? Are there any idiosyncratic factors 
involved? They then highlight ways for detecting distortion in the reporting of data. 
These include implausibility of the account, knowing the informant’s mental set and 
how it might influence his/her account and comparing the informant’s account with 
other accounts.  
 
In another paper on the disadvantages of being an outsider, Argyris (1969) highlights 
the defence mechanisms that a researcher can encounter from individuals and 
organisations. With regards to the defence mechanisms of individuals, Argyris lists 
manifestations of fear, surface collaboration, problem denial, the silent treatment, by-
path seduction and stalling as mechanisms that the interviewee may use. The 
interviewee would feel the need to use these mechanisms because contact with an 
outsider would be a cause for anxiety for the interviewee. On this point Goffman 
(1959, 1974) and Douglas (1976) both note that subjects of study manipulate and 
negotiate meanings in different situations, sometimes intentionally and sometimes 
unintentionally. In doing so, they hide or conceal meanings from the view of 
outsiders. 
 
McCall (1969) highlights three main concerns for participant observation research. 
These are the reactive effects of the observer’s presence, distortion effects of selective 
perception and interpretation by the observer and the limitations on the observer’s 
ability to witness all the relevant aspects of the phenomena. Leading on from this they 
provide a check list for observational data and interview data. The check list for the 
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observational data includes checking against reactive effects (i.e. does the observer’s 
presence have any effect on him/her?), ethnocentricity (does an observational item 
reflect the researcher’s imposition of a foreign, uncongenial perspective?) and going 
native (does the researcher over identify with participants or with a particular 
faction?). The check list for the interview data includes checking against 
knowledgeability (what is the interviewee’s knowledge like?), reportorial ability 
(what is his/her memory like?), reactive effects of the interview situation (is he/she 
combative, hesitant, attentive?) and ulterior motives (was he/she trying to expose 
someone or rationalise a fact?). 
 
4.2.3. Participant observation and insider research 
 
The social scientific study of community by insiders is regarded as flawed since the 
insider is regarded as subjective while the outsider is regarded as objective. As stated 
earlier, it is normal practice in social science for outsiders to study other 
communities. Participant observation theorists are not in universal agreement, 
however, concerning this normative view towards insider research. For example, 
Jorgensen (1989) looks on insider research positively by stating that personal interests 
in the topic of study allow for new insights and creativity which can be inspired by 
emotional and intellectual identification. He gives an example of Ferraro (1981) who 
conducted a study into wife battering, while she herself had had similar personal 
experiences. He says “Ferraro’s battering experiences enabled her to establish rapport 
quickly and very satisfactorily with battered women” (Jorgensen, 1989, p. 27).   
 
Furthermore, Jorgensen (1989) gives examples of studies in which researchers have 
acted as insiders without this resulting in a loss of objectivity. An example is given of 
Jules-Rosette’s (1975) work on native African, Christian fundamentalist groups. 
Jorgensen concludes that “Her report provides confirmation of the observational 
advantage of this strategy with little indication that a loss of objectivity resulted” 
(Jorgensen, 1989, p. 63).  
 
However, insider research is generally regarded as disadvantageous because of the 
pertinence of bias to the researcher himself/herself. It is possible if the researcher is 
an insider that he/she can start studying what he/she thinks ought to be happening 
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rather than what is happening even unconsciously. It may not necessarily be the case 
that he/she is biased towards his/her community, it could quite possibly be the case 
that the insider is biased against his/her own community.  
 
4.2.4. Insider research and bias  
 
Schwartz and Schwartz (1969) note that there can be a problem of affective 
participation on behalf of the researcher. The researcher could become affectively 
involved in a way that may even be beyond his/her own awareness. The form of 
affective participation can range from sympathetic identification to projective 
distortion. The researcher’s experience, awareness and personality construction can 
all affect the form of participation in which the researcher engages. Schwartz and 
Schwartz (1969) suggest that it is possible to counteract these distorting influences 
through raised awareness of the biases, and of their causes and consequences.  
 
Schwartz and Schwartz (1969) also note that participant observation is a process of 
registering, interpreting and recording. The researcher’s bias can affect this process 
through several ways. These include blind spots, unconscious motivations, attitudinal 
sets, personally significant images, symbols and meanings which can all affect the 
process of perception (i.e. registering) and interpretation. Furthermore, his/her bias 
can be sociocultural, intellectual or theoretical and can similarly affect the registration 
and interpretation of data. Schwartz and Schwartz (1969) ask certain questions to the 
researcher on this issue: Is the researcher cautious or incautious? How much does 
he/she need to be right? Will he/she tend to see what he/she wants to see or expects to 
see from his/her data? How much failure can the investigator sustain without being 
discouraged or distorting the data? What does he/she believe people ought to be? 
What perspectives does he/she have on human activity? They suggest that bias can be 
dealt with in three ways. The researcher should be motivated to look for the biases, 
he/she should look for their meanings and ramifications actively and he/she should 
look upon the uncovering of bias as a continuous process of discovery. 
 
The way to deal with bias is through an initial open statement of interest on behalf of 
the researcher and then clear, methodological tools used for the elimination or at least 
reduction of bias. Agar (1980) offers certain strategies for dealing with bias. He 
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suggests that bias-awareness training can be built into the programme of research. He 
suggests that the researcher could be trained against cultural persuasions. He also 
suggests that the same material could be viewed in different ways, examining the 
possibility of how different biases could lead to alternative explanations. He also 
suggests the use of more than one social scientist in examining the same area of 
research - Denzin would call this investigator triangulation. These are all possible 
mechanisms for dealing with the problem of bias. 
 
Another disadvantage of being an insider is tied to an advantage of being an outsider. 
By being an insider, one is able to access information that outsiders are unable to 
access. At the same time, one becomes blind to certain points because they are so 
much a part of everyday life. Ichheiser (1949a) asserts on this point that: “We are 
unaware of even very striking features of our own culture, for example, and it is 
frequently the stranger who is able to perceive things to which ourselves as members 
of the society are totally blinded” (p. 1). An outsider, however, would come from the 
outside of the community, and because of the stark differences, would be able to 
detect something which the insider would not be able to see. 
 
4.2.5. Hegelian and Cartesian perspectives on the insider and outsider debate 
 
This distinction between the insider and the outsider is one that can be viewed as a 
false distinction if viewed within the context of the Hegelian framework. If the insider 
is subjective and participates, and the outsider is objective and observes, then this 
could be seen to be a Cartesian distinction. This is because such a distinction ignores 
the reflexive and interactive nature of social functioning. This reflexive and 
interactive nature is all the more important within the framework of a sociological 
form of social psychology. If the self is formed through social processes, especially 
with regards to how groups view the self, then this perspective reduces the differences 
between the perceptual processes of the insider and the outsider – because they would 
both be more able to see ‘through the eyes of the other’.  
 
This point can be illustrated with reference to Muslims in Britain. As a Muslim in 
Britain, one has continuously been provided with opportunities to see ‘through the 
eyes of the other’ whether this be in the media which have continuously, over the 
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years, represented the Muslim community in British public life, or in school in which 
one is similarly able to access other’s views of one’s community through discussions 
with peers.  
 
4.2.6. Race, culture and religion 
 
The insider/outsider discussion, from a social psychological perspective, views the 
distinction between insiders and outsiders as one of perception and the ability to 
perceive. This would be a reductionist account of social processes, especially if it 
fails to incorporate the notion of history and culture. The South Asian Muslim 
community in Bradford represents difference in three ways. Each of these sources of 
difference serves to separate the communities further in an experiential manner, 
which makes the insider/outsider distinction more profound.  
 
The first source of difference is race. Racism remains prevalent in Bradford, actual or 
perceived. If the racism is not actual, it is certainly ‘perceived’ and as such 
differentiates the South Asian Muslim community from the English community. The 
centrality of race to social psychological interaction is noted by Ichheiser (1949b): 
“Looking at each other is the most primary form of conversation. Between white 
people and Negroes (sic) the initial and basic part of the ‘conversation’ is concluded 
before they start to talk to one another” (p. 396). The South Asian Muslim 
community is viewed and views itself as a different race, which in practical terms, 
means being of a different colour.  
 
The second source of difference is culture. The culture of the South Asian Muslim 
community is considerably different to English culture, in terms of dress and 
language, type of food, and mannerisms. This culture tends to be found more in the 
‘backstage’ of the community’s life, and there it is vibrant and self-confident. The 
South Asian Muslim community does differ within itself culturally, in styles of dress 
for example, however its extent of cultural difference is much greater when compared 
to English culture. The pertinence of this point towards the debate on difference or 
‘otherness’ can be highlighted by examining the difference between black 
communities in Britain that tend to be more culturally assimilative and Asian 
communities that tend to be more culturally different (Beckerlegge, 1991).  
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The third source of difference is religion. The South Asian Muslim community is 
different to the English community in its religion as well, and is viewed as such. This 
means that there are certain beliefs and practices on an individual and communal 
level that relate to religion which differentiates the communities. Participating in such 
practices leads to the formation of a certain world-view and a sense of purpose 
relating directly to the Islamic belief-structure. 
 
These three sources of difference are anchored deep in the history of both 
communities, and they play an important part in everyday processes in a local 
community. The difference between the insider and the outsider is not only a 
difference based upon a social psychological perspective, about not being able to 
access the backstage, or about going native, or about the researcher becoming so 
much a part of the furniture that some processes become invisible to the researcher. 
These issues certainly form part of the debate, but the difference between the insider 
and the outsider is one that also incorporates the historical and cultural differences 
that together contribute to the identity processes in a local community in Bradford 
such that events in Bradford are connected to previous centuries which inform 
present-day debates. A social psychology of identity processes in the South Asian 
Muslim community in Bradford must incorporate such perspectives into its analysis 
and its methodology, and any researcher, whether he/she be an insider or an outsider, 
must recognise the importance of these processes in terms of their effect on present-
day events. The insider/outsider debate itself must accept that the barriers that exist 
between insiders and outsiders are not only those of social interaction and language, 
for example. But rather, the differences derived from race, culture and religion 
contribute to the debate also and research methodologies have to incorporate the 
importance of such differences into their approach.  
 
The benefits and harms of insider research have been discussed in relation to the 
study of intergroup processes within a minimalist paradigm (i.e. in the absence of 
culture and history). It is suggested, here, that the benefits of having an insider study 
his own community are all the more pronounced when the insider/outsider distinction 
is one that involves race, culture and religion (with their histories and associated 
consequences). 
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4.2.7. Limitations to insider research 
 
Though the insider has a greater degree of access to various aspects of social life, 
there are several issues which nevertheless limit such access. First of all, by 
definition, the insider may find it difficult to access outsider perspectives of the area 
of study (for the opposite of all the reasons that are advantageous for insider 
research). For example, if the insider is trusted by youths who are on the fringes of 
criminal activity, the police may simultaneously decide to view him/her with distrust. 
Or if the insider is examining outsider representations of the local community, then 
those involved in the manufacture of such representations may hesitate in 
participating in such research.   
 
Secondly, the insider/outsider discussion tends to exaggerate the homogeneity of 
communities such that though this insider is indeed an insider to the Muslim 
community in Bradford, there remain nevertheless various parts of the community to 
which he would not be able to gain access. For example, it is difficult for a male 
researcher to gain sufficient access to the social psychological world of young 
Muslim girls due to the segregated nature of the Muslim community in Bradford. 
That is one key reason why this thesis has focused on young men. Other examples of 
inaccessible areas of Muslim life include extremist groups and elder patriarchs.  
 
A third limitation of insider research is that there is a limit to the extent of 
questioning. Though the researcher did ask at times some pertinent questions, there 
was still a point beyond which the researcher could not proceed for fear of damaging 
the trust that enabled the access in the first place. Several of the interviews were 
arranged with prominent members of the Bradford community and sensitivity over 
the politicised nature of the interview itself (and any repercussions for the 
interviewee) necessitated care in the framing of questions in order to ensure the 
completion of the interview and an acceptable degree of trust.  
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4.2.8. Ethics in social research  
 
A question of ethics that faces researchers, apart from the methodological issue of 
bias, is whether it is acceptable to gain access to a community, to study them for a 
few years, and then to leave them, without having helped deal with some of their 
problems, though the research may provide some answers to their problems. For 
example, if someone is researching into the social processes surrounding riots then 
one way of using that research would be to educate local communities and their local 
police forces in how to prevent riots. One could find, through conducting research 
into riots, that social understanding is based on, as Ichheiser (1949) has suggested, 
misunderstanding. For example, the police force misunderstand the youth, the youth 
misunderstand the police, and riots feed off such antagonistic feelings. This is an 
example to show how important it is to connect areas of research to the subjects of the 
research. I am in agreement with those social scientists who suggest that the ethical 
dimension should not be ignored especially in the case of social psychologists who 
are studying natural, social phenomena. Gramsci (1971) makes a similar point in his 
advocation of organic intellectuals in that he stated that the study of social life should 
not be separated from participation in social life and that the outcome of such studies 
should serve emancipatory ends. I would hope that, through my research, I would be 
able to help offer possible ways of bridging the gap that exists today between the 
Muslim community and the wider society.  
 
But this creates another problem, this relates to the question of deciding what exactly 
is useful or ethical? As Denzin (1978) writes: ‘While most sociologists now agree 
that it is impossible to conduct research in the absence of personal and political 
values, few are agreed on the exact nature of these values and the precise role they 
should occupy in their activities’ (p. 325). This relationship between values and 
research should be distinguished from the methodological problem of bias. Research 
in social science can be and normally is decided according to a value-system either of 
the researcher or the sponsoring body. Any practical programmes that may emerge as 
a direct result of such research would similarly be based upon the corresponding 
value-system. This incorporation of a role for values within research paradigms can 
be acceptable, however, such a role can prove problematic if it affects the acquisition 
and examination of evidence in pursuit of research themes. The researcher here has to 
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be careful that his/her own value-system does not affect the outcome of the results of 
the research in a conscious or unconscious manner. Essentially this means that the 
researcher has to be open to and to accept the possibility of findings that are against 
his/her own value-system. This methodological form of bias has to be prevented from 
affecting the research by using the techniques outlined above. This is one area in 
which the researcher has to maintain an ‘objective’ outlook, whether he/she is an 
insider or an outsider. 
 
4.2.9. Conclusion 
 
The above discussion makes clear the several advantages of insider research e.g. 
access, knowing the language and trust. These being simultaneously disadvantages of 
outsider research which have been recognised by theorists of methodology (Dean and 
Whyte, 1969; Argyris, 1969; McCall, 1969). More recent theorists such as Jorgensen 
(1989) feel able to extol the benefits of insider research. However, the issue of bias
56
 
remains. The researcher has adopted mechanisms for dealing with this through the 
suggestions of Schwarz and Schwarz (1969) and Agar (1980) as detailed above. A 
Hegelian view towards communication reduces the extent of difference between 
insiders and outsiders, however, in the case of this particular study the additional 
factors of race, culture and religion (as sources of differences) serve to increase the 
extent of difference between insiders and outsiders. The researcher has chosen to 
adopt a methodology that will position the researcher as insider and the research was 
conducted with the above constraints in mind. A post hoc discussion of such an 
approach is provided in the conclusion to the thesis. 
 
4.3. Conclusion 
 
The methodology has been constructed in order to investigate three separate points of 
the identity-representation dialectic. This is in the specific context of the ‘Rushdie 
affair’ and the Bradford Muslim community. The three sites of the community, the 
text and the reception of the text provided access into the relation between identity 
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 A Foucauldian perspective, as exemplified by Said (1978/1995), would however suggest that the 
issue of bias is as much, if not more, the problem of outsider research, in terms of the relation between 
industries of knowledge and power. 
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and representation. Interviewing the ‘specialists’ provided access to the 
Weltanschauung of Bradford Muslim youth in terms of their social representations, 
identities and discourse. Analysing the rhetoric during the ‘Rushdie affair’ provided 
access to the nature and content of dialogic contestation. And returning one form of 
representation back to those who are represented provided insight into a moment 
when the hegemonic met the subaltern. 
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5.0. REPRESENTATIONS, IDENTITIES AND DISCOURSE AMONGST  
BRADFORD MUSLIM YOUTH 
 
This chapter documents and analyses the findings of the first empirical study which 
was an examination into the social psychological world of South Asian Muslim youth 
in Bradford. I will first outline the two main social representations that act as 
stereotypes of the community under study. These are of the ‘Paki’ and the ‘Muslim’. I 
will then describe two issues both of which concern the manner of relationship 
between the South Asian Muslim youth and ‘white society’. This will be followed by 
a section which examines the range and type of response to such a social environment 
and connects the response to the representations involved. I will examine, following 
on from Samad (1998) and Vertovec (1998), the nature and content of Muslim 
identity discourse in Bradford and its relation to key recent events and processes such 
as the ‘Rushdie affair’ and mediatic globalisation. The data used in this chapter are 
derived in the main from the interviews. I will hope to have provided, by the end of 
the chapter, an overview of some of the main themes that inform and structure the 
social psychological worldview of South Asian Muslim youth in Bradford. 
 
5.1. Social representations of identities 
 
As stated earlier, social representations “are the representations of something or of 
someone” (Moscovici, 1984b, p. 67). This section will describe representations of 
identity categories that are relevant to South Asian Muslim youth. I will be examining 
social representations here as stereotypes. Stereotypes have been variously defined in 
social psychology (e.g. Allport, 1954b; Hogg and Abrams, 1988) but here I would 
like to apply a particular definition of stereotypes which corresponds with its lay 
understanding. Stereotypes are social representations of specific groups of people. 
They usually involve negative evaluation consequently stigmatising the identity, and 
tend to be disputed by the group subject to stereotyping. Three social representations 
were investigated in this study with the interviewees: the ‘Paki’, the ‘Muslim’ and the 
‘Bradford Muslim’. There are levels of generalisation and particularisation 
concerning social representations (Billig, 1996). I wish to examine the two 
representations of ‘Muslim’ and ‘Paki’ as general representations which provide a 
social psychological background to identity processes amongst South Asian Muslim 
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youth in Bradford. I will describe the representation of the ‘Bradford Muslim’ 
towards the end of this chapter.  
 
5.1.1. Social representations of the ‘Paki’ and the ‘Muslim’ 
 
Kelly (1990) has found that ‘Paki’ was universally utilised by school children against 
children with brown skin, irrespective of their being Indian or Bangladeshi. The 
researcher similarly found through the interviews that ‘Paki’ is used as a general 
category against those with ‘brown’ skin. There does not seem to be much 
differentiation between the various communities, and separate categories are not 
utilised.  
 
I think it’s quite mixed up. I think most of the time, you must have 
heard the phrase ‘Paki’, it doesn’t matter whether you’re from India, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, you know, it’s lack of understanding amongst 
white people when they stereotype certain people into one category. 
(2-5)
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I mean, if a Sikh person do something then they won’t say it’s a Sikh, 
they’ll say it’s a ‘Paki’ because anybody black, brown, they’ll see 
them as ‘Paki’. (1-6) 
 
I mean, I think, I grew up in Huddersfield and I think they just lump 
everybody together to be honest with you. I think if people use terms, I 
mean this is from my own personal experience growing up in 
Huddersfield, I think people just lump them together. I don’t think it’s 
to do… they’ll use the same terms of abuse towards a Sikh as against a 
Muslim even I mean, there was a lad at my school who was slightly 
dark skin who was an Italian, he wasn’t Asian at all, he was a Catholic 
but because his skin was slightly darker than everybody else, he used 
to be called ‘Paki’. (3-6) 
 
The ‘Paki’ was mostly described in the interviews as a racial taunt. The anchorings of 
‘Paki’ is of someone with different colour skin. The interviewees generally did not 
refer to ‘black’, instead they referred to ‘brown’ as skin colour. This suggests some 
difference from representations concerning African-Caribbeans. Several other 
characteristics were mentioned once, these being that a ‘Paki’ is someone who is 
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 The labels at the end of each quote refer to the group and interview number of the interviewee 
respectively, see appendix (iii). 
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‘thick’58, smells, is a noisy neighbour, is part of a large family, is a parasite on the 
state, is fraudulent and unclean, and is involved in drug-pushing and violence. The 
only positive representation was of ‘Pakis’ as honest workers in factories. All of these 
descriptions came from the South Asian Muslim youth interviewees, as such they are 
depictions of how they see themselves categorised.  
 
Eight of the nine attributes (all except thick) could all be understood as rule-breaking 
behaviour, and in the examples quoted above, the rule-breaking would relate to rules 
of health and hygiene (smell, are unclean), social interaction e.g. upholding the norms 
of politeness and civility (are noisy neighbours, are part of a large family, are 
involved in violence) and of following the law (are parasites on the state, are 
fraudulent, are involved in drug-pushing). The general representation is that of the 
‘Paki’ as rule-breaker. To uphold the standards of health and hygiene, politeness and 
civility, and the law is to uphold civilisation, as in civilised behaviour itself. And 
conversely, to denigrate, disrespect, ignore or be ignorant of such norms is to be 
characterised as uncivilised. So the representation is anchored as rule-breaker i.e. 
uncivilised. Jahoda (1999) has suggested that the etymology of the term ‘civilisation’ 
is founded upon a notion of rule following behaviour whether it be in terms of 
following the law or in keeping within standards of politeness. So the social 
representation of the ‘Paki’ is anchored as ‘uncivilised’ and ‘non-white’. 
 
The second social representation is that of the ‘Muslim’. This representation is 
particularised to that of the ‘fundamentalist’, which is anchored as backward/anti-
modern and aggressive. 
 
I think they afraid of that the Muslims will impose their own views, 
they wanna have four wives and they wanna chop our hands off and 
they want to stop us from drinking …and this image is like they are 
terrorists and they want to impose their views and they are living in the 
dark ages and they mistreat their women and they want to force us to 
become like them yeah, and they’re very intolerant. (1-2) 
 
They perceive Muslims to be those kind of people who don’t 
assimilate into society who want to remain distinct and separate 
although they live in this society. Also issue about arranged 
                                                 
58
 A slang term for someone of less than average intelligence, usually used in reference to others. 
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marriages…There’s an assumption that the people who are Muslims, 
the older generation is forcing their kids to become practising, and 
there’s also stereotypes about women and the oppression of women. 
(1-4) 
 
The ‘Muslim’ represents the past to British society, not only the past of the ‘other’, a 
distant civilisation with its own manner of living, but also the past of its own society. 
The themes of arranged marriages, sexual inequality and barbaric forms of 
punishment are as characteristic of pre-modern British society as they are of ‘other’ 
cultures. In this sense, the ‘Muslim’ as backward represents the past as the present. 
The assertiveness not only represents an obstinate refusal to change, to maintain the 
space that they have been allocated, but furthermore it represents an attempt to 
expand their area of control. 
 
I think if we’re getting really down to basics, the thing that probably 
frightens people is, they might feel that the Muslims are trying to take 
over. Erm… I think that is a deep seated feeling, to take over the 
culture, yes. (3-4) 
 
Well, basically, that these people, they don’t fit in, they don’t want to 
fit in... And they’re here on one form and that is cause of crusade, 
they’re here on a mission, that is a religious mission, and they want to 
dismantle and change and convert everything, you know fly the flag at 
10 Downing Street. (2-2) 
 
The mutual contradictions between the two forms of anchoring suggest a 
psychological process, one that is based upon fear, a fear of returning to the pre-
modern and a fear of being over-run by ‘others’. A report commissioned by the 
Runnymede Trust (1997) identified the notion of Islamophobia – a fear of Islam and 
Muslims. The social representation of the ‘Muslim’ is therefore one that is 
intrinsically related to fear. 
 
Moscovici (1988) has identified three separate types of representations: hegemonic, 
polemical and emancipated. Hegemonic representations are characterised as uniform 
and coercive, and polemical representations are understood as involving vocal, open, 
direct contestation. If the difference between the two representations is understood as 
one of degree with the variables being the extent of awareness and contestation, then I 
would suggest that though the ‘Paki’ and the ‘Muslim’ are not prototypical examples 
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of hegemonic representations, they are nevertheless more hegemonic than polemical. 
This is because of the lack of contestation of the content of both representations in the 
public sphere.  
 
5.1.2. Social representations of ‘white society’ 
 
I now wish to describe the social representations of ‘white society’ by South Asian 
Muslims. A key ‘other’ to South Asian Muslims in this study is itself subject to 
representational processes as it is referred to as ‘white society’. The shorthand for this 
is ‘goreh’ – ‘goreh’ is the plural for the Urdu word for white. The transition from 
adjectival status to nominal status is indicative of the representational process in 
which one characteristic, namely skin colour, assumes classificatory predominance.  
 
If ‘goreh’ was the name for this representation, then discrimination was their practice. 
This being a common complaint throughout the interviews. This discrimination was 
manifested through two forms of social interaction. The first is a direct form of abuse 
behaviour exhibiting prejudice on racial grounds, involving the vocalisation of clear-
cut, prejudiced statements. The second is a more subtle, polite, indirect and hidden, 
though present, form. This tending to be associated with official forms of social 
encounters. Examples of the second form of social encounters are work and 
classroom situations i.e. situations in which the social relations involve contractual 
arrangements which leads to familiarity between the persons involved, a greater sense 
of responsibility towards the maintenance of social relations and a higher probability 
of accountability before the law. The reason for this difference is that racism and 
racist stereotyping have become unacceptable from a legal and cultural point of view. 
This distinction has been referred to by Wieviorka (1994): “Some scholars, relying on 
American studies, oppose the old ‘flagrant’ racism to the ‘subtle’ new versions” (p. 
182). Consequently, in those situations in which racist stereotyping does occur, the 
prejudice can only be exhibited in a non-accountable way such that the person 
involved can alleviate himself/herself from any sense of responsibility, this has meant 
that racist behaviour assumes a subtle character. One South Asian Muslim politician 
said about the new second and third generation: 
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They are in a better… able to understand the subtleties of white, racist 
society. (2-2) 
 
A Muslim youth leader from Manningham said :  
 
A. I think it’s taken a different diversity now, a different form of 
racism. 
 
Q. In what sense? 
 
A. In the sense that it won’t be direct. It’d be subtle. (1-1) 
 
An English youth worker said : 
 
I think racism has always been… yeah it’s under the carpet, it’s not as 
overt as it used to be… (3-5) 
 
An example of such forms of subtle racism was provided by one interviewee when he 
spoke of his experience at work: 
 
For example, if I need a holiday there are a different sort of 
curriculum, a different sort of rules for me than for my white 
counterparts, why should that be the case. I mean I wanted to swap the 
shifts when I’m working yeah and it’s taken me like two months, why, 
whereas the goras when they want to swap it’s like there’s no 
problem, no matter what position they are, whereas for us they make 
some sort of excuse… (2-2) 
 
A common theme throughout the interviews was separation. This was objectified by 
two particular issues. The first is the changing pattern of geographical distribution 
and the second concerns Lawcroft House, a recently built police station in 
Manningham, Bradford. I will deal with the changing pattern of geographical 
distribution first. Historically, ethnic minority communities tended to concentrate 
around the inner-city areas of Bradford, around the textile industry which acted as 
their initial place of employment. The decline in the textile industry during the 
eighties has led to massive concentrations of unemployment for most, yet a 
considerable minority has found other forms of employment mostly through small 
business initiatives and this has led to economic and social mobility. For some, this 
has meant that they have tried to improve their social and economic status by moving 
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away from the inner city areas towards the suburbs of Bradford i.e. they have tried to 
move from working class areas towards middle class areas.  
 
This social mobility experienced by a considerable minority within the community 
should result in the dissolution of the geographical boundaries. However, this is not 
the case. This is because as one Asian Muslim family moved into Heaton, then 
slowly, one by one, the English families moved out, such that the English families 
became minorities in the same street where they were once a majority. This process 
was repeatedly referred to in the interviews as an example of the social and 
geographic separation that remains in certain parts of Bradford.  
 
We moved to Heaton and we moved there about thirteen years ago, I 
think there was only one Asian family on our street, now there’s one 
white family left, no sorry two white families left and the others 
moved out. But… I don’t know whether it’s because they don’t see us 
as good neighbours or it’s the stereotyping image that they’ve got of 
us… (1-1) 
 
As for us, I can give you hundreds of examples of cases in Heaton and 
certain parts of Bradford, people have moved from inner cities into 
outer cities, and as soon as they see one or two ethnic minority people 
moving in, the English people start moving out. (2-6) 
 
As the Muslim community has moved from this traditional area into 
Oak lane and now further on Toller lane and thereafter further on into 
Heaton, as the community has moved outwards, the white community 
has also moved out of that area into Bingley, Cottingley and Shipley. 
(3-2) 
 
The social representation of ‘white society’ is one that aims to maintain social 
distance, and consequently, difference. Two other factors that are associated with and 
qualify social separation are individualism associated with English neighbours and 
the religious restrictions concerning socialising in public houses. The interviewees 
contrasted the openness of South Asian Muslims in comparison to the individualism 
of English neighbours. The rules of social encounters for English neighbours were 
perceived to be aimed at maintaining a relatively greater amount of distance. 
Secondly, the main social meeting place is the public house and this caused an 
obstacle to social engagement as Muslims are forbidden from drinking alcohol or 
sitting at a table at which alcohol is served. This religious behaviour has symbolic 
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significance for South Asian Muslims and its maintenance seems to be important for 
their religious identity. This has meant that the main area for socialising in English 
society is stigmatised by the Islamic religion thus reducing the probability of social 
contact. Gervais and Jovchelovitch (1998b) found that social drinking which occurs at 
the pub also affects the socialisation of Chinese as they perceive themselves as 
drinking less. One of their respondents is quoted: “…if you don’t go to a pub with 
them, you can’t be friends with them, because that’s the only way that you can 
actually get to know them…” (p. 19). 
 
Lawcroft House is a newly built police station
59
 that is situated in the centre of one of 
the residential concentrations of the South Asian Muslim community in Bradford. 
The riots of 1995 were centred around demonstrations outside Lawcroft House, since 
the persons who had been arrested were being held inside. The police station is an 
objectification of an extreme sense of separation between the South Asian Muslim 
community and the police. The words used in viewing the photograph were 
“fortress”60 (some used “fort”), “castle” and “watchtower”. The word “fortress” was 
used most often and across all three groups. 
 
If you’re trying to foster community relations you don’t build a huge 
police station that looks like a fortress at the top of a hill. It just looks 
like a watchtower and I think that’s how people perceive it. (2-1) 
 
The key message symbolised by the police station is separation. The wall was 
especially criticised for being unnecessary. 
 
And there’s the police station that’s basically telling you that, you 
know… basically I think the wall, it creates ‘us’ and ‘them’ situation 
and it’s very intimidating. (2-5) 
 
It shows… it gives an image of this is a place not to be approached, 
you’re not welcome here…. (1-3) 
 
                                                 
59
 The police station was built in the years 1992-1993. 
60
 One interviewer suggested that the police station had been labelled as ‘the fortress’ by the media 
after the disturbances/riots in Bradford in June, 1995.  
 122 
This separation is seen to be due to a perceived threat or fear on behalf of the police 
and associated with this is a sense of mistrust and suspicion on behalf of the local 
community.  
 
The wall itself, that looks like there’s something they’re hiding or 
they’re afraid of and they are frightened, what are they frightened of? 
(2-6) 
 
There’s nothing inside which you can see, that gives a picture that 
there is something they hide from you. And when you hear the story of 
people… those people were interrogated, and that person was arrested, 
and that person committed suicide in police custody, these sorts of 
stories, it makes you wonder… (2-4) 
 
The police station objectifies power and control to the interviewees. This is linked to 
a perceived threat in that the symbol of power is required in order to control the 
perceived threat. 
 
Yeah, I mean this police station, firstly that wall right, it’s so big and 
so imposing and it seems like right alien right. It’s like you’ve got 
natives living in a certain area so build a big castle to keep them in 
control. If you look at people who come from other countries yeah, 
and the first thing they do is right, they build a big, big imposing castle 
or… what they call encampment or something yeah where the army is 
safe inside it and they can always come out and some communities get 
a bit yeah. And the message is given to the community is right, that 
“We’re not a part of you”. If they felt that the Muslim community was 
part of their community right, what’s the need to build big walls in the 
police station for? They’re telling the local community that “Look, 
we’re not a part of you, we are in here, and we are here to control you, 
we’re different from you and we don’t trust you” yeah. And this 
institutional racism right, to me this wall portrays that so well yeah. I 
can’t see them going in a white area, yeah and building a police station 
with big walls like this telling the community “Look, we’re not part of 
you, we don’t trust you, we feel that you might attack us right with 
smaller walls so we need big walls to…”, it’s a proper us and them 
mentality that it gives. (1-2) 
 
The police station. Horrible building, never liked it, it reminds me of 
the British empire… it’s like a fort they built and sometimes they 
defend themselves. I thought when it was built, people criticised them 
but what I personally think I mean they built it deliberately, I think it’s 
simply to show the community there, well look it’s a kind of symbol 
of power, “We’re here to watch you. If you don’t be careful, you know 
where we are”. It represents power, institutional power. (2-3) 
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This interviewee, in his response to what the photograph of the police station 
represents to him, stated that it reminds him of the British empire. This connection to 
antagonistic, conflict-associated representations of history was frequent as references 
were made to the Napoleanic prisons, Colditz, Northern Ireland, the British empire, 
and fifteenth and sixteenth century castles (sic). The building is anchored into 
antagonistic representations from history, and the anchoring is into situations 
involving conflict and an imbalance of power relations.  
 
Moscovici (1984b) has stated that representations are of things and people. The social 
representation of the police station is of an object which itself objectifies 
representations of people since the representation of the police station as a fortress 
objectifies the fear of the local population on behalf of the police. The police station 
is an example of the close dialectic between buildings and people, thereby increasing 
the semantic connection between objects and people. In conclusion, the police station 
is an objectification of institutional power that leads to a sense of separation between 
the police and the local community. The building itself raises levels of suspicion and 
mistrust by signifying the need for clear separation. The local community anchors it 
as a representation of conflict in social relations. The police being an ‘other’ to the 
local community is objectified by the local community as separate, confrontational, 
intimidating and frightened.  
 
The social representations of ‘white society’ are generally anchored as subtle in their 
racism through, for example, the maintenance of social distance. The police station as 
an objectification of power, specifically white power, continues the theme of 
maintenance of social distance and is anchored as separate, confrontational, 
intimidating and frightened (though the view of racism as subtle is no longer 
applicable). The inclusion of the equation of power introduces the anchorings of 
confrontational, intimidating and frightened.  
 
5.2. Identities as responses to stereotypes 
 
The response of the second and third generation that is associated dialectically with 
this representational field is varied. A typology of the responses, though providing 
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clarity to the interpretation of a complex social process, can provide a simplistic 
analysis of a social phenomenon which includes post-migration, transnational 
communities, globalisation and international relations, post-modernist cultural 
transformation, post-industrial decline, identity hybridisation, historiographic 
controversies surrounding cultural stereotypes, intergenerational conflict, 
misunderstanding, alternative conceptualisations of the relationship between the 
secular and religious, and the subliminal acquisition of hegemonic discourses. The 
complexity of such a social process does suggest that any attempt at providing a 
typology would be an attempt to provide structure to a situation which does not admit 
much structure. However, the researcher has identified three generalised types of 
response from the participant observation and the interviews
61
.  
 
The three types are firstly, a group that is associated with successful attempts at social 
mobility and that tends to, at least, neglect cultural and religious practice. The second 
type celebrates a counter-culture which includes significations of rejection of 
authority. This group is associated with higher levels of unemployment, a mixture 
and range of cultural and religious identification and practice and tends to be based 
around a street culture. The third type advocates a distinction between cultural and 
religious practice, by valorising religious practice, even if it is contrary to cultural 
practice. There does not seem to be a correlation with an economic strategy for this 
type. I will be referring to the three types as ‘coconuts’, ‘rude boys’ and 
‘extremists’62. The first type are known as ‘coconuts’, since they are viewed to be 
brown on the outside and white on the inside
63
. This stereotype suggests a betrayal of 
culture and history. The second strategy of the indifferent majority can be known as 
‘rude boys’. This stereotype suggests an aggressive and indifferent approach. The 
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 These three types were identified repeatedly, though there was a clear Muslim/non-Muslim 
distinction here in that the non-Muslims did not identify the three types at all, though they were 
identified and referred to repeatedly by the Muslim interviewees. The only member of category three 
to provide a typology was the senior youth worker. The overall typology was reconstructed from 
answers to a question in the interview on the range of response of Muslim youth to living in Bradford. 
They provided descriptive elements which when accumulated lead to the identification of three types. 
As I work through each identity type below, I will provide a quote from each of the two Muslim 
interview groups as examples of convergence of different perspectives on a similar form of 
identification.  
62
 The interviewees did not refer to the labels as types, however, their answers to this question can be 
mapped onto the three categories. These labels are in common usage in Bradford Muslim youth culture 
and were identified as relevant by the researcher after the interviews had been conducted. 
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third strategy of the ‘Muslim identity’ approach is stereotyped as ‘extremists’. This 
stereotype suggests an overzealous and intolerant approach.  
 
All three stereotypes are definitions of the group imposed from outside the sub-group 
but from within the South Asian Muslim community. The identification of all three 
strategies through the use of inter-group categories from within the youth sub-cultures 
points to the inter-group rivalry that exists between the members of each type. The 
categorisation of alternative types as strategies is indirectly an affirmation of the 
strategies adopted by the in-group as type. The identification of these three types was 
made by the interviewees acting as specialist observers (and in some cases recent 
participants) i.e. they are outsiders to the youth groups they are discussing. There 
were occasions in the interviews when the interviewee referred to a type outside of 
this general consensus. I will discuss this below after a short description of each type. 
 
5.2.1.  The ‘coconuts’ 
 
The ‘coconut’ identity position is the smallest numerically with very few opting for 
this strategy since they are unable to either because of a restrictive family 
environment or lack of economic opportunities. This option corresponds with the 
social mobility strategy, in that the members of this category opt to social 
psychologically separate themselves from the representation of their identity through 
the stereotypes of the ‘Paki’ and the ‘Muslim’ by increasing the distance between 
themselves and the South Asian Muslim community since they do not wish to be 
associated with the stereotype. Their ties with the culture and religion of their families 
are kept to a minimum, a minimum which is required to keep some form of 
attachment to the culture and religion of their parents.  
 
Yeah definitely, I mean I think some people leave Islam completely… 
(1-2)  
 
I would say there are some people who wouldn’t their religion, their 
culture, don’t want to do it, they want to know about their family, 
move away… (1-3) 
                                                                                                                                           
63
 A similar form of appellation is described by Gervais and Jovchelovitch (1998b) in their research on 
the health beliefs of the Chinese in Britain. Those that were deemed to be too assimilative were known 
as ‘bananas’: yellow on the outside, white on the outside. 
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There are others of course who are... whose parents and the 
environment hasn’t presented that culture in a positive way to them 
and they have seen discipline, in life, they have seen something they 
don’t like and therefore they are disaffected. (2-4) 
 
Their social mobility is usually associated with economic mobility which has meant 
that those who opt for this strategy usually move out of Bradford towards areas of 
higher economic opportunity. Of those that have moved away some tend to return to 
Bradford because of their attachment to their families. Complete detachment or 
separation is rare. 
 
Q. So what they tend to do, they tend to move away from Bradford 
yeah… 
 
A. Yeah, but that’s only for a short while, short period, only during, 
during study times and very rare cases is if they’re employed in 
elsewhere, for example down south, you know midlands or wherever 
but even that only tends to happen for a short while. For a year away 
from Bradford they usually end up coming back home. (1-5) 
 
There is a high degree of correspondence between the three types that were identified 
in this study and the types of the responses that were identified in the review of the 
literature
64. The ‘coconut’ that accepts the dominant discourse can be related to 
Hutnick’s (1991) strategy of assimilation in which the minority group has a high level 
of identification with the majority culture and a low level of identification with its in-
group culture. Similarly, this type can be related to Peach and Glebe’s (1995) 
liberalisation political strategy, Knott et al..’s (1993) anti-religious feminist strategy 
(involving young women in their study) and Werbner’s (1996) anglicised post-
colonial identity. The common denominator in these strategies is the acceptance of 
the dominant discourse which includes the stereotype of the ‘Muslim’ and the ‘Paki’. 
 
                                                 
64
 Three ideal types of identity have been discussed above and there seems to be a considerable amount 
of overlap between these identities and those mentioned in the literature. There are, however, some 
types that have been identified in the literature which did not correspond with the types identified in 
the interviews. For instance, Hall (1992a) writes of the formation of new identities around terms 
chosen and inflected to encompass differences. Similarly, Hutnick (1991) discusses two strategies 
which were not identified in the interviews. These are the strategies of acculturation and marginality. 
Acculturation involves a high level of identification with the majority group and a high level of 
identification with the ethnic minority group and marginality involves a low degree of identification 
with the majority group and a low degree of identification with the ethnic minority group. 
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5.2.2.  The ‘rude boys’ 
 
The second type, the ‘rude boy’ identity, seems to be the identity adopted by the 
majority. This identity type is usually associated with disaffected, usually 
unemployed young males. They do not distinguish between religion and culture and 
have a strong sense of Pakistani religious nationalism. The distinction between 
religion and culture is not made since they are taught through the madrassahs and/or 
their parents a cultural identity which includes religious and cultural values and 
makes no distinction between the two. The practice of the previous generation is 
required to be perpetuated through the maintenance of cultural identity.  
 
And then you got people on the bottom of the scale right, which is 
around here, the majority of people around here I’d say are 
unemployed I dunno they’re in a culture now where they’re just 
thrown around together in groups right and over here there’s sad 
stories, what do they do, my mate’s got a job, what’s he doing, he’s 
packing and he getting piss-rate. That’s nothing for… (1-1) 
 
I think they’re a significant minority. I mean I’m talking about people 
who seem very, very disenfranchised and totally at a loss, who’ve got 
no idea where they’re coming from, pick up on little bits of identity, 
mainly maybe you know I’m talking particularly about the Mirpuri 
community, they will pick up on the chauvinism of where they come 
from and certain aspects of, it’s almost tribal really, feudalistic, so 
they’ll pick up on that in terms of giving themselves a sense of identity 
but there is this whole mixture of street culture and sort of LA gangs…  
(2-1) 
 
The third people are that they don’t know much about their faith, their 
parents don’t know about it, they have had no… they haven’t done 
their own research about the faith, they have very little education 
themselves and the parents didn’t have the education and they don’t 
know Islam, what Islam is, and therefore they are intertwined with the 
Pakistani culture, or Kashmiri culture, or Bangladeshi culture and 
Islam. They don’t know, they can’t separate, and therefore they 
sometime innocently see that this part of Islam while it isn’t, and to 
some extent we’re all guilty of that. (2-4) 
 
Their cultural consumption is a mixture of signifiers and identifiers from the 
American black culture industry, the Indian film industry based in Bombay, and 
South Asian folk music, usually the Punjabi bhangra. Religious and ethnic identity is 
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strong, though religious practice varies considerably within this type ranging from the 
fully practising to the twice yearly mosque visitors
65
. The three sub-components of 
this identity are the bhangra/Bollywood component, the rap/hip-hop component and 
the post-industrial, Northern ghetto component. The first two components are 
examples of social creativity. The bhangra/Bollywood component re-evaluates a 
previously negative characteristic – that of being Asian – in a positive manner by 
celebrating the entertainment dimension of the Asian cultural diasporic experience.  
 
So I think there is something in the subconscious of our young people 
in terms of their cultural heritage, their cultural affiliation and identity 
that they don’t feel at ease still with reggae although in any young 
community you always have a minority but the majority of them are 
into bhangra, are into qawwalis, into Alaap… (2-2) 
 
The rap/hip-hop component similarly re-evaluates a previously negative characteristic 
as a positive characteristic, in that being non-white and living in a ghetto can be 
associated with power and esteem in the form of rappers or hip-hop artists – both of 
which are widely celebrated within the popular music industry. Some of the 
interviewees alluded as to why black cultural artefacts were so popular amongst 
South Asian Muslim youth: 
 
I think that is also the case, especially a lot of the rap music talks about 
the situation of the Negroes in America, about racism, about problems 
with the police and other things. The other thing also is that a lot of the 
young people lack role models, within their own community who they 
can look up to, say this is my role model, this is the person I’d like to 
follow cos he does this, this and this. So there’s a lack of role models, 
so Muslim children or Asian or white kids they see people like Tupac 
and Snoop Doggy Dog they see them as role models because they 
know how to speak, talk the language, the designer gear they wear, so 
they went to emulate that person. (1-3) 
 
… the black culture is seen as anti-authority and stick two fingers up at 
the establishment, so they feel that they’re part of that culture right, 
they’re saying “Look, we’re bad as well and we’re outside your laws 
as well and we’ll do what we like”. (1-2) 
 
Q. So, why black people, why not white people? 
 
                                                 
65
 Eid is a twice yearly festival in which the day of festival begins with prayers at the local mosque. 
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A. Because from the early days through their educational life and work 
life, because of that discrimination that they’ve suffered, they can 
associate with themselves more with black people than with white 
people. (1-5) 
 
However, this appropriation of culture simultaneously involved the appropriation of 
representations of the ‘black man’, i.e. there was an internalisation of the 
representation of the ‘black man’ as criminal and dangerous (Howarth, 2000): 
 
Yeah maybe because they’ve lost in a sense, yeah… they’re fighting 
white people, generally I think personally when a white person sees a 
black person they have that fear inside them that the black man is 
strong right, and if you say ought to ‘em they’re gonna knock ya. 
Whereas at one time right, Muslims right we were passive society, and 
a gora would say “Ya black bastard, Paki” whatever right and our 
parents would say “No puttar66 don’t say anything, forget it, he’s only 
using his mouth”, maybe it’s because of our religion right because it 
preaches peace. But the black man, the black person is a lot stronger. 
White people are scared of them. So they think bring a bit of culture in 
right so white people are not gonna mess about with us. Personally 
that’s what I feel, it’s probably got something to do with that. In a 
sense, they can relate to black people a bit more because they’re 
persecuted the same as us… (1-1) 
 
This cultural transference has meant that black youth culture in North America has 
become a source of identifiers for young South Asian Muslim males in Bradford. 
This acceptance and projection of cultural symbols that are associated with black 
culture is in contrast to the rejection of the term ‘black’ as a unificatory label to be 
adopted by all ethnic minority communities in opposition to racism as was suggested 
by anti-racist groups during the seventies and eighties. The community leaders 
rejected the term ‘black’ in favour of ‘Asian’, yet, Asian youth cultures have come to 
identify strongly with black youth cultures. The influence of American-based black 
youth culture on Asian youth culture was obvious for the insiders, yet most of the 
outsiders, especially the non-South Asian Muslims
67
, failed to recognise the relevance 
of the question. 
 
This social strategy involves the rejection of a negative stereotype, that of the ‘Paki’, 
and a simultaneous celebration of South Asian culture and racial victimisation 
                                                 
66
 ‘Puttar’ is Punjabi for ‘son’. 
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through the championing of forms of culture, such as the qawwali, bhangra, or hip-
hop (or a hybrid mixture of all three), which act as strategies of social creativity. The 
negative is evaluated as positive. The ‘rude boy’ strategy similarly presents a number 
of shared attributes with other types offered in the literature. This strategy is 
equivalent to Hall’s (1992a) counter ethnicity, Hutnick’s (1991) strategy of 
dissociation (involving a high level of identification with the in-group culture and low 
level of identification with out-group culture), Peach and Glebe’s (1995) political 
strategy of ghettoisation, Knott et al.’s (1993) strategy of cultural synthesis and 
Werbner’s (1996) identification of a pan South Asian cultural aesthetic. 
 
5.2.3.  The ‘extremists’ 
 
The third ideal type is characterised by an assertive religious identification that seeks 
to resist the dominant representations of Muslims. The move towards an authentic 
religious practice in a non-Muslim society initiates a tension between what is 
regarded as balanced and normal, and what is regarded as extreme and unreasonable. 
Much of those signified by this ideal type either tend towards the path of 
rejectionism, or are concerned that they are heading in that direction. 
 
…then there’s a great number who are aware who are in Muslim 
groupings, maybe they’ve found some other expression for being in 
this society for trying to define their identity. (2-1) 
 
Some people do the other extreme and become very narrow and rigid 
in their Islam as a defence mechanism against what they feel is an 
attack upon them, because they don’t think they can answer the 
questions they become very dogmatic, yeah. (1-2) 
 
There are those who are trying to define their Islamic identity, of 
trying to become good role models, becoming good Muslims, trying to 
live by the tenets and teachings of Islam which doesn’t mean ok, 
doesn’t mean that you become an extremist in everything, that Islam 
teaches you to be a balanced person, to live in the society that you live 
with, to progress, to move forward, to change the status quo, to 
improve the situation of the people, that’s what Islam is about. (1-3) 
 
This strategy requires the challenging of the dominant social representation, and as 
such, the representations involved with this social strategy are polemical 
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representations. In this particular case, the stereotype of the ‘Muslim’ is portrayed as 
backward and anti-modern, and the response of the Muslim identity option is, for 
instance, to take an example of anti-modern practices such as the wearing of the 
headscarf and to trans-code it or re-evaluate it in a positive manner by suggesting that 
it allows for women to be judged according to their character and ability and not their 
physical appearance. This example is an example of polemical representations being 
used as social strategies by minority groups.  
 
This type of response is one that explicitly makes a distinction between religious 
values and cultural values. Jacobson (1996b) suggests that this development occurs 
because religious boundaries are more clear-cut and provide more essential meaning 
than cultural boundaries.  
 
Right I think a lot of young people are experiencing Islam and let me 
give you a bit of the history here, because many of the parents that 
came here they didn’t know much about Islam themselves, they saw 
Islam as certain ritualistic things so when the child is five, six, seven, 
they make he learns the Qur’an, he knows how to pray but the basic 
teachings of Islam are ignored, the children are sent to the mosque so 
they go for three four hours every day, they read the Qur'an rote 
learning but they don’t… but they don’t learn the essence of its 
message, you know, they don’t… the parents don’t develop the child’s 
character, the love of Islam, the respect for parents, respect for the 
community, teachers, all those things that are imbibed in the Qur’an 
and Islamic teachings, so as young people are older and those who 
come to Islam they realise that on there is a dichotomy here between 
Islam and culture, Islam says this, but the culture and my parents say 
this, do you understand, so there is that thing, young people are 
breaking away from this cultural mould and they are trying to develop 
their identity as Muslims who are living in Europe, in Britain, and not 
in essence say because my parents are from Pakistan… (1-3) 
 
The Muslim identity strategy corresponds with Hall’s (1992a) religious orthodoxy 
strategy, Hutnick’s (1991) dissociation strategy, Peach and Glebe’s (1995) political 
organisation strategy, Knott et al..’s (1993) religious identity strategy and Werbner’s 
(1996) Islamic reformist strategy. Jacobson (1996b) identifies the Muslim identity 
strategy but isolates several sub-components such as protesting as Muslims and 
radical Islam. 
 
5.2.4. Identities as ideal types 
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A general reference to these three types is provided in the following quotes:  
 
I would say the majority are in two type but there could be more than 
two types yeah. One who understood their culture, religion and 
background and have good understanding with their parents and one 
who are not sure and there are some who are opposing it. (2-6) 
 
I mean I think some people leave Islam completely, some people do 
the other extreme and become very narrow and rigid in their Islam as a 
defence mechanism against what they feel is an attack upon them… 
And, but the vast majority is just becoming indifferent, they say “I’m 
Muslim” but they’re indifferent to Islam. (1-2) 
 
The following long discussion provides an overview of the three types as identified 
by a South Asian Muslim politician:  
 
A. I’m not sure. I mean.. I think it’s… I also see the emergence 
amongst Muslim youth either they go extreme over there or… Those 
who have gone, for instance some of the Muslim youth organisations, 
I’m not naming but there are few of them who are probably moving 
forwards to the extreme and there are those who have become totally 
pathetic, and those who are moving towards the extreme, they can be 
assertive but their assertion is sometimes not acknowledged. The white 
establishment write them off saying you are just a fringe group, not 
representing the mainstream of Muslim youth and there are those who 
are simply preoccupied with their economic development, they’re 
not… as long they have their money. Then there’s the majority, so 
becomes very retreated, you see… 
 
Q. Into themselves?  
 
A. Yeah, and become cynics. 
 
Q. So there you have identified three main groups, there’s the… 
 
A. Activists. 
 
Q. The activists, then there is shall we say, people who are… 
 
A. Who are aspiring to be middle-class, they are quite capable of doing 
things, they have the abilities, they’ve got the intelligence, they’ve got 
the qualifications, the ability to organise, but they’re not investing in 
their community or whatever it is, they’re only interested in 
themselves…  
 
Q. And this is the assimilative type?  
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A. I think that they are not assimilated yet but I think that they are 
because I mean they believe that in order to be accepted and in order to 
be able to succeed in this society they have to make some 
compromises. And the third group which is the most unfortunate, they 
have either retreated to their own enclaves, they have become cynics, 
they have become cynical. They think that… 
 
Q. What do you mean by enclaves?  
 
A. Into their own sort of areas of where we have heavy concentrations 
of Muslims in certain conurbations, from a country in certain areas of 
the cities like in Oak lane… 
 
Q. Leeds Road?  
 
A. And they are the ones, they in a way have become very despondent. 
There is a permanent sense of hopelessness… (2-3) 
 
The above quote provides clear identification of the three types. These three types 
represent a typology, and as stated at the beginning of this section, a typology can 
simplify the complexity and heterogeneity of actual lived experience, and though 
these three types were the most oft-mentioned, some interviewees did refer to other 
types. 
 
There’s people that are Islamic… middle class people that are just 
trying to get on in their lives, they got their own, they got their 
religion, they’re into their religion right but not too heavily, they got a 
decent job to got to, they got a decent house and that’s ok, and they 
don’t really want to mess it up. (1-1) 
 
Then there is a very large group of young people who having from 
Muslim homes, having come from Muslim countries, their affiliation 
and links with Muslim is only as far as they have Muslim names or 
they come from Muslim families. Equally I think they have a very 
vague notion about the countries of origin they come from. In terms of 
society here, they feel that for a variety of reasons they feel that they 
are not having opportunities given to them whereby they can compete 
on equal level with the society in terms of employment, businesses, in 
terms of their own personal development (2-2)  
 
The interviewee in the first quote is referring to an Islamic identification that is 
combined with social mobility, and the interviewee in the second quote is identifying 
a cultural assimilationist approach that is detached from opportunities for social 
mobility. I would suggest that the three types of identity should be understood as 
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ideal types, representing three points on a triangle that represents the variety of ideal 
positioning that is available to South Asian Muslim youth in Bradford. The three 
ideal types can be diagrammatically represented as below in figure 5.1., such that an 
identity can be positioned at any point in the circle around the triangle. Each point on 
the triangle corresponds with alternative discourses and social and cultural practices.  
 
The spatial depiction of such identity positioning permits a certain level of flexibility 
for identity expression, that is, it allows for the possibility of numerous forms of 
identity expression which do not correspond exactly with the three identity ideal 
types. For example, the two alternative types identified above could be understood as 
being positioned between two points on the triangle. The first would be positioned in 
between the ‘coconut’ and the ‘extremist’, and the second would be positioned in 
between the ‘rude boy’ and the ‘coconut’. So for example, the two positions could be 
depicted as occupying points A and B respectively in figure 5.1. below. 
 
Figure 5.1. Distribution of ideal types as potential identity positions 
 
                                                        coconuts   
 
 
                                                                          ×B                                                
                                          A× 
 
 
                                    extremists                    rude boys  
  
 
 
 
 
 
The identities are examples of hybridity (Bhabha, 1994) in relation to their extraction 
from cultural reservoirs i.e. they are not monolithic and so it is not the case that one 
option is exclusively Western-sourced, another Asian-sourced and a third Islamic-
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sourced. There is a tension in each type that is at least tri-polar, as the youth attempt 
‘to achieve equality and recognition in British society without affronting their 
parental values’ (Gillespie, 1995, p. 5). 
 
5.3. The emergence of Muslim identity discourse 
 
Participant observation led to the identification of the incorporation of identity 
politics discourse by South Asian Muslim youth in Bradford. ‘Rights talk’ had 
assumed common currency. Such talk centres around the rejection of a hegemonic 
representation which has the result of discriminatory practices. The stereotypes of 
‘Paki’ and ‘Muslim’ as hegemonic representations have the combined effect of 
spoiling the identities of South Asian Muslim youth in Bradford which they see 
objectified through the police station and the patterns of house moving which act as 
examples of what are perceived to be discriminatory practices. The exacerbation of 
difference calls for the discourse of identity rights. But in this case, the source of self-
identification is religion such that the identity being advocated is Muslim identity. 
This section will examine the relation between Muslim identity and the ‘Rushdie 
affair’ initially, and will then move on to discuss the perceived influence of mediatic 
globalisation upon Muslim identity. That there has been an emergence of Muslim 
identity in the face of stigmatising hegemonic representations, and that this is down to 
an enhanced self-perception, was recognised by the interviewees
68
. I wish, however, 
to begin by discussing the content and nature of identity discourse itself. The 
following is an extract from the interview with a senior youth worker:  
 
Q. Do you think in looking at Bradford over the last ten/fifteen years, 
there has been a an emergence of Muslim identity?  
 
A. Yes, I think so. 
 
Q. Why do you think that has been the case?   
 
A. Because, people are becoming less afraid to show it. There’s 
something about passageways and rites, that people will have the 
confidence to say, “It’s alright, I’m a Muslim and I do this and that’s 
ok, and I’m gonna damn well do it”. And people say “It’s ok”. 
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emergence of Muslim identity, but it is not possible to categorically state from this data alone that this 
emergence is directly related to the ‘Rushdie affair’. 
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Whether it is, or the Sikhs or whatever… And that’s a general 
acceptance but it’s also starting as a general confidence as an 
individual. That’s the interesting… 
 
Q. Yeah, do you think it’s something that has come from behind the 
scenes, that they might have prayed at home, and kept quiet about it, 
and now they’re more confident about saying… not even saying, about 
being as they are, being open, public?  
 
A. I think it’s always happened, except now people saying “I feel 
strong enough to say, I feel confident”, and being very open about it.  
 
Q. So why do you think, what causes that change? Is it just a passage 
of time or is it something else?  
 
A. It’s not just time, it is passage. It is passage, but it is not just about 
passage of time. I think it is about individual’s unnecessary fears being 
diminished so they feel more capable of doing it. I think it is about the 
indigenous population’s fear diminishing, therefore allowing it to 
happen. It is about people’s confidence and understanding their rights, 
to say, “I am allowed to do this so I will do this”. There’s too many 
simplistic answers in this world and I’m not sure there is answer to 
why. (3-5) 
 
The youth worker has provided an account of the feelings and thought processes that 
stigmatised identities’ experience as they emerge in the public sphere. A close 
reading of the above extract reveals the essential structure of identity politics 
discourse. I will refer to the second and fourth answers quoted above in order to 
outline the structure.  
 
Identity discourse is characterised by a decreasing sense of fear: “people are 
becoming less afraid to show it”, “I think it is about individual’s unnecessary fears 
being diminished”. This is coupled with an increased sense of self-confidence: 
“people will have the confidence to say ‘It’s alright, I’m a Muslim and I do this and 
that’s ok, and I’m gonna damn well do it’”, “…they feel more capable of doing it”. In 
the first answer the increased self-confidence is related to defiance. This in turn is 
related to an increased sense of acceptance from wider society: “And people say ‘It’s 
ok’. Whether it is, or the Sikhs or whatever… And that’s a general acceptance”, “I 
think it is about the indigenous population’s fear diminishing, therefore allowing it to 
happen”. 
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The reverse of the above quotes from the extract provides an insight into the social 
psychological situation before the emergence of identity politics discourse. This is 
characterised by a fear on behalf of the wider community (“it is about the indigenous 
population’s fear diminishing”), there is similarly a fear on behalf of the stigmatised 
identity (“people are becoming less afraid to show it”) which affects their self 
confidence (“people will have the confidence to say, ‘It’s alright, I’m a Muslim and I 
do this and that’s ok, and I’m gonna damn well do it’”), meaning that the identity is 
not expressed publicly (“people saying ‘I feel strong enough to say, I feel confidant’, 
and being very open about it”) since it is not permitted in the public sphere (“to say, ‘I 
am allowed to do this so I will do this’”).  
 
Identity politics is, in this example, about the assertion of a spoiled identity in the 
public sphere. Two interviewees spoke of the relation of signifiers in the public 
sphere to Muslim identity. 
 
…there’s been an emergence of people… if you look at sisters now, 
they wear hijab whereas ten years ago… there’s a massive jump, so 
many sisters are now wearing it yeah, to show they’re Muslims, to be 
proud that we are Muslim. If you look at the brothers who’ve got 
beards yeah, who go to the mosque, it’s a lot more. (1-2) 
 
Q. Do you think these stereotypes make youngsters embarrassed about 
being Asian or being Muslim?  
 
A. Yeah I think they do I think they find it hard to exhibit their 
Muslim identity, I mean you’ll rarely find a Muslim walking round 
with a hat or a beard, and sisters it’s much harder for women, cos 
obviously they’ll stand out. If they’re wearing hijab or whatever… 
 
Q. There seems to be a lot more of that though, there’s a lot more 
young guys wearing beards and things like that? 
 
A. I mean that’s I think more and more people are reasserting 
themselves, those people that have come back as it were in inverted 
commas they are reasserting their identity and that’s only a small 
minority I think. (1-4) 
 
Identity politics discourse has so far been characterised by a decreasing sense of fear 
coupled with a increasing sense of self-confidence and acceptance which leads to the 
public display of identity signifiers. Identity politics discourse is also characterised by 
a sense of victimisation around a particular category, this being the cause of 
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victimisation: “We are being persecuted because we are members of category X”. 
This type of discourse has been central to the development of Muslim identity and 
has assumed, after mediatic globalisation, worldwide resonance. 
 
…so people do talk about it, they do realise, that Bosnia who are they, 
predominantly Muslims, people of Kosovo, Albania, who are they, 
predominantly Muslims, the people of Iraq, who are they, they are 
Muslims, the people of Kashmir, who are they, they are Muslims, the 
people of Palestine, who are they, they are Muslims, you know, even 
Sudan when they bombed the pharmaceutical – Sudan is a 
predominantly Muslim country, so I’ve quoted you seven countries of 
places around the world, all seven are Muslims, so obviously when 
Muslim young people see this on the TV… obviously it makes you 
realise and it strengthens your identity... (1-3) 
 
The reporting of global Muslim-related events has had a compound effect on Muslim 
identity in Bradford. The nineteen nineties witnessed a series of major international 
events that involve Muslims or Muslim countries. This included the Palestinian 
intifada, the Gulf War, the war in former Yugoslavia, the bombings being linked to 
Usama bin Laden, the 1998 bombings of Iraq, the nuclear test explosions in Pakistan 
and the war in Kosovo. The notion of the ummah – the global Muslim community – 
requires the local Muslim community to, at least, appreciate and empathise, if not 
more, with the Muslim ummah and those parts of it that are experiencing suffering. 
The effect of a series of such continuous international episodes on a local identity 
such as the Muslim community in Bradford has led to a concomitant strengthening of 
Muslim identity, if only at the symbolic level. The global events augmented Muslim 
identity in Bradford in several ways: they were a reinforcement and universalisation 
of the stereotype that was previously viewed to be locally-specific and the 
discrimination and victimisation that they experienced at a local level is globalised, 
the identity discourse therefore assumed global proportions. The above analysis 
provides a transitional account of the emergence of identity discourse. This account 
suggests that the process of transition is without resistance. It is my suggestion that 
this is not the case in this particular study. I will examine below the consequences of 
the use of rights discourse centred around religious identity during the ‘Rushdie 
affair’. 
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5.3.1. Religion as the basis of rights discourse 
 
A study of the social psychology of identity politics has to include an historical 
approach. This is because identity politics movements are tied to key historical events 
(Calhoun, 1994). I would suggest that Muslim identity discourse is tied to the 
‘Rushdie affair’ and mediatic globalisation. I would further suggest that a study of 
Bradford is relevant to this theme since Bradford was, and perhaps is, perceived as a 
key location for assertive forms of Muslim identity politics discourse. Race had been 
a source of political identification during the eighties, the publication of The Satanic 
Verses, however, led to the adoption of rights discourse but in relation to religion as a 
identificatory category. 
 
The ‘Rushdie affair’ was not just about the protest about the book as 
someone who was at the centre of the protest and the organisation of it 
in Bradford. Our protest was… in Bradford… was not just about the 
book itself, it was about putting Muslim religious agenda and Muslim 
religious identity very much on the map and saying to society “We are 
also here and our presence matters and our presence should be…”. We 
begin to accept the rights of minorities, black and Asian minorities to 
live here, within that, the Muslim also had a right to live and to be 
respected and their identity to be recognised and to be seen in a 
positive light as a religious identity because that was their source, that 
is the source of energy for Muslims and that… (2-2)  
 
The issue highlighted here is one of relevance, religion was seen as a source of 
identification and the ‘Rushdie affair’ was about recognition and respect according to 
the choice of identification on behalf of the minority. However, such demands were 
met with rejection by the wider society. One campaigner, who was similarly at the 
heart of the campaign in Bradford in calling for the withdrawal of the book, spoke at 
length about these feelings of rejection. After describing in great length the 
experience of economic discrimination in Bradford over a twenty year period he said:  
 
So I think the young people have experienced quite a bit of obstacles 
in that way and they were expecting when the time comes they will 
fully be able to share that, they fully be accepted. Then they were 
hoping that they would be fully accepted and they felt that they were a 
part of it til this Satanic Verses came and then many of the young 
people who made remarks, some of them had written letters, which we 
have bags and bags of it at the council for mosques, they say they 
don’t know what’s… they fully… they’re so grossly rejected, every 
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contribution this society has done, every good thing these young 
people or old people have done in this society for many, many years, 
decades, just one thing all they were asking for is a we are a faith 
community and we want to be treated with fairness and respect. They 
weren’t asking for favours or any materialistic thing, all they were 
asking for recognition of their wholeness, not just part of the Muslim 
community but the whole of the Muslim community. And that was the 
experience of that time. (2-4) 
 
It is the relation between contribution and recognition that was felt to have been 
disrupted by the ‘Rushdie affair’. The result of this has been a turning inwards, an 
introspective look away from the gaze of the disrespectful, dominant ‘other’. 
 
…when you are rejected by the society at large, you will look inwards 
and you will try to investigate who you are and I have heard comments 
from the library particularly Mr Qureshi - the Book Centre, that 
although The Satanic Verses after we started protesting would have 
sold perhaps but he said that many, many times more Islamic books 
were sold to the young Muslims, young peoples who took keen 
interest in the Islamic literature, and some of the non-Muslims bought 
some Islamic literature as well to try and find out what it is… and we 
have got more experience that many, many of the young Muslims have 
started to take a keen interest in finding out what Islam is. …it’s 
mostly the rejection of the society at large which made the young 
people look for their identity. (2-4) 
 
I think it did, it made them realise that there is elements of racism, 
religious hatred, misunderstanding, so I think to a lot of young people 
that was the case and it helped them mould an identity and especially 
young people, it made them think who they actually are, where do they 
fit within this spectrum of Britain, are they Pakistanis, are they British, 
are they white, are they Muslims, are they Asians, who are they, it 
questions people who am I at the end of the day? (1-3) 
 
The peculiarity of the chain of events require some comment. The ‘Rushdie affair’ as 
stated above was a call for recognition of religious identity. This was met with 
rejection. This was followed by an increased religious identification that was 
somehow due to rejection. I will return to a possible explanation of this later in this 
chapter. 
5.3.2. The ‘Bradford Muslim’: The social construction of radical Islam 
 
Identity politics movements are rooted to location and history, and certain events and 
places are related to the emergence of identity politics discourse as they are perceived 
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to be the representatives of the more assertive branch of the movement. The 
community in Bradford is perceived as such a prototype of an ethnic minority 
community (in this case the Muslim community) in a multicultural setting engaged in 
identity politics assertion. Its pressures, tensions, crises, structural arrangements, 
patterns of development, resolutions, endurance and stability are seen as typical of the 
development of an ethnic minority community within a multi-cultural city. It is 
therefore regularly under the observant eye of the political scientist, social planner, 
journalist, sociologist and government advisor. This focus on Bradford is due to a 
social representation of Bradford and the Muslim community in Bradford that dates 
back to the early eighties as the Bradford Muslim community was involved in three 
campaigns: a campaign against Ray Honeyford, a campaign for halal meat in schools 
and a campaign against The Satanic Verses. The media themselves are viewed as 
constructing their own social representation of the experience of multiculturalism in 
Bradford: 
 
I’d say this is a media concoction in that when, if you study umm… 
anti-racist politics in the history of Bradford, there were lots of local 
authorities that were coming up with anti-racism initiatives through 
mid to the late seventies, for some reason, I’m not quite sure why, 
Bradford was seen as one of the initial or prime movers in 
multicultural politics or multicultural relations… This is going back to 
the early eighties and Bradford specifically came out, and again it 
wasn’t anything different that was being done from places like Slough 
or Birmingham but for some reason the media latched onto us and the 
with the Honeyford affair and the work that was… the orchestrated 
campaign from the far-right part of this sort of Thatcherite revolution 
really, they homed in on Bradford and I think that’s done a lot of 
disservice to Bradford as a positive community. It’s always the case of 
people coming to Bradford for research and there was no reason to 
focus on Bradford as being anywhere… particularly different from 
anywhere else and I think as a consequence of Honeyford which went 
on for a couple of years, but then immediately when the book was 
burnt in eighty nine they sort of latched onto it straight away. I think 
that’s sort of rooted in a media creation really… (2-1) 
 
Bradford is perceived as a laboratory for race relations and particularly 
for relations between Muslims and non-Muslims, a laboratory for not 
only Britain but for Europe, from just the number of visits we have in 
this office from all over Europe. In fact we had yesterday a delegation 
from Russia, looking into the whole aspect of how the city’s coping 
with its multi-faith identity so certainly I think Bradford issue of race 
identities, people are much more interested how this large Muslim 
community is coming to terms with and how this wider society coming 
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to terms with this very large growing… So certainly, Bradford is very 
much in news, very much in… So therefore Bradford Muslims are 
kind of barometer, it’s a measurement to the state of affairs of the 
Muslim community throughout UK. So anything we do becomes a 
standard and partly that is about Satanic Verses and partly that is about 
Bradford’s Muslim community’s kind of vocal protest, some of the 
most significant political protests which affected this country and 
society came from Bradford. Halal meat issue… multi-cultural 
education policy issue, the whole aspect of teaching R.E. in schools 
and alternative worship to Christianity came from Bradford, 
Honeyford affair which was a major kind of breakthrough on 
highlighting racism within schools was Bradford. So if you look 
Bradford has this history of organised, not one off, organised, 
sustained, long-term campaigning… The Honeyford affair went on for 
years and Satanic Verses went on for years, halal meat went on for 
years, so from 1981/1982 to almost 1988 there isn’t a single year in 
the history of Bradford Muslims when the Bradford community was 
not campaigning and protesting on a given issue. So what you call a 
decade of Muslim protest and it came from Bradford and that to some 
extent elevated the Muslim community’s position within the Muslims 
community as a whole… and it also became a focus for media 
attention as well as criticism. (2-2) 
 
I’ve had CBS in America, NBC, French TV, BBC, ITN, I’ve lost 
count quite honestly of the people that want to come here. I’ve had the 
New York Times here wanting to do stories about Bradford and about 
community sometimes, sometimes we’ve said yeah, most of the time 
we’ve said no because all they’re trying to do is use Bradford to tell a 
story, and have a go. (3-3) 
 
Whether or not the Bradford Muslim community has been more assertive in relation 
to other communities, it has certainly become the object of media and academic 
attention. However, the mediatic and academic narrative that was constructed was 
repeatedly criticised.  
 
…we try to promote Bradford and there’s an awful lot of things that 
we think Bradford should celebrate, a lot of good things, but what is 
happening is the media, if they want a bad news story they’ll come to 
Bradford and find one, they won’t look for the good things, they’ll 
look for the bad and they’ll come and find the bad things or show the 
bad things and give Bradford, put it on the spotlight once again, and 
show it in a negative light and it’s so frustrating... (3-3) 
 
I think at every opportunity available, you may quote me here, I think 
they are busily engaged in depicting us as negative, fanatical, 
uncompromising community because of our history, they know. (2-3) 
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The frustration at the depiction of events as components of a constructed narrative 
was due to the community being subject to the processes of representation. The 
community itself was viewed as prototypical in its identity politics assertion and 
consequently, a leader in the challenging of the hegemonic discourse. The response to 
the challenge was the construction of a representation of the assertive subaltern: the 
‘Bradford Muslim’ – a radicalised version of an already existing representation. The 
event that initiated such a representation during the ‘Rushdie affair’ was the book 
burning and has become one of the two key significant events of the ‘Rushdie affair’ 
as described within the media. However, the response to the book burning was post 
hoc. One interviewee, a key member of the campaign, spoke of the discrepancy 
between the construction and wide diffusion of the representation through the popular 
image of the book burning in Bradford and the actual presence of the media at the 
demonstration.  
 
The interesting thing about Bradford is when the book was burnt, there 
was no media present. No one knows that… There was one 
photograph taken by a freelance journalist, a friend of mine who 
happened to be there. But there was no media present even to the 
extent of the local Telegraph and Argus… didn’t turn up. The 
Bradford… the book burning actually became important when 
Khomeini actually made the fatwa… Now the interesting thing is that 
all the footage which the media uses about the book burning, either the 
footage was based on the book which was burned in Blackburn or they 
used the footage from the video which we made ourselves. Okay, so 
the media itself has no record of the book burning other than these 
were the photographs… The week after, the freelance, once they 
became interested then they were digging for… and the only 
photograph they could find was the freelance photographer and when 
the TV wanted to show, initially they showed Blackburn and then they 
realised that Bradford made its own video so they actually bought it 
from the Council of Mosques. (2-2) 
 
The focus upon the book burning in Bradford led to a focus upon Bradford as a whole 
which in itself was a continuation of the representation of Bradford as a source of 
protest. The focus during the ‘Rushdie affair’ however led to a binary juxtaposition 
between identities. That of the liberal versus the Muslim.  
 
And I think most of that (the image) came from the Salman Rushdie 
time where the media was intentionally using people who were least 
eloquent and more stereotypical image as spokespersons for the 
Muslim community. These were persons not picked by the Muslim 
community, but picked by the media because they best fitted the image 
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they wanted to portray because they wanted to show that Salman 
Rushdie was enlightened and liberal and modern and good person and 
these were people who supposedly were backward and awful and 
intolerant. So they had to pick people in the community who best fit 
that image. So they find a guy, you know big beard and wore a hat, 
couldn’t speak English properly, ask him questions and then contrast 
that to Salman Rushdie or people, some white liberals defending his 
point of view. So I think from that the image stuck about the Muslims 
in Bradford as being sort of backward. (1-2) 
 
The interviewee attributed agency in this quote to the media, which is similar to the 
response to the police station i.e. that there is agency in those situations which 
involve objectifications of relations of power. One result of this in the ‘Rushdie 
affair’ was the construction of the ‘Bradford Muslim’. 
 
As noted earlier, the social representation of the ‘Bradford Muslim’ was found in 
Haroun’s (1997) analysis of the letters sent to the editors of newspapers during the 
‘Rushdie affair’. This representation was investigated in the interviews and was found 
to be anchored around three categories. The first is that of a religious community that 
is backward, living in the past and rigid in its application of law, essentially the 
antithesis of modernity.  
 
More fundamentalists, more narrow, more rigid, more stuck in the 
traditions, less willing to change, that kind of image is given yeah. 
…So, I think from that the image has stuck about the Muslims in 
Bradford as being sort of backward. (1-2) 
 
The second is that of a united community but in a politically challenging way and for 
a purpose that is held to be subversive, and so the community is represented as 
political, (and politically uncompromising), up-front/in your face, militant and 
consequently untrustworthy.  
 
…they probably see Bradford as more militant and more up front in 
terms of Islam than elsewhere… (3-3)  
 
One interviewee, when asked about the ‘Bradford Muslim’, described them as 
incorporating both of the above characteristics: 
 
More political, more in your face, highly religious, and living when 
people talk about the older generations living in the past, living in the 
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past, trying to create a Pakistan that disappeared ten/fifteen years 
ago… (3-5) 
 
The third category is that this is an ex-rural community (and only recently so) due to a 
large portion of the community having been displaced because of the building of a 
new dam and the chain migration that is associated with immigration to Britain from 
the Indian sub-continent (Shaw 1994). This category anchors the community as 
illiterate/uneducated, tight-knit, tribal and working class.  
 
The thing is when you’re talking about Bradford Muslims as people 
were at that time, they did have particular image of the Bradford 
Muslims as a separate entity and it was rightly or wrongly because I 
mean again factually I can’t back this up but there will be material 
there. It was migration form a rural community in the main, so that 
you were talking about families , people who had come not only from 
rural communities but fairly tight-knit local community and therefore 
would have different characteristics than maybe in other areas who 
maybe come other sorts of community, maybe more industrialised or 
something of that nature. (3-1) 
 
I would suggest that this is an example of the construction of a representation of an 
identity politics movement as an unreasonably assertive subaltern which attempts to 
challenge the hegemonic discourse. 
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5.4. Conclusion 
 
The first empirical study involved participant observation followed by interviews 
with eighteen key informers/specialists. The aim of this study was to explore the 
social psychology of South Asian Muslim youth with respect to identity and 
representation. This was divided into social representations of identities, identity 
responses as ideal types, and a new form of identity politics discourse. 
 
In terms of social representations of identities, the ‘Paki’ is anchored as uncivilised 
and non-white. The ‘Muslim’ is anchored as backward/anti-modern and aggressive. 
The social representation of ‘white society’ is anchored as racist (and subtly so), the 
police station as an objectification of ‘white power’ is anchored as separate, 
confrontational, intimidating and frightened.  
 
The three ideal types of identity response are ‘coconuts’, ‘rude boys’ and ‘extremists’. 
Each is related to the stereotypes of the ‘Paki’ and the ‘Muslim’. The ‘coconut’ ideal 
type involves the rejection of the stereotype and the maintenance of distance from the 
source of such stereotypes. The ‘rude boy’ ideal type involves an engagement through 
social creativity with the stereotype of the ‘Paki’. The ‘extremist’ ideal type similarly 
involves an engagement through social creativity with the stereotype of the ‘Muslim’.  
 
The third area of study is the development of an identity politics discourse that 
focuses around the issue of Muslim identity. This is historically and geographically 
particular to Bradford, as it is perceived as a spring of Muslim identity assertion, from 
which activism flows to other parts of the country. The employment of rights 
discourse for religious identity through campaigns that begun or were situated in 
Bradford led to the focusing of attention upon Bradford that was intensified during 
the ‘Rushdie affair’. This led in turn to the construction of an assertive antagonist, the 
‘Bradford Muslim’, one that challenges hegemony. The rights discourse, though by 
now had assumed common usage and, after a series of international crises involving 
Muslim populations, international relevance.  
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A key question of this thesis is how does the indigenous population respond to a 
resident internal ‘other’? The findings of this particular study are that it maintains its 
psychological integrity by maintaining distance. The stereotypes of the ‘Paki’, the 
‘Muslim’, the separating out of neighbourhoods, the police station – all these function 
to maintain separation and difference. The ‘Paki’ and the ‘Muslim’ are stereotypes 
that depict ‘otherness’ on the grounds of major Western discourses. Modernism and 
progress through civilisation are both central discourses in Western intellectual 
history and very much define what it is to be a British, European, or Western 
individual. So to be accused of being anti-modern and uncivilised is to be accused of 
being against the very essence of British, European and Western identity. The 
stereotypes therefore maintain ‘otherness’ at the most essential level. It is therefore 
hardly surprising that patterns emerge which suggest that community separation is 
being maintained. Similarly, the police station objectifies a necessity on the part of 
the police, and therefore authority, to maintain and highlight separation. As Eagleton 
(1991) writes: “Once power nakedly reveals its hand, it can become an object of 
political contestation” (p. 116). The problem with the police station is its naked 
aggression. If social psychology is in part the study of what is hidden and accepted 
even in disagreement, then the police station makes studying the social psychology of 
racism in Bradford an easier enterprise. The subtleties of racism, or the new type of 
racism, make the victim of racism wonder whether their perception of discrimination 
is nothing more than a delusion of victimisation. But the police station objectifies in a 
crude manner the racism that is perceived (and often difficult to detect) in 
representations of authority. The police station therefore in attempting to fulfil the 
remit of policing the community merely serves to confirm the community’s fears that 
the police are racist. The importance of the police station is that it objectifies the view 
of authority towards the internal ‘other’: a brick wall embodies a psychological 
barrier to integration.  
 
The South Asian Muslim youth in Bradford respond to the stereotypes of their 
‘otherness’ in two separate ways. They either internalise the stereotypes (e.g. the 
‘coconuts’) or they resist the stereotypes (e.g. the ‘rude boys’ and the ‘extremists’). 
Internalisation of the stereotypes necessitates the maintenance of distance from the 
source of the stereotypes. This strategy is similar to that of those members of ‘white 
society’ who are seeking to maintain psychological and actual distance from the 
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South Asian Muslim community as mentioned above. The other two strategies 
involve the resistance of the stereotypes. One type, the ‘rude boys’, involves the 
resistance of the stereotype of the ‘Paki’ and the other type, the ‘extremists’, involves 
the resistance of the stereotype of the ‘Muslim’. The resistance in both cases takes the 
form of trans-coding or social creativity. That is, a previously negative characteristic 
is re-interpreted rhetorically in a positive manner. The representation is therefore 
contested and ceases to be hegemonic. 
 
Though both ‘rude boy’ and ‘extremist’ ideal types involve a rejection of stereotypes 
through linguistic reflections, their engagement with the hegemonic discourses is 
more complicated through the incorporation of the identity politics discourse. This 
utilisation of rights discourse was initially around the issue of race, for example in the 
campaigns involving the Bradford 12 and the Honeyford affair. But the halal meat 
campaign and the ‘Rushdie affair’ brought religion into the identity discussion. In 
fact, the ‘Rushdie affair’ was in part, according to some of the key leaders of the 
campaign in Bradford who were interviewed for the purposes of this chapter, a 
campaign for self-definition as a religious minority seeking identity rights. The issue 
of The Satanic Verses was particularly problematic because the book was perceived 
to be essentially undermining, through sarcasm and sacrilege, a central foundation of 
belief in Islam: Prophethood. The campaign against the book was therefore a 
campaign to maintain the bare necessities of a religious identity.  
 
The South Asian Muslim community in Bradford had been categorised as an 
especially assertive community and the burning of the book in Bradford combined 
two factors that accelerated the campaign. First of all, a book was burnt, and secondly 
it was burnt in Bradford. The importance of Bradford is that the Bradford South 
Asian Muslim community was seen as prototypical of the Muslim community as a 
whole. The ‘Bradford Muslim’ then emerged as a social representation, this being a 
developed form of the representation of the ‘Muslim’. The ‘Bradford Muslim’ was 
anchored as backward, political and ex-rural. So the campaign for protection from 
stereotypes through identity politics discourse resulted in the construction of another 
stereotype, that of the ‘Bradford Muslim’. The challenge of the hegemonic resulted in 
the assertion of representational power by the hegemonic discourse through the 
construction of a representation of those that contested the hegemonic representation. 
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Difference is therefore maintained, and previous stereotypes of the ‘Muslim’ are 
superseded by developed versions of their previous forms, the ‘backward’ and the 
‘assertive’ are now more ‘backward’ and more ‘assertive’, because not only do they 
burn the book, but they are also willing to kill the author.  
 
This response to identity assertion (i.e. rejection) has, however, peculiarly led to an 
assertion of Muslim identity. This is because the response has confirmed what the 
identity discourse had assumed. Identity discourse assumes discrimination, 
subjugation and victimisation. The response to Muslim identity assertion, by the 
media at least, confirms such assumptions. It was during the ‘Rushdie affair’ that 
these issues were raised in the national and international public sphere and it is the 
argumentation during the ‘Rushdie affair’ and their connection to social 
representations that we will examine next. 
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6.0. DIALOGICAL ARGUMENTATION DURING THE ‘RUSHDIE AFFAIR’ 
 
This chapter contains the results of an examination into the nature and content of 
dialogical argumentation during the ‘Rushdie affair’. Five television programmes that 
were aired during the ‘Rushdie affair’ have been analysed for their rhetorical content. 
Bi-polar positions were identified and the arguments will first be listed according to 
their main points, examples being provided in each case. This detail has been 
provided so that the reader can access the contents of the arguments during the 
‘Rushdie affair’. This will be followed by a structural analysis of some of the 
processes of argumentation that the sides adopted. The manner in which social 
representations are utilised to support argumentation has been found to be similar for 
both sides, though they represented radically different views. The use of social 
representations will be seen to be integral to the form and nature of argumentation. 
 
6.1. The identification of rhetorical positions 
 
Four main rhetorical positions were identified
69
, representing different lines of 
argument, each reflecting different social groupings. These were: the radical liberal 
position, the moderate liberal position, the moderate Muslim position and the radical 
Muslim position
70
. Each position corresponds to a group identity that is associated 
with certain representations of the affair. The two polarised views at the time of the 
affair were the Muslim/fundamentalist viewpoint and the liberal/writer’s viewpoint. 
These two categories form general viewpoints
71
, though particularisation could point 
to differences between different groups within these categories. For example, within 
the Muslim category, there were some groups who argued against the book but did 
not agree with the fatwa, while other groups supported the banning of the book and 
the fatwa. The two extreme opinions, signifying the poles of the dialogical axis, were 
represented by a fundamentalist form of Islam and a similarly extreme form of 
                                                 
69
 It is not necessary that the position is articulated by someone who holds the same view (Billig, 
1991). 
70
 This typology has been suggested by Modood (1998).  
71
 These two viewpoints are, for the sake of convenience, referred to as the liberal viewpoint and the 
Muslim viewpoint. It is acknowledged that there may be some liberals who share some views with the 
Muslim viewpoint, and vice versa. Similarly, many people participated in the debates who were neither 
liberal nor Muslim.  
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liberalism. The four positions can be related to the ‘Rushdie affair’ in the following 
table. 
 
Table 6.1. Rhetorical positioning on issues relating to the ‘Rushdie affair’ 
 
Rhetorical position Book burning Fatwa Islamophobia 
Radical liberal Disagree Disagree Disagree 
Moderate liberal Ambiguous Disagree Agree 
Moderate Muslim Agree Disagree Agree 
Radical Muslim Agree Agree Agree 
 
The moderate positions were, in the context of the ‘Rushdie affair’, rhetorically 
hybrid. The hybrid nature of these rhetorical positions was related (in different 
degrees) to the bi-polarised positions. They represented positions of compromise and, 
as such, shared rhetoric with both bi-polar positions as depicted in the table above.  
 
Each rhetorical item in the transcript was categorised according to four properties. 
Firstly, the position being articulated, secondly the articulator, thirdly the type of 
rhetoric and fourthly the direction of rhetoric. Table 6.2. below describes the 
distribution of the frequency of rhetorical items according to the person who 
articulated them. The table shows on average a high frequency for the radical liberal, 
a very low frequency for the moderate liberal, a moderately high frequency for the 
moderate Muslim, and a fairly low frequency for the radical Muslim position. The 
frequencies for the moderate and the radical Muslim positions vary considerably for 
the first four programmes which were aired in the immediate aftermath of the 
‘Rushdie affair’ (the fifth being aired a year later).  
 
Table 6.2. Frequency of rhetorical items per identity position
72
 
 
Rhetorical  
Position 
Pro. 1 Pro. 2 Pro. 3 Pro. 4 Pro. 5 Mean 
Radical liberal 53.5 43.3 58.9 62.6 29.6 50.9 
Moderate liberal 1.0 0.0 2.2 5.1 24.0 6.9 
Moderate Muslim 34.7 41.3 13.3 7.0 42.4 24.9 
Radical Muslim 0.0 12.5 16.7 13.1 0.0 8.8 
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Table 6.3. describes the distribution of ‘extreme’ position statements. These are those 
rhetorical items that represented polarised debate. Such that an ‘extreme’ rhetorical 
item would, in the case of the liberal position, articulate a radical liberal position, be 
articulated by a radical liberal, contain a primary
73
 form of rhetoric and be pro-liberal. 
The frequency of such ‘extreme’ items reveals the nature of rhetorical exchange 
during a crisis event. The table shows that ‘extreme’ items account for almost half of 
all rhetorical items. 
 
Table 6.3. Frequency of extreme rhetorical position statements 
 
Rhetorical Position Pro. 1 Pro. 2 Pro. 3 Pro. 4 Pro. 5 Mean 
Extreme liberal item 44.6 15.4 51.1 45.8 28.0 38.0 
Extreme Muslim item 18.8 15.4 0.0 4.2 24.0 11.7 
 
6.1.1.  The liberal rhetorical position 
 
The right to freedom of imagination: The campaign against the book by sections of 
the Muslim community had begun in India in September 1988 (Ahsan and Kidwai, 
1991). The campaign did not receive much attention until the book burning and the 
declaration of the fatwa. The liberal position had not been articulated extensively in 
the national press prior to these events. However, both the book burning and the 
fatwa precipitated discussion in the national public sphere. The issue of freedom of 
speech was central to the ‘Rushdie affair’. The liberals were defending Rushdie’s 
right to publish and the Muslims were advocating boundaries to such notions of 
freedom. The liberal position stressed the importance and the value of a writer’s 
imagination and suggested that freedom for writers will mean that offence will be 
caused to some. McEwan
74
 stated on this that:  
 
I think that it is important to bear in mind that if you live in a free 
society, one of the freedoms you have is to be daily outraged by what 
you read. We all are outraged and sometimes even insulted by other 
people’s opinions. And it’s the very nature of a pluralist society that 
                                                                                                                                           
72
 The frequencies in this table and in the following two tables are provided as percentages. 
73
 See later for explanations about types of rhetoric. 
74
 Readers wishing to check the identities of the individuals referred to in this and later sections should 
consult appendix (viii). 
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we just learn to live with the scuffs and rubs of those… of that kind of 
life.  
 
Peter, a bookseller in the Everyman discussion said: “We must as minorities and 
individuals be prepared to be offended, as I am… books that I sell in my shop many 
of them in some way or another the contents offend me”.  
 
The limitations of freedom of expression were acknowledged by those defending this 
position. Weldon admitted that she would be willing to consider changes to a text: 
“You change manuscripts for all sorts of reasons if it does not affect what is called the 
integrity of the text”. The issue of incitement to hatred is related to this point. 
Ignatieff said to Akhtar in The Late Show programme of 8
th
 May 1989:  
 
You’re making this as a tactical move, because you know that 
incitement to racial hatred is an absolute no, no. Even the free speech 
people on… on my side would be with you if you could prove that it 
incited to racial hatred, and that’s definitely true. If you could prove to 
me that it makes, you know, white citizens, or non-Asian, or non-
Islamic citizens of Bradford hate Muslims, I would definitely be with 
you… 
 
Winner said in Hypotheticals on a similar point: “I think the issue as to whether the 
film (sic) would enrage and turn people against any one religion or race is an issue”. 
This highlighted some of the dilemmas faced by the liberals on the issue of free 
speech. Winner was questioned on this in the Hypotheticals programme in which he 
said that he did not consider a brief suspension against marching for the National 
Front as a major infringement of the freedom of the nation. A suspension of book 
sales, however, was a different matter because that was a “suspension of the 
transmission of ideas”.  
 
Though the book may have been accepted as offensive, it was still regarded as worth 
defending under the right of freedom of expression. Waterstone, the owner of the 
chain of book stores expressed similar statements:  
 
I personally find Satanic Verses to be deeply offensive book, I have 
a… a… an instinctive dislike on anything which verges towards 
blasphemy but at the same time it is an important work. It is an 
interesting examination of the reaction of an intelligent atheist towards 
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divine revelations and believers. Now these are important issues. They 
may be offensive to… to see an examination but they are issues which 
are important to raise and should be raised.  
 
The liberals regarded the protection of this freedom as necessary. Mailer on this point 
said: “…people who sell books but don’t care enough about them to defend them are 
equal to writers who write books who don’t care enough them to er stand up for 
them”. Steiner described his reaction against those who refused to publish the book 
as: “Complete outrage and shame at that kind of cowardice”. 
 
The experience of the ‘Rushdie affair’: The liberals chose to describe the affair in 
dramatic ways: “These are extraordinary days for British culture”, “this whole 
business is one of the cruellest, most outrageous pieces of blackmail that we have 
ever lived through” and “the conflict between Islam and the West has escalated into a 
total confrontation of values and culture, not just between East and West but within 
the already strained multicultural fabric of British society” were some of the 
descriptions of the crisis used to begin television programmes.  
 
The liberal viewpoint perceived the affair as generating a climate of fear which would 
reduce the freedom that they had to write or speak. The Late Show programme of the 
22
nd
 February began with the following statement as part of its introduction: “Only 
fear can stop a writer from writing. Only fear can stop a book from being sold.” 
Mailer, when asked why the affair had become an issue of conscience for American 
writers, said:  
 
I obviously have been thinking about that for the last six days or so. 
And you know, we start writing, when we begin as novelists and we’re 
young, we usually write in great fear, we’re so afraid of the 
consequences of our work. We don’t know what’ll happen when the 
book comes out, we get the feeling that we will be killed when the 
book comes out. As you get older and you get more blasé and you also 
get withered and professional and you know… you know where 
you’re at and you lose that fear. And this has brought back what I 
would call the primal fear of novelists. So in that sense, aah, it’s had 
enormous importance for us, just directly, selfishly, we’ve all put 
ourselves in Salman Rushdie’s place. 
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The writers identified with Rushdie as someone in the same trade and as someone 
who faced the same pressures as they did in writing, and they feared that what had 
happened to Rushdie may happen to them. Winner, on the programme Hypotheticals, 
gave an example of this fear when he said:  
 
Well, I was at a very important Writer’s Guild seminar on censorship a 
few weeks ago, and they were asked to sign a petition for Salman 
Rushdie and a large number of people stood up and said that they 
feared that their names and addresses would be given and it didn’t get 
many signatures. 
 
The climate of fear felt by the liberals raised the possibility of worsening conditions. 
The liberal argument was that the book should not be banned because if it was banned 
then this could lead to much worse situations in which greater freedoms could be lost. 
Mailer said on this, “Once they start issuing bomb threats and sniper threats to 
bookstores, there’s gonna be hell to pay”. Ignatieff summarised this point when he 
asked Akhtar: “The problem… the problem, Shabbir, is 1935. The problem is the 
Nuremberg laws. You start with Rushdie, you burn Rushdie, then where do you 
stop?”. He explained further in the same programme:  
 
Because people say to me, they say to me, I can understand in their 
outrage about The Satanic Verses, they burn The Satanic Verses, it’s a 
bad thing, I disapprove of burning books but what bothers me is then 
they start objecting to something else. Soon, we don’t just have one 
book burning, we have nice, big bonfires in the middle of… in front of 
the Mayor’s office in Bradford. Nice, big bonfires and a lot of stuff 
goes into it, a lot of stuff that you as a philosopher wouldn’t want 
burned at all.  
 
Weldon expressed similar fears: “It is said ‘Books today, people tomorrow. Burn the 
books today, kill the writer tomorrow’”. 
 
The depiction of ‘otherness’: The representation of Muslims was quite varied, the 
following are examples of how some liberals viewed Muslims. Ignatieff in the 
introduction to his visit to Bradford said that he expected to find “‘otherness’, 
difference, a gulf of culture and language. I expect not to feel at home”. This 
statement is immediately followed in the programme by a discussion in which 
Ignatieff and Akhtar express radical disagreements. The representation of the Muslim 
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position on the fatwa was provided by Robertson in Hypotheticals when he asks the 
Muslim participants the following questions: “You don’t think that this man deserves 
to die?”, “And do you have a duty to be his executioner?” and “Let’s just… but don’t 
you have some duty to condemn him, or to capture him or even to kill him?”. The 
liberals perceived the Muslims as not having read the book. On occasion the Muslims 
were linked to violence. Steiner said: “And in the horror of this whole story, in the 
lunatic, murderous horror of what is being visited on Salman Rushdie” and “Nobody 
forces anyone to read a book. And of course, the murderous screamers and burners of 
books from Bradford onto today haven’t even tried to open it”. Weldon said on 
Hypotheticals: “Alas, it has fallen into the hands of those who do not understand the 
nature of fiction or the revelatory nature of fiction”. 
 
The liberals had views about the way they felt the Muslims should have responded. 
Robertson asked whether the campaign had in fact increased support for the book? 
McEwan suggested that the proper way for the Muslims to have responded was 
through the level of ideas. Peter, the bookseller, suggested that if this was done, then:  
 
…you’ll give a very impressive contradiction to what you see as the 
abuse in the book. The fact that you feel that you’ve got one hand tied 
behind your back because you’re being decent and you feel that he was 
being indecent err… doesn’t actually… isn’t actually the case. You 
can… if you want to present your view and you do so with the 
teaching of Muhammad, this will be very much respected…  
 
Some perceived the Muslim response as agitative. Robertson asked on this issue 
whether the Muslim representatives would prevent further escalations in violence: 
“Shabbir Akhtar, obviously some younger members of the community are taking 
things a bit too far. Would you do anything to pacify them?”. Rees, a former Home 
Office Minister said:  
 
But people who are organisers had better think that there are other 
people who react to these things, not just the feelings of the people 
who are marching themselves. Because a march is not just a march, it 
also sparks off those innate anti-Muslim, anti-coloured which are 
pretty deep in the community… 
 
Ignatieff, in his visit to Bradford, expected a split identity, or a community in tension:  
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It could be said that I’m hearing someone who’s putting a very, good 
gloss on a rather divided identity. Someone who’s actually very torn 
between a devout Muslim and a secular person. You make it sound as 
if you’ve brought the two together. But someone listening to you, 
across what you’re saying, might say, this guy is just papering over the 
cracks… 
 
Commenting on the family that he spent the most time with, he said: “Everyday in the 
classroom and on TV, Rehan is learning to want things that may lead him to break 
with his Islamic past. Keeping a faith in the media age isn’t going to be easy”. 
 
The play Iranian Nights covered many of the issues dealing with this particular point 
and as such, the play provides a view from which we can derive the liberal’s 
representations of the Muslim community. The scene in which the young Muslim 
activist described his conversion to Islam explains the liberal’s explanation of the 
Islamic youth. His conversion is on the night in which he received some severe racial 
harassment, and the humiliation that he received forced him to find his pride in his 
faith. The young man’s turn towards faith is also depicted in the play as a rejection of 
the strategy adopted by his father: “Can’t you see you failed? Five years a labour 
councillor, result? Fifteen years, chairman of the multicultural committee for racial 
integration. Result? Nothing!”.  
 
The point of discrimination is directly linked to the ‘Rushdie affair’ in the Everyman 
programme, when John, the chair of the discussion, said:  
 
I mean the implications of what you’re saying is that… that Muslim 
community is deeply hurt and is making an issue about The Satanic 
Verses. And that’s really a symptom of feeling discriminated against 
as a… as a racial and cultural group so that this is all the symptom of a 
deeper level of racism that exists out there. 
 
The play also questions the sincerity of the Muslim position in several places. The 
poet in the play asked a religious tyrant: “Do your threats actually have anything to 
do with Islam or is it the same old story of power, terror and realpolitik?”. The father 
rebuked the son in the play when he told him that the mullahs were “Ignorant, corrupt 
hypocrites” and the son himself was portrayed as a hypocrite as he arranges 
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prostitutes for Arab Sheikhs and as he arranged financial deals for drug smugglers. 
The perception is that the Muslim community is experiencing difficulty in adjusting 
to life in Britain and that those who do become Islamic do so because of rejection 
from mainstream, British society. Also, that those who do become Islamic tend to 
exhibit contradictions in their behaviour, either consciously or unconsciously, as a 
result of negotiating their lifestyle in Britain. 
 
The possibility and mechanism for dialogue within a multicultural setting was a 
central issue throughout the ‘Rushdie affair’. Two of the five programmes ended in 
contrasting ways. Peter, the book seller in Everyman, showed how these dilemmas 
can lead to different answers depending upon what he knew about the book:  
 
My views are very liberal with a small ‘l’, and it’s easy to pat yourself 
on the back for tolerating other people and it’s only when I have 
actually come to meet err… individuals and hear what they’ve got to 
say and what their concerns are and what their values are, that you 
actually… that I actually can put flesh on what can be a rather 
academic idea. Without this, I can see things happening which might 
make me a lot more aggressive and a lot more provocative. That’s the 
kind of mistake I couldn’t possibly now make. Because I would 
understand the weight of genuine feeling, of true, valid feeling in the 
Muslim community.  
 
Ignatieff ended his visit to Bradford with the following:  
 
There are such things as radical, complete disagreements. A liberal 
who walks around thinking that everything can be fudged, we can all 
be good friends, we can all be brothers, we can all get inside each 
other’s heads. As I said to Shabbir at the end of this is that what 
multiculturalism comes down to is getting inside the head of someone 
from another culture, another world. And if you think that’s easy, you 
got another think coming. 
 
6.1.2. The Muslim rhetorical position 
 
The right to freedom from sacrilege: The central issue of the ‘Rushdie affair’ was 
the treatment of the Prophet’s character in Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses. The 
novel is in the style of magical realism and mixed imagination with history. This led 
to a number of sections in the novel which caused consternation to the Muslim 
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community. A Muslim girl from Bradford stated: “And if the Prophet’s wives are 
prostitutes, then where does that leave us? That’s because err… as women, we look to 
the Prophet’s wives as examples as how we should live”. The motive for the book 
was given as hate, Essawy saying: “I think the prime motive for this book was hatred. 
He hated Islam”. And Rushdie was blamed for reviving a medieval portrayal of Islam 
by Akhtar: “It umm… uses words like Mahound which on any literary ground is 
totally unjustified… Well, Mahound means the devil. It’s a Christian term used in the 
Middle Ages”. 
 
The experience of the ‘Rushdie affair’: The Muslim response to the affair was quite 
varied. There was much commentary on the perceived helplessness that the Muslims 
experienced, Siddiqui said: “I think err… there is no other way the Muslim 
community can proceed… if you want to change the law, sometimes you have to 
break it”. Akhtar said:  
 
And many groups as you know have had to break the law in order to 
change the law, women’s movements, trade unions and so on. And 
Muslims of course, will probably engage in similar kinds of civil 
rights or civil disobedience movements to get these things done. And it 
is interesting to note that the majority of British Muslims have in fact 
taken that stance. 
 
The Muslim campaigners were suspicious and dismissive of the media. They did not 
feel that were given a fair say in the ‘Rushdie affair’, Akhtar said in The Late Show 
studio discussion: “what has been happening throughout the media has been an 
unargued assumption on the part of the press and indeed of academic writing that 
fundamentalism has no intellectual basis”. At the same time, Muslim participants in 
programmes complained of stereotyping. Tahir said on Everyman, “…the Muslims in 
general have been branded as militant, and all we hear from the radio and the media 
as such…” Some accused the media of aggravating the affair, Siddiqui said on 
Hypotheticals that: “Already here, within twenty four hours, the media here had 
created a hysteria in the country which to me is unforgivable”.  
 
The experience of ‘otherness’: There were repeated references throughout the 
programmes to the different ways in which Muslims felt besieged. Essawy ended The 
Late Show programme shown on 22
nd
 February 1989 with the dramatic: “…the 
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‘Rushdie affair’, is seen by the Muslim as a continuation of the Crusades, and 
someone please stand up and say the Crusades are over”. Akhtar spoke of: “The issue 
is about Islam versus, you know, certain very militant forms of secularity”, and later 
he mentioned the “liberal inquisition”. And Siddiqui said: “You see, alarm bells ring 
in my mind and in the minds of all Muslims that there is a conspiracy at the back of 
it, a literary conspiracy, explain to me the literary prizes?”.  
 
Two Muslims at different points of the same programme (The Late Show, 8
th
 May 
1989) spoke of their insecurity as a result of the affair. This feeling of insecurity was 
in relation to calls for repatriation of immigrant communities:  
 
There is no question about me leaving here. This is our country, we’ve 
got nowhere to go back so don’t… I don’t think anyone should be 
threatening us, you know, if you want to live here. As though we’ve 
got a choice, we have no choice. This is our country, we’re gonna live 
here and we want to live here with dignity.  
 
Some of the Muslim representatives spoke about the pressures that they faced as they 
tried to maintain their faith in a secular society. Arshad, a restaurant owner spoke of 
the contradictions that he faced:  
 
The line for me, yeah, as far… as far as I’m concerned, I’m… I’m 
already considering ways of getting out of it. I mean, if you… if you 
want to ask me as to why… what I’m doing at a personal level, this 
‘Rushdie affair’, although I’ve been involved in this business for the 
last three or four years. I’m… it’s been in the back of my mind but 
there are certain things that I want to do now. I mean… I want to… 
my kids are growing up, I’ve got one daughter, my wife is expecting. I 
want to be teaching them a version of Islam which is not 
compromised, which… which does not say that, yes, daddy is selling 
alcohol because he is making a living. But I want to say it’s wrong and 
I’m not doing it. 
 
The feeling of representational subjugation was articulated by Saima in the Everyman 
programme. She spoke of how she felt, as a Muslim woman, trapped within a view of 
herself that is held by others: 
 
When I want other people to see me, I have to see… It’s fighting 
against what I really want to be. I can’t be myself, you tell me to be a 
hundred per cent truthful to myself and I can’t because it would 
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distort, it would do more damage for Muslims. I have to go out of my 
way to wear Western clothes so people just don’t think of me as 
foreign, really, I have to do these things. Not that I feel ashamed not to 
wear western clothes, to wear Pakistani clothes, you know, I feel much 
more comfortable in them actually. But I have to make a positive 
effort because people would automatically discard me.  
 
Tahir elaborated upon this theme in the same programme: “we are trapped in a 
stereotype image of ours, that we are just the followers of mad mullahs and Islam is 
an insagacious, anti-intellectual, dark, medieval religion”.  
 
6.2. Rhetorical positioning and social representations 
 
Argumentation requires the use of social representations. This interaction between 
social representations and rhetoric is multifarious. This section will examine how the 
content of social representations is connected to the rhetorical position
75
. The two 
rhetorical positions examined here, the liberal and the Muslim position, formed the 
dialogical axis of the ‘Rushdie affair’. They were both associated with their 
respective identity positions. The social representations to be associated with the 
liberal rhetorical position centred around the theme of ‘a writer fighting 
totalitarianism’, and the social representations to be associated with the Muslim 
rhetorical position centred around the theme of ‘an oppressed minority’. I will now 
examine both of these competing representations.  
 
6.2.1. The liberal position and social representations 
 
The book burning, and its reporting, had already merited comparisons with the Nazis. 
The fatwa on Salman Rushdie compounded such a representation as Rushdie was 
anchored as a writer in the face of totalitarianism and censorship. The play Iranian 
Nights ends with a list of writers that includes Oscar Wilde, D. H. Lawrence, Vaclav 
Havel and ends with Salman Rushdie. This list anchors the ‘Rushdie affair’ and the 
liberals/writers who support Rushdie into a narrative view towards history as a story 
of censorship and oppression. 
                                                 
75
 The previous section examined the contents of social representations during the ‘Rushdie affair’. The 
chapter will now proceed towards examining the structure of rhetoric. In doing so, I will be using 
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This view of the writer was related to a representation of the Muslim community 
which anchored the community into a history of fascism. Ignatieff on The Late Show 
spoke of Khomeini as similar to Hitler and Stalin. As such, the Muslim community 
was represented as an example of totalitarian fascism, and anchored within a 
historical narrative that connected the Muslim community in Britain to the totalitarian 
regimes of Hitler and Stalin. 
 
The Muslim community was further anchored in several ways. First of all, the 
community became the subject of a category prototype such that social 
representations of specific types of Muslims became common, an example being the 
‘Bradford Muslim’. The representations associated with the ‘Bradford Muslim’ of 
backwardness and militancy were found in these programmes. Secondly, there was an 
anchoring of representatives of the community as hypocritical. The hypocritical 
aspect was exemplified by a campaigner in The Late Show who sold alcohol in his 
restaurant. Thirdly, the community was represented as socially determined in that 
their religious assertion was seen as a response to racism. This theme was repeated in 
Everyman and Iranian Nights. 
 
These three representations of a writer in the face of persecution, an authoritarian 
collectivity and the nature of religious fascism were combined to form a rhetorical 
stance that positioned the writer against an authoritarian collectivity which had 
assumed, during the ‘Rushdie affair’, the face of religious fascism.  
 
6.2.2. The Muslim position and social representations 
 
The Muslim rhetorical position was centred around the experience of a minority 
culture as the ‘Rushdie affair’ was anchored into the history of struggle for minority 
rights, one campaigner making the comparison with the civil rights struggle in the 
United States of America. The feelings of subjugation that the affair aroused, 
especially in relation to the lack of recognition, were related to the Muslim 
community’s self-perception as an oppressed minority. The intensity of the ‘Rushdie 
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affair’ had the added effect of enhancing a persecution complex with some of the key 
campaigners. A lack of access to the channels of communication during the affair led 
to a sense of negative over-representation by others, a sense of representational 
subjugation. This helped feed a besieged mentality, such that the community felt 
simultaneously oppressed representationally and rhetorically.  
 
The social representations of being an oppressed minority and having a persecution 
complex were representations not only of their own lived experience, but also of the 
manner in which they felt they were treated by others. This leads onto the third 
representation, that of a minority culture advocating minority rights, this providing an 
emancipatory narrative to the community. The language of identity politics was 
utilised repeatedly by campaigners during the affair. The experience of being an 
oppressed minority as well as the associated persecution complex calls for an 
emancipatory narrative that provides the community with an exit strategy from an 
environment of representational subjugation.  
 
The three social representations of being an oppressed minority, having a persecution 
complex and the advocacy of an emancipatory narrative formed the core of the 
Muslim rhetorical stance during the ‘Rushdie affair’. The relation of these two sets of 
representations to rhetoric will be examined in the next section. 
 
6.3. Levels of rhetorical functioning 
 
The nature of dialogical, rhetorical contestation in a national crisis such as the 
‘Rushdie affair’ is heterogeneous. Though the argumentation is across a dialogical 
axis, in that it is bi-polar, the actual content and nature of rhetoric is three-fold. That 
is, the attempts to argue against a counter-position in the ‘Rushdie affair’ took three 
forms. I would like to name these forms of rhetoric: primary, secondary and tertiary
76
.  
 
Primary rhetoric is the actual surface dialogical contest itself and refers to the content 
of the discussion. Therefore, it is necessary to access the contents of argumentation in 
order to access the primary level of rhetoric. The primary level of rhetoric in the 
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‘Rushdie affair’ is represented by the argument for the extension of the laws on 
blasphemy by the Muslim community and the protection of freedom of speech by the 
writers. An example of such a form of rhetoric is the following from the 
Hypotheticals programme:  
 
Robertson: Dr Akhtar is asked to give expert evidence for the 
prosecution on how this book shocks and offends the Muslim faith. 
What do you say, doctor?  
  
Akhtar: Well. It umm… prostitutes the reputation of the Muhammad 
and his companions and insults certain female values by depiction of 
scenes in the brothel of al hijab.  
  
Robertson: Uhum, and… 
 
Akhtar: And moreover, uses words like Mahound which on any 
literary ground is totally unjustified. 
  
Robertson: Words like Mahound being… what is the significance of 
that for Muslim believers?  
  
Akhtar: Well, Mahound means the devil. It’s a Christian term used in 
the Middle Ages. 
  
Robertson: So it likens the Prophet to the devil. 
  
Akhtar: Yes. 
  
Robertson: And that is what makes it blasphemous.  
  
Akhtar: Indeed it does.  
 
Secondary rhetoric is rhetoric about rhetoric. This includes justification and criticism 
of rhetorical style, structure and mannerism. Though this type of rhetoric is analytical 
of the nature of argumentation, it nevertheless remains as part of the argumentative 
process. A rhetorical style that does not seem to ‘suit’ the situation can be criticised 
and this serves to undermine the counter-position as a whole. For example, in 
Everyman, Peter says: 
  
But if you remain true to your views of civilisation and not abusing 
other people, and preserving your… your… your dignity, you’ll give a 
very impressive contradiction to what you see as the abuse in the book. 
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The fact that you feel that you’ve got one hand tied behind you’re back 
because you’re being decent and you feel that he was being indecent 
err… doesn’t actually… isn’t actually the case. You can… if you want 
to present your view and you do so with the teaching of Muhammad, 
this will be very much respected, I’m sure by most people and they 
will understand you and understand the fact that you’re hurt and so on. 
And that the negative impact of that book, if you think it has a 
negative impact, will be dissipated.  
 
Tertiary rhetoric is the ‘explaining away’ of rhetoric, and can take the form of 
psychological and sociological explanations for identity counter-positions. This form 
of rhetoric refuses to take the primary rhetoric of the counter-position at face value 
and attempts to provide an explanation that seeks to find the ‘hidden’ reasons for such 
positions, and in doing so, undermines the counter-position as a whole. An example is 
from Iranian Nights when a young Islamic leader explained his religious awakening 
to his father as being due to a severe racial assault at university. Though this type of 
rhetoric is usually targeted against primary forms of rhetoric, it will, nevertheless, be 
found alongside primary forms of rhetoric. The frequency of each type of rhetoric is 
provided in the table below. 
 
Table 6.4. Frequency of items of rhetoric according to type 
 
Type of Rhetoric Pro. 1 Pro. 2 Pro. 3 Pro. 4 Pro. 5 Mean 
Primary  81.2 41.3 63.3 76.2 59.2 66.1 
Secondary  6.9 10.6 10.0 19.2 3.2 11.4 
Tertiary 11.9 48.1 25.6 4.7 36.8 22.2 
 
6.4. Individualism as ideology and identity politics 
 
The ‘Rushdie affair’ was taken as an example of highlighting the limits of 
multiculturalism as political practice. The book burning and the call for the death of 
Rushdie by some members of the British Muslim community represented the limits of 
acceptability for secular tolerance. In this sense, multiculturalism had failed (Weldon, 
1989). The bi-polarised argumentation between the writers and the Muslims, as 
discussed above, was the result of this act of confrontation. However, the three-fold 
distinction in types of rhetorical disagreement veils a hidden level of rhetoric, a level 
 166 
at which the two bi-polarised sides are in agreement. I will proceed for the rest of this 
chapter to examine the similarities in rhetoric.  
 
The first manner in which the two rhetorical positions are in agreement is at the level 
of ideology. Farr (1991a), leading on from Ichheiser (1949a), has identified 
individualism as a collective representation i.e. at the level of collective, universal 
ideology. Gergen (1995) has traced identity politics back to individualism. It is the 
connection between individualism, identity politics and ideology that I wish to 
discuss next.  
 
Moscovici (1984a) writes that the “Individual is a historical fact and one of the most 
vital inventions of the modern age…” (p. 521). Elsewhere, he says: “…if asked to 
name the most important invention of modern times, I should have no hesitation in 
saying that it was the individual” (Moscovici, 1985, p. 13). This historical approach 
to the individual does present some problems in that the notion of the individual is not 
monolithic. Lukes (1973b) identifies eleven different types of individualism. 
Moscovici (1984a), however, identifies three types of individualism: 
 
If individualism corresponded to a single social representation, all 
would be straightforward, and one would know what one had in mind. 
In our culture, however, there are three representations, each of which 
has different origins and different features. First, there is the 
representation of the individual who has become ‘emancipated’ from 
the servitudes of tradition, who defines himself in opposition to the 
collectivity, with his rights and duties and his specific consciousness. 
Secondly, there is the representation of the ‘sublimated’ individual, 
who sacrifices his pleasures, his ordinary feelings, to gain his salvation 
and to carry out the goals of the collectivity… And finally there is the 
representation of the individual as an ‘outsider’ who is compelled to 
pursue his selfish aims by dint of calculations and to act in a most 
impersonal way, ignoring values and prior relationships with others… 
the first representation was an outgrowth of the Renaissance and the 
French Revolution, the second an offspring of the Reformation, and 
the third a product of the money and market economy. (p. 520-521). 
 
Moscovici outlines several versions of individualism and relates them to three 
historical moments. A question here is, how does the ideology of the individual 
understood as a collective representation relate to these representations of the 
individual? Certainly, the individual of the Enlightenment is the type of individualism 
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that was being defended during the ‘Rushdie affair’ by the writers. However, this was 
not the type of individualism that assumed common usage. I will return to this issue 
towards the end of this chapter. 
 
The pervasiveness of individualism in the ‘Rushdie affair’ is demonstrated in the 
following extract from The Late Show programme in which Ignatieff visited 
Bradford. The extract is from the beginning of the programme and begins with 
Ignatieff’s voice-over as he explains his feelings about visiting the Muslim 
community in Bradford. This voice-over is accompanied by a collage of images
77
 
depicting the Muslim community in Bradford, and is followed immediately by the 
conversation below:  
 
Ignatieff: I don’t know the first thing about Islam, and the Asian 
friends I have in London live just like me. So coming to Bradford, I 
don’t know what to expect. I have this image of an Asian community 
which lives in a kind of bell-jar, sealed off from the rest of British 
society in its own ghetto, with its own food, its own religious rituals, 
and its ties to countries like Pakistan that I’ve never even visited. I 
expect ‘otherness’, difference, a gulf of culture and language. I expect 
not to feel at home.  
  
Akhtar: Salman Rushdie doesn’t matter, I mean I keep on saying this 
to everybody… 
  
Ignatieff: Why doesn’t he matter? He’s an individual… 
  
Akhtar: Well, in that sense of course, but I meant in this cause, in this 
debate. The issue is not about Salman Rushdie, the issue is not about 
me or you either. The issue is about ideas. It is… the issue is about 
Islam versus, you know, certain very militant forms of secularity, 
which are opposing it. I mean, what I mean when I say that Salman 
Rushdie doesn’t matter, of course not as an individual, he does matter, 
but in this debate Salman Rushdie is quite dispensable… (italics 
mine). 
 
The sequential juxtaposition of a disagreement over the value of an individual (in the 
context of the ‘Rushdie affair’) with the introductory comments made by Ignatieff 
(concerning his expectations of cultural ‘otherness’) implicates a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. However, this statement should be delimited by the following. The reason 
why Rushdie matters according to Ignatieff is because he is an individual. This 
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invoking of the ideology of individualism by Ignatieff as an “Of course!” resembles 
the naturalising tendencies of ideology as highlighted by Eagleton (1991): 
“Ideology… offers itself as an ‘Of course!’, or ‘That goes without saying’… Ideology 
freezes history into a ‘second nature’, presenting it as spontaneous, inevitable and so 
unalterable” (p. 59). This invocation of ideology as spontaneous and inevitable in this 
particular instant is also incontestable. Akhtar can only respond with the actual “Of 
course”, twice. So the rhetorical disagreement at one level dissipates to agreement at 
the level of ideology. Whether this agreement is on an Enlightenment version of 
individualism, or on a much more generalised form of individualism is difficult to 
say. Lukes (1973b) describes a religious form of individualism which Moscovici 
(1984a) relates to the Reformation, but it is difficult to say whether the individualism 
that is agreed upon incorporates such notions. 
 
This discussion has so far presented the writer’s position as upholding an 
Enlightenment form of individualism. This simplifies the discussion because it 
ignores the collectivist nature of the writer’s identity as depicted in the ‘Rushdie 
affair’. Mailer spoke of the fear that the affair had revisited upon writers on The Late 
Show (broadcast 22 February 1989):  
 
I obviously have been thinking about that for the last six days or so. 
And you know, we start writing, when we begin as novelists and we’re 
young, we usually write in great fear, we’re so afraid of the 
consequences of our work. We don’t what’ll happen when the book 
comes out, we get the feeling that we will be killed when the book 
comes out. As you get older and you get more blasé and you also get 
withered and professional and you know…you know where you’re at 
and you lose that fear. And this has brought back what I would call the 
primal fear of novelists. So in that sense, aaaah, it’s had enormous 
importance for us, just directly, selfishly, we’ve all put ourselves in 
Salman Rushdie’s place. 
  
Here, Mailer was drawing upon a collective sense of identity: that of the writer. 
Ignatieff spoke similarly on his visit to Bradford. The campaign is therefore perceived 
as antagonistic towards their own identity. Their social organisation, therefore, 
assumes the character of identity rights, consequently pursuing a collectivist strategy. 
One that draws upon a social sense of identity. This difference can be further 
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explained by reference to Ichheiser’s (1949a) distinction between interpretation in 
principle and interpretation in practice. The interpretation in principle, in this 
particular case, is that of Enlightenment individualism, however the interpretation in 
practice is identity rights. 
 
The Muslim rhetorical position incorporated an identity politics discourse in that 
references were made to the civil rights struggle. This incorporation was necessary 
for proper engagement with the outside world. Gervais (1997) found that Shetlanders 
had to “establish a dialogue and to engage with alien representations, if not to make 
them their own” (p. 282) in order to communicate their argument to the outside 
world. Gergen (1995), as stated in chapter two, suggests that identity politics is 
derivative of Western, individualist ideology. This means that the discursive strategy 
that the Muslim rhetorical position employs is derivative of individualism as 
ideology. 
 
The differences between the two positions, therefore, at the level of primary, 
secondary and tertiary rhetoric subside at the level of ideology. The adoption of 
collectivist notions of identity and the advocation of identity rights by both groups 
relates both rhetorical positions back to individualism. I will examine below other 
examples of similarities between the two sides in terms of rhetoric.  
 
6.5. A common argumentative technique across rhetorical positions  
 
An argumentative technique was noticed to be shared across both rhetorical positions. 
This was a tendency towards radicalisation. The ‘Rushdie affair’ was an unfamiliar 
event to both sides in British social and political history. This meant that it had to be 
made familiar. This process initially occurred in the news rooms. Nevertheless, the 
beginning of the television programmes had opening sequences that tended to provide 
radicalised versions of the positions of various protagonists. For example, Ignatieff, 
who began two of the programmes, began one with “These are extraordinary days for 
British culture”. He began the second with “…the conflict between Islam and the 
West has escalated into a total confrontation of values and culture”. The introduction 
to the play Iranian Nights described the play as being “…written as a response to the 
cultural crisis caused by the ‘Rushdie affair’”. The Hypotheticals programme began 
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with a scene in which certain Muslim participants were asked whether they would 
have been willing to kill Rushdie if they had seen him in a restaurant. The Muslim 
representatives similarly tended to radicalise the position, one such representative 
stating on The Late Show that this affair could lead to a third world war. The 
unfamiliar ‘Rushdie affair’ was anchored according to radical depictions of the 
arguments and their consequences.  
 
The affair was also radicalised in the way in which it was anchored into history. Since 
it was a first-time occurrence for British society and for the Muslim community in 
British society, it had to be anchored (as Moscovici suggests) into history. But both 
sides chose a confrontational view of history in their choice of anchors. For example, 
the writers chose to link the campaign against The Satanic Verses to the Nazis, the 
Nuremberg trials, especially with regard to the burning of the book. The struggle 
against the campaign became likened to the struggle against fascism. This was a 
regular theme throughout the programmes. Ignatieff stated so in his visit to Bradford 
and the play Iranian Nights suggested so as well. The Muslim representatives tended 
to anchor this affair in their version of a confrontational view of history which meant 
that they linked the affair to the Crusades, and hence suggested the affair was viewed 
as part of an ongoing struggle between Islam and Christianity, Essawy stated such a 
position on The Late Show.  
 
This tendency towards radicalisation was linked to a fear that this issue could be the 
first of many. A tendency towards radicalisation was therefore linked to a view 
towards the future. Ignatieff spoke of a possible bonfire of books in front of the 
mayor’s office in Bradford, and Weldon replied “Burn the books today. Kill the 
writer tomorrow” to the question of whether freedom of speech entailed the right to 
burn a book.  
 
The tendency towards radicalisation could be qualified by reference to the 
considerable representation of the moderate Muslim position in four of the five 
programmes. The moderate Muslim rhetorical items were, however, generally framed 
within dialogic encounters which involved rebuttal and exchange between radical 
liberals and moderate Muslims. The direction of conversation occasionally, though, 
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revealed a tendency towards radicalisation. For example, Ignatieff in the visit to 
Bradford had the following exchange with Akhtar:  
 
Akhtar: Christianity has not produced err… the kind of quality of 
allegiance that Islam has. Because what you’ve got to remember is that 
Islam, even in the twentieth century, manages to produce a 
discrepantly large number of martyrs which Christianity doesn’t. I 
think that actually is some measure of enthusiasm in a faith: to what 
extent people are prepared at a crisis point to give their lives, it’s not 
an easy thing to do. And I think that Islam, the fact that it manages to 
do that so routinely, is to its… 
 
Ignatieff: Why is martyrdom such a value in Islam? Why… why… 
 
Akhtar: Well, it’s a value in Christianity too. It used to be a value in 
liberalism as well.  
 
Ignatieff: But giving your life is almost a definition of fanatical 
surrender of personal judgement on certain views.  
 
Akhtar: Is there anything you’d be willing to kill for?  
 
Ignatieff: If err… by some ghastly mischance, this became a theocratic 
Islamic state. I would frankly fight, not only to be an agnostic 
minority, but err… I’d fight to protect the rights of… I would have 
fought against the Germans in the Second World War, I would have 
fought against the… err… I would fight against the Soviet state. 
Simply, on the same grounds that my freedom to have wayward and 
difficult opinions is… is worth fighting for. I think Hitler threatened 
everything, I think Stalin threatened everything and I have to say the 
Ayatollah Khomeini threatens everything. I don’t equate the three. 
They’re different phenomena but he threatens everything that I stand 
for and believe. Err… if he was simply a religious teacher who held 
his views and confined them to the Iranian state and to his particular 
branch of the Moslem faith, no problem, no problem at all. But he’s a 
man, who is calling for holy war against the Western world, against 
secularism, and I’m a convinced secularist, so he’s making war on me 
and he stands for everything I oppose. He’s also threatening an author, 
a writer, a member of my own trade. He’s threatening him with death, 
he’s ruined the man’s life. He is… he is anathema to me and if it came 
to a fight, indeed, I would fight the Ayatollah. 
 
This example begins with Akhtar defending the issue of martyrdom, and ends with 
Ignatieff defending and advocating his right to fight. Both positions move from 
discussion on the issue of martyrdom to a point of mutual disagreement. Another 
example is taken from Hypotheticals, Robertson asked Siddiqui about his reaction to 
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a hypothetical situation in which he found himself sitting in the same restaurant as 
Rushdie:  
 
Robertson: Dr Siddiqui, you’re dining with Shabbir and Yusuf. What 
do you do in that situation?  
 
Siddiqui: I would totally ignore the man, I would just walk out of the 
restaurant.  
 
Robertson: You would walk out of the restaurant.  
 
Siddiqui: Yeah. 
 
Robertson: Let’s just… but don’t you have some duty to condemn 
him, or to capture him or even to kill him?  
 
Siddiqui: No, no, no. I have condemned him, he has been condemned 
as err… any man has ever been condemned by a world jury of a 
thousand million Muslims. Err… but as a British citizen, I have a duty, 
if you like, a social contract with the British err… state not to break 
British law.  
 
Here, Siddiqui, a prominent supporter of the fatwa, was being asked whether he 
would kill Rushdie. He initially avoided the question, but the moderator pursued the 
line of questioning. Though Siddiqui, in this instance, didn’t directly advocate the 
murder of Rushdie, he later indirectly did so. Both examples involve the move 
towards increased distanciation between representatives of counter-positions. The 
Everyman programme was an exception to this tendency as it was the only 
programme to contain more moderate items than extreme items and it also provided a 
counter-example to the tendency towards radicalisation. Being aired a year later, it 
involved a scene in which Dawn, a Deacon in the Church of England, intervened in a 
disagreement to attempt to move the conversation in the direction of moderation.   
 
Shabbir: There you go again, I have… who… which Muslim is saying 
you don’t have the freedom to say what you want? 
 
Rashida: But you are! 
 
Shabbir: I am saying don’t insult somebody. 
 
Saima: Yes, that is a… 
 
Shabbir: Insult! Insult! There is a very big difference. Can’t you see… 
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Rashida: I appreciate how deeply it’s hurtful, but I would still defend 
Rushdie’s right to publish. Umm… and I would also say that the 
bloodshed and so on that has resulted, I can’t make him responsible 
but the people who fought… 
 
Dawn: I wonder whether why the thing has stirred up so much feeling 
is because the Muslim community as a whole in this country is feeling 
misunderstood and is feeling inhibited, and… and… I just wonder 
wheth… whether one of the things about ‘The Satanic Verses’, what 
has been actually satanic about it, umm… has been that it’s… it’s 
almost made the division greater. It could have done that. 
 
John: Just to, just to pursue this a bit. I mean the implications of what 
you’re saying is that… that Muslim community is deeply hurt and is 
making an issue about ‘The Satanic Verses’. And that’s really a 
symptom of feeling discriminated against as a… as a racial and 
cultural group so that this is all the symptom of a deeper level of 
racism that exists out here.  
 
Shabbir: Yes, as a whole of them, the Muslim community. Part of it 
maybe they think exactly that. That is the main reason, that they have 
objected to this book. But you see, we all know, that… a form of 
racism has always been there. People always joked and laughed about 
Islam and the Muslims which we did not mind, they criticised it 
heavily, we did not mind. But with this particular book he went over 
the mark. And the Muslim was not prepared to take it, not any longer. 
So he just erupted.  
 
Matloob: I’ve heard young people who I’ve come into contact saying 
that previously in the seventies, they were known as ‘Pakis’, anybody 
who was Pakistani. He might be… the person might be Indian, might 
be Chinese or might be anything. They were referred to as ‘Pakis’, 
now the term of abuse is a ‘Muslim’. 
 
John: I mean I think this perspective does make much more sense, 
that… that… that it’s a community crying out, how can you allow, 
you’ve oppressed us for years in this society. How can now you allow 
the very thing that we deeply depend on to uphold our faith and 
strength to be insulted? 
 
The Everyman programme distinguished itself from the other four programmes by 
including scenes in which the tendency of dialogue was towards moderation. It is 
difficult to ascertain whether this was due to the editing of the programme or the fact 
that it was aired a year after the ‘Rushdie affair’ when the issues had become less 
contentious. Incidences of the tendency towards radicalisation or moderation as a 
function of conversational context were, however, rare.  
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This tendency towards radicalisation has been noted by another media researcher. 
Cottle (1993) analysed the televisual portrayal of the ‘Rushdie affair’ by a regional 
television company. He similarly found a tendency towards radicalising the story. 
Two television reporters had compiled a report which included them following a 
march against the publication of The Satanic Verses by Muslim residents of 
Birmingham and a random selection of ‘vox pops’ in which residents of Birmingham 
were asked as to their response to a possible banning of The Satanic Verses by the 
local council. Cottle (1993) analysed the imagery associated with this report as well 
as the reporting of individual opinions and he concluded that the reporters tended to 
emphasise conflict and controversy. As an example, one reporter when asking 
passers-by about their opinions on the issue informed them that the book was about to 
be banned by the council, though this was not the case.  
 
The rival sides exhibited a tendency to particularise and caricaturise the opposing 
sides by constituting certain positions as category prototypes. The writers/liberals 
constructed and repeated a particular social representation which anchored Muslim 
campaigners as violent, ignorant, illiterate and hypocritical. For example, Steiner said 
on The Late Show: “Nobody forces anyone to read a book. And of course, the 
murderous screamours and burners of books from Bradford onto today haven’t even 
tried to open it”. Weldon said in Hypotheticals that: “Alas, it has fallen into the hands 
who do not understand the nature of fiction…”. The play Iranian Nights has a line: 
“The inhabitants of the earth are of two sorts. Those with brains and no religion. And 
those with religion but no brains!”. Later on, the play described the mullahs as 
“Ignorant, corrupt hypocrites!”. Hypocrisy and contradiction was a recurrent theme. 
The play Iranian Nights has the Islamic revolutionary dealing with drug suppliers and 
Ignatieff in his visit to Bradford asked Arshad, the restaurant owner, why he sold 
alcohol in the restaurant.  
 
The Muslim discussants also exhibited a tendency to caricaturise the liberal position. 
The advocates of freedom of speech were described as belonging to the “liberal 
inquisition” and as exhibiting “militant forms of secularity” by Akhtar in the visit to 
Bradford by The Late Show. The campaign of the liberals/writers was anchored and 
objectified as a conspiracy as advocated by Siddiqui on Hypotheticals: “You see, 
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alarm bells ring in my mind and in the minds of all Muslims that there is a conspiracy 
at the back of it, a literary conspiracy…”. 
 
6.6. A common narrative across rhetorical positions 
 
Both rhetorical positions assumed a narrative that employed representations of 
victimisation and heroism. Each representation is discussed separately below:  
 
Portrayal of self as victims: Both sides showed a similarity in their patterns of 
argumentation in that they both portrayed themselves as victims. The liberals/writers 
portrayed Rushdie as a victim of a violent form of fundamentalism which made them 
fearful since they identified with Rushdie, and the Muslims portrayed themselves as 
victims of abuse and discrimination. For example, Steiner, on The Late Show began 
one of his points with: “And in the horror of this whole story, in the lunatic, 
murderous horror of what is being visited on Salman Rushdie…”. The image of 
oppression is repeated in the play Iranian Nights as a poet argued for his freedom 
from a religious tyrant. Ignatieff similarly makes his case against suppression of 
freedom of speech in the visit to Bradford by The Late Show. 
 
The Muslims felt that they had been victimised as well. This was in two ways. One 
was in regard to the issue of immigration. The ‘Rushdie affair’ had raised the issue of 
immigration to Muslim participants in television programmes. Arshad in The Late 
Show on its visit to Bradford said: “I don’t think anyone should be threatening us, you 
know, if you want to live here. As though we’ve got a choice, we have no choice. 
This is our country, we’re gonna live here…”. A person working in Arshad’s 
restaurant said later “You know, we… we work here, we pay taxes, everything. And 
then at the end of the day we’re called immigrants which is not right”.  
 
The second way in which the Muslim had been victimised was with reference to the 
way that they felt portrayed. Tahir in Everyman spoke at the beginning of the 
programme as if he felt that he was not understood: “I would like you to feel how 
much hurt we are”. Saima in the same programme later said: 
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It’s fighting against what I really want to be. I can’t be myself, you tell 
me to be a hundred per cent truthful to myself and I can’t because it 
would distort, it would do more damage for Muslims. I have to go out 
of my way to wear Western clothes so people just don’t think of me as 
foreign, really, I have to do these things… I have to make a positive 
effort because people would automatically discard me.  
 
Tahir said on this point: “…we are trapped in a stereotype image of ours, that we are 
just the followers of mad mullahs…”. The Muslim participants in the discussion were 
identifying themselves as victims either of direct racism or stereotyping. Gergen 
(1995) links identity politics to portrayals of the self as victims. This can be seen here 
as well in that both sides were representing themselves as victims, and this can be 
linked to their assertion of, and appeal towards, their respective identities as 
liberals/writers and Muslims. 
 
Portrayal of self as heroes: Both opposing views present themselves as heroes, 
championing their respective causes. The liberals/writers represented themselves as 
championing the cause of freedom, in this case, in the name of a novelist. For 
example, Steiner said on The Late Show that: “Wherever this book does not appear, 
we have lost an essential battle for the sheer freedom of a human being not to read a 
book”. The representational background for such an anchoring is that of the writer 
seeking to write freely in the face of restrictive authority. The play Iranian Nights 
concluded with a list of writers who have been persecuted for their writing, the list 
includes Omar Khayyam, Oscar Wilde, D. H. Lawrence, Vaclav Havel and ends with 
Salman Rushdie. Those writers that stand up to the oppression are regarded as heroes 
such as Wilde and Havel, and by mentioning Rushdie’s name at the end of the play, 
the writers of the play are suggesting that Rushdie is a similar type of hero. 
Consequently, by association, so are all those who support him. 
 
The Muslim participants in the programmes similarly viewed themselves as heroes, 
though they were championing their own cause. The Muslim campaigners viewed 
themselves as arguing for equal treatment under the law for protection against 
blasphemy. This campaign for equal treatment was an extension of the campaign 
against the book. The campaign for equal treatment was anchored by the Muslim 
campaigners as similar to the struggle for civil rights in America. Akhtar said in the 
visit to Bradford by The Late Show: 
 177 
 
And many groups as you know have had to break to law in order to 
change the law, women’s movements, trade unions and so on. And 
Muslims of course, will probably engage in similar kinds of civil 
rights or civil disobedience movements to get these things done.  
 
Similarly, Siddiqui said on Hypotheticals: “…I have been advising the Muslim 
community having looked at British traditions on this, if you want to change the law, 
sometimes you have to break it”. This identification with the civil rights struggle and 
the history of oppressed minorities not only provided an anchor for the Muslim 
campaigners, but also categorised them as heroes championing the rights of 
minorities. This can be linked to Modood’s (1993) point mentioned in the first 
chapter that Muslim responses to living in British society tend to be derivative of 
familiar, secular approaches as opposed to being obscure, Islamic options. That is, the 
options chosen by the Muslim community are associated with, for example, the civil 
rights struggle. This reflects Saito’s (1994) findings in which British practitioners and 
non-practitioners of Zen had a different view of Zen to Japanese practitioners and 
non-practitioners of Zen. This is because the British interviewees in her study had 
anchored
78
 their perception of Zen into their own European-based view of Eastern 
society.  
 
6.7. Conclusion 
 
This rhetorical analysis of the televisual coverage of the ‘Rushdie affair’ has 
attempted to show that, though the positions were dialogically opposed, the 
differences in rhetoric decreased at the level of ideology and structure. The 
differences in rhetoric, indeed, their oppositional nature, were expressed through 
primary, secondary and tertiary forms of rhetoric. The nature of argumentation, 
though it was dialogical, was not homogenous. The argumentation took the form of 
criticism and justification of the binary opposite view, however, this form of rhetoric 
does not account for all of the argumentation. Much of the rhetorical engagement 
occurred at the level of secondary and tertiary rhetoric.  
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The disagreements however did not extend to the domain of ideology. At the level of 
ideology, there was agreement on the importance of the individual. Similarly, both 
rhetorical positions assumed the language of identity politics which itself is derivative 
of individualism. There was agreement at the level of structure as well. Radicalisation 
was found to be a rhetorical technique that was common to both positions. This 
technique of argumentation can be seen to be a function of rhetoric in the public 
sphere, especially with reference to the representation of others. The opposing sides 
use these techniques as a way of anchoring their opponent’s argument at an extreme 
position. The question to be asked is, are these radicalised positions examples of 
unfamiliar representations, or of negatively evaluated or even dialogically 
oppositional familiar representations? Rose (1996) in her work on television 
representations of madness asks “…are all kinds of unfamiliarity equivalent?” (p. 56). 
And in answer to this she writes:  
 
In making identifications such as ‘barbarian’, are we rendering the 
unfamiliar familiar (everyone knows what a barbarian is and does) or 
are we maintaining the other as Other? These options are not mutually 
exclusive. Dangerous or ambiguous categories of people are to some 
extent made intelligible by assimilating them to a familiar, if fearful, 
category or space of Otherness… I would suggest that the argument 
that the central purpose of a social representation is to make the 
unfamiliar more familiar is too general. It cannot deal with those very 
cases where the representations function precisely to marginalise and 
exclude certain groups and cope with the ambiguity they represent. It 
cannot deal with the tenacity of social representations whose central 
purpose appears to be to maintain, at a symbolic level, the ‘outsider’ 
quality of some groups. (p. 56-59).  
 
This relates to Hall’s (1997b) comment about the relation of subjects such as the 
hysterical woman and individualised criminal to the discourse within which it is 
situated i.e. they are ‘necessary’ subjects that are required for the proper functioning 
of language. The radicalised and particularised portrayal of the Muslim position as 
violent, ignorant, illiterate and hypocritical is, I would suggest here, a ‘necessary’ 
subject of individualism as ideology. It is because of this, that I would suggest that all  
forms of unfamiliarity are not equivalent. Those forms of familiar ‘otherness’ that 
represent the binary opposites to the self that lies at the heart of an ideology of 
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 Saito (1994) uses Bartlett’s theory of remembering as opposed to Moscovici’s theory of social 
representations. Bartlett’s term for Moscovici’s anchoring is social conventionalisation, though they 
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individualism will have a salience in the social world which other forms of difference 
will not. I would suggest that the binary opposite to the representation of the Muslim 
(during the ‘Rushdie affair’) as violent, ignorant, illiterate and hypocritical is humane, 
educated, literate and genuine – and that this constitutes the liberal individual.  
 
The Muslim rhetorical position radicalised the liberal position as well, but whether 
this has salience will depend upon ideology and access to the channels of 
communication. A lack of both would suggest minimal success at communication of 
their rhetorical position. I would suggest that a study of non-Muslims’ perceptions of 
the ‘Bradford Muslim’ during the ‘Rushdie affair’ would provide some answers to 
this issue. 
 
The two narrative themes of victimhood and heroism may seem contradictory at first, 
but are in fact compatible. This is to do with the notion of the hero in the modern 
public sphere. The victim can become a hero, and the hero is, or was, a victim. In this 
sense, the victim emerges as a hero after overcoming his/her victimisation, and this is 
the case for the Muslim position as well as the liberal position. Both perceived 
themselves as victims, and then both pursued strategies which portrayed themselves 
as heroes. In this sense, there is no contradiction with the two themes of 
argumentation. 
 
The question that could be asked here is, is there any relation between the narrative of 
victim turned hero with the ideology of individualism? I would suggest that there is. I 
would further suggest that this narrative is the narrative of the heroic individual who 
is humane, educated, literate and genuine and has overcome a period of victimisation. 
This links the ideology of individualism with the identity politics movements. Gitlin 
(1993) writes of the notion of victimisation in identity politics, and certainly, in the 
dialogical argumentation examined here, a feeling of victimisation is related to 
identity politics. I will examine in the next chapter the nature of reception to one form 
of hegemonic representation. 
                                                                                                                                           
are similar processes. 
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7.0. DECODING REPRESENTATIONS OF THE BRADFORD MUSLIM  
COMMUNITY 
 
This chapter is the third in a series of empirical studies, this study being an analysis of 
the transcripts of eight focus group discussions conducted around one of the 
television programmes used for the previous study. The analysis found that the 
discussants adopted, in the main, an oppositional stance towards the representation of 
the Bradford Muslim community in the national public sphere. This will be examined 
in relation to their views towards the presenter of the programme, Michael Ignatieff. 
A discussion on the nature of representation follows with an analysis of the 
discussants’ reception of the representatives of the community as depicted by the 
programme which was found to be related to identity politics discourse. This is 
followed by a discussion of the discussants’ ambivalent attitudes towards the issue of 
stereotyping. The chapter ends with a discussion on the contestation of representation 
as a political act. 
 
7.1. Oppositional decodings of hegemonic representations 
 
The discussants generally exhibited an oppositional type of decoding. Of the fifty two 
discussants, three tended towards negotiated types of decoding though they remained 
oppositional in general. The oppositional type of decoding was expressed in relation 
to the media as a whole, the presenter of the programme, and a variety of criticisms 
concerning the presences and absences of certain topics and representatives. This 
critique formed the skeletal structure of the discussants’ responses to the programme.  
 
7.1.1. The media as site for assertion of hegemony  
 
The media, through its depiction of Islam and the Muslim community in Bradford, is 
itself an oppositional ‘other’ to that which it is representing. This was the constant 
theme throughout the discussions. This oppositional view, though shared by all, was 
heterogeneous. It was heterogeneous in its intensity and in its critical analysis, and a 
broad oppositional approach did not prevent positive receptions of the programme. 
After viewing the programme, all of the groups began with negative, critical 
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comments towards the programme. These included accusations of bias, dishonesty 
and misrepresentation.  
 
You get the media’s view of what’s going on, you get a biased view, 
you never get the actual truth of what’s going on. (2-479) 
 
This view towards the programme can be located within a wider Weltenschauung 
which perceives the media as antagonistic towards Muslim concerns.  
 
I just wanna say that there is a media campaign against Muslims in 
general all over the world, not just in Bradford, everywhere, I think 
they see Muslims as a threat and they’re scared basically. (5-2) 
 
When asked if the discussants could recount positive portrayals of Islam in the media, 
two replied in the negative, for example.  
 
No I can think many examples where I thought that was not a good 
programme but not when it was actually a good programme. (8-2) 
 
The manner in which this programme was anchored was revealed by a question from 
a discussant just before the end of the focus group discussion. He asked the 
researcher:  
 
Were you on about the Tottenham Ayatollah that programme? (1-7) 
 
This was a programme that had been aired a few years earlier on Channel Four in 
which a television crew, led by the journalist Jon Ronson, followed an exiled Islamic 
leader who was based in Tottenham. The programme had received critical reviews 
from sections of the community after its transmission. The remembering of this 
programme and its relation to the discussion shows that the discussant had anchored 
the discussion about The Late Show programme into a view towards the media as 
antagonistic.  
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and the number assigned to the participant respectively. The letter ‘M’ when following the group 
number indicates ‘moderator’. 
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Thompson (1990) writes on the issue of asymmetry between representation and 
reception: 
 
Unlike the dialogical situation of a conversation, in which a listener is 
also a potential respondent, mass communication institutes a 
fundamental break between the producer and receiver, in such a way 
that recipients have relatively little capacity to contribute to the course 
and content of the communicative process. Hence it may be more 
appropriate to speak of the ‘transmission’ or ‘diffusion’ of messages 
rather than of ‘communication’ as such. (p. 218-219). 
 
This particular study on South Asian Muslim youth has found that the continuous 
transmission of representations of their identity and their community has led to the 
rejection of the messenger itself as biased and untrustworthy. This was the general 
approach of the youth to the programme, however, as this chapter will show, the 
decodings reveal a much more complicated process of interpretation, one that is not 
trapped within the deterministic confines of ideological opposition. The next section 
will examine the reception of the presenter of the programme.  
 
7.1.2. Presenter as agent for assertion of hegemony 
 
Michael Ignatieff, a writer, was the presenter of the programme. He spoke for thirteen 
minutes and fifteen seconds throughout the programme (34.1% of the whole 
programme
80
). This format portrayed Ignatieff as an outsider travelling to Bradford in 
an attempt to understand the position taken by the Muslim community during the 
‘Rushdie affair’. Ignatieff said at the beginning of the programme: 
 
I don’t know the first thing about Islam, and the Asian friends I have 
in London live just like me. So coming to Bradford, I don’t know what 
to expect. I have this image of an Asian community which lives in a 
kind of bell-jar, sealed off from the rest of British society in its own 
ghetto, with its own food, its own religious rituals, and its ties to 
countries like Pakistan that I’ve never even visited. I expect 
‘otherness’, difference, a gulf of culture and language. I expect not to 
feel at home. 
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 He appeared visually less than this and shared some scenes with members of the Bradford Muslim 
community. 
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This demarcation of an ‘otherness’ within the liberal self of British society is later 
modified by Ignatieff when he said : 
 
I expected a community in a bell-jar. Instead, I found a community 
that’s deeply, militantly British. Even down to the Yorkshire accent. 
 
As such, the ‘otherness’ was the construction of Ignatieff himself. However, though 
Ignatieff consequently ceased to present himself as an outsider
81
, but since the 
‘otherness’ was not substantiated, the reception of Ignatieff was as an outsider. 
Though he is Canadian with a clear and obvious Canadian accent, and stressed so in 
the programme, he was referred to repeatedly as a “white guy”. Others referred to him 
as “typical gora” and “white bastard”. A minority praised the presenter for asking 
difficult questions, though the majority expressed a strong dislike for the presenter, 
for example: 
 
Absolutely, he was just grabbing… he made no concerted effort to 
actually try to overcome any stereotype umm… the impression I got 
from some of the things he said, some of the things he was provoking, 
the questions that he was asking… prompts, some of the prompts that 
he was giving it seemed to me that he was just trying to reinforce his 
own stereotypes. Rather than bridge the gaps so he actively didn’t do 
anything… actively didn’t do what he set out to do… (2-2) 
 
Ignatieff was variously described as opinionated, pressurising, one-sided, exhibiting a 
pretence, taking the biscuit, a con man, a cross-examination lawyer and a person with 
his own agenda. He was perceived as not willing to change his mind, making the 
interviewees answer the questions the way he wanted them to, attempting to break 
down the interviewees, talking over his interviewees, providing immediate objections 
to them, reinforcing his own stereotype and playing with the interviewees. This 
characterisation of Ignatieff emphasised two aspects: the rhetorical and the 
dramaturgical. The rhetorical in their descriptions of Ignatieff as one-sided, 
opinionated, not willing to change his mind, and attempting to break the interviewees 
down. The dramaturgical in their descriptions of Ignatieff as exhibiting a pretence, 
taking the biscuit, playing with people and having an implicit agenda. 
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 This did not prevent the discussants from viewing certain scenes as depicting ‘otherness’, see later. 
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Billig (1996) connects these two approaches to social discourse in public life in the 
following:  
 
It would not take great imagination to consider the rituals of a 
parliament or those of a law-court as beings pieces of pure theatre. The 
orators, whether politicians or lawyers, delivered their speeches like 
actors, often combining the gestures of tragedy with those of 
pantomime. Defence and prosecution, government and opposition, 
judge and speaker, all have their allotted roles in the conventions of 
oratorical drama… (p. 39). 
 
However, such a notion should be delimited by his later qualification:  
 
If all the world is a stage, then what goes on backstage is being 
excluded. Thus, a complete sub-world, that of the theatre, is not being 
considered as the model for social life, but only one element of that 
sub-world: the public performance. The problem is that this is the one 
part of the theatrical world which demands the suppression of 
arguments. During a performance, all members of the cast must leave 
their disagreements in the wings, and must work together to produce 
the drama. (Billig, 1996, p. 45). 
 
The metaphor of the theatre suggests that there are therefore two types of rhetoric in 
the television programme depending upon the presence of the audience’s gaze. The 
finished television programme contains the staged rhetoric. The same themes and 
arguments would have been covered (albeit from a different identity position) in the 
second type of rhetoric described above by Billig and that is the backstage 
argumentation. This will include the disagreements that would have occurred between 
the producers, writers, editors and the presenter in the production (i.e. at the site of 
encoding) of the programme.  
 
The previous chapter suggested that the liberal position was identified as humane, 
educated, literate and genuine. The discussants, however, categorised Ignatieff as, for 
example, not willing to change his mind, attempting to break the interviewees down, 
exhibiting a pretence, and having an implicit agenda. Why did the discussants 
interpret him as inflexible and insincere? One answer may be that it was an attempt 
by the discussants to undermine the dominant, rhetorical position of the ‘other’. The 
focus on the style of argumentation (i.e. on secondary as opposed to primary rhetoric) 
was in itself a rhetorical attempt to trans-code the liberal, open ‘other’ to a rhetorical, 
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dramaturgical and ultimately oppressive ‘other’. A question for future research is how 
is Ignatieff received in this programme by those who are closer to his own rhetorical 
position. 
 
7.2. Representation and its discontents 
 
The discontentment surrounding the issue of representation of the Muslim position 
during the ‘Rushdie affair’ focused on three types of representation. The first is the 
choice of quote itself. The second is the choice of topic to be covered. The third is the 
choice of representative. The discussants had no direct knowledge or experience to be 
able to suggest that the presences and absences in such cases were deliberate. 
However, knowledge of the ‘Rushdie affair’ and a general view towards the media as 
antagonistic were sufficient to warrant a suggestion of agency on behalf of the 
programme producers. I will examine each source of discontent below. 
 
7.2.1. Choice of quote 
 
The discussants made references to the editing of the programme and suggested that 
the programme had been constructed so as to weaken the Muslim position:  
 
Umm well I think when he was speaking to Shabbir Akhtar, some of 
the things that maybe Shabbir Akhtar put in a positive way they were 
cut off or shortened and he was seen to have the last say and leave a 
negative image of Islam. (7-1) 
 
He wasn’t looking for a point of view, he was just there to defend. I 
bet you interviewed a few people that they good competition and they 
showed him what they felt about it, and he didn’t put it on that show. 
Half of the stuff that they said he probably cut it. That’s what I think. 
He just put the bits in that people wanted to hear. (5-1) 
 
Even when a positive aspect was mentioned, such as a perceived successful defence 
on the issue of martyrdom in Islam by Akhtar, the discussants voiced their surprise at 
its inclusion in the programme.  
 
He got him good on the martyrdom issue didn’t he? He trapped him 
nicely in that. (2-6) 
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I’m surprised… I’m surprised they actually left that in the editing. (2-
2) 
 
An admission that the programme makers may have attempted to provide a balanced 
account would have provided an anomaly to the consensus view that the programme 
makers were biased. Hence, the immediate rebuttal to a suggestion that the 
programme included scenes in favour of the Muslim position. 
 
7.2.2. Choice of topic 
 
The choice of topic was also raised. For example, the choice of topic was questioned 
by the discussants due to the mention of arranged marriage and the lack of discussion 
or mention of the law on blasphemy. This issue was highlighted further in another 
question in which the discussants were asked about the coverage of the ‘Rushdie 
affair’. The discussants were mostly under the age of fourteen during the ‘Rushdie 
affair’ yet most were aware of the issues raised by the affair. They felt that the affair 
itself was not comprehensively covered, and that the Muslim argument had not been 
fairly represented. The book itself was not discussed, the law on blasphemy was not 
discussed and the affair itself was viewed as being reduced (or radicalised) to a 
civilisational conflict. They questioned the inclusion of stereotypical scenes of inner 
city life, a discussion on arranged marriage and one group spoke at length about the 
suggestion of incompatibility between science and religion in the programme (though 
the majority felt that Mirza had dealt with this question well). 
 
The group discussion would end as it began, with an open-ended question. The 
discussants would be asked if there were any scenes that they particularly wished to 
comment upon. The answers to this question also tended to reveal an oppositional 
reception to the programme. Though the question was non-directive, the majority of 
scenes recounted were done so as criticisms of the programme. The negative scenes 
that were remembered at this point in the discussion were those that highlighted the 
incongruities of a South Asian Muslim presence in Bradford.  
 
The scenes that signified incongruity included one scene in which the educational 
wishes of the Muslim parent are contrasted with the child’s media environment after 
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the child expressed a desire to become a mechanic “like Charlene in Neighbours”. 
The contrast that Ignatieff made between social and public life and the wishes of 
parents was objected to in the focus group discussions. Some of the discussants 
wished to emphasise compatibility between social and public life and an Islamic 
lifestyle. Another example of a scene involving incongruity, though of a different 
nature, was a camera shot of graffiti on a wall which read “Paki’s out”. This 
suggested that a far right movement was active in Bradford and its presence 
suggested that the argument of repatriation still had some resonance even if the 
subjects for such repatriation were second generation South Asian Muslims. The 
discussants felt uncomfortable with this short scene (for nine seconds), in that they 
felt it promoted inter-racial tension. The picture itself is shown during a conversation 
between Ignatieff and Akhtar on the possibility of a link between the publication of 
The Satanic Verses and increasing racial tension. The discussants did not refer to the 
conversation during the camera shot of “Paki’s out”, though such a reference would 
have qualified the shot, but instead the shot itself was perceived as provocative. This 
suggests that the discussants prioritised visual over oral representation. The two 
groups which mentioned this particular scene were based in youth centres and 
consequently around a street culture which was more alert to issues of race.  
 
Both of these objections in the focus group discussions were aimed at reducing the 
difference that they perceived the programme had projected. Along these lines, they 
similarly objected to a comment made by Ignatieff in which he categorised Khomeni 
with Hitler and Stalin, though he qualified such a categorisation, the discussants felt 
that this was a deliberate attempt to link the Muslim position with fascism. 
 
And another thing that he tried to portray, the Ayatollah is even though 
he used a rebuttal if you like to say that he’s not linking the three but 
the images have already been stuck into each other’s minds that he 
compared it with Hitler and Stalin and then said Ayatollah. And so you 
have an image of these tyrants within this century and he’s linking 
Ayatollah with Hitler and then he says, “Oh no I’m not trying to make 
any connections between them”, but the image has already been… (7-
1) 
 
This did not preclude the rehearsal of scenes that were deemed to be positive 
representations. The positive scenes that were recounted concerned the 
 188 
commensurability of a South Asian Muslim identity with what is perceived to be a 
British lifestyle. The scenes viewed as positive representations involved the Muslim 
girls’ school in Bradford. The issue of the apparent contradiction between science and 
religion, the traditional and the modern was raised in the programme and the school 
was perceived through its headmistress to have represented itself (and consequently 
the community) well, though the discussion was about the teaching of Darwinian 
theory and the incompatibility of Darwinian theory with Islamic teachings. The 
school’s resolution of incongruity, as perceived by some of the discussants, offered a 
positive representation. As can be seen from above, the discussions around the choice 
of topic tended to centre on the issue of difference. The discussants objected to scenes 
which emphasised difference and praised scenes that emphasised compatibility. 
 
7.2.2.1. A confirmatory manner of decoding  
 
The discussants were generally alert to detail throughout the programme and they 
would refer to phrases and incidents throughout the discussions. Most of the 
references were accurately recollected. However, there were two occasions when the 
discussants had misread a scene and both were in the direction of oppositional 
decoding. For example, one discussant said: 
 
Do you see the American guy, he was saying, “Well I’m just as British 
as you”, what does that mean? (1-7) 
 
When in fact Ignatieff had said: “…you’re more British than I am, cos I’m a 
Canadian”. And in another discussion one discussant said the following: 
 
Clips of what’s normal and what’s in bondage like a woman if you 
saw her in hijab, that was a deliberate focal point to feed point to see 
which looks right and which looks wrong. Right there was this woman 
with an hijab walking with her children looking really locked up with 
no freedom and then there was this really big poster, massive poster, 
now she was small and that was big your eye can catch that to make it 
look that is the normal way, you know there was a woman who was 
half naked and you understand so there’s freedom on one side, and 
there’s a woman with total no freedom on the other side and I think 
that clip there was built to purposely feed the viewer which is obvious 
to me that was engineered. (6-4) 
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However, though there were numerous shots of women in ‘purdah’, the actual shot 
with The Sunday Sport advert in the background had an old, bearded, Muslim man 
walking in front of the poster. So the contradistinction pointed out by the above 
discussant was in the direction of oppositional decoding and so was the result of 
psychological remembering. This relates to Moscovici’s (1984b) point about the 
conventional nature of social representations and the dominance of the conclusion 
over the content. The majority of the recollections were, however, by far, accurate.  
 
7.2.3. Choice of representative 
 
The third form of contention focused around the choice of representative. Cottle 
(1993) notes the use of personalisation in news stories, and this programme similarly 
used three persons as representatives of the Muslim community such that these 
representatives personalised the issues at the heart of the ‘Rushdie affair’. Three 
members of the Bradford Muslim community that participated in this programme 
were Shabbir Akhtar (a representative of the Bradford Council of Mosques), Nighat 
Mirza (a headteacher of a Muslim Girls’ school) and Arshad Javed (a restaurant 
owner). The amount of time that each contributed orally is presented in the table 
below. 
 
Table 7.1. Frequency of appearance of Muslim representatives 
 
Name of 
representative 
Time on 
air (secs) 
Percentage of total 
Muslim representatives 
Percentage of total of 
programme 
Shabbir Akhtar 392 48.3 16.8 
Arshad Javed 287 35.3 12.3 
Nighat Mirza 133 16.4 5.7 
Total 812 100.0 34.8 
 
The discussants were asked about the representatives and how they felt about them as 
representatives of the Bradford Muslim community. Shabbir Akhtar was asked about 
the campaign against the book, the tensions experienced by a Muslim living in British 
society and the negotiation between freedom of expression and community rights. 
Nighat Mirza made one comment about racial integration and then engaged in a 
discussion about the limits of religious education. Arshad Javed is a restaurant owner 
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in Bradford. His family was provided as an example of a typical Muslim family. The 
typicality was represented through elaborations on the extended nature of the family 
lifestyle, shots of women in the kitchen and shots of the family having an Asian 
dinner while seated on the floor. Javed was asked about his family and business 
lifestyle, the campaign against The Satanic Verses including the book-burning, and 
the fatwa issued by Khomeini.  
 
Shabbir Akhtar was the central representative of the Bradford Muslim community in 
the programme. He spoke on behalf of the Bradford Council of Mosques and it was 
his challenge to Ignatieff in a previous edition of The Late Show programme that led 
to Ignatieff travelling to Bradford in order to understand the Muslim position. Shabbir 
Akhtar had studied philosophy at Cambridge and was now working for the local 
Racial Equality Council. His discussions with Ignatieff were conducted across a table 
from which both could be seen throughout the programme. Their conversation, 
though separated into sections, was distributed towards the beginning and the end of 
the programme and lasted for a total of ten minutes twenty three seconds. Of this, 
Ignatieff spoke for four minutes twenty four seconds (42.3% of the conversation), and 
Akhtar spoke for five minutes fifty nine seconds (57.6% of the conversation). 
 
The most recurring view of Shabbir Akhtar in the group discussions was that he 
agreed too much with Ignatieff due to being pressurised or scared, or that he “backed 
off” on too many occasions i.e. the representative as apologist82. The discussants also 
felt that he did not represent the community well in the direct exchanges.   
 
I actually think he didn’t want to be open or straight forward, because I 
think he was scared that we would take the wrong idea or something. I 
reckon I think he knew it, he could have been more straight forward 
and this is to the point, I think he was trying to just explain a lot more 
which he didn’t really listen to, he just used to move to the next point 
and didn’t really give him full time. (8-3)  
 
There were, however, several discussants who viewed Shabbir Akhtar positively in 
that he represented the position well and that he did not rescind from the general 
Muslim position. Similarly, there were several discussants who viewed Akhtar more 
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negatively suggesting, for example, that he was only representing or advocating 
himself.  
 
Nighat Mirza, the headmistress of a Muslims Girls’ School, was the subject of two 
short scenes in the programme. She was received as a positive representative of the 
community in that she was understood to be more in tune, less afraid and 
knowledgeable (through her references to the Qur’an). She did not actually quote 
Qur’anic text but instead inferred from the Qur’an, but this was sufficient for the 
discussants. This did not prevent one discussant from criticising her for lack of proper 
wearing of the headscarf. This positioning of Mirza was made in comparison to the 
other two key representatives in the programme, as she was seen as the only one 
“who stood up”.   
 
I think she was really spot on, I thought she was, when she was talking 
she was talking short sentences and to the point. (8-1) 
Yeah she was good. (8-2) 
She wasn’t moving away to the side like the other guy it was much 
more convincing, much more convincing. (8-1) 
 
The only educated Muslim person who stands up for Islam is Mrs 
Mirza, she is the only one who stood up for Islam... (3-1) 
 
She was not without criticism though, as she was criticised for appearing narrow 
minded and exhibiting a general level of education.  
 
Javed was involved in long discussions with Ignatieff towards the end of the 
programme mainly on the issue of the fatwa and whether he would carry it out 
himself. Though Javed held a forthright stance in this conversation, he was 
universally criticised in the discussions. The criticism focused around a scene in 
which he admitted to selling alcohol in his restaurant which is forbidden in Islamic 
law. This was during a discussion on the challenges facing Javed in attempting to 
raise his children with a sense of Muslim identity. His admission was met with 
laughter during the actual viewing in some groups and the discussants themselves 
dismissed him as being “clocked”, having “got stuck”, being “lost” and a “fake”.  
                                                                                                                                           
82
 This is in contrast to Bowen (1992) who describes Akhtar as “incisive, disconcerting and often 
devastating in debate” (p 10).  
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Personally I think he picked his people out well cos at the end of the 
day…  (1-1) 
… he had the weak people didn’t he? (1-3) 
He had him in his car, he had him in his car, and he asked him about 
Rushdie and he asked him we’re going to your restaurant and you sell 
alcohol there don’t you, he’s clocked him straight away… (1-1) 
That’s true, that’s true… (1-11) 
He knew who he picked out, and the guy didn’t have a leg to stand 
on… (1-1) 
 
The researcher had wished to examine the relationship between reception of a 
programme and identity positioning. The researcher had identified three identities for 
South Asian Muslim youth in Bradford, these being ‘coconuts’, ‘rude boys’ and 
‘extremists’. The focus groups mainly consisted of members from the second and 
third categories but there was no obvious or systematic difference between these two 
identities in the way that they interpreted the television programme. The three 
representatives were received polysemically but this did not correspond towards a 
pattern across particular individuals, nor did the discussions themselves repeat any 
obvious patterns. Contradictions and rejoinders were part of the discussion on 
occasion but there were only a few incidents of this nature. It was the researcher’s 
view that this difference would be most prominent in the representations of 
representatives of the community, but this did not occur. The differences could be 
more prominent if focus group discussions are conducted with ‘coconuts’ as well.  
 
The discussions revealed a dominant view towards each representative. Shabbir 
Akhtar was received as “scared” and “backing off”, Arshad Javed was received as 
“fake” and “lost”, and the third, Nighat Mirza was received as standing up for what 
she believed. Mirza was received and explained through contrasts with the other two. 
 
It was alright, only the lady she gave a good answer for that against the 
guy, all the rest of them didn’t have a clue. (4-5) 
 
She defended everything he questioned… (1-1)  
Defended it well… (1-M) 
Yeah I think she did, gave a good argument, whereas others were 
trying to pussyfoot their way round it… (1-1) 
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The discussions on the representatives highlighted two important characteristics 
which the discussants required of the representatives. The first is veracity, that is self-
representation in as straight-forward manner as possible almost to the point of 
defiance
83
 i.e. in a non-compromising manner. The second is authenticity and 
integrity. The discussants felt that representatives of the community should only 
represent the community if they were themselves in a ‘moral’ position to do so, this 
implied and required authenticity and integrity.  
 
Mirza was received positively because she was perceived to be veracious and 
authentic, especially because of the discussion on the teaching of Darwinism in 
Islamic schools. Akhtar was perceived to be genuine but not veracious enough. So he 
was accused of “beating about the bush”, “agreeing too much”, “backing away” and 
“being scared”. Javed was perceived to be veracious and defiant but lacking in 
authenticity. Though he spoke about killing Rushdie which was raised by Ignatieff, 
he had earlier admitted to selling alcohol in his restaurant and the discussants did not 
view this positively as they felt that he was not genuine in his convictions. The table 
below summarises the above. 
 
Table 7.2. Relationship between representatives and characteristics 
 
Characteristics Authenticity Non-authenticity 
Veracity  Community worker Hypocritical fundamentalist 
Non-Veracity Apologist - 
 
I will return to this theme towards the end of this chapter when I will examine the 
nature of reception to representation in relation to identity politics and the challenging 
of hegemony. The selection of representatives (as a form of misrepresentation) which 
was the theme of some of the discussions around this topic leads onto the next section 
which examines the absence of other types of representatives (also as a form of 
misrepresentation). 
 
 
                                                 
83
 The close relation of defiance to identity politics discourse can also be noted in the interview extract 
from the first methodological study in which the senior youth worker paraphrased Muslim identity talk 
as “It’s alright, I’m a Muslim and I do this and that’s ok, and I’m gonna damn well do it”. 
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7.2.3.1. Projection of the identity position 
 
The previous discussion on the choice of representative highlighted three different 
types of representative: the ‘apologist’, the ‘hypocritical fundamentalist’, and the 
‘community worker’. Multiplicity of representation within the same programme has 
been noted by Rose (1996): 
 
For within a single programme, that is Casualty, there are many 
different representations of madness. There is the violent maniac 
(‘Running amok in the waiting room’), the self-mutilator who is also 
dangerous (‘Self-inflicted cigarette burns’), the self-injurer who is in 
no way dangerous but is distressed (‘The bulimic dancer’), the mildly 
odd (‘Wandering about in the waiting room’) and the possibly 
miraculous (‘Hysterical blindness’). (p. 280). 
 
However, this did not prevent a second issue being raised as a form of 
misrepresentation, this being misrepresentation through the absence of ‘appropriate’ 
representatives. The main absence was that of Islamic scholars according to the 
discussants. Another absence was that of practising, activist youth, those that had 
been involved in the campaign. 
 
You notice that there were no Islamic scholars representing or any 
people actively promoting Muslim groups, or you know…a six year 
old kid from school, a restauranteur, a waiter with shoulder length hair 
with broken English, things like that so there was no… I wouldn’t say 
this was representative of the community or Islam. (7-1) 
 
The lack of an ‘appropriate’ representative became a source of embarrassment:  
 
You pick a guy who’s probably come from Pakistan in the last 
eighteen/nineteen months, who doesn’t understand much English, and 
you ask him what do you think of pseudo-liberalism ideas. And what 
do you think of freedom of speech, the essence, the core of democracy, 
and the guy goes, “Hang on, what are you talking about?”. And then 
he doesn’t want to come across thick on TV so he answers it in the 
best manner he can and that’s what he comes across as, thick. (3-1) 
Yeah so that’s what we see there yeah, other people watching this 
saying, all people like that… (3-2) 
I mean we were laughing… (3-1) 
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… this is embarrassing. (3-2) 
 
The cause of embarrassment is due to the perceived imbalance in argumentative 
ability. The suggestion of alternative representatives is an attempt at representation 
through strategic essentialism. The suggested representatives therefore reverse the 
source of negative self-evaluation and allow for a prototypical presentation of the 
identity position in the face of hegemonic representations. Lukes (1974), by quoting 
Polsby (1963), provides an answer to the question of which absences are significant: 
 
Then which non-events are to be regarded as significant? One 
satisfactory answer might be: those outcomes desired by a significant 
number of actors in the community but not achieved. (Lukes, 1974, p. 
38)  
 
According to this approach, a significant absence in the programme was that of 
scholars. Six out of the eight groups mentioned scholars (or Mawlanas or Imams) as a 
noticeable absence: 
 
Yeah but that was the side they wanted to see, innit. That’s the side 
they wanted to present, them Asians, the media that’s what they want 
to show so most of the people they… that’s why they went to the 
people at the restaurant, cos that’s the sort of Bradford that they want 
to show the Asians are like, if they were worried about the proper 
answer they could have gone to some Mawlana, there’s loads of 
Mawlanas in Bradford, instead they go to some cowboy in a 
restaurant. (4-6) 
 
Other examples of absences included a Muslim who agreed with liberalism, a “proper 
fundamentalist”, an “intellectual”, and a businessman who was Islamically practising. 
The majority of the discussion around this topic though focused on scholars. This 
shows that the central issue for the discussants was not that of a wide representation 
of the community which revealed the heterogeneous nature of the community, but 
more of a projected image of the community through its scholars. This is because 
these same scholars could satisfy the earlier two criteria of veracity and integrity. The 
argument used in favour of the use of scholars was that they would have provided an 
authentic position on the ‘Rushdie affair’, authentic in relation to the sources of 
religious practice. 
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7.2.3.2. The difficulty of strategic essentialism 
 
The call for the inclusion of scholars and practising, activist youth as representatives 
of the community resembles the strategic essentialism that Gervais (1997) noted 
amongst Shetlanders: 
 
Which strategies did Shetlanders adopt to resist the imposition of 
dominant meanings and to restore a sense of agency? First and 
foremost, they resorted to what can be described as ‘strategic 
essentialism’. They put forward a consensual image of the ‘real 
Shetlander’ derived from myths, traditions, and reconstructed 
history… The long-term consequence of this strategic essentialism – 
which in the short-term may be necessary to protect the community – 
is that it leads to the exclusion of significant numbers from the 
collective definition of ‘being a Shetlander’. (p. 291).  
 
The strategic essentialism, that was adopted by some of the discussants as a means of 
contesting negative representations, was itself contested. Other discussants felt that 
such a representation did not reflect the true composition of the Bradford Muslim 
community. Such a strategy also made some of the discussants question their own 
practice, and hence, a self-referential aspect to their reception qualified a call for 
strategic representation. 
 
I think it does, you guys are arguing yeah they should have chosen 
someone who was educated, but are all Muslims in Bradford 
educated? Are they all scholars? (3-3) 
 
Do you understand he’s picking on a person, he’s not talking to a true 
Muslim here now. Do you understand? (6-4) 
I debate that. That’s not the point. It’s not for us to say whether 
somebody’s a true Muslim or not? I think he wasn’t an educated 
Muslim. (6-2) 
Not educated enough. (6-3) 
He didn’t know why? (6-4) 
He fell into traps and he fell into holes that the guy was digging for 
him ages before in the conversation, he just if he’d have come… I’ll 
put it into perspective if he’d had come even here to talk to us the guy 
doing the we would have torn him to shreds. Honest to God we would 
have torn him to shreds because those people who he selected and they 
were selected there must have been a vetting procedure before the 
programme was made, those people were selected because of their 
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ignorance and that is all, you can make any argument right or wrong 
depending on the people arguing it. (6-2) 
Alcohol in his restaurant… (6-4) 
Even that isn’t a problem, that would not have been a problem, he 
could have said, “Fine I’m a sinner, I sell alcohol, that’s my… I’m 
gonna take that with me”. (6-2) 
“That’s my personal thing”. (6-4) 
“That’s my downfall”. (6-1) 
“Yeah, that’s my weakness”. (6-2) 
 
Nevertheless, even those who were sceptical about strategic essentialism viewed the 
programme as constructed: 
 
He’s got to represent the Muslims. (3-2) 
There’s only one guy representing Muslims… (3-5) 
I’m not saying every single Muslim, as himself, yeah as a Muslim, 
he’s saying ok you’re a Muslim, ok he set him up innit, he’s saying oh 
he’s selling alcohol… (3-2) 
You know the way they did it… (3-1) 
I know they did set him up… (3-5) 
 
The above exchange exemplifies the problem of representation and its effects upon 
those that are represented. This holding of simultaneous yet contradictory views 
towards representation will be explored further later. 
  
7.2.3.3. The internalisation of hegemonic discourse 
 
Though the discussants expressed much discontent with the programme, and in doing 
so they presented themselves as being able to reject the rhetoric and representations 
that constituted the programme through an oppositional positioning, they nevertheless 
showed throughout the discussions that they adhered to the ideology of individualism. 
One discussant said:  
 
Everyone’s an individual, aren’t they? (5-4) 
 
This understanding of individualism related to the representation of the Bradford 
Muslim community: 
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We shouldn’t stereotype the Bradford Muslim, cos everyone’s their 
own individual. Yeah there’s a lot of different type of Bradford 
Muslims out there. There’s them which are more westernised, there’s 
them which are more backwards, there’s them which are holding onto 
culture, there’s them trying to find true Islam. (2-3) 
  
I mean you can’t have one person actually representing to give an 
opinion on the whole of Bradford on the whole of the Muslim 
community. You’ve got to have a few people who can actually 
contribute and discuss the matter cos not one person can actually give 
the whole… like I said give an opinion on everybody, on everybody’s 
account. (5-2) 
 
Here, the discussants advocated individualism as a check against a monolithic 
representation of the Bradford Muslim community. The discourse of identity politics 
would attempt to strategically promote one representation of the identity position and 
this was suggested by many of the discussants. However, others resorted to 
individualism as a check against a form of representation that concealed differences 
underneath the strategic representation. Ignatieff’s use of individualism was criticised 
in one discussion when the discussants suggested that Ignatieff was treating Salman 
Rushdie as an individual whilst simultaneously stereotyping the Bradford Muslim 
community. 
 
7.3. The ambivalent decoding of stereotypes 
 
There was beneath the surface of the discussions a tension between representation and 
reality that manifested itself several times during the discussions. One of the issues at 
the centre of these discussions was the nature of stereotyping. The discussants could 
not escape the fact that the programme contained ‘real’ images of Bradford and the 
Muslim community, and yet they complained about stereotypes in the programmes. I 
will proceed below through a description of some of the key points that were made on 
the issue of stereotypes. 
 
7.3.1. Invalidity of stereotypes 
 
The starting point is strategic misrepresentation, as it actually was in many of the 
focus group discussions. A specific example was repeatedly used. Ignatieff conducted 
short interviews towards the end of the programme with two waiters (which lasts for 
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one minute twenty eight seconds) in a restaurant. The first engaged in a discussion 
about the book itself, the second criticised the Home Secretary’s comments about the 
affair. The discussants felt that the inclusion of these scenes was inappropriate.  
 
But that’s what bugs me, every time these programmes come up, 
they’ll get some restaurant guy or go to a taxi stand and speak to 
someone there who don’t know anything yeah, don’t even know how 
to speak English, “But this, but that”, and they’ll put people like that 
on TV on national TV to kind of represent the Muslim… (2-5) 
But what they say is that there’s a lot of Muslims who work in 
restaurants, there’s a lot of Muslims who work in… we’re 
misrepresenting them, I mean, you can’t pretend that they don’t exist? 
(2-M) 
But if that’s an intellectual programme then why don’t they go and see 
an intellectual about it? (2-4) 
That’s what we’re saying… (2-5) 
Yeah and if Shabbir Akhtar is so intelligent… (2-3) 
I mean if it was a cookery programme you wouldn’t go to the mosque 
and ask the mullah there what ingredients do you put in the chicken 
korma? (2-4) 
 
7.3.2. Validity of stereotypes 
 
The discussants were critical of the representations of the Bradford Muslim 
community in the programme (including these two short conversations with the 
waiters), however, there was a tendency in some of the discussions for the criticism of 
the representations to be followed up by a criticism from another discussant who 
would suggest that the representations were fair. 
 
What bad bits? (1-M) 
Messy streets. (1-6) 
Come on that’s just Bradford. (1-7) 
 
Say you took a random sample… (3-3) 
Random sample, you would have got some educated people had you 
took a random sample, I guarantee you. (3-1) 
Not necessarily. Think of the number of illiterate people there are, 
butchers, God knows what yeah. (3-3) 
They took every single illiterate person they could find yeah? (3-1) 
I think it was fair, them guys they did pretty well. (3-3) 
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7.3.3. Universality of stereotypes 
 
The discussants raised concerns about the problems of representation and its relation 
to stereotyping. However, they also recognised that they themselves viewed other 
communities stereotypically, and that such stereotypical representations were flawed 
as descriptions of other communities.  
 
You know, what people have to understand is when they meet one 
Muslim, that Muslim does not represent all of the other Muslims. (3-5) 
Yeah, stereotyping… (3-2) 
You know I don’t think people understand that. (3-5) 
Oh come on, we do that to say… (3-3) 
Everyone does it… (3-5) 
Say a Christian, or Hindus, we meet one, and we say alcoholic blah 
blah, and we take an image yeah from them subconsciously… (3-3) 
Surely that’s human nature… (3-5) 
Yeah exactly… (3-3) 
 
The discussions on the subject of stereotypes, therefore, raised some internal 
contradictions. The discussions would begin with the complaint against the 
programme that the programme misrepresented the Bradford Muslim community, 
especially in its use of stereotypes which were viewed to be false. However, the 
discussants, sometimes the same discussants, would later in the discussion suggest 
that the stereotypes were true and simultaneously state that the stereotypes were false, 
and that they stereotyped others as well. So the two rebuttals to the claim of 
misrepresentation were “Come on, we do the same!” and “Let’s face it, it’s true!”. 
Not only are the rebuttals contradicting the initial statement of misrepresentation, but 
they also contradict each other. The contradictions between the three views on 
stereotypes did not prevent the discussants from articulating them.  
 
Table 7.3. Variety of opinions on stereotypes 
 
Opinion on stereotype It’s not just! Let’s face it,  
it’s true! 
Come on, we do 
the same! 
Stereotypes are true No Yes No 
Stereotypes are false Yes No Yes 
Stereotypes of in-group Yes Yes No 
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Stereotypes of out-group No No Yes 
 
The researcher would suggest after observation during the focus group discussions 
that a sense of rejection led through the discussion to a sense of dejection. That 
stereotypes are too powerful to be challenged. So the common sense view (perhaps 
the liberal consensus) that stereotypes are typically false became transformed into its 
anti-logoi that stereotypes are true. This depiction of the trajectory of the focus groups 
discussions could be explained through a conversational analysis of the group context 
such that as the group began its discussion of the programme, the discussants were 
addressing the out-group presenter (hence their negativity) and that the respondents 
proceeded to discuss the programme between themselves rather directing the 
conversation towards an out-group. This explanation could be supported if the 
response of the discussants to the stereotypes were distributed in such a manner that 
the criticism of the programme would be found towards the beginning of the 
discussions and the introspection of the discussants would be found towards the end. 
This was, however, not the case. The criticism of the programme was uniform 
throughout the discussions: the beginning, the middle, and the end. The moments of 
dejection and introspection were distributed irregularly throughout the discussions. 
For example, in two discussion groups the comments were made towards the 
beginning of the discussions. In another, the comments were made towards the end.  
The comments were made consistently throughout a fourth discussion group within a 
dialogical argument between two sections of the group, one arguing that the 
representations were true, the other arguing that they were false (though both agreed 
that the programme was set up). In another focus group discussion the comments 
were prompted by the moderator towards the middle and end of the discussion. The 
comments did not seem to fit into a pattern in relation to conversational context. 
  
The distinction between the two rebuttals is that one suggests that stereotypes are 
true, and the other suggests that stereotypes are necessary. Or are they true and 
necessary? We will deal with the second point first. There is a tradition within social 
psychological thought that suggests that stereotypes are cognitively and perceptually 
necessary (Allport, 1954b; Tajfel and Wilkes, 1963). There is another tradition within 
social psychological thought that similarly suggests that stereotypes are necessary but 
from within a psychodynamic perspective (Gilman, 1985). There is a third tradition 
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which also suggests that certain stereotypes are necessary and that they emerge from 
within discourse itself (Hall, 1997b). Ichheiser (1949b) similarly proposes a position 
which suggests that stereotypes are necessary.  
 
Billig (1985) criticises the perceptual approach to stereotyping because it seems to 
side against tolerance as the norm. The rule is prejudice according to this approach, 
and the exception is tolerance. Billig (1985) suggests instead that the notion of 
particularisation should be used to counter the notion of categorisation such that the 
space for tolerance is made available. So Billig (1985) suggests that stereotyping and 
prejudice are not necessary psychological phenomena. The psychodynamic and 
discursive arguments are more problematic. The identification of key positions within 
discourse such as madness allow for the proper functioning of language. A positive 
evaluation of self-identity and a negative evaluation of others leads to a psychological 
identity structure that requires notions of ‘otherness’ for the maintenance of identity 
(Gilman, 1985). 
 
Ichheiser’s (1949b) notion of prejudice and the consequent stereotyping suggests that 
prejudice is necessary for the proper functioning of society because difference is the 
norm, and to suggest otherwise is prejudice according to Ichheiser (1949b). The 
problem with this suggestion is the skewed nature of the content of stereotypes. 
Ichheiser calls for the acceptance of difference as in itself necessary. However, if 
difference is necessary, and therefore prejudice and stereotypes are similarly 
necessary, then does this also mean that stereotypes are true? Even if on occasion the 
overwhelming character of a stereotype can be negative? And how does one account 
for the numerous absences in social representations? I would suggest, in line with 
Hall (1997a, 1997b), that the combination of psychodynamic and ideological 
interventions necessitates strategic misrepresentation such that positive and negative 
evaluations are asymmetrically distributed. This does not mean that the 
representations in themselves are false, they may be true, but that they are used to 
over-represent the subject matter in the historical example of the identity politics 
movements. 
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7.4. The contestation of representation as a political act 
 
Morley (1992) criticises the encoding/decoding model because it allows for an 
attribution of intentionality towards the producers of the programme. The nature of 
consciousness and unconsciousness at the level of ideology is difficult to assess from 
the programme itself, and even studying the production of the programme may not 
lead to the answers to these questions. Certainly, the type of programme would affect 
the intentionality of the producers (e.g. entertainment, current affairs), and a possible 
distinction between the conscious intentions and unconscious motivations should not 
be neglected. I would suggest that the issue of agency should neither be outrightly 
dismissed nor enthusiastically pursued. The direct site for study of such intentionality 
is the site of production. A question to be asked here is, is it possible to assess 
intentionality, even at the level of ideology, through a study of the reception of the 
programme by those whom it is representing? I would suggest that such a study, 
while not providing a definitive answer, may nevertheless provide evidence of the 
possible presence and direction of intentionality.  
 
The focus group discussions were designed to occupy the discursive space where 
subjugation meets domination. Here, agreement and consensus are absent as 
hegemonic representations are contested. The oppositional readings of representations 
of, for example, the hypocritical fundamentalist and the proposed counter-
representation of strategic essentialism were both social psychological attempts at 
emancipation from representational subjugation.  
 
The central theme through which the programme was interpreted was the congruity of 
a South Asian Muslim presence in Bradford. To what extent was multiculturalism 
possible? Or conversely, what are the limits of multicultural policy? It was the 
programme’s perceived destabilising effect upon this discussion which caused much 
consternation in the discussions: 
 
The questions were wholly inadequate, they were, like I said he made 
no attempt to get to the real questions, the real issues, he was 
reinforcing his own stereotypes, now this is what came across to me, I 
don’t know if it was his intention, what came across to me was some 
 204 
of the questions specially asked on the way to the guy’s restaurant 
were about Islam’s… the next Muslim on the street is a threat to you 
and your way of life, speaking to the average person living in this 
society, that even your next door neighbour would at the end of the 
day would be willing to take up arms, he’s a threat to you, he’s a threat 
to your way of life. Umm… that’s what came across to me… (2-2) 
 
It was this attempt at accessing the back-stage of social interaction and its consequent 
projection into the national public sphere which was deemed to be subversive. “Part 
of the shock value of television and other media… is that it routinely makes available 
behaviour which, in most contexts of face-to-face interaction, would generally be 
regarded as belonging to back regions” (Thompson, 1990, p. 232). The feelings of 
rejection that reflected this form of representation were repeated in a conversation in 
which the themes of racism and immigration were not too far behind:  
 
Ok, let’s take your average English villager who’s never been to any 
major city, yeah… (3-M) 
Fair enough, it will affect the non-Muslims… But I’m saying the 
Muslims… (3-5) 
What would they say, to them, how would they feel, this programme? 
How would they interpret this programme? (3-M) 
“Eee bye gum, son, these foreigners are taking over aren’t they?”. (3-
1) 
That’s right, it’s all immigrant thing, that’s it, it’s all about race, not 
about religion. (3-4) 
“… next ship home”. (3-1) 
 
This extract shows the close semantic relationship between the issues raised in the 
‘Rushdie affair’ and the language of racism. Here, such language has been recounted 
as the perceived reception of the non-Muslim community. A study into the social 
representations in the media during the ‘Rushdie affair’ and their relation to the 
language of racism could highlight the extent of such a correlation. It is the 
consequence of radical incongruity that threatens their sense of national and local 
belonging. Their hesitant desire to be a ‘British Muslim’, without compromising their 
religious tradition, encourages a spirit of willingness to attempt to combine views of 
collectivity, religion and morality which are at times contradictory in nature. 
Nevertheless, they continue to try, in the words of Shabbir Akhtar, most live 
according to a modus vivendi. The Late Show, however, was perceived as a 
programme that set out to highlight the contradictions (in what they accept is a 
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confusing experience) of a South Asian Muslim presence in Britain. Morley (1992) 
writes:  
 
Whether or not a programme succeeds in transmitting the preferred 
or dominant meaning will depend on whether it encounters readers 
who inhabit codes and ideologies derived from other institutional areas 
(e.g. churches or schools) which correspond to and work in parallel 
with those of 
the programme or whether it encounters readers who inhabit codes 
drawn from other areas or institutions (e.g. trade unions or 'deviant' 
subcultures) which conflict to a greater or lesser extent with those of 
the programme. (p. 106-7). 
 
In light of this quote, the focus group discussions that were conducted in this study 
showed that this particular programme was met with creative and critical resistance 
by those whom it was representing.  
 
7.5. Conclusion 
 
Social representations are contested by identity politics movements at various sites, 
essentially all those sites that involve the cultural maintenance and reproduction of 
social knowledge e.g. the school, the media, the arts. The media has, historically, 
been one site for contestation of power in terms of representation. This study 
involving focus group discussions with South Asian Muslim youth living in Bradford 
around a programme that claimed to represent the rhetorical, identity position of the 
Bradford Muslim community during the ‘Rushdie affair’ is an investigation into the 
synergy that is the result of a meeting of representations that are oppositionally and 
asymmetrically related. The immediate and obvious outcome is one of opposition, 
criticism and deconstruction. The discussants showed a high degree of awareness and 
alertness in their viewing of the programme. The researcher was surprised several 
times during the discussions by the level of analysis of the discussants as some 
pointed to details in the composition of the programme that suggested a high level of 
perceptual and analytical awareness. Perhaps, the politically marked nature of the 
identities stimulates a heightened state of awareness. 
 
The discussants raised problems with the media as a whole, the presenter and the 
composition of the programme. The attribution of agency and the attribution of 
 206 
intentionality to the presenters and the producers was common. This ties in with the 
identity politics perspective which assumes that there is agency in the preservation of 
domination by the representatives of the hegemonic discourse. The writer, Ignatieff, 
came under huge criticism during the discussions as the discussants focused their 
criticism onto him specifically. He objectified to them what they understood to be the 
manners and practice of a dominant ‘other’. Ignatieff, as somebody in a position of 
power, was anchored as clever, deceptive, intolerant and obdurate. This 
objectification of Ignatieff represented an impenetrable wall that cut across the 
dialogical axis of this debate. Such a representation of Ignatieff and the media means 
that meaningful dialogue itself is impossible.  
 
The discussions concerning the themes raised by the programme centred around one 
issue: the congruity of a South Asian Muslim presence in Bradford, or as the 
discussants understood it, “You don’t belong here!”. The depiction of a variety of 
incongruity-inducing themes throughout the programme such as arranged marriages 
and inner city life was criticised for its encouragement of ‘otherness’ and difference. 
Similarly, though conversely, the depiction of the possibility of congruity was 
encouraged as in the interview with the headmistress of the Muslim Girl’s school. 
The discussants were also aware that programmes such as these had an educative 
effect on a population which lived around them, such that, one community could 
access the backstage life of another through its portrayal in a television programme. 
The portrayal of difference and ‘otherness’ therefore exacerbated community 
relations according to one discussant. The circularity of representation therefore 
serves to increase a feeling of separation in this instance. The ‘Rushdie affair’ was 
interpreted as a response to a general perception of being treated with “genial 
contempt” by some of the discussants, and that the ‘Rushdie affair’ was an expression 
of frustration. It is ironic that the campaign which was meant to highlight frustration 
at a lack of recognition and respect in society was met with further attempts at (what 
was perceived to be) exacerbating difference (in a negative manner). The belief that 
the discourse of racism was underlying the criticisms of the Muslim position during 
the ‘Rushdie affair’ was stated by some of the discussants. This area is open to further 
research. 
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The type of representative was also a cause of much criticism. The representative who 
received the most criticism was the restaurant owner who was perceived to be a 
hypocritical fundamentalist. The two categories of veracity and authenticity were 
central to the reception of the representative, with the category of authenticity being 
more important than veracity since the representative as ‘apologist’ was more well 
received than the ‘hypocritical fundamentalist’. The relevance of these two categories 
of authenticity and veracity emerges from within the context of the social psychology 
of identity politics. If the general group seeking representation is understood as an 
example of the identity politics movements, then there is some sense in understanding 
veracity and authenticity as being key characteristics of representatives of the 
movements. Authenticity is important because the main premise of the identity 
politics movement is that it is based on an actual situation of oppression, and that the 
struggle for emancipation is from actual causes of subjugation. Those that represent 
the struggle for emancipation must therefore do so as genuine representatives. Any 
inconsistency between rhetoric and practice (on behalf of the key representative) 
within the identity politics paradigm serves to weaken the strength of the rhetorical 
position. The veracity of the key representative is necessary because he/she faces a 
hegemonic discourse and veracity – straightforwardness to the point of defiance – is 
therefore, psychologically a recognition, through defiance and denial, of a lack of 
representational power. The two characteristics of the key identity position were then 
related to the power and strategy of the dominant rhetorical position. Veracity was 
required in order to defy (and to deny) power. Authenticity was required to protect 
against charges of hypocrisy. 
 
The dialogical nature of argumentation requires a representation of a key identity 
position which articulates the main rhetorical position of the identity politics 
movement against the hegemonic representation. This move towards strategic 
essentialism on behalf of the identity politics movements was resisted by some of the 
discussants. This was because they recognised that such a psychological stance was 
not representative of the diversity of experience within the Bradford Muslim 
community, this point was made through reference to individualism. Simultaneously, 
they recognised that they themselves were not able to meet the criteria of authenticity 
and veracity. So, for example, within the discussions, if one discussant called for 
strategic essentialism as a psychological device for rhetorical representation, then this 
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would be followed by a rebuttal by another discussant who felt that such forms of 
essentialism were unrealistic. The complaint to be made against the hypocritical 
fundamentalist of being inauthentic was now deemed as a charge that could be made 
against themselves, fearing this, they resisted calls for strategic essentialism. 
 
Three positions on stereotypes were discussed. What psychological function can such 
contradictory positions fulfil? That stereotypes are true, and false, and universal, or 
somewhere in between these three positions, ultimately means that stereotypes are 
inevitable. Hall (1997b) suggests that an oppressive representation may result in a 
cycle of entrapment as attempting to break away from one form of stereotype may 
ultimately only mean the adoption of a position that reflects a binary opposite to the 
negatively evaluated stereotype, such that the hegemonic discourse remains as the 
source of evaluation. I would suggest that the descent of the iron cage of 
representation similarly leads to the entrapment of its subjects as they oscillate 
between the anticipatory strategic essentialism of identity politics which denies the 
validity of stereotypes and the subjugation that is the result of a coercive, hegemonic 
social representation which accepts the validity of stereotypes. This line of oscillation 
between emancipation and subjugation leads to a sense of ambivalence and ultimately 
dejection, as the inevitability of the iron cage of representation presents itself to those 
who are representationally subjugated. 
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8.0. Conclusion 
 
To paraphrase Jodelet (1991), a transformation in immigration policy swings open the 
doors of a country, and the social situation which emerges overturns mental attitudes 
whose roots are to be found in the distant past. Mass migration in the post-war period 
resulted in the transformation of ‘otherness’ from an exogenous to an endogenous 
form. This act of economic migration unleashes a social process that is as complex as 
it is deep in its constitutive structure. It is deep because it draws upon a history of a 
thousand years which includes West-Muslim interactions such as the Crusades, 
Andalucia, the Mughal empire and the Raj, the Ottoman empire and colonialism. It is 
complex because it involves three types of ‘otherness’ – race, culture and religion - 
which are themselves polysemically received. The contradictory nature of legal and 
psychological denial of racism, the problem of incorporating a tolerant attitude 
towards cultures (or other cultures – this being at a time of rapid transformation of 
culture itself), and the vexed approach to religion per se and Islam in particular, 
serves to complicate an already complex picture. The maturing of the second 
generation of South Asian Muslims through the British educational system and under 
the umbrella of liberal ideology would raise the issues of ‘otherness’ that had 
otherwise remained in the background. What would be left in the past, and what 
would be carried into the future? How would British society respond to the 
endogenisation of ‘otherness’? And how would the second generation respond to 
British society’s response to the endogenisation of ‘otherness’?  
 
These are some of the questions that this thesis has attempted to explore and I will 
now discuss them below. After an initial section which will reflect on the 
methodological procedure, I will examine the interaction between identities and 
representations, especially in relation to issues of ‘otherness’ and power, and in doing 
so, I will provide examples of objectifications of such relations. I will then proceed to 
interpret the ‘Rushdie affair’ within the theoretical context of this thesis. This will be 
followed by a discussion on the structure of rhetorical engagement during social 
conflict. The conclusion will end with a consideration of the main theoretical 
contributions of this thesis in relation to the theory of social representations, its 
relation to identity processes and the possibility of ‘escape’ from hegemonic 
representations. 
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8.1. Methodological reflections 
 
Two advantages of insider research are ease of access and knowledge of language and 
culture. The importance of the issue of accessibility became evident during the first 
study. The interviewees had been divided into three groups of key informers. The first 
group consisted of young, South Asian Muslims – the researcher himself belonging to 
this group. The second group consisted of older, South Asian Muslims, and the third 
consisted of older, English residents of Bradford. Six interviews were required for 
each group. The first and second group interviews were relatively easy to arrange, 
each being arranged after one, or at the most, two phone calls or visits. The interviews 
were arranged and conducted within four weeks. The third group interviews, 
however, took three months to complete. Three interviews within this group were 
arranged immediately. The fourth interviewee was slightly delayed in responding to a 
letter which had been sent to him. The fifth and sixth interviews though took up to a 
month to arrange. Several candidates were chosen for this category, but the researcher 
was refused interview access by some outright. Four candidates refused to be 
interviewed, two from the local media, one from a local supermarket chain, and a 
fourth from the local council festival committee
84
. The reasons given included lack of 
time and a lack of knowledge on the topic of interview
85
. Repeated attempts at 
communication were required, most were unsuccessful.  
 
The difference between those category members that agreed to interview immediately 
and those that didn’t was the power relation between the category members and the 
South Asian Muslim community. Those that responded immediately tended to occupy 
positions in which there was direct accountability to the South Asian Muslim 
community (e.g. politicians, headmasters, policemen) whereas those that effectively 
refused to be interviewed tended to occupy positions which lacked any direct and 
official accountability to the South Asian Muslim community (e.g. journalists, 
businessmen). The insider status was pertinent to the interview part of the study.  
 
                                                 
84
 The fourth had originally agreed to an interview, however, the researcher missed the appointment, 
after which the fourth candidate stated that he did not have the time available through a third person. 
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The benefit of the researcher as insider is difficult to assess in the absence of a direct 
comparison. The key question for this debate is, what exactly is the researcher inside? 
Or conversely, what is it that the outsider is outside of that makes him/her an 
outsider? The contribution of Goffman and Ichheiser to this debate would suggest that 
this question is, basically, one of social psychology i.e. of perception and 
stereotyping, but in this specific example, the categories of race, culture and religion 
(and the associated and derived social networks) add to the complexity of the 
problem. That is, the difference between front-stage and backstage is not only of 
different social groups, for example, between members of a social movement such as 
the ecology network and those outside, but these differences here are also 
characterised by skin colour, and cultural, linguistic and religious signifiers. The 
extent to which these differences affect trust is difficult to assess in the absence of a 
direct comparison.  
 
The researcher can testify to a high degree of access, up to as in some cases complete 
participation. Informal discussions with youth leaders, access to religious practice, 
access to backstage social arenas, and an ability to check the validity of comments 
during discussions by virtue of being an insider, are all advantages that this researcher 
experienced. The issue of trust, or mistrust, was hardly raised except once when the 
researcher was accused of providing information for non-Muslim think tanks and 
governments.  
 
The issue of objectivity as a weakness of insider research is derivative of a Weberian 
and Cartesian view of social research. The assumption of this criticism is that the 
insider is disadvantaged methodologically, but the history of writers on Muslim 
identity shows that such a distinction is flawed. Gellner, Halliday and Lewis all have 
positions from which they conduct research on Muslim identity. These positions do 
not mean that their work is immediately and forever flawed, it means that their work 
is derivative of a certain perspective and should be viewed as such. Researchers in the 
field of social representations have conducted their work in areas of study that are of 
great importance and value to them, for example, work has been conducted on social 
representations of madness (Rose, 1996) and race relations (Philogène, 1999). 
                                                                                                                                           
85
 The researcher faced the same defence mechanism highlighted by Argyris (1969) listed as problems 
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Similarly, this research has been conducted from a certain perspective, that of the 
insider. The researcher would align himself with a weak version of the anti-objectivist 
argument. A strong version would suggest that there is no distinction between facts 
and values. A weak version suggests that there is a distinction, but that facts are 
related to ideological and political persuasions. The bias that may be derivative of this 
is to be located in the conduct of research and analysis of the data, not in the 
ideological or political persuasion per se. 
 
This leads onto the relation between ideology and methodology. The researcher began 
the research as an insider, an almost complete participant. However, as the research 
progressed, the researcher found that he began to move social psychologically 
towards the outside of the community, that is the further the research developed, the 
less the researcher was an insider, as he began to progressively view the object of 
study as an object of study and separate from himself, though he remained inside the 
community and as participant. This shift in positioning has shown the researcher that 
the insider/outsider perspectives and distinctions are not absolute nor static, though 
they remain important for particular fields of research. With respect to ideology, if we 
take ideology to refer to a Durkheimian collective representation (as in liberal 
ideology) and an emancipatory strategy (as in identity politics), then the researcher 
has discovered that prolonged involvement in the act of research has made the 
researcher more sensitive to the varieties and particularities of ideological 
functioning. To discover what everyone else takes for granted, is simultaneously to 
discover what one takes for granted. 
 
8.2. Social representations and identities 
 
I have in this thesis employed the theory of social representations and combined it 
with a view to identity politics discourse. I identified three forms of identity in 
chapter two. The first was a collective notion of identity. The second and third were, 
respectively, a politically marked identity type and a non-politically marked identity 
type. The suggestion in the theoretical chapter was that a non-politically marked 
identity was subject to a hegemonic representation and that it became politically 
                                                                                                                                           
for access to outsiders. This is because the researcher was an outsider to this interview category. 
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marked once it rhetorically engaged with the hegemonic representation through trans-
coding or social creativity. This suggestion was substantiated by the findings of this 
study which identified two identity ideal types that were related through trans-coding 
to hegemonic representations. The ‘rude boy’ was related to representations of the 
‘Paki’, and the ‘extremist’ was related to representations of the ‘Muslim’.  
 
There are two stereotypes as social representations of the South Asian Muslim 
community. These are that of the ‘Muslim’ and the ‘Paki’. The ‘Muslim’ is anchored 
as backward and aggressive. The ‘Paki’ is anchored as uncivilised and non-white. 
Within the confines of this study, the two stereotypes differ from each other in that 
‘Muslim’ is media-generated whereas ‘Paki’ is culturally generated. However, this 
reverses the historical order of the two in that ‘Muslim’ has been subject to numerous 
cultural stereotypes throughout the history of Islam, whereas ‘Paki’ is derivative of 
‘Pakistani’ and is, therefore more modern and hence should be more associated with 
the media since ‘Pakistan’ is a recent invention. The ‘Paki’ as a social representation 
is absent from the national media, though it is present as a cultural stereotype in local 
communities
86
.  
 
An analysis of the interviews with the key informers, led to the identification of three 
types of social strategy, as types of identity formation – there was a close parity with 
those identity types that have been identified in the literature. These were the 
‘coconuts’, the ‘rude boys’ and the ‘extremists’. The first type differed from the 
second two in that it involved an acceptance and internalisation of stereotypes. This 
group then confronts its negative evaluation by assimilating to the values and 
representations of the dominant group, thereby creating a distance in terms of identity 
between its self-perception and self-presentation, and that of the community being 
stigmatised, which this group of ‘coconuts’ now constitutes as separate from itself i.e. 
it forms a boundary between itself and the group being stigmatised. This social 
                                                 
86
 The universality of ‘Paki’ as a racial taunt does raise some questions. First of all, Pakistanis are one 
set of Asians amongst Indians and Bangladeshis in Britain (numbering approximately 31% according 
to the 1991 census, see Ballard, 1994). So how does a minority attribute become the source of 
categorisation for the whole unit? That is, how does ‘Paki’ being a short form of Pakistani come to be 
adopted as the racist taunt against all South Asians? This question becomes more problematic when it 
is acknowledged that ‘Pakistan’ is a recent, modernist, nationalist invention which historically has little 
significance in that it is not involved in any significant encounter with Britain or the West, yet it seems 
so culturally salient. 
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strategy of social mobility is a social psychological strategy and sometimes is related 
to a strategy of economic mobility. 
 
The second and third types of identity formation amongst South Asian Muslim male 
youth in Bradford are both forms of social creativity. They both reject the outsider 
representations of group identity and adopt either different dimensions of inter-group 
comparison or re-evaluate a previously negative characteristic in a positive manner – 
usually these two forms of social creativity are related. These two forms of social 
creativity involve polemical representations in that the subject of discussion is 
contested. The disputed nature of the social representations requires the incorporation 
of a rhetorical or argumentative approach towards the analysis and understanding of 
these identity processes. This will be returned to later.  
 
The second type of identity formation, the ‘rude boys’, is an amalgam of three quite 
different cultural influences. These influences derive from a bhangra/Bollywood 
cultural matrix, a rap/hip-hop cultural matrix, and a Northern/post-industrial ghetto 
cultural matrix. The bhangra/Bollywood cultural matrix is the result of a second 
generational interpretation through translation of Punjabi folk dance and Indian 
cinema, this forming the basis of a second generation Asian cultural identity. The 
rap/hip-hop cultural matrix is associated with the rap/hip-hop industry in the United 
States of America especially amongst black/African-American artists. The third 
cultural matrix is the Northern, post-industrial ghetto cultural matrix which also 
provides key identifiers and patterns of behaviour for young South Asian Muslim 
males. An Asian cultural identity is celebrated through bhangra and the adoption of 
signifiers related to the rap industry is an example of the assertion of self-pride in a 
situation which previously stigmatised their notions of identity. So the two 
anchorings of ‘Paki’ as uncivilised and non-white are reflected through trans-coding 
and celebrated through bhangra and rap. So previous sources of negative evaluation 
(Asian culture and brown skin) are now positively evaluated. 
 
The third type of identity formation is that of the ‘extremists’. This identity type is 
also an example of the social strategy of social creativity in that a previously 
negatively evaluated aspect of identity is now positively evaluated. So being a 
Muslim, though it is negatively stereotyped, is a source of esteem and pride for this 
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group. One example of such reversal is that in the aftermath of the ‘Rushdie affair’, 
Muslims were accused of being backward. The ‘extremists’ would turn this around 
and suggest that British society was too progressive, and that increasing immorality, 
as they viewed it, would have serious consequences for the stability of British society 
as a whole. So the anchoring of ‘Muslim’ as backward is reflected through trans-
coding as stable, such that a previously negatively evaluated identity is now 
positively evaluated. 
 
The ideal types are integrally related to social representations of identities as the 
‘coconuts’ are incorporating both stereotypes of the ‘Paki’ and the ‘Muslim’, the 
‘rude boys’ are creatively responding to the stereotype of the ‘Paki’ and the 
‘extremists’ are creatively responding to the stereotype of the ‘Muslim’. These 
represent ideal positions and social reality will produce examples of compromises, 
hybridisations and contradictions between these ideal types. These findings reveal the 
close dialectic between representations and identities, especially in how identities are 
responses to the social representations of themselves. The social representations of 
the ‘Paki’ and the ‘Muslim’ serve to provide a representational field within which are 
positioned three responses, that of the ‘coconuts’, the ‘rude boys’ and the 
‘extremists’, that are directly related to the representations in terms of how they 
engage with the negative evaluations.  
 
Table 8.1. Identity-representation relation 
 
Hegemonic 
representation 
Anchoring Ideal identity 
type 
Representation-
identity dialectic 
Liberal Humane, educated, genuine Coconut Incorporation 
Muslim Backward, aggressive Extremist Trans-coding 
Paki Non-white, uncivilised Rude boy Trans-coding 
 
The social representations of ‘Muslim’ and ‘Paki’ as ‘backward’ and ‘uncivilised’ are 
examples of representations of difference. This difference is defined against 
discourses of ‘modernity’ and ‘civilisation’, discourses which are central to European 
and Western identity (e.g. Hall, 1992b; Jahoda, 1999). I would agree with Rose 
(1996) that Moscovici’s definition of social representations as familiarising the 
unfamiliar is not specific enough to explain those instances (in relation to identity) in 
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which the representations function in order to maintain a sense of ‘otherness’. There 
is anchoring and objectification in these instances, but the familiarisation of 
unfamiliarity leads to the construction of difference. This understanding of the 
functionality of social representations requires an incorporation of a view towards 
semantic space in which some anchorings will provide meaning to a representation of 
the Western, modern, European self (at a general level), and other anchorings will 
represent that which is different.  
 
So how does this representation of ‘otherness’ affect life in Bradford? Both 
representations of the ‘Paki’ and the ‘Muslim’ contribute towards the construction of 
an ‘otherness’ which represents difference at its most basic. The result is separation. 
The erection and maintenance of barriers between ‘them’ and ‘us’ as manifested by 
the police station
87
 or house moving exacerbates a notion of separation and distance, 
such that the social psychological perception of ‘otherness’ is translated into an 
empirical reality. The police station provides an example of an objectification of a 
social representation that is directly linked to identity. One young South Asian 
Muslim said:  
 
If they felt that the Muslim community was part of their community 
right, what’s the need to build big walls in the police station for? 
They’re telling the local community that “Look, we’re not a part of 
you, we are in here, and we are here to control you, we’re different 
from you and we don’t trust you” yeah. 
 
Similarly, the house moving was related to inter-group representations: “I don’t know 
whether it’s because they don’t see us as good neighbours or it’s the stereotyping 
image that they’ve got of us…”. Both of these are examples of objectifications of 
social relations that are characterised by ‘otherness’. These examples and the above 
discussion should have highlighted the close relation between representations and 
identities. 
 
8.3. When the subaltern met the hegemonic 
                                                 
87
 Goffman (1963) writes on this that: “Thus in the stigmatised arises the sense of not knowing what 
the others present are ‘really’ thinking about him.” (p. 25). This issue has become more relevant now 
that racism is seen to have adopted a more subtle face (Wieviorka, 1994). The example of the police 
station, however, relieves the stigmatised of this particular problem.  
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I wish to proceed now to discuss the ‘Rushdie affair’ within the theoretical 
framework of this thesis. Rushdie’s cri de coeur: “I am being enveloped in and 
described by a language that does not fit me” (Rushdie, 1991, p. 405) encapsulates 
the feeling of being the subject of misrepresentation. It is ironic that this same feeling 
was the root cause of the ‘Rushdie affair’. The Satanic Verses was viewed as the 
postmodern face of a new form of orientalism (Sardar, 1998). The new community 
was struggling to free itself from the confines of centuries of cultural stereotypes, 
only to find that these same stereotypes were now being re-introduced into the 
modern conscience within the field of postmodern fiction. The character of the 
Prophet, which had been at the centre of orientalist attempts at critiquing Islam, now 
became the subject of the postmodern gaze. The consequence of a postmodern 
critique was the ‘Rushdie affair’, a refusal against cultural misrepresentation.  
 
The rhetorical analysis identified two positions during the ‘Rushdie affair’. These 
were the liberal position and the Muslim position. These two positions represented 
the bi-polar positions in the debate and were each associated with certain social 
representations. The social representations surrounding the Muslim rhetorical position 
centred on the theme of a minority community advocating its rights against a 
majority, hegemonic culture. The social representations surrounding the liberal 
rhetorical position centred on the theme of writers being persecuted by totalitarian 
regimes. The item analysis found that the majority type of rhetoric in the television 
programmes was primary i.e. focusing on the actual contents of the central discussion 
of the affair, extreme items
88
 counted for almost half of all rhetorical content in the 
five programmes and similarly that radical liberals accounted for half of all rhetorical 
content. All of these factors are indicative of a general tendency towards 
radicalisation of the dialogue. This point however should be mitigated by the high 
instance of tertiary rhetoric
89
 and the high incidence of moderate Muslim rhetorical 
statements.  
 
                                                 
88
 Extreme items were those advocated as primary forms of rhetoric by the respective radical 
exponents. 
89
 Especially programmes 2 and 5 which tended towards ‘understanding’ the Muslim position. 
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The language that began to be used to articulate the Muslim case was that of identity 
politics. But this presented another problem, one that has been alluded to by Jodelet 
(1991): “The unthinkable hybrid is not so much the child of the patient but the loony 
who has become a civilian” (p. 271). The racial, cultural, religious ‘other’ speaking 
through the language of identity politics represented an integration of contradictions 
that was unthinkable to the dominant position, and unacceptable towards its 
maintenance. Asad (1990) wrote on this:  
 
In my view the fear aroused in the ‘Rushdie affair’ (and the often 
unrestrained language it generates among normally staid persons) has 
to do with a perceived threat to authority, not to power: More 
precisely, the fear is generated by the fact that people who do not 
accept the secular liberal values of the governing class are nevertheless 
able to use the liberal language of equal rights in rational argument 
against a hegemony of secular British culture and to avail themselves 
of liberal law for instituting their own strongly held religious 
traditions. (p. 475). 
 
Asad (1990) posits the ‘Rushdie affair’ as a symptom of British postimperial identity 
crisis. The ‘unthinkable hybrid’ certainly challenges liberal hegemony in this 
instance. An acceptance of the Muslim position would have had the potential of 
precipitating ideological decomposition, especially since liberalism was so tied up 
historically with the notion of ‘otherness’ (e.g. Grosrichard, 1998). So, ultimately, a 
critique of domination is an invitation to a counter-critique since stereotypes “arise 
when self-integration is threatened. They are therefore part of our way of dealing with 
the instabilities of our perception of the world” (Gilman, 1985, p.18).  
 
The threat to psychological integration during the ‘Rushdie affair’ was managed 
through the construction of the particular and radicalised ‘Bradford Muslim’. Those 
that were defiant in the face of hegemony, that is, those that challenged hegemony, 
were particularised as a type of Muslim that was to be negatively evaluated. The 
dominant position thereby avails itself of any criticism which may allege wholesale 
discrimination against a community. Criticism is against those who “go too far”. The 
assertive challenge against hegemonic representations is represented in such a manner 
(within the linguistic confines of the dominant discourse) that the challenge appears 
as a familiar ‘other’, but familiar as ‘other’ within the confines of the dominant 
discourse. The ‘Bradford Muslim’, a third media-generated representation, is 
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anchored as anti-modern, demanding and ex-rural, and was found repeatedly in the 
interviews, focus group discussions and the television programme that had set out to 
explore the Muslim position. The above discussion has shown that the contestation of 
dominant representations has the effect of creating further dominant representations, 
such that to contest is to radicalise oneself. 
 
The differences in content, however, masked a similarity in structure in 
argumentative style, technique and narrative. The rhetorical analysis conducted for 
this thesis found that there were many similarities between the two positions. First of 
all, they shared types of rhetoric. Secondly, they were both derivative of an identity 
politics discourse, and consequently, liberal individualism. Thirdly, they shared the 
rhetorical technique of radicalisation, and fourthly, they shared a common narrative 
of the hero-victim. This similarity in structure shows that disagreement can mask 
agreement. However, the issue of power is pertinent to this issue. Because, although 
both positions shared structures of rhetoric, such that the liberal position 
particularised the Muslim position to that of the ‘Bradford Muslim’ and the Muslim 
position particularised the liberal position to that of the ‘radical secularist’, access to 
the sites of representation and the salience of certain forms of representation have 
meant that some representations represent more than others.  
 
8.4. The social psychology of identity politics 
 
One effect of this imbalance of power relations has been the internalisation of identity 
politics discourse. The question for the second generation in Bradford through the 
‘Rushdie affair’ was how should they articulate their concerns to a wider society that 
seems so different? The ‘Rushdie affair’, an event that necessitated dialogue, 
required, just like the Shetlanders in Gervais’s (1997) study, “the engagement with 
alien representations, if not to make them their own” (p. 282, italics mine), i.e. those 
of identity politics. The argument of sacrilege fell mostly on deaf ears, deaf because 
the sacred itself had become a dying species. Religion symbolises different histories 
and different positions. Consequently, the employment of these terms during the 
‘Rushdie affair’ had the reverse effect of compounding the oppositional viewpoint. 
An alternative argument was required, one that could not only resonate with the 
history of British society, but also its aspirations i.e. its future. The discourse of 
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identity politics was most suited for this purpose, the employment of a language that 
was understood by those for whom it was intended, even if it did not wholly represent 
(or even was relevant to) the Muslim community’s actual lived experience (in that 
identity politics discourse is derivative of Enlightenment individualism).  
 
The social representations that suggest a negative evaluation of identity for the South 
Asian Muslim youth in Bradford emerge from and are embedded within a discourse, I 
would suggest that this discourse not only situates representations of their identities, 
but that it also provides the linguistic resources for emancipation from the negative 
evaluation. In the case of the South Asian Muslim youth in Bradford, this means that 
they rely on the discourse of identity politics as an emancipatory strategy. Identity 
politics discourse has been related to “powerful, meaningful, emotionally significant 
events” (Calhoun, 1994, p. 24) and the South Asian Muslim youth in Bradford have 
lived through several at the local and the international level. The halal meat 
campaign, the Honeyford affair, the ‘Rushdie affair’, the Gulf war, the wars in former 
Yugoslavia, the continued bombing of Iraq, the war in Chechnya and the Middle East 
peace process are all events that contribute sub-narratives to a total narrative that 
symbolises ‘otherness’ and victimisation. The international media network helps to 
globalise the narrative, and the associated representations of ‘otherness’ and 
victimisation. The generations (mainly the second and the third) that have been raised 
in Britain reached maturity at the same time as these local, national and international 
events.  
 
The extent of internalisation of the identity politics discourse was highlighted through 
the focus group discussions in that much of the reception of the programme could be 
interpreted through the use of identity politics discourse as an explanatory framework. 
This was in relation to the content and manner of reception, the attribution of agency 
to the presenter (and the producers), the suggestion of incongruity, the reception of 
representatives, the call for strategic essentialism and against strategic 
misrepresentation. However, there was an acknowledgement of the limited utility of 
identity politics discourse within the discussions. 
 
The aim of the focus group discussions (that covered in the main the ‘extremist’ and 
‘rude boy’ identity positions) was to provide a meeting point for hegemonic 
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representations and their contestation. The response of opposition, criticism and 
deconstruction by the discussants highlighted the political nature of representation in 
this instance. Themes of incongruity (of a Muslim presence in Bradford) raised in and 
throughout the programme, even if they were covered in short scenes lasting a few 
seconds, were constantly criticised. Similarly, themes that suggested compatibility 
were praised. This was relevant to the notion of identity politics discourse as well 
because the central purpose of identity politics discourse is to achieve identity 
between difference. The criticism of representations of difference and praise of 
representations of similarity are therefore intrinsically related to identity politics 
discourse. The views expressed about the presenter and the representatives in the 
programme revealed a highly structured manner of reception. The representation of 
the dominant ‘other’ was objectified in the personality of Ignatieff and anchored as 
clever, deceptive, intolerant and obdurate. The attribution of agency confirms the 
feeling of victimisation that is constitutive of identity politics. 
 
Similarly, the analysis of the reception of the three representatives in the focus group 
discussions found that identity politics was central to the manner of reception. The 
three representatives were distinguished according to the two characteristics of 
veracity and authenticity. Veracity is in response to power, or the lack of it. 
Authenticity is required because it is a defence against a common strategy of liberal 
individualism which is to point out the difference between rhetoric and practice. The 
distinction between identity and practice has been raised as Samad (1992) and 
Vertovec (1998) have pointed out, and this was noted by the interviewees. But the 
assumption underlying this question is that advocacy of the identity perspective 
requires consistency between articulation and practice. Any discrepancy between the 
two results in the invalidation of the argument itself, and by association, the 
contestation of the hegemonic discourse. Any challenge against a dominant position 
is met with the familiar “But do you practice what you preach?”. The bursting of the 
contestatory bubble has the reverse effect of silencing all opposition to a dominant 
discourse, since only the ‘angels without blemishes’ can take a moral stance against a 
dominant hegemony.  
 
The discussants were calling directly, and through their criticisms, for a type of 
representative that matched these two characteristics. This strategic essentialism was 
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in response to what they viewed to be strategic misrepresentation and this forms the 
core of the struggle over representation. The problem with representations, and 
specifically stereotypes, is that they can be simultaneously true, false and universal. 
How can stereotypes be simultaneously true and false? The representations of the 
Bradford Muslim community in the programme were undoubtedly of the community 
itself. In that sense, they were true and valid. But the selective nature of the 
representations as interpreted by the discussants suggested that as representations they 
were false in terms of the absence of positive representations and a substantial 
rhetorical challenge. This strategic misrepresentation necessitates strategic 
essentialism. But the trajectory of the discussions was such that calls for strategic 
essentialism, which in effect meant the sole representation of positive representations, 
were rebutted as being in themselves misrepresentative. There was further 
acknowledgement that stereotyping other communities in a negative manner was a 
characteristic of their own psychological functioning. It is from the oscillation 
between calls for strategic essentialism and against strategic misrepresentation 
coupled with the acknowledgement of stereotyping within their own community 
against others that emerges a sense of dejection and inevitability about representation. 
The above discussion shows that the social psychology of identity politics is 
intrinsically linked through absences and presences, projections and denials, to the 
politics of representation. 
 
8.5. Theoretical contributions 
 
The introduction identified three main areas of theoretical focus for this thesis. These 
are the utility of the theory of social representations, the intergroup nature of 
representational activity, and the possibility of emancipation from hegemonic 
representations. I will conclude by discussing these theoretical concerns in light of 
my empirical findings. The theoretical chapter identified five advantages of the theory 
of the theory of social representations. These were that the theory permits a 
sociological level of interpretation, incorporates the notion of history and culture, 
allows for a perspectivist approach, calls for the study of content and structure, and 
highlights the need for context-specific social psychological research. All five 
advantages proved pertinent to this study.  
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The study of the social nature of social psychological thinking has been central to this 
study since group interaction in focus group discussions and media texts, such as 
television programmes, have both been used to investigate issues of identity and 
representation. History and culture have been invoked in the interviews, television 
programmes and focus group discussions. For example, the connection between 
representation and history was evident in the interviews around the topic of Lawcroft 
House, the police station, which was symbolically associated with the British Raj and 
an imperialist mentality. History was, in this instance, conventionalising the present. 
The manner of response to the police station and to the television host Michael 
Ignatieff in the focus group discussions highlights the utility and interdependent 
nature of anchoring and objectification. Similarly, one can make sense of the 
representatives in the Late Show programme through the manner in which they were 
anchored and, consequently, objectified as representatives of alternative identity 
positions. 
 
The connection between meaning and form can be found in the process of 
radicalisation which would make little sense if analysis was restricted to either of the 
two. The advantages of specificity and a perspectivist approach have meant that this 
research is specific to the group in this study and my interpretation of them. For 
example, the ‘Bradford Muslim’ as a representation is tied geographically and 
temporally to a certain place and moment in time. I would suggest that the 
‘Birmingham Muslim’ or the ‘Glasgow Muslim’ would not make much sense within 
this context. The perspectivist approach has allowed me to study and delineate the 
social psychological world of South Asian Muslim youth in Bradford. An outsider 
studying the same group may arrive at different conclusions. These two advantages 
could be better emphasised through comparison with alternative studies which could 
highlight how differences in subject-matter, or content and perspective, could lead to 
alternative findings. 
 
The second area of theoretical focus is the intergroup nature of social representations. 
I identified two absences in relation to social representations theory, these are in 
relation to identity and power. The central aim of this thesis has in fact been an 
examination of this very issue, the interaction between representations and identities. 
This thesis has investigated this interaction in two specific instances. The first is 
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outlined in table 8.1. above in which three specific identities as ideal types in 
Bradford are related to social representations. The identities of the ‘coconut’, the 
‘rude boy’ and the ‘extremist’ are found to be dialectically related to representations 
of the ‘Muslim’ and the ‘Paki’. The variety of identities highlights the complexity and 
the creativity of South Asian Muslim youth as each type attempts its own solution to 
a negative evaluation. The second is the example of the social construction of the 
‘Bradford Muslim’ as a radical prototype. This representation has been shown to be 
the product of an intergroup crisis such that moments of antagonism between social 
groups can lead to the formations of social representations. Both examples highlight 
the dynamic nature of identity processes which remain in the late modern age in a 
constant state of flux. Furthermore, both examples reveal how social representations 
are intrinsically linked to intergroup formations and interactions. 
 
The third area of theoretical focus is the possibility of emancipation from hegemonic 
representations. The empirical findings suggested that the subaltern in order to 
‘escape’ from negative evaluations used the arguments of identity politics. Though 
the content of the rhetoric during the ‘Rushdie affair’ and the content of the focus 
group discussions would suggest that there were serious disagreements between the 
two positions, nevertheless, at the level of structure of argument and type of 
discourse, both occasions revealed a similar use of identity politics discourse. Though 
the discourse of identity politics is one essentially about freedom, there are two ways 
in which it is tied to determinism. First of all, not all identities are negatively 
evaluated, and there is heterogeneity between types of difference. Race, culture and 
religion are three types of difference and identities that organise around these 
categories will find themselves evaluated and received differentially. In one sense, 
those that have simultaneously been negatively stereotyped over centuries and in a 
grotesque manner (e.g. see Jahoda, 1999) and have the resources to linguistic 
emancipation (i.e. through identity politics discourse) have little choice but to 
challenge the negative stereotypes through identity politics discourse. Secondly, 
identity politics discourse is a derivative and a developed form of liberal 
individualism (Gergen, 1995), and as a linguistic, emancipatory resource it ties those 
who adopt it to liberal individualism. The subaltern identity therefore becomes 
subsumed within ideology by engaging through it. This linguistic determinism forces, 
in a subtle and subliminal way, the subaltern to incorporate the hegemonic.  
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To quote Eagleton (1991): ‘In pulling the rug out from beneath one’s intellectual 
antagonist, one is always in danger of pulling it out from beneath oneself’. (p. 108). 
Will the employment of identity politics discourse be useful, or more pertinently, will 
it remain relevant in the long-term? Is it a genuine reflection of what is essentially an 
identity based upon a religion with alternative epistemological and ontological 
foundations? Will the employment of identity politics discourse lead to a 
transformation of the subaltern – a liberalisation even? These are some questions 
which face the subaltern. The hegemonic must deal with issues of negative 
representations of a major minority in its midst. Jodelet (1991) suggests that 
transformations in mental health care are insufficient if they do not incorporate the 
representational dimension:  
 
The transformations made in psychiatric practice, with the opening of 
hospitals and the development of a community therapy sector, are 
responsible for a change of perspective which, however, fails to focus 
on the real problem of the relationship with the mentally ill. That is the 
problem of the representation of their illness and their condition, out of 
which their ‘otherness’ and their social status are constructed. (p. 4).  
 
However, even an incorporation of the representational dimension into the equation 
can be insufficient if the subject of representation is a necessary subject (Hall, 
1997b). In such circumstances, the hegemonic discourse would have to re-adjust in 
order to maintain its integrity, especially if it is based upon binary oppositions which 
characterise ‘otherness’ in terms of race, culture and religion. A report by the 
Runnymede Trust (2000) suggests that this point can be dealt with by replacing 
closed views of the ‘other’ with more open views, which would allow for interaction, 
dialogue and difference. But this begs a further question, would the liberal individual 
have to be re-constituted for such an interaction to occur? And if so, then in the likely 
occurrence of this not happening, are stigmatised communities forever condemned to 
the periphery of value in order to maintain a positively evaluated identity for the 
dominant and hegemonic community? 
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Appendix (i) 
 
Interview schedule for key informers 
 
How do you think the second and third generations are adapting to living in British 
society, and Bradford in particular? Do you think that there are differences between 
Asians in the way that they deal with this issue? Why do you think that these 
differences are so? Do you think that there is one monolithic identity that is present 
on the social scene in Bradford? Or would you identify different types? What do you 
think it is that leads to these differences?  
 
Do you think that there is a stereotype about Muslims and Asians? Is it responding in 
one way or in different ways? Is the response related to the stereotype? In what way? 
What do you think has the most effect on you, your family, your community or the 
media?  
 
Do you think that there has been an emergence of Muslim identity in the last decade 
or so? Is this at the level of practise? If not, why not? Why is there a discrepancy 
between identity and practise? Do you think that this identity development is 
community based or media related?  
 
And similarly for an Asian identity? What do you think characterises these identities? 
And what factors affect them? How do you see the influence of black culture on 
Asian youth in Bradford? Why do you think that it is so prevalent? Does it bring 
more pride?  
 
What do you think about the ‘Rushdie affair’? Did it affect you, in what way? How 
do you think it affected Bradford? Do you think that international events like the 
recent US bombing of Iraq have an effect on young Asians in Bradford? What do you 
think of the Stephen Lawrence enquiry? How do you think it has affected Bradford? 
Are there differences in the ways that people respond to such events? Why is that the 
case?  
 
How do you think that Bradford is perceived by the rest of the country? Why do you 
think that that this is the case? Is there such a representation as the ‘Bradford 
Muslim’? Is it not the case that it is Bradford’s fault? How do you see the situation 
developing? What is your view of the Bradford riots/disturbances? 
 
Some would say that some of the factors causing these differences are a search for 
self-esteem, a search for meaning, a need for security and a need for power and 
control. Do you think that any of these factors are relevant as explanations for identity 
processes in Bradford?  
 
How will the situation be in twenty or thirty years time? What would you like the 
situation to be in twenty or thirty years time?  
 
Finally, I would like to show you some pictures, I would like you to tell me what 
these pictures mean to you. 
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Appendix (ii) 
Photographs of buildings in Bradford used for interviews 
Haq Halal supermarket  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rolex Trading Company (next to the Beehive inn) 
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Lawcroft House 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lister Mills 
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Carlisle Road mosque  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Westgate mosque 
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Appendix (iii) 
 
Table describing interviewees 
 
Transcript Profession Setting for interview Interview category 
1-1 Businessman Take-away restaurant Young Muslim 
1-2  Charity worker Interviewee’s home Young Muslim 
1-3 Teacher Interviewer’s home Young Muslim 
1-4 Youth worker Youth club Young Muslim 
1-5 Youth leader Take-away restaurant Young Muslim 
1-6 Businessman Take-away restaurant Young Muslim 
2-1 Book shop owner Book shop Elder Muslim 
2-2 Race relations worker Race relations office Elder Muslim 
2-3 Councillor Council office Elder Muslim 
2-4 Religious leader Business office Elder Muslim 
2-5 Youth worker Restaurant Elder Muslim 
2-6 Businessman Business office Elder Muslim 
3-1 Headteacher Headteacher’s office Elder non-Muslim 
3-2 Member of parliament MP’s office Elder non-Muslim 
3-3 Police inspector Police station Elder non-Muslim 
3-4 Businessman Hotel Elder non-Muslim 
3-5 Senior youth worker Youth club Elder non-Muslim 
3-6 Local reporter Newspaper office Elder non-Muslim 
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Appendix (iv) 
 
Schedule for focus group discussions on The Late Show – A Visit to Bradford 
 
This is a forty minute programme in which a writer travels to Bradford to discuss the 
‘Rushdie affair’ with members of the Muslim community in Bradford. I would like 
you to watch the programme, after which we will discuss the programme and the 
issues raised by it. 
 
So what is your initial response to the programme? Do you like it, dislike it? Why, 
why not?  
 
What do you think of the questions and the way they were answered?  
 
What do you think of Ignatieff himself? Do you think he was fair?  
 
What do you think of the Muslim representatives in the programme e.g. Akhtar? 
Mirza? Arshad? Do they reflect Bradford well? Do you think other people should 
have been interviewed? Who? Why?  
 
What do you think of the issues covered? Are you familiar with the ‘Rushdie affair’? 
Do you think the right issues were covered? If not, why not?  
 
What sort of image does this portray of Bradford, and Muslims in Bradford?  
 
Are there any scenes that you would like to discuss specifically? 
 
What do you think of the ‘Rushdie affair’ itself, as portrayed in this programme? 
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Appendix (v) 
 
A chronology of the ‘Rushdie affair’ (1st July 1988 – 31st Dec 1990)90 
 
26
th
 Sept 1988  Viking/Penguin, London, publishes Salman Rushdie’s The 
Satanic Verses. 
 
3
rd
 Oct 1988  Objectionable passages from the book brought to the attention 
of Muslim organisations, mosques, and Muslim ambassadors in the UK. Penguin 
officials contacted for immediate withdrawal of the book. 
 
5
th
 Oct 1988  The Government of India bans The Satanic Verses. 
 
11
th
 Oct 1988  The UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs formed in 
London in order to mobilise public opinion against The Satanic Verses. 
 
21
st
 Oct 1988  Hundreds of thousands of Muslims sign the petition protesting 
against the publication of The Satanic Verses, and the calling for its withdrawal.  
 
8
th
 Nov 1988  The General Secretariat of the Riyadh-based Organisation of 
the Islamic Conference asks member states to take action against the publisher and 
the author if they fail to withdraw the work. 
 
21
st
 Nov 1988  Al-Azhar, the 1,000 year-old venerated Islamic seminary in 
Egypt, brands The Satanic Verses as blasphemous and calls on Muslim countries to 
take concerted action. 
 
1
st
 Dec 1988  Mr. Ken Hargreaves, MP, moves an Early Day Motion in the 
House of Commons, regretting the distress caused to Muslims in the UK by the 
publication of The Satanic Verses. 
 
10
th
 Dec 1988  A massive protest rally in London, organised by the Islamic 
Defence Council (UK), against the publication, earlier, of The Satanic Verses. 
 
14
th
 Jan 1989  Muslims in Bradford, Yorkshire (UK) burn a copy of The 
Satanic Verses in a symbolic expression of protest. 
 
16
th
 Jan 1989  W.H. Smith, Britain’s biggest retail outlet for newspapers and 
books, withdraws The Satanic Verses from the sale in its shops. 
 
1
st
 Feb 1989 Mr. Douglas Hurd, the British Home Secretary, addressing a Muslim 
gathering in Birmingham, rules out any change in the blasphemy law and, instead, 
asks the British Muslims to join ‘the mainstream’. 
 
                                                 
90
 Much of this chronology is taken from Ahsan et al. (1991) and Haroun (1997). 
 262 
14
th
 Feb 1989  Ayatollah Khomeini proclaims that Salman Rushdie, for his 
apostasy, deserves the death penalty. Salman Rushdie and his wife, author Marianne 
Wiggins, go into hiding and are placed under armed guard. 
 
15
th
 Feb 1989  Iran proclaims a national day of mourning in protest against 
The Satanic Verses. Thousands of demonstrators chanting ‘death to Britain’ stone the 
British embassy in Tehran. 
 
Viking/Penguin’s New York offices are evacuated for an hour 
following an anonymous bomb threat. Salman Rushdie cancels a planned three-week 
US tour to promote The Satanic Verses. 
 
           Harold Pinter leads a delegation of writers to 10 Downing 
Street to protest the fatwa against Salman Rushdie. 
 
                PEN American Centre condemns “the extreme action the 
Ayatollah Khomeini has taken in calling for the death of Salman Rushdie.” 
 
16
th
 Feb 1989  The British Government protests to the Iranian Charge 
d’Affaires in London over Ayatollah Khomeini’s fatwa. Sir Geoffrey Howe, the 
British Foreign Secretary, says that ties with Tehran will be impossible if it fails “to 
respect international standards of behaviour”. 
 
The British Arts Council issues a statement calling for 
tolerance and understanding, accepting that the Islamic community has the freedom to 
criticise Mr. Rushdie’s book. 
 
Pakistan lodges protests against The Satanic Verses with both 
the UK and the United States governments and demands that the novel should be 
banned. 
 
18
th
 Feb 1989  Salman Rushdie issues a statement: “As author of The Satanic 
Verses I recognise that Muslims in many parts of the world are genuinely distressed 
by the publication of my novel. I profoundly regret the distress that publication has 
occasioned to sincere followers of Islam. Living as we do in a world of many faiths 
this experience has served to remind us that we must all be conscious of the 
sensibilities of others.” 
 
21
st
 Feb 1989   Iran withdraws ambassadors from the EEC countries. 
 
23
rd
 Feb 1989  More than 80 prominent Asians sign a statement defending 
Rushdie’s right to publish.  
 
25
th
 Feb 1989  Iran cancels a British trade exhibition over the ‘Rushdie affair’. 
 
27
th
 Feb 1989  A British Muslim delegation calls on Mr Patten, Minister of 
State at the Home Office, for fair treatment under the blasphemy law. 
 
28
th
 Feb 1989   The Iranian parliament votes unanimously to sever all 
diplomatic ties with Britain. 
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5
th
 March 1989 The Vatican expresses solidarity with people who have been 
injured in their faith. 
 
7
th
 March 1989 Iran breaks off diplomatic ties with Britain. 
 
13
th
 March 1989 The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate in London refuses to grant 
Abdul Hussain Chowdhury summonses against Rushdie and rules that the blasphemy 
law protects only the Christian religion. 
 
16
th
 March 1989  The Organisation of Islamic Conference resolves to ban 
Penguin publications in 45 Muslim countries. 
 
1
st
 April 1989   The Muslim Institute in London holds a conference on the 
‘Rushdie affair’ in which the keynote speaker supports the fatwa publicly. 
 
27
th
 May 1989  A demonstration is organised by the British Muslim Action 
Front in London. It is the largest demonstration against the book to date. It eventually 
turns into a riot on Westminister Bridge. 
 
29
th
 May 1989  Two Labour MPs call for the withdrawal of The Satanic 
Verses. 
 
20
th
 June 1989  The British High Court grants the Muslim Action Front leave 
to challenge an earlier court ruling in March, refusing to issue summonses for a 
private prosecution. 
 
4
th
 July 1989   Mr John Patten, the Minister of State at the Home Office, 
writes to influential Muslims on issues confronting the Muslim community.  
 
20
th
 Oct 1989  A Harris poll conducted for the BBC Television shows that 
four out of five British Muslims want some sort of action taken against Rushdie. 
 
16
th
 Dec 1989   Muslims at 1,000 mosques in the UK raise their hands in a 
show of solidarity for the campaign against The Satanic Verses. 
 
8
th
-12
th
 Jan 1990 British Muslims conduct a 5-day vigil outside the offices of 
Penguin/Viking publishers. 
 
4
th
 Feb 1990  Rushdie writes a long piece: In Good Faith, published in The 
Independent.  
 
7
th
 Feb 1990  Harold Pinter reads out Rushdie’s essay Is Nothing Sacred? for 
the Herbert Read Memorial lecture at the Institute of Contemporary Arts in London. 
 
10
th
 Feb 1990  Ayatollah Ali Khameini endorses his predecessor’s fatwa 
against Rushdie. 
 
27
th
 Feb 1990   The Council for the British Muslim Action Front argues in the 
High Court for equality in law. 
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6
th
 March 1990  Lord Hutchinson and Lord Harris urge prosecutions against the 
British Muslims for their protests. 
 
9
th
 April 1990   The Queen’s Bench Divisional Court, under Section 4(1) of the 
Public Order Act 1986 dismisses the application for issuing a summons against The 
Satanic Verses for causing public disorder. 
 
10
th
 April 1990 The British Muslim Action Front seeks leave to appeal to the 
House of Lords. 
 
28
th
 April 1990  Rushdie expresses surprise that those threatening against his 
life have not been prosecuted. 
 
8
th
 May 1990  The Daily Telegraph publishes a Gallup Poll in which the 
majority of respondents say that Rushdie should apologise.   
 
25
th
 May 1990  The High Court refuses British Muslims leave to appeal to the 
House of Lords. 
 
28
th
 Sept 1990  Iran and Britain resume diplomatic links. 
 
30
th
 Sept 1990  Rushdie appears on ITV and speaks of his experiences for the 
last twelve months. 
 
24
th
 Dec 1990   Rushdie claims to embrace Islam in front of the Egyptian 
Minister for Awqaf and some Egyptian officials. He says that he will not publish the 
paperback edition or permit its translation while any risk of further offence exists. 
 
26
th
 Dec 1990   Ayatollah Khameini reaffirms the fatwa and states that it 
cannot be revoked. The UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs holds that Rushdie 
has not addressed the central issue of the total withdrawal of the book. 
 
28
th
 Dec 1990  Rushdie writes an article Why I have embraced Islam for The 
Times and explains why he cannot totally withdraw the book. 
 
29
th
 Dec 1990   The UK Action Committee for Islamic Affairs rejects 
Rushdie’s conversion as insincere. 
 
31
st
 Dec 1990   Rushdie speaks on Radio 4’s Sunday Programme and re-
affirms his earlier pledge of conversion and states again that he would not be 
publishing the paperback edition or permitting any further translations. 
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Appendix (vi) 
 
A list of all the programmes shown on television concerning Islam and/or 
Muslims Between 1
st
 July 1988 & 31
st
 Dec 1990
91
 
 
Date  Channel Time Description of programme 
7 July 1988 BBC2 9.30 p.m. Exiles: A profile of an Iranian exile 
29 Jul 1988 CH4 2.30 p.m. The faiths next door: Looking at legal and Islamic 
recognition of marriage 
3 Aug 1988 CH4 9.00 p.m. The Palestinians 
10 Aug 1988 BBC2 8.10 p.m. Wideworld: Photographers on the civilisation of 
the Moors 
10 Aug  1988 CH4 9.00 p.m. The Palestinians 
21 Aug 1988 BBC2 8.45 p.m. Profile of Lawrence on centenary of his life 
1 Sept 1988 CH4 10.00 p.m. True Stories: Beirut - Drama on life in Lebanon 
3 Sept 1988 BBC2 2.45 p.m. Dictatorship or democracy? Pakistan after Zia  
21 Sept 1988 BBC2 9.40 p.m. Beirut: The war generation 
24 Sept 1988 BBC2 3.10 p.m. Network east: Extracts of the novel The Satanic 
Verses by Salman Rushdie 
8 Oct 1988 CH4 6.30 p.m. Cities of Islam: Fez     
15 Oct 1988 CH4 6.30 p.m. Cities of Islam: Istanbul 
22 Oct 1988 CH4 6.30 p.m. Cities of Islam: Cairo 
29 Oct 1988 CH4 6.30 p.m. Cities of Islam: Jeddah 
17 Jan 1989 BBC2 7.50 p.m. Open space: Turkish political exile on oppression and 
torture in Turkey 
17 Jan 1989 CH4 11.30 p.m. The Bangladesh story: History 
24 Jan 1989 CH4 11.30 p.m. The Bangladesh story: The Mujib years 
31 Jan 1989 CH4 11.30 p.m. The Bangladesh story: The military years 
11 Feb 1989 BBC2 6.30 p.m. Triumph of the West: Discussion between Christian and 
Islamic civilisation 
12 Feb 1989 BBC1 10.30 p.m. Everyman: Sudan’s civil war 
13 Feb 1989 BBC1 9.30 p.m. Panorama: Inside the Ayatollah’s Iran 
10 Mar 1989 BBC2 9.30 p.m. Paradise of martyrs: Life in Iran 
14 Mar 1989 BBC2 8.00 p.m. Open space: The Palestinian Intifada 
20 Mar 1989 BBC1 9.20 a.m. Kilroy: Palestine (series of 3 programmes) 
21 Mar 1989 BBC1 9.20 a.m. Kilroy: Palestine (series of 3 programmes) 
22 Mar 1989 BBC1 9.20 a.m. Kilroy: Palestine (series of 3 programmes) 
25 Mar 1989 BBC2 3.15 p.m. Network east: East or West? The way forward 
30 Mar 1989 CH4 8.00 p.m. Opinions: Fay Weldon on The Satanic Verses crisis 
7 Apr 1989 CH4 10.55 a.m. Suleyman the Magnificent: Documentary on the Ottoman 
Empire 
13 Apr 1989 BBC1 12.20 a.m. Friday prayers 
17 Apr 1989 CH4 12.00 p.m. The Sons of Abraham: The history of Abraham 
17 Apr 1989 CH4 11.10 p.m. The eleventh hour: The Arab Israelis 
20 Apr 1989 BBC1 12.20 a.m. Friday prayers 
24 Apr 1989 CH4 12.00 p.m. The Sons of Abraham: Shi’ites - Followers of Ali 
26 Apr 1989 BBC2 9.30 p.m. Shalom salaam 
27 Apr 1989 BBC1 12.00 a.m. Friday prayers 
1 May 1989 CH4 12.30 p.m. The Sons of Abraham: The dervishes - Lovers of God 
3 May 1989 BBC2 9.25 p.m. Shalom salaam 
4 May 1989 BBC2 12.30 a.m. Friday prayers 
7 May 1989 BBC1 10.10 p.m. Everyman: Charles Glass’ Lebanon 
7 May 1989 ITV 12.00 p.m. Visions: Muslims in Ramadhan 
                                                 
91
 Those programmes in bold are related to the ‘Rushdie affair’. 
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8 May 1989 BBC2 11.15 p.m. The late show: Michael Ignatieff visits Bradford 
10 May 1989 BBC2 9.25 p.m. Shalom salaam 
17 May 1989 BBC2 9.25 p.m. Shalom salaam 
20 May 1989 CH4 10.25 p.m. Iranian nights 
24 May 1989 CH4 8.30 p.m. Dispatches: Story of Sayed Jaffar 
24 May 1989 BBC2 9.25 p.m. Shalom salaam 
25 May 1989 CH4 10.45 p.m. Islamic answers: Q&A’s about Islam 
30 May 1989 ITV 10.35 p.m. Hypotheticals: A satanic scenario 
4 Jun 1989 BBC1 10.10 p.m. Life under occupation: Palestinians and Israelis in 
occupied territories 
26 Jun 1989 CH4 12.00 p.m. The Sons of Abraham: Sunnis and the forbidden Mecca 
26 Jun 1989 CH4 9.00 p.m. Voices from Gaza 
3 Aug 1989 ITV 1.00 a.m. It’s my belief: Islam and women in Britain 
14 Aug 1989 CH4 3.45 p.m. Dispatches: Iraqi gas warfare against the Kurds 
31 Aug 1989 ITV 1.00 a.m. It’s my belief: Declining religion 
4 Sept 1989 CH4 9.00 p.m. Iran - The other side 
30 Sept 1989 BBC2 2.45 p.m. Network east: The life of a mystic, Allama Iqbal 
2 Oct 1989 BBC2 9.30 p.m. Panorama: Afghanistan - The squandered victory 
10 Oct 1989 CH4 11.00 p.m. Keeping the faith – Women, religion and taboo 
15 Oct 1989 CH4 10.00 a.m. Documentary on Nasser (part 1) 
20 Oct 1989 BBC2 8.00 p.m. Public eye: Major survey into the mood of British 
Muslim communities 
22 Oct 1989 CH4 10.00 a.m.  Documentary on Nasser (part 2) 
25 Oct 1989 CH4 11.45 p.m. A Sufi tale 
29 Oct 1989 CH4 10.00 a.m. Documentary on Nasser (part 3) 
11 Nov 1989 BBC2 2.00 p.m. Network east: Discussion on young Asians in Britain  
13 Nov 1989 BBC2 7.30 p.m. Portrait: Interview with Yasser Arafat  
15 Dec 1989 CH4 11.00 p.m. The riddle of midnight: An examination of India’s forty 
years of independence (written and narrated by Salman 
Rushdie) 
1 Jan 1990 CH4 7.00 p.m. Hostages 
5 Jan 1990 ITV 9.00 p.m. Stolen: Drama about a mixed marriage (Part 1) 
7 Jan 1990 CH4 8.00 p.m. Reporting Lebanon: Effects of war on Lebanon 
12 Jan 1990 ITV 9.00 p.m. Stolen: (Part 2) 
15 Jan 1990 BBC2 7.10 p.m.  A-Z of belief 
19 Jan 1990 ITV 9.00 p.m. Stolen: (Part 3) 
26 Jan 1990 ITV 9.00 p.m. Stolen: (Part 4) 
2 Feb 1990 CH4 8.00 p.m. The great Moghuls: Babur- Through the Khyber 
2 Feb 1990 ITV 9.00 p.m. Stolen: (Part 5) 
6 Feb 1990 BBC2 11.15 p.m. The late show: Is nothing sacred? 
9 Feb 1990 BBC2 7.30 p.m. Visions: Interview with Dr Zaki Badawi 
9 Feb 1990 CH4 8.00 p.m. The Great Moghuls (Part 2): The young Akbar 
9 Feb 1990 ITV 9.00 p.m. Stolen: (Part 6) 
16 Feb 1990 CH4 8.00 p.m. The great Moghuls (Part 3): The court of Akbar 
23 Feb 1990 CH4 8.00 p.m. The great Moghuls (Part 4): Jahangir 
2 Mar 1990 CH4 8.00 p.m. The great Moghuls (Part 5): Shah Jahan 
9 Mar 1990 CH4 8.00 p.m. The great Moghuls (Part 6): Aurangzeb 
29 Mar 1990 BBC1 12.05 a.m. Ramadhan, a month to remember: Imam Muradadeen 
31 Mar 1990 BBC2 8.00 p.m. Is nothing sacred? Two programmes on the ‘Rushdie 
affair’. Salman Rushdie talks to Nigel Williams 
5 Apr 1990 BBC1 12.05 a.m. Ramadhan, a month to remember: Family life 
8 Apr 1990 CH4 7.00 p.m. Fragile earth: Yemeni environmental problems 
12 Apr 1990 BBC1 12.20 a.m. Ramadhan, a month to remember: Children and fasting 
19 Apr 1990 BBC1 12.05 a.m. Ramadhan, a month to remember 
27 May 1990 BBC1 10.35 p.m. Everyman: A discussion with nine people from 
various backgrounds on the ‘Rushdie affair’ 
16 May 1990 CH4 5.30 p.m. Flight over Spain: A look at the 13
th
 century Granada 
19 May 1990 CH4 12.45 a.m. On the other hand - religion and politics: The rise of 
fundamentalism in South Asia 
5 Jun 1990 BBC1 10.25 p.m. Arafat – Behind the myth 
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21 Jun 1990 BBC2 9.30 p.m. Under the sun: Can Israelis and Palestinians live in 
peace? 
8 Jul 1990 BBC1 10.45 p.m. Heart of the matter: British families of relief workers 
killed by Palestinians in Sudan choose the resulting 
punishment 
10 Jul 1990 BBC2 9.30 p.m. Present imperfect: An account of a middle class Pakistani 
family coping with living in Britain 
23 Jul 1990 BBC2 7.00 p.m. East: An account of young Kashmiri men and women 
trying to get to Pakistan 
1 Aug 1990 ITV 10.35 p.m. Disappearing world: The Kalasha - Rites of a pagan tribe 
in the north west frontier of Pakistan 
8 Aug 1990 CH4 9.00 p.m. Rear window: Holy war of words - looking at literature 
of change and dissent 
15 Aug 1990 CH4 9.00 p.m. Rear window: Women and Islam 
22 Aug 1990 CH4 9.00 p.m. Rear window: Thanks be to God, we are secular 
3 Sept 1990 BBC2 8.05 p.m. Eyes on the prize: America on the crossroads, Martin 
Luther King and Malcolm X 
3 Sept 1990 BBC1 9.30 p.m. Panorama: Saddam’s secret arms ring 
9 Sept 1990 CH4 9.25 a.m. Settler’s tales: Portraits of first generation Asian 
immigrants 
10 Sept 1990 BBC1 9.30 p.m. Panorama: Saddam’s fifth column 
16 Sept 1990 CH4 9.25 a.m. Settler’s tales 
16 Sept 1990 CH4 9.30 p.m. The media show: Reporting the Gulf - A global crisis 
23 Sept 1990 CH4 9.25 a.m. Settler’s tales 
25 Sept 1990 CH4 8.00 p.m. The curry connection 
30 Sept 1990 CH4 9.25 a.m. Settler’s tales 
2 Oct 1990 CH4 8.00 p.m. The curry connection 
7 Oct 1990 CH4 9.25 a.m. Settler’s tales 
7 Oct 1990 BBC1 10.55 p.m. Everyman: Muslim community’s dilemma over Saddam 
Hussain 
9 Oct 1990 CH4 8.00 p.m. The curry connection 
14 Oct 1990 CH4 9.25 a.m. Settler’s tales 
16 Oct 1990 CH4 8.00 p.m. The curry connection 
17 Oct 1990 CH4 5.30 p.m. Flight over Spain: Cordova 
18 Oct 1990 CH4 8.00 p.m. The great Moghuls: Babur - Through the Khyber 
22 Oct 1990 BBC2 7.10 p.m. Open space: Lives of Palestinian children in the Intifada 
23 Oct 1990 CH4 8.00 p.m. The curry connection 
25 Oct 1990 CH4 8.00 p.m. The great Moghuls: The young Akbar 
31 Oct 1990 CH4 8.30 p.m. Dispatches: Discrimination in the police 
1 Nov 1990 CH4 8.00 p.m. The great Moghuls: The court of Akbar 
8 Nov 1990 CH4 8.00 p.m. The great Moghuls: Jahangir 
13 Nov 1990 CH4 9.00 p.m. Critical eye: Kurdistan - The last colony 
15 Nov 1990 CH4 8.00 p.m. The great Moghuls: Shah Jahan 
18 Nov 1990 BBC1 10.15 p.m. Heart of the matter: Should the Church push for peace? 
22 Nov 1990 CH4 8.00 p.m. The great Moghuls: Aurangzeb - The fall of the Empire 
27 Nov 1990 BBC2 7.45 p.m. Assignment Turkey: One of us? 
4 Dec 1990 CH4 8.30 p.m. Sufism: The heart of Islam - Living Sufism 
11 Dec 1990 CH4 8.30 p.m. Sufism: The heart of Islam - Eternal life 
18 Dec 1990 CH4 8.00 p.m. The great Moghuls: Aurangzeb - The fall of the Empire 
18 Dec 1990 CH4 8.30 p.m. Sufism: The heart of Islam - Losing self 
27 Dec 1990 BBC2 9.30 p.m. A letter to Christendom 
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Appendix (vii) 
 
A transcript of the television programme The Late Show – A Visit to Bradford 
 
 
  Time  Transcription of audio content   Visual content 
 
Scene 1 Ignatieff in television studio.  
00.00 00.00. Ignatieff: …believers in Palestine to embark 
on a campaign of murder and highjackings against 
Westerners in retaliation for so-called Zionist 
crimes. In the same week, Egyptian  
00.00. Michael 
Ignatieff standing 
in studio. Camera 
focusing in onto 
him. 
00.10 fundamentalists issued a death threat against the 
Arab world’s finest novelist, Naguib Mahfouz, for 
blasphemy. Meanwhile,  
 
00.20 Salman Rushdie enters the 83
rd
 day of his enforced 
captivity and Muslims throughout Britain are 
planning a mass demonstration  
 
00.30 to protest against The Satanic Verses. In the eleven 
years since the Iranian revolution brought Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s 
 
00.40 fundamentalist regime to power, the conflict 
between Islam and the West has escalated into a 
total confrontation of values and 
 
00.50 culture, not just between East and West but within 
the already strained multicultural fabric of British 
society. On February 2  
 
01.00 I hosted The Late Show’s debate on the ‘Rushdie 
affair’. On that show, Shabbir Akhtar of the 
Bradford Council of Mosques, a 
 
01.10 philosopher by training, defended the 
fundamentalist position and argued that Western 
liberals had never taken the trouble to truly 
understand Islam. I decided to take up this 
challenge. He had been on my home territory,  
 
01.20 it was time for me to go to his.  
Scene 2 Collage of images of Bradford with various 
voice-overs. 
 
01.23 01.23. Voices of demonstrators.  01.23. Terraced 
housing at 
01.30 01.32. Radio reporter: Demonstrators were 
waiting outside, to give the Home Secretary, the full 
force of their views on the ‘Rushdie affair’. His 
visit was planned before the controversy but  
night. Panning 
around houses at 
night 
01.40 his speech was written to take account of the danger 
it imposes to community relations.  
01.48. Second 
terraced housing 
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01.45. Hurd: You clearly feel as if the most sacred 
things of your faith have been insulted and 
wounded. 
street at night. 
01.50 You feel shocked and you feel angry. But to turn 
such 
protests towards violence as has been suggested, 
not, I agree, in 
01.53. 
Newsagents from 
outside. 01.59. 
Sunset. 
02.00 this country but elsewhere, or the threat of violence, 
I must say, 
is wholly unacceptable. Talks of death, talks of 
arrows being 
02.03. Akhtar at 
home, eating, 
reading. Shot 
from outside 
house. 02.07. 
Men taking shoes 
off while entering 
into mosque. 
02.10 directed at hearts, such talk is vicious, it’s 
repugnant to civilised men or women. 02.17. 
02.11. Shot from 
outside prayer 
hall of Imam 
giving sermon. 
02.17. Young 
Asian girl outside 
sweet shop. 
02.20 02.23. Ignatieff: I don’t know the first thing about 
Islam, and the Asian friends I have in London live 
just like me. So coming  
02.21. Women in 
chador walking 
away down street. 
02.24 Two Asian 
kids on street. 
02.28. More kids 
on street. 
02.30 to Bradford, I don’t know what to expect. I have 
this image of an Asian community which lives in a 
kind of bell-jar, sealed off  
02.33. Ignatieff 
entering Akhtar’s 
house.  
02.40 from the rest of British society in its own ghetto, 
with its own food, its own religious rituals, and its 
ties to countries like Pakistan that I’ve never even 
visited. I expect ‘otherness’,  
02.44. Street of 
terraced housing. 
02.50 difference, a gulf of culture and language. I expect 
not to feel at home.  
02.55. Akhtar: Salman Rushdie doesn’t matter, I 
mean I keep on saying this to everybody… 
02.58. Ignatieff: Why doesn’t he matter? He’s an 
individual…  
02.54. Women in 
chador on street. 
Scene 3 Akhtar and Ignatieff in Akhtar’s home, 
discussing across table. 
 
03.00 03.00. Akhtar: Well, in that sense of course, but I 
meant in this cause, in this debate. The issue is not 
about Salman Rushdie, the issue is not about me or 
you either. The issue is about ideas. It  
03.00. Akhtar in 
his house sitting 
at table. 
03.10 is… the issue is about Islam versus, you know, 
certain very militant forms of secularity, which are 
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opposing it. I mean, what I mean when I say that 
Salman Rushdie doesn’t matter, of course  
03.20 not as an individual, he does matter, but in this 
debate Salman Rushdie is quite dispensable err… 
Muslims don’t really care about Salman Rushdie. 
Salman, you’ve got to remember that Salman 
Rushdie…  
03.29. Ignatieff: But isn’t that  
 
03.30 exactly what drives people crazy on the other side? 
The casualness, I’m serious, the casualness with 
which you’re prepared to envisage the idea that 
another human being, formerly a Muslim 
03.34. Pan to 
Ignatieff. 
03.40 as it happens, is gonna spend the rest of his life in 
hiding.  
Because of the vengeful wrath of your religion? 
And it doesn’t 
 
03.50 bother you, it doesn’t matter to you?  
03.52. Akhtar: Well, of course, I mean, that… 
that… that does trouble me…  
03.55. Ignatieff: It isn’t a matter of regret?  
03.57. Akhtar: Well, it is of course sad that it has 
turned out the way it has. I mean,  
03.51. Pan back 
to Akhtar.  
04.00 obviously, if Rushdie had been more careful in 
some of his public statements on television before 
he went into hiding and had given greater thought 
to what he had done, had been prepared to enter 
into a meaningful dialogue with the Muslims, I  
04.06. Kids 
walking up 
terraced house 
street.  
Scene 4 Collage of images from 04.06.   
04.10 think this would have developed…  
04.12. Sound of cashier at shop.   
04.19. Muslim girl 1: It’s an insult  
04.10. Asian 
clothes shop from 
outside. 04.14. 
Inside clothes 
shop. 04.18. 
Young girl in 
shop. 
04.20 to our whole way of life and umm… our… our 
Western counterparts err… feel that why are all 
these people, these… you know, they’re just 
creating a mountain out of a molehill. I  
04.25. Young girl 
in discussion. 
Scene 5 Young Muslim girls in group discussion from 
04.25. 
 
04.30 mean, so what, one person’s written a novel and 
it’s only based on fiction, but, it’s… it’s… it’s not 
fiction, this fiction is based upon real people, real 
events.  
 
04.40 04.40. Muslim girl 2: Being women, it is a sense 
because certain points that he’s made, Solomon 
Rushdie umm… like he’s called the Prophet’s 
wives prostitutes, I mean it is affected to us. 
Because,  
04.40. Three girls. 
Middle speaking.  
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04.50 if he’s talking about umm… the Prophet’s wives 
he’s including all the women in general, I mean the 
Muslim women, it is affected.  
04.58. Muslim girl 3: And if the prophet’s wives 
are  
04.58. Pan to 
fourth girl. 
05.00 prostitutes, then where does that leave us?  
05.07. Muslim girl 4: That’s because err… as 
women, we look to the Prophet’s  
05.07. Pan to one 
of three girls from 
before, left one 
speaking. 
05.10 wives as examples as how we should live. If you 
explain it to people that this is why we feel so 
offended, this is why we are resorting to such 
measures then… then… then some of them  
05.14. Back to 
first girl in 
discussion.  
05.20 umm… do the more compassionate ones do realise 
and do understand. But then again, you get people 
saying well, you know, go back to where you came 
from. How dare you come to  
 
05.30 our country and… and… and tell us how to, you 
know, when in Rome, do as the Rom… when in 
Rome, do as the Romans do, err… that we are, that 
this is, that we are the Romans in Rome  
 
05.40 as far as I am concerned because I was actually 
born here. 05.44. Quiet.  
05.49. Akhtar: In the long run it will alert the  
05.44. Asian 
woman hanging 
washed clothes on 
line. 
Scene 6  Images of Bradford society from 05.44.  
05.50 majority community here that within their ranks are 
people who think that they owe allegiance to 
something above the state, above the national… and 
that’s a very worrying thought,  
05.50. Alleyway 
between terraced 
houses. 05.55. 
Khokhar hair 
salon. 
06.00 particularly for English people because of all the 
world’s nations the English people are the most 
nationalist, I think.  
06.06. Ignatieff: It could be said that I’m hearing 
someone who’s  
06.05. Religious 
old man in front 
of butchers. Zoom 
back to billboard 
advertising 
displaying 
pictures of 
women in 
swimwear. 
06.10 putting a very, good gloss on a rather divided 
identity. Someone who’s actually very torn between 
a devout Muslim and a secular person. You make it 
sound as if you’ve brought the two  
06.16. Nun 
waking up street, 
zoom back to 
Asians in front of 
van. 
06.20 together. But someone listening to you, across what 
you’re saying, might say, this guy is just papering 
over the cracks…  
06.22. Women in 
chador crossing 
street. 06.26. 
Women in 
dupatta crossing 
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street. 
06.30 06.30. Akhtar: Well, I agree, I mean, it’s…  
Scene 7 Akhtar and Ignatieff at table.  
06.33 it’s not easy but of course, religion is not meant to 
be easy. Umm… I mean, the alternatives here 
would be, on the sexual side for example, to take 
human  
06.33. Akhtar and 
Ignatieff at 
Akhtar’s home 
across table. 
06.40 nature and to adjust say scriptural demands about 
sexuality to human nature i.e. reduce their severity. 
The alternative is to make human nature live up to 
these demands no matter how  
 
06.50 much temptation one feels. That, the latter course is 
the Islamic alternative. You do not change the law 
of God to suit human nature, you change human 
nature to suit the law of God. But I  
 
07.00 don’t of course, deny that it is much easier said than 
done. And in practice, of course, many people fail 
by these rules.  
07.07. Ignatieff: What does that actually mean?  
07.09. Akhtar: It means in practice, of course, that 
there is no other legitimate  
07.07. Close-up 
shot on Akhtar. 
07.10 form of relationship other than marriage. Umm… 
and a strong sense that any form of relationship 
other than that would be immoral.  
 
07.20 07.20. Ignatieff: Did you find that tough as an 
adolescent to live with?  
07.23. Akhtar: Yes, of course. It is very difficult to 
umm… live with that demand. Umm… umm…I 
think that umm… most  
07.20. Panning to 
Ignatieff. 
07.30 Asian people, particularly women, find that it is 
always a difficulty to live up to demands of what 
their own culture and that of the Western culture. 
But actually, but what is truly  
07.30. Panning 
back and focusing 
onto Akhtar. 
07.40 surprising is the manner in which almost all of these 
people manage to come to some kind of modus 
vivendi, somehow they manage to live. And… and 
with… with a far lesser degree of  
 
07.50 umm… moral and psychic tension that you might 
expect. I think that part of the reason for that is 
because, particularly in the case of Muslims, 
religion is such a strong anchoring force. It gives  
 
08.00 you a very firm sense of guidance. Doesn’t mean of 
course that you don’t occasionally stray or make 
errors, that’s a part of the failings of our common 
humanity but it does mean that you have  
 
08.10 a strong sense of what is right and wrong. 
Therefore, you do not create unnecessary 
temptations for yourself.  
 
Scene 8  Various images of Muslim society in Bradford,  
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first of worshippers in mosque then of girls in 
Muslim school. 
08.17 08.17. Arabic recitation for beginning of prayer.  08.17. Dark, 
panning onto 
street at night. 
08.20 08.21. Akhtar: You can reply to a sensible critic to 
a fair critic by another book. I think that Rushdie is 
not a fair critic of Islam. 08.26. Ignatieff: I don’t 
follow that. Why can’t you reply, even  
 
08.30 if it’s over the top…  
08.32. Akhtar: Well, what do you suggest that I 
should do? How should I reply? I have no idea, I 
am at complete loss… as to… other than the reply I 
am giving you, for  
08.30. Dark, 
panning to 
buildings at night. 
08.40 example, you know. I mean I thought I’d write a 
book, fiction-intent…  
08.42. Ignatieff: Well, writing a book sure beats 
burning it? 08.45. Akhtar: Yes, but I don’t hold 
you say to the use of insult and obscenity. Indeed, I 
think it should be burnt. It  
08.41. Men 
praying in 
mosque. 08.47. 
Man using prayer 
beads.  
08.50 should be destroyed. So, I mean, I don’t see what’s 
the problem here. One who judges and 
discriminates…  
08.58. Ignatieff: The problem… the problem, 
Shabbir, is 1935. The problem is the  
08.53. Man in 
mosque, focusing 
onto younger man 
behind him. 
09.00 Nuremberg laws. You start with Rushdie, you burn 
Rushdie then where do you stop?  
09.06. Akhtar: Well, I think it’s worth noting… 
09.08. Ignatieff: Because people say to me, they 
say to  
09.03. Man in 
contemplation in 
mosque. 09.08. 
Man in mosque, 
09.10 me, I can understand in their outrage about The 
Satanic Verses, they burn The Satanic Verses, it’s a 
bad thing, I disapprove of burning books but what 
bothers me is then they  
panning to 
another man in 
mosque. 
09.20 start objecting to something else. Soon, we don’t 
just have one book burning, we have nice, big 
bonfires in the middle of… in front of the Mayor’s 
office in Bradford. Nice, big bonfires and a  
09.21. 
Branches in front 
of building. 
09.29. Ignatieff 
09.30 lot of stuff goes into it, a lot of stuff that you as a 
philosopher wouldn’t want burned at all.  
09.34. Ignatieff: I expected a community in a bell-
jar. Instead, I found a community that’s  
walking up street 
during day. 
09.40 deeply, militantly British. Even down to the 
Yorkshire accent. But I’m also finding that the 
‘Rushdie affair’ has been a trauma for them, leading 
them to draw back from us, to defend a 
09.42. Muslim 
girls’ school sign, 
panning   
09.50 heritage they feel we don’t understand. The Muslim 
girl school in Bradford is five years old and was set 
up by parents who were afraid their children were 
slipping away from the true faith. The 
to front of school. 
09.55. Science 
sign on door, 
opened to show  
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10.00 parents, many of whom are unemployed, pay £450 
a year for true Islamic teaching. And I expected to 
go back to the Middle Ages.  
girl’s in chemistry 
class. 10.05. Test-
tube experiment, 
10.10 I had a surprise, the girls were doing the same 
science experiments I used to do and in the English 
class they were 
panning to girl 
doing experiment. 
10.14. Girls doing 
experiment. 
10.20 reading Kes and sympathising with the humiliation 
of a little, white boy forced naked into the showers 
by a sadistic teacher. 10.29. Reading from English 
class for eight seconds. 
10.20. One girl 
reading Kes in 
classroom. 10.26. 
Teacher in 
classroom. 
10.30 10.37. Mirza: The insecurity is from the main, 
indigenous  
10.30. Young girl 
reading. 10.33. 
Girl listening. 
10.35. Two girls 
following. 
Scene 9  Interview with Mirza.  
10.40 population. They feel that maybe we will not treat 
them as they expect and they don’t try it. So 
somebody has to make a move,  
10.41. Nighat 
Mirza in room.. 
10.50 we have been making the moves for the past twenty 
one years. I have lived here for a long time, every 
time I have moved from  
 
11.00 one house to another, it is us, it is the black people 
who have to go and knock on the next door, saying, 
“We are here, how are you?”. I think now, the time 
has come that the other population  
 
11.10 also comes across and say “How do you do, nice 
day isn’t it?”.  
 
Scene 
10 
At mixed secondary school including quote from 
headmaster. 
 
11.15 11.15. Quiet. 11.15. Mixed 
schools 
playground, 
distant shot. 
11.20 11.22. English headmaster: I am not in favour of 
separate faith schools. 11.26. Ignatieff: Why is 
that? 11.29. English headmaster: I think they  
11.28. 
Headmaster. 
11.30 will be divisive again, umm… I’m all in favour of 
Muslims, Sikhs, Hindus whatever umm… keeping 
their traditions, keeping  
 
11.40 touch with their homeland, however you wish to put 
it. But err… we’re all living together in a very, 
multicultural city and we need  
11.47. Kids in 
playground  
11.50 togetherness. I watch the kids play in my yard here, 
Muslims with…with their English friends, umm…  
playing football, 
camera following 
game. 
12.00 it means a lot, that’s where we’re going to start 12.00. Young 
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winning the battle against racism…  English girls. 
12.10 in schools, in school playgrounds as well as in 
classrooms. 12.16. Ignatieff: Rehan Khan is one of 
twelve Muslim  
12.11. Asian girl 
with English 
friends. 12.18. 
Asian  
12.20 children at Allerton Middle school. It was Rehan’s 
family that I got to know best in Bradford. 
boy with English 
12.30 12.30. Rehan: I like to play football so does Daniel 
and me other friends. Daniel is English and I play 
with 
friends, camera 
following  
12.40 him a lot. So I play with Alastair, Robert, Graham, 
Paul, Wayne and all the other people in the class.  
Rehan in 
playground.  
Scene 
11 
Girls reading Qur’an in Muslim girls school, 
interview with Mirza and girls in chemistry 
lessons. 
 
12.48 12.48. Arabic Qur'an. 12.48. Girls 
12.50  listening to 
Qur'an. 
13.00 13.00. Mirza: If the woman is not educated, then 
how is she going to pass on the values to her 
children and the education they want is not 
necessarily certificates at the end of it, but mor… 
moral  
13.01. Young girl 
reading Qur'an in  
13.10 values which they carry out with them to the world 
at large and manage to survive with them. 13.18. 
Ignatieff: I want to get a 
school panning to 
another reading. 
13.19. Another 
reading.  
13.20 sense of the limits to your teaching, umm… we’ve 
seen a science class, you’re a chemistry teacher. I’m 
wondering whether there are scientific doctrines or 
theories that you wouldn’t teach. 
13.24. Two young 
girls reading,  
13.30 I mean Darwinism, for example, is a controversial 
issue for Islamic people. 13.35. Mirza: We will tell 
them that there is such a theory around. We’ll also 
tell them… 13.39. Ignatieff: There is a theory 
panning to two 
more and two 
more.  
13.40 of Darwinism… 13.41. Mirza: Darwinism… and 
we’ll also say to them this is what Qur'an says. This 
is my belief, as a Muslim, this is what the… this is 
what the rest of the world believes. We 
13.47. Nighat 
Mirza sitting in 
room. 
13.50 got to understand what other people believe to be 
able to hold onto what we feel is right. Without that 
knowledge, then my own belief becomes a little bit 
shaky because I will not be able to 
 
14.00 make a decision if what I am is believing is correct. 
14.06. Ignatieff: What does Qur'an say about issues 
that are 
 
14.10 covered by the Darwinian theory? How big is the 
divergence, the difference, between the two 
theories? 14.13. Mirza: Well, Allah said that He 
14.19.Girl in 
chemistry class, 
doing test-tube  
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has created us as man and a woman. Darwin theory  
14.20 saying that we have come together as matter. There 
is a lot of difference and I believe I was created the 
way I am now, and I 
experiment, 
panning to second 
girl doing 
experiment. 
14.30 have not evolved from err... a development process. 
14.33. Ignatieff: So that you teach the two, but at 
the end of the day, it’s your wish as a devout 
believer that Muslim girls will end up 
14.30. Girls 
praying. 
14.40 believing as the Qur'an teaches them, surely. 14.44. 
Mirza: If we do our teaching right, yes. I am sure 
that they will. 14.48. Ignatieff: Well then, can 
14.41. Girl doing 
test-tube 
experiment. 
14.48. Nighat 
Mirza. 
14.50 they be good scientists? 14.51. Mirza: I am a 
chemistry teacher, I think that my belief has not 
interfered with what I do in a science lesson. What 
it does make me appreciate is, yes, there is 
 
15.00 something there, there is a God, there is some 
Controller. And it makes me admire and become 
more close to Allah, rather than  
 
15.10 take me away from that.   
Scene 
12  
Assembly at mixed secondary school and quote 
from headmaster. 
 
15.15 15.15. Hymns at school. 15.15. Asian kids 
in assembly at 
middle school. 
15.20   
15.30 15.34. English headmaster: I the err… powers that 
be in London, Mr Baker etc do understand the 
problems in a city like  
15.33. English 
kids in assembly. 
15.38. Shot from 
behind of singers 
leading  
15.40 Bradford, the they’re not sympathetic to it, because 
what to give an example, the recent umm… the 
recent bill which states that  
front of assembly. 
15.42. 
Headmaster. 
15.50 we should have a Christian based assembly every 
morning in schools such as this with a small 
percentage of Muslim children  
 
16.00 and Sikhs, it’s umm… it’s not on, it’s divisive in 
my view. Of course, in schools where the 
percentage is much higher, where the vast majority 
of the children are of non-Christian origin,  
 
16.10 it’s… it’s ridiculous. That to me, is the bottom line. 
16.16. Hymns.  
16.17. Outside 
school 
playground  
16.20  from a distance. 
Scene 
13 
Collage of images of Bradford with Ignatieff 
voice-over. 
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16.27 16.27. Announcer for demonstration against 
Rushdie for about 10 seconds in Urdu. 
 
16.30 16.38. Ignatieff: You’re making this as a tactical 
move, because  
16.30. Announcer 
for  
16.40 you know that incitement to racial hatred is an 
absolute no, no. Even the free speech people on… 
on my side would be with you if you could prove 
that it incited to racial hatred, and that’s 
demonstration. 
16.50 definitely true. If you could prove to me that it 
makes, you know, white citizens, or non-Asian, or 
non-Islamic citizens of Bradford hate Muslims, I 
would definitely be with you. But I don’t see it, 
16.50. Panning up 
wall with NF on 
it. 16.55. Two 
Asian men 
standing on street. 
16.59. Imam 
dressed 
17.00 Shabbir, I just don’t see it?  in shalwar 
kameez in front of 
car.  
Scene 
14 
Akhtar and Ignatieff at table. Interrupted 
visually by shots of Bradford. 
 
17.04 17.04. Akhtar: Well, ok, let’s suppose… let’s take 
an ordinary non-Muslim reading The 
17.04. Akhtar 
17.10 Satanic Verses, what would his first reaction be? It 
would be an interesting question to ask. I think that 
someone who read this book without an adequate 
knowledge of Islam, and that’s the 
and Ignatieff at 
table. 
17.20 majority of the people in this country naturally, 
would tend to see in it certain stereotypes and 
stereotypical images of Muhammad, and of the 
Islamic faith in general, err… reinforced in an 
artistic 
 
17.30 mode. He has portrayed enough… The book does 
actually revive the image of the medieval idea that 
nothing can explain the phenomenal success 
17.32. ‘Paki’ on 
wall, panning 
across wall to 
‘Paki’s out’. 
17.40 of Islam other than the work of the devil. 17.43. 
Ignatieff: But the only protection you have is to get 
up out of your chairs and march down the street and 
say to the citizens of Bradford,  
17.41. Man 
promoting  
17.50 citizens of the world, “I’ve had enough, can’t stand 
it”. And you’ve done that. What other protection do 
you want? That’s what I don’t understand. 17.56. 
Akhtar: Well, the protection would be, that like the 
government banned the Observer, we’d 
campaign from 
car in street. 
18.00 like to have the book banned. I don’t see if the 
government can do… 18.01. Ignatieff: But if you 
ban… if you ban Rushdie’s book, you then begin to 
infringe on the rights of those like me, who like to 
buy it. 18.08. Akhtar: Yeah, but by the same token, 
18.09. Asian man 
outside shop 
listening. 
18.10 one could say that umm… the liberal inquisition as 18.11. Man 
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it were, has been encroaching on the rights of one 
and a half million… 18.15. Ignatieff: What do you 
mean by the liberal inquisition? 18.17. Akhtar: 
Well, actually, the term is not mine. It’s err…  
campaigning for 
demonstration 
from car. 18.18. 
Akhtar and 
Ignatieff at table.  
18.20 Shaykh AbdulQadir al Murabit’s term. He’s a 
writer. Umm… what is meant by the liberal 
inquisition is that umm… liberal society has certain 
kinds of laws and axioms which are in fact sacred to 
it, which it does not 
 
18.30 allow rational debate on. 18.32. Ignatieff: But I 
said to you, I don’t think that’s sacred. I really don’t 
think so. 18.35. Akhtar: Err… fine, but I mean, 
there’s a lot of liberals who do think that certain 
things… 18.38. Ignatieff: I mean, I have come 
here, because I think freedom has to be negotiated. 
 
18.40 You have a view of what freedom is, I have a view 
of what freedom is and in a free society, you sit 
there across a table and you bang it out. 18.48. 
Akhtar: Yeah, well, I agree, freedom has 
 
18.50 to be negotiated and of course, owing to certain 
unfortunate incidences, we find it difficult to do that 
with Rushdie because he’s in hiding. But when he 
was actually out, it’s worth noting  
 
19.00 the reaction and attitude he’s had. Before Rushdie 
went into hiding, his attitude towards the Muslims 
who were complaining about is book was one of 
utter condescension and intolerance. A 
 
19.10 feeling that he was the enlightened one, and all 
these other people were totally ignorant which is of 
course a total, false image. So, of course, I mean I 
quite agree with you that freedom is a negotiated 
entity and it… the limits of that freedom are in 
 
19.20 fact, are in fact umm… decided by law over a 
period of time. And many groups as you know have 
had to break the law in order to change the law, 
women’s movements, trade unions and so on. And 
Muslims of course, will probably engage in similar 
 
Scene 
15 
Rehan and cousins watching Neighbours, 
followed by Rehan’s family at dinner, followed 
by discussion on ‘Rushdie affair’. 
 
19.29  19.29. Rehan and 
cousin running up 
hill. 
19.30 kinds of civil rights or civil disobedience 
movements to get these things done. And it is 
interesting to note that the majority of British 
Muslims have in fact taken that stance. Remember 
the death threat has not come from any British 
Muslim authority, it 
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19.40 has come from an external source. 19.44. Rehan: 
Oh great, Neighbours is on. 
19.47. Opening 
door to house, 
and going through 
hallway. 
19.50 19.50. Neighbours music.  19.53. Focusing 
from house onto 
Arabic decoration 
on wall. 19.55. 
Kids watching 
Neighbours. 
20.00 20.07. Ignatieff: I go back with Rehan to watch 
Neighbours at his uncle’s house. Three brothers and 
their families plus the grandparents live in one 
street and they’re in and out of each  
20.04. Focus on 
Rehan watching 
television. 
20.10 his uncle’s house. Three brothers and their families 
plus the grandparents live in one street and they’re 
in and out of each other’s houses all day. No one I 
know in London lives in an 
20.10. All of the 
kids watching 
television. 
20.20 extended family and I was drawn to its warmth. But 
I was worried that it might suffocate these kids one 
day. Everyday in the classroom and on TV, Rehan 
is learning to want things that 
 
20.30 may lead him to break with his Islamic past. 
Keeping a faith in the media age isn’t going to be 
easy. 
 
20.40 20.40. Quiet. 20.45. Moira Stuart on the news: 
Iran’s interior minister has called for an economic 
boycott of Britain over the  
20.44. Outside the 
house looking in, 
women cooking 
in the kitchen. 
20.50 Salman ‘Rushdie affair’. Iran wants the issue raised 
tomorrow at the meeting of the Islamic Conference 
Organisation in Saudi Arabia. 
20.52. Laying 
table cloth on 
floor. 20.54. 
Women cooking. 
20.57. Kids 
handing baby to 
each other. 20.57. 
Rice taken out of 
pot.  
21.00 in Kuwait, the Prince and Princess of Wales have 
arrived… 21.03. Family eating dinner. 21.07. 
Arshad (father): Did anybody come to your school 
talking about this book? 21.09. Rehan: Yeah. 
21.03. Women 
making chapattis. 
21.05. Taking rice 
into next room. 
21.08. Placing 
kebabs dish on 
cloth. 
21.10 21.10. Arshad: Yeah, who came? Rehan: The 
whole school, everybody’s talking about the book. 
21.15. Arshad: Everybody’s talking about the 
book. What about you?  
21.10. 
Distributing food. 
21.13. Feeding 
baby. 21.15. One 
person eating. 
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21.18. Whole 
family eating 
together. 
21.20 Younger brother: Umm… maulvi. Arshad: 
Maulvi came? What did he say? Younger brother: 
He… he said he’s stupid. Arshad: What is stupid? 
The book is. Younger brother: No. Salman 
Rushdie is stupid. 
 
21.30 Arshad: Rushdie is stupid. Younger brother: He 
brought this kind of monster in and said it’s Salman 
Rushdie. 21.35. Arshad: A monster? That’s very 
good. That’s very good. Has he told you about the 
book though?  
21.36. Mother. 
21.39. Metal 
water jug being 
passed around. 
21.40 Younger brother: Yeah, he gave us this little 
paper. Arshad: Yeah, and what did it say in the 
book? Younger brother: Loads of dirty stuff. 
Arshad: Dirty stuff? 21.49. Grandfather: These  
21.42. Rehan 
talking at dinner. 
21.49. Arshad’s 
dad talking. 
21.50 are instances like the… Peter Wright’s book. They 
spend millions of taxpayers money to ban that book 
coming into this  
 
22.00 country. What does the freedom of expression come 
there? 22.06. Arshad: There is no question about 
me leaving here. This is our country, we’ve got 
nowhere to go back so don’t… I don’t  
22.06. Arshad 
speaking. 
22.10 think anyone should be threatening us, you know, if 
you want to live here. As though we’ve got a 
choice, we have no choice. This is our country, 
we’re gonna live here and we want to live here  
22.19. Camera 
zooming out of 
house to show 
whole family 
eating together. 
22.20 with dignity. We know how to behave, we’ve been 
behaving for the last thirty years. We’ve been here 
thirty years? And there’s two million of us. Each 
one of us is offended on the issue and yet the 
government is not doing anything. 
 
Scene 
16 
Ignatieff and Arshad travelling in car to 
restaurant, intermixed with interview with 
Rehan and cousins. 
 
22.30 22.30. Quiet.  22.37. Darkness 
lighted to house 
during day,  
22.40 22.40. Ignatieff: Every evening, Arshad, Rehan’s 
uncle and the oldest brother in the family goes out 
and visits one of the three restaurants he owns in the 
Bradford area. He never tells the staff  
Ignatieff and 
Arshad get into 
car. 
22.50 which one he’s going to visit. The one I’m driving 
him to is in Harrogate, forty miles away. 22.57. 
Quiet (in car).  
22.54. Focusing 
back, family 
waving goodbye. 
22.57. Car 
leaving house. 
23.00 23.02. Ignatieff: Yours was an arranged marriage. I 23.01. Arshad and 
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don’t… I don’t know how that works. Tell me how 
it worked in your case. I don’t wanna pry but I 
mean… it’s mean it’s  
Ignatieff in car. 
23.10 just the difference. 23.11. Pause. 23.13. Arshad: 
What… well, in my particular case, what happened 
was that umm… I married my first cousin. And my 
mother…I mean, I… I’d known her, because she’s 
my 
 
23.20 first cousin, I’d known her, I’d seen her. I’d met 
her, she… she knew me. And my… my parents 
thought it would make a good match. And they 
arranged it with my uncle and my auntie who 
 
23.30 are my sort of err… father and mother-in-law. And 
it was done, and I went to Pakistan and got married 
and brought her over here. I mean she’s been to 
England in the last ten years, three or 
 
23.40 four times, visiting on, you know, school leave and 
stuff like that. So we knew each other and she knew 
me pretty well. But I 
 
23.50 mean we didn’t have a… an affair or we didn’t sort 
of err… go out together or we didn’t sort of err… I 
wasn’t courting her or  
 
24.00 anything. I just got married and I brought her over 
and then, you know, from then on we have been 
living as husband and wife. 
 
24.10 24.10. Rehan: Me and me cousin as you know, and 
she’s my auntie. And I’ve got… her mum is my 
auntie, her dad is my  
24.10. Rehan with 
cousins in  
24.20 uncle. Her husband’s my uncle as well. And my 
granddad… my granddad is me mum’s dad and 
mum, gran… granddad and me  
front room. 
24.30 grandma. And me grandam’s son’s me uncle as 
well. 24.34. 24.36. Arshad: We have to have a very 
strong Muslim identity.  
24.35. Car 
coming up hill. 
24.40 You know, our women, have to be dressed in a 
positively Muslim way with the hijab. If you start 
compromising, then there is nobody higher… then 
no one has an idea where it’s going to  
24.45. Arshad and 
Ignatieff in car. 
24.50 end up. So, if you draw the line right from the very 
start… 24.54. 24.59. Ignatieff: But you’re… 
 
25.00 we’re driving to a restaurant where you’re selling 
alcohol? So what… are you saying that the line’s 
gonna change for you now?  25.07. Arshad: The 
line for me, yeah, as far… as far as I’m concerned, 
I’m…  
25.03. Focusing 
on Arshad in car. 
25.10 I’m already considering ways of getting out of it. I 
mean, if you… if you want to ask me as to why… 
what I’m doing at a personal level, this ‘Rushdie 
affair’, although I’ve been involved in 
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25.20 this business for the last three or four years. I’m… 
it’s been in the back of my mind but there are 
certain things that I want to do now. I mean… I 
want to… my kids are growing up, I’ve got one 
 
25.30 daughter, my wife is expecting. I want to be 
teaching them a version of Islam which is not 
compromised, which… which does not say that, 
yes, daddy is selling alcohol because he is making a 
 
25.40 living. But I want to say it’s wrong and I’m not 
doing it. 25.48. Rehan: I’d like to be a football 
player.  
25.48. Kids in 
front room. 
25.50 Ignatieff: Who do you want to play for? Rehan: 
Bradford city. Younger brother: Be an engineer, 
engineerer… for planes and  
 
26.00 err… fighter planes like in the RAF. I’d like to go 
in tha’ and be an engineerer. Younger sister: I 
know something else that I might be. Ignatieff: 
What’s that? Younger sister: A mechanic. 
 
26.10 Ignatieff: Oh, a mechanic, like Charlene in 
Neighbours. Younger sister: Yeah. Get all dirty. 
26.19. Arshad: If it…  
26.19. Arshad in 
car. 
26.20 if it comes to just pulling the trigger, I assure you 
there will be a lot of people in Britain who will do 
that. Because, I mean, the Muslims, you know, if 
they’re provoked err… enough, they 
 
26.30 wouldn’t need somebody from Iran to come and 
pull the trigger for them. There will be people 
inside Belgium, people inside Britain for that 
matter, who would say “Fine, this has to be done”, 
 
26.40 and they would go ahead and do it. Regardless of 
the consequences, so Khomeini has not tried to 
frighten people into following him. It’s been quite 
the opposite, he has just given a 
 
26.50 verdict. I think it must have been in the back of his 
mind that he will just give a verdict and all the other 
verdicts will follow.  
 
27.00 And then… 27.01. Ignatieff: Arshad, what are you 
saying to me? Are you saying to me that if it came 
to it, you would be prepared to pull the trigger on 
Rushdie? 
27.07. Focusing 
onto Arshad. 
27.10 I mean, talking seriously? 27.12. Arshad: I am 
talking seriously, yeah, if it came to it and we were 
face to face… who knows? 27.19. Ignatieff: What 
do you  
 
27.20 mean who knows? 27.21. Arshad: I… I’m saying 
who knows? I might pull the trigger, yes because I 
am offended by what he has written, deeply 
offended by what 
 
27.30 he has written, and I’m not the only one. I mean, 
these peo… these kids, young kids who are 
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shouting on the streets, you know, “Kill Rushdie”, 
they’re not shouting cos it’s just a slogan, they 
mean it. Because… 27.39. Ignatieff: Are you 
saying that 
27.40 because you feel it or because you feel that there’s 
a… that that’s what you’re supposed to say? 27.46. 
Arshad: No, I’m not saying anything 
 
27.50 that I’m supposed to say. I’m saying that this man 
has deeply offended me, he has hurt me, he has hurt 
me by ridiculing and making fun of things that I 
respect, I hold very dear to and… he  
 
28.00 is basically… basking in publicity and in… in the 
wealth that he has gathered from this and the fact 
that now he is living in fear, I think is the price that 
he’s paying. Because… because Imam 
 
28.10 Khomeini’s fatwa, I think to sum extent, was to 
frighten him as well. To sum extent, if Imam 
Khomeini wants to kill somebody, I mean, I don’t 
know whether he does or not, but if he did, 
 
28.20 surely, if he is as awesome and powerful as the 
Western media make him out to be, he… he… he 
wouldn’t need to give out a fatwa. He would have 
just sent some people to get rid of Rushdie 
 
28.30 and then Rushdie would have been dead without 
anybody knowing about  
 
28.40 it. 28.41. Ignatieff: But Arshad, are you really 
thinking about what you’re saying here? You’re 
saying that when someone gives you  
 
28.50 offence and when someone hurts your feelings, it’s 
right to threaten them, it’s right to frighten them and 
at the limit it’s right to kill them, is that what you’re 
saying to me? 
28.50. Zooming 
back to include  
29.00 29.00. Arshad: I’m not saying that. What I am 
saying is that this man has offended my feelings 
and if… if I was to make the case to him, he should 
be made aware that he has offended a lot of  
Ignatieff. 
29.10 people, he has offended nearly a billion Muslims all 
over the world. 29.15. Ignatieff: Well, you’ve done 
that, but you don’t need to do it by threatening his 
life? 29.19. Arshad: No, no, but  
 
29.20 he… he has not even come out to apologise. The 
man has not even unequivoc… not a single 
unequivocal apology has come either from him or 
the publishers. 29.29. Ignatieff: But why 
 
29.30 don’t you see it as a matter of principle on his side? 
You say that you have a principle on your side, and 
I’ve come to Bradford to find out about it and I 
accept that there’s a principle on your side, 
 
29.40 believe me. But why do you have such trouble 
accepting there’s a principle on his side? He’s a 
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man who’s written a book, he takes the words he 
writes very seriously, he didn’t do it by 
29.50 accident, that’s precisely why you’re excited and 
angry about it. Well, he is prepared to defend his 
principle of writing freely as he chooses as to the 
end and that it seems 
29.51. Car going 
up hill in 
Yorkshire. 
30.00 to me is entitled to respect. 30.02. Restaurant music.   
Scene 
17 
Ignatieff talking to workers in restaurant.  
30.09  30.09. Wok with 
food in restaurant, 
panning across 
different dishes. 
30.10  30.15. Tomato 
added to wok. 
30.19. Chef. 
30.20  30.21. Different 
dishes. 30.27. 
Dishes being 
taken out. 30.29. 
More dishes. 
30.30 30.32. Ignatieff: But what if I said to you that, it’s 
the sentence you began with “I think what 
everybody thinks”. Isn’t there a lot  
30.34. Waiter to 
Ignatieff,   
30.40 of pressure in the Muslim community to say just 
what you’ve said? If you said to me, “I think 
Salman Rushdie is actually a great guy, I think it’s a 
terrific book but don’t tell anybody”, 
then back to 
waiter. 
30.50 you’d be in trouble, right? 30.52. Waiter: I 
certainly would. I mean the people around me, I 
mean they wouldn’t agree with me, they’d just look 
at me and say “Right!”. 30.56. Ignatieff: Out! 
30.56. Waiter: Yeah, he’s a black sheep. You 
know, they wouldn’t agree at all. Anybody who 
says anything  
 
31.00 about the book that doesn’t agree with what people 
have already said or done, you know, he’s just 
cast… out, you know, they won’t agree with him at 
all. I mean if I was to turn around and  
 
31.10 tell the papers or I can tell you, “Oh, the book is 
great, he’s a great guy!” You know, “I think he 
should write another one!” and that, I don’t think 
 
31.20 it will work very well. 31.22. Ignatieff: Certainly, 
not work for you. 31.24. Waiter: No, it wouldn’t. 
That’s right. 31.26. Ignatieff: But doesn’t it make 
you a little uncomfortable that you can’t…? I mean 
aren’t you saying that I can’t think for myself 
 
31.30 here, I’ve gotta say what people want me to say? 
31.33. Waiter: I can’t think for myself. I mean, 
he’s wrote the book, I mean like I said before, 
31.31. Back to 
Ignatieff. 31.39. 
Back to waiter. 
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before he wrote the book he should have thought… 
31.39. Ignatieff: I’m asking about you, 
31.40 I mean are you really free to say what you wanna 
say here? 31.47. Waiter: I think he’s done wrong. 
Ignatieff: You think he has. Waiter: Yeah. 
 
31.50 Ignatieff: You really do. 31.51. Waiter: I really do. 
That’s my point of view, I think he’s done wrong. I 
mean, anybody… everybody else is saying it but 
I’m not saying cos they’re saying it. I’m saying it 
cos I’ve actually read the book, and I think it’s 
wrong. 31.59. Music. 
 
32.00 32.02. Ignatieff: The Home secretary gave a speech 
in Birmingham a while ago, telling Muslims to 
behave in a society… to fit in,  
32.00. Chefs at 
work in kitchen. 
32.03. Dish being 
cooked. 32.05. 
Ignatieff and 
waiter. 
32.10 what was your reaction to that speech? 32.13. 
Waiter 2: Well, I was quite annoyed actually. I 
mean for the past twenty. Thirty years we’ve been 
behaving and for this small reason, you  
 
32.20 know, he goes and tells all the Muslims off, and you 
should behave otherwise you’ll be put on the next 
ship home – which is wrong. We’re all legal. You 
know,  
 
32.30 I’m just as British as you are… 32.31. Ignatieff: 
Sure, you’re more British than I am cos I’m a 
Canadian! 32.36. Waiter 2: The only difference 
between you and me is,  
 
32.40 right, the colour of our skin. We’re black and 
you’re white, this is what it all boils down to in the 
end. You know, we… we work here, we pay taxes, 
everything. And 
32.45. Dishes 
being taken out of 
kitchen. 
32.50 then at the end of the day we’re called immigrants 
which is not right. 32.54. Akhtar: Christianity has 
not produced err… the kind of quality of allegiance 
that Islam has. Because what you’ve got to 
remember is that Islam, even in the twentieth  
 
Scene 
18 
Akhtar and Ignatieff at table.  
33.00 century, manages to produce a discrepantly large 
number of martyrs which Christianity doesn’t. I 
think that actually is some measure of enthusiasm in 
a faith: to what extent people are 
33.00. Focus on 
Akhtar. 
33.10 prepared at a crisis point to give their lives, it’s not 
an easy thing to do. And I think that Islam, the fact 
that it manages to do that so routinely, is to its… 
33.19. Ignatieff: Why is martyrdom such 
 
33.20 a value in Islam? Why… why… 33.23. Akhtar: 
Well, it’s a value in Christianity too. It used to be a 
33.29. Zooming 
back to Ignatieff. 
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value in liberalism as well. 
33.30 33.30. Ignatieff: But giving your life is almost a 
definition of fanatical surrender of personal 
judgement on certain views. 
 
33.40 33.40. Akhtar: Is there anything you’d be willing 
to kill for? 33.43. Ignatieff: If err… by some 
ghastly mischance, this became a theocratic Islamic 
state. I would frankly fight, not only to be an 
agnostic minority, but err… I’d fight to protect the 
rights  
33.40. Focus on 
Akhtar. 33.43. 
Focus on 
Ignatieff. 
33.50 of… I would have fought against the Germans in 
the Second World War, I would have fought against 
the… err… I would  
 
34.00 fight against the Soviet state. Simply, on the same 
grounds that my freedom to have wayward and 
difficult opinions is… is worth  
 
34.10 fighting for. I think Hitler threatened everything, I 
think Stalin threatened everything and I have to say 
the Ayatollah Khomeini  
34.16. Both on 
screen  
34.20 threatens everything. I don’t equate the three. 
They’re different phenomena but he threatens 
everything that I stand for and 
together. 
34.30 believe. Err… if he was simply a religious teacher 
who held his views and confined them to the 
Iranian state and to his particular 
 
34.40 branch of the Moslem faith, no problem, no 
problem at all. But he’s a man, who is calling for 
holy war against the Western 
 
34.50 world, against secularism, and I’m a convinced 
secularist, so he’s making war on me and he stands 
for everything I oppose. He’s also threatening an 
author, a writer, a member of my own trade. 
 
35.00 He’s threatening him with death, he’s ruined the 
man’s life. He is… he is anathema to me and if it 
came to a fight, indeed, I would fight the Ayatollah. 
 
35.10   
Scene 
19 
Collage of images of Bradford with Ignatieff 
voice-over. 
 
35.13. 35.13. Asian Mughal instrumental music. 35.13. Panning 
across dump site 
behind 
35.20  terraced housing. 
35.28. Panning 
across terraced 
housing to in 
front of 
35.30  car with ‘I love 
Kashmir’ sticker 
stuck backwards 
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on window. 
35.35. Lister 
mills.  
35.40 35.48. Ignatieff: Does it change my view of the 
rights of wrongs?  
35.42. Ignatieff 
talking to young 
kids. 35.46. 
Ignatieff coming 
up escalators at 
Interchange. 
35.50 I think not in the end, I think I come away feeling 
that the right to publish is such a precious right 
err… that it must be upheld. I think that there is 
something tragically symmetrical about the  
35.58. Ignatieff 
and ticket master. 
36.00 principles being defended here. I am defending 
Salman Rushdie’s right to publish because I believe 
the word is sacred. It’s not because I believe 
freedom is sacred, but a writer’s 
36.02. Different 
angle on ticket  
36.10 imagination for me is a… not a sacred thing but is 
such an important thing it must be defended at all 
costs. They on their side are defending a principle 
that sounds very similar, which is 
master and 
Ignatieff. 36.13. 
Train coming in,  
36.20 the Word is holy, the Holy Word of the Qur’an is 
holy. You can’t make this into novels. You can’t 
make this into blasphemous speculations about the 
sexual life of the Prophet, praise be his 
panning across to 
waiting travellers. 
36.30 name. You see, both of us are defending a 
conception of the word as being tremendously 
important. The only good thing that has come out of 
this affair is the sense that all of us, secular 
36.35. Ignatieff 
walking up 
station platform. 
36.40 liberals and Muslims, have rediscovered words 
count. What goes on a page matters, people can be 
so offended by it that they’re prepared to die for it. 
People can be so committed to its defence 
36.43. Asian 
young lad at train 
station. 36.48. 
Ignatieff  
36.50 that they’re willing to spend the rest of their lives 
in… in solitary confinement, which is what will 
happen to Salman Rushdie if things don’t change. 
up platform. 
37.00 37.00. Quiet.  
Scene 
20 
Akhtar at table.  
37.03 37.03. Akhtar: I think the discussion with Michael 
was very useful, in terms of mapping areas where 
we agreed and in  
37.03. Akhtar at 
home. 
37.10 making me have some sense of where he stands, as 
it were. What are the principles, if you like, which 
are motivating him to take the stands he’s having. 
Cos I mean, part of the problem is that as 
 
37.20 Michael himself admits, is the kind of mutual 
incomprehension, people talking at cross purposes 
and a lot of that’s been happening. So for me it’s 
been a truly informative experience. 
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37.30 37.30. Interviewer: You didn’t convince him did 
you, that the book should be banned? 
37.33.Akhtar: Probably not, but equally he didn’t 
convince me of err… the opposite opinion. 37.38. 
Ignatieff: There are  
 
Scene 
21 
Counter-posing images of Akhtar and Ignatieff.  
37.39 such things as radical, 37.39. Ignatieff at 
train station. 
37.40 complete disagreements. A liberal who walks 
around thinking that everything can be fudged, we 
can all be good friends, we can all be brothers, we 
can all get inside each other’s heads. 
 
37.50 As I said to Shabbir at the end of this is that what 
multiculturalism comes down to is getting inside 
the head of someone from another culture, another 
world. And if you think 
 
38.00 that’s easy, you got another think coming. And this 
society, I think, has tended to delude itself by a lot 
of loose, empty and unthinking rhetoric about 
multiculturalism. Everybody’s 
38.09. Outside 
Akhtar’s house, 
panning  
38.10 brother… in favour of brotherhood, and when… but 
when push comes to shove as it has in this affair, 
we’re not such brothers as we thought. 38.16. 
38.17. 17.13 to Manchester is approximately 10 
minutes late. 17.13 to Manchester is approximately 
10 minutes late.  
to focus on 
Akhtar looking 
out of window. 
38.20  38.23. Ignatieff 
waiting on 
platform. 
38.30 38.30. Asian music ending.  
38.40.   
38.50. 38.50. Finish. 38.50. Finish. 
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Appendix (viii) 
 
A summary of the five programmes 
 
The Late Show, 22 February 1989 
 
The Late Show was a late night arts discussion programme shown almost daily during 
the week on BBC2. This particular programme was shown in the immediate 
aftermath of the fatwa, about a week after the fatwa was issued. It was hosted by 
Michael Ignatieff, himself an author, and consisted of two sections. The first section 
involved three short interviews with authors from America and Europe. The second 
section consisted of a discussion with six panellists, each panellist representing a 
certain viewpoint in the affair.  
 
The first section involved interviews taken by Michael Ignatieff with three authors. 
The first was with Norman Mailer, an American novelist, the second with Edward 
Said, an American university professor of literature, and the third with George 
Steiner, a European author. The first interview conducted with Norman Mailer began 
with a discussion of the latest developments in America where three book chains had 
decided to withdraw the book from sale. Writers in America had conducted a public 
meeting to protest against this and Norman Mailer was amongst them. The points of 
discussion were: Why are the American writers protesting about the withdrawal of the 
book? Will the book be put back onto display? Can the writers not understand the 
outrage felt by Muslims on this issue? What do the writers think of the booksellers?  
 
The second interview was conducted with George Steiner, a European author. This 
interview also involved a discussion on the possibility of the German and French 
publishers cancelling their publication of the book. This interview covered the 
following main points: What is your view of the book? Why has the Islamic world 
taken such an offence? Does the secular world read texts differently to the Islamic 
world? Has the Islamic world proved that books are the most important things in the 
world? Have the French and German publishers decided to cancel their publication of 
the book? How do you feel about the book not being published in certain parts of 
Europe?  
 
The third interview was with Edward Said. The points covered in this interview were: 
What is your opinion of the book? What is it about the book that makes it 
postmodern? Why do you think it gives deep offence to the Muslim community? Do 
you think Rushdie was irresponsible to have written the book?   
 
The programme then shifted to a discussion between studio guests. Six persons, each 
representing a different perspective, were invited onto the programme. These were in 
the words of Ignatieff, “the English writer, Ian McEwan; the Muslim and feminist 
writer, Fadia Faqir; the exiled Iranian journalist and writer, Shusha Guppy; the 
professor of Islamic literature at Exeter University, Aziz Al-Azmeh; the chairman of 
the Islamic society for the promotion of religious tolerance, Dr Hessam El-Essawy; 
and representing the Bradford Council of Mosques, Dr Shabbir Akhtar”. Michael 
Ignatieff himself was the chair of the discussion. Of the discussants, two were 
representing the Muslim case (though to different degrees): Essawy and Akhtar. 
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Michael Ignatieff and Ian McEwan were representing the writer’s case, and the rest 
fell in between these two polarities of the debate at different levels of the spectrum. 
 
The discussion began with Ignatieff asking each person their view of the book and 
their view on the banning of the book. A variety of opinions were given here, Akhtar 
said that the book should be withdrawn from publication whereas all the others said 
that it shouldn’t92. There were differences in opinion on the merits of the book. 
Akhtar said it was an “inferior piece of literature” and McEwan described it as a 
“fabulous mosaic”. Ignatieff then asked Akhtar why the Muslim community viewed 
the book as an attack on its identity? Akhtar’s response was that the book is seen as 
abusive and vulgar.  
 
Ignatieff then asked McEwan whether he thought that the fictional form is perceived 
as a threat by the Muslim community. McEwan’s response suggested that he thought 
that there was an inherent tension between a literary tradition which is sceptical of 
truths and enclosed systems which claim truth. Azmeh, when asked the same 
question, said that religious bodies “do not admit parodying”. There then followed a 
discussion on the Qur’an as a piece of literature, and the relationship that the Qur'an 
has with other literary works.  
 
This is then followed by a discussion which is related to the previous discussion, 
which asked the question whether the global Islamic community felt that its faith was 
threatened by the novel? Answers were given to this question by Guppy, Akhtar and 
Essawy. Guppy expressed surprise that the Muslim community felt threatened by the 
novel, whereas Essawy denied this being the case. Akhtar made the remark that such 
precedents should not be permitted if a religion wishes to maintain its internal 
integrity. Ignatieff then enquired of Essawy and Akhtar whether they would they have 
been as equally offended if the writer had been a non-Muslim? They both answered 
that they would not have been as equally offended.  
 
The panel then moved on to discuss the issue of tolerance and free speech. Ignatieff 
began by asking Essawy how he defined tolerance within the Islamic tradition. He 
then asked Faqir how she, as a Muslim writer, dealt with the issue of free speech 
while remaining within a tradition. This led on to a discussion on free speech within 
British society and its limitations. McEwan and Akhtar, representing both opposites 
of the spectrum on the debate, contributed to this part of the discussion.  
 
The discussion then ended with Ignatieff asking everyone how they thought that the 
gap between the Muslim and non-Muslim community could be bridged. Akhtar 
suggested that the press should print a defence of the “virtues of fundamentalism”. 
Azmeh suggested that the Muslim community should not be subject to generalisation. 
Faqir suggested that Islam should be studied and any crude distinctions resulting in 
polarisations should not be used. McEwan argued against the death threat and asked 
for a “coherent, intellectually argued position for fundamentalism”. Guppy, similarly, 
suggested dialogue. Essawy suggested that old prejudices should be left behind. The 
discussion ends here.  
 
                                                 
92
 Dr Essawy did not give his opinion on the banning of the book at this particular part of the 
discussion, but he did do so later in the programme. 
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The Late Show, 8 May 1989 
 
The second programme to be used for this study is, in a way, a continuation from the 
previous programme. It was also hosted by Michael Ignatieff. It was aired on 
television two and a half months after the death threat, and three and a half months 
after the book burning in Bradford. The introduction to the programme leads on from 
the end of the previous programme in which Akhtar of the Bradford Council of 
Mosques had argued that Western liberals had “never taken the trouble to truly 
understand Islam”. So Ignatieff “decided to take up the challenge” by visiting the 
Muslim community in Bradford.  
 
The programme is constructed as a documentary. There are several parts to the 
documentary which are interwoven throughout the programme. These parts include a 
table conversation/dialogue between Ignatieff and Akhtar at Akhtar’s home, a group 
discussion involving Muslim teenage girls, an interview with the headteacher of 
Muslims girls’ school, an interview with an English headmaster of a local 
comprehensive and participant observation by Ignatieff while he has close association 
with a Muslim family. Ignatieff provided a commentary on the issues under 
discussion throughout the programme.  
 
The programme began with an introduction by Ignatieff. In this introduction, Ignatieff 
summarised the ‘Rushdie affair’ up to the date of the programme. The programme 
began with a playing of a recorded speech by Douglas Hurd, who was at the time, 
Home Secretary. The speech and the introductory comments by Ignatieff highlighted 
the conflict of interests that the ‘Rushdie affair’ raised for the British Muslim 
community and the conflict of values that resulted. This was followed by an example 
of such a clash of values in which Akhtar and Ignatieff discuss the role of Rushdie as 
an individual in the whole affair.  
 
The programme then moved on to discuss the book itself and the issue of its offensive 
nature. A group of young Muslim women are taken as an example of the Bradford 
Muslim community and they offered their reasons why they found the book to be 
offensive. Akhtar and Ignatieff then discussed the difficulties faced by a Muslim 
community living in Britain, especially with regard to the maintenance of its religious 
values. This is in part connected to the next part of the discussion in which they both 
discuss how the Muslim community should have responded to the publication of the 
book.   
 
The discussion concerning the maintenance of religious values led onto the issue of 
education, and specifically, how the Muslim community aimed to preserve its 
identity. Ignatieff visited a Muslim girls’ school to examine these issues. He 
examined the implications of such education for a multicultural city like Bradford by 
discussing some of these implications with an English headmaster of a local 
comprehensive.  
 
The programme then moved back to Akhtar’s home as Akhtar and Ignatieff discuss 
the issue of freedom of expression and its limits. Ignatieff then moved on to examine 
how a Muslim family was dealing with the issues of maintaining their identity in 
Britain. He explored the tensions faced by their uncle, Arshad, since he sold alcohol 
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in his restaurant, and he explored how the children are responding to the ‘Rushdie 
affair’.  
 
Ignatieff then travelled with Arshad to his restaurant. He asked him on the way to the 
restaurant whether he would be willing to kill Rushdie, Arshad answered that he 
would, and the discussion revolved around this issue. He asked Arshad further 
whether his answer was the result of pressure from the community which was a theme 
that he explored further at the restaurant.  
 
The programme then returned to Akhtar’s home. Akhtar and Ignatieff discussed the 
value of martyrdom, and both agreed that they would fight for their beliefs. This 
highlighted the tension between the two positions, which was the point on which the 
programme ended. Ignatieff ended the programme by saying that the ‘Rushdie affair’ 
involved radical disagreements, and that the project of multiculturalism had made 
some assumptions about mutual inter-community understanding which were difficult 
to achieve.  
 
Iranian Nights, 20 May 1989 
 
Iranian nights was a play written by Howard Brenton and Tariq Ali which opened on 
the 19
th
 of April at the Royal Court Theatre in London for a two week run. It was then 
broadcast on Channel Four on 20
th
 May 1989. It was written as a response to the 
cultural crisis caused by the ‘Rushdie affair’. The following is a summary of the play.  
 
The play began in the courtroom of an Oriental king. He had around him Omar 
Khayyam, a poet, and Sheherezade, a story-teller. The play began with Omar 
Khayyam relating the story of a young Persian scholar who had become a heretic and 
who was then tried for writing books “which tore at the faith of the imams”. The 
scholar was killed in open court. The poet and the story-teller began to tell stories to 
the king from One Thousand and One Nights. They began with stories about lust. The 
king then asked them to narrate a moral story.  
 
They narrated a story which is synonymous with the recent political history of Iran. A 
holy man overthrew a tyrant and became the leader of Persia. He fought war after 
war, and then wishing to unite his people, he issued a death threat against a poet in a 
far-off land. The poet then decided to travel towards Persia to talk to the holy man. 
The poet tried to convince the holy man but failed, and then decided to ask some 
questions. He asked why Islam is unable to progress like other religions? He failed to 
convince the holy man. He then asked more questions, all of these questions pointed 
to discrepancies in the holy man’s position. This story ended here. They then 
recounted another story of lust. The king then asked to hear some sayings of the 
Prophet, which are recounted. The king then said that he is tired of his tyranny and 
decided to migrate to Bradford, England.  
 
The play shifted to a scene in England in which a father and son were discussing the 
book burning protest. The father tried to appease the son, but the son was adamant on 
the importance of his Islamic commitments. The father expressed his despair at his 
son, not understanding how he has become like this. The son recounted a story from 
his days at university where he received racial harassment. The son said that he 
turned to his faith to avoid such humiliation. The son then discussed his pride in his 
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faith and how this pride helped him. He then derided his father for not practising 
Islam. The conversation ended when the father referred the son to his own hypocrisy 
as he was a pimp for Arab friends. The scene changed, and the son answered a phone 
call in which a friend from university contacted him and arranged a deal between him 
and American drug distributors. The play ended with a speech by Sheherezade about 
the tensions faced by immigrants living in a different society.  
 
Hypotheticals, 30 May 1989 
 
Hypotheticals was a programme broadcast on ITV at 10.35 p.m. on the 30
th
 May 
1989. It involved the construction of a scenario in which seventeen participants were 
invited to discuss a hypothetical scenario and to act out certain roles (which were not 
that different from their every day life roles) within this scenario. The participants 
were chosen to cover the spectrum of debate on the issue. A lawyer was chosen to 
moderate the proceedings. The participants were Yusuf Islam, formerly Cat Stevens; 
Shabbir Akhtar, representing the Bradford Council of Mosques; Kalim Siddiqui, 
Muslim Institute; Fay Weldon, writer; Max Madden, MP for Bradford West; Michael 
Day, Commission for Racial Equality; Rt Rev Stanley Booth-Clibborn, bishop Of 
Manchester; Jack Acton, Superintendent, West Yorkshire police; Merlyn Rees, 
former Home Secretary; Matthew Evans, chairman, Faber and Faber; Michael 
Winner, film director and producer; Farrukh Dhondy, commissioning editor, Channel 
Four; Alan King-Hamilton QC, retired Judge; Andreas Whittam-Smith, editor, the 
Independent; Tim Waterstone, Waterstones & Co. Booksellers; Gita Sahgal, reporter, 
Bandung File, Channel Four; and Dr Michael Plint, chairman, Plint and Partners. 
 
The scenario began in a restaurant with Yusuf Islam, Shabbir Akhtar and Kalim 
Siddiqui (all representing the Muslim community) dining in a restaurant. They 
noticed Salman Rushdie in the restaurant dining with Fay Weldon (representing the 
right to publish). Michael Day was also dining in the restaurant with Max Madden 
(both representing a view that is sympathetic to the Muslim community but at the 
same time acknowledge the right of freedom to write for the author). Yusuf Islam, 
Akhtar and Siddiqui were all asked how they would respond to Rushdie’s presence in 
the restaurant and whether they would kill Rushdie. All three said that they would not 
kill Rushdie, then Robertson asked whether they would prevent someone else killing 
Rushdie? This issue was connected to the issue of obeying British law, and whether 
the Muslim representatives were prepared to disobey British law in order to follow 
Islamic law. Robertson then asked Reverend Booth-Clibborn, Day and Madden MP 
on how they would respond to an attack on Rushdie. The issue here being whether 
those who express some sympathy for the Muslim case are prepared to defend 
Rushdie’s life. All three answered positively.  
 
Robertson then began the scenario again, with a manuscript of The Satanic Verses 
being sent to the publisher. Robertson following on from this, proceeded 
chronologically, through the ‘Rushdie affair’. The first issue to be dealt with was the 
issue of the writer’s responsibility, and whether a book should be published if it is 
likely that the book will cause offence to a particular community, and these questions 
were put to Evans, Weldon, Dhondy and Winner. They answered that a book can still 
be published though it may cause offence to a particular community. The discussion 
then moved on to whether a book should be published if it is deemed blasphemous. 
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The question was asked whether the blasphemy laws should be extended to cover 
other faiths. 
 
They then discussed the publication of the book, and the protests that followed. 
Akhtar was asked whether he would protest against the book. He was then asked 
about the form of protest he would wish to use. Would this include burning books, or 
burning effigies of Rushdie? The police representative was then asked about the 
legality of such demonstrations and whether the Muslim community has a right to 
demonstrate in such a manner and whether this form of protest should be allowed 
under freedom of speech? The question was also raised here about the benefits gained 
by protesting in such a manner. Did the Muslim representatives view such protests to 
be counter-productive? The media’s role was also questioned here, specifically, 
whether their role was provocatory to the affair?  
 
The scenario was moved on as a bomb was thrown at a Waterstone’s book store. The 
issue being discussed here was whether intimidation against the book sellers would 
eventually have led to their withdrawing the book? Robertson asked Winner and 
Weldon the same question about whether intimidation would work, and their 
response to such a situation. Robertson then moved on to ask how the Muslim 
community leaders would respond to such a situation, and whether they would seek 
to escalate or moderate the situation.  
 
Robertson then asked the police representative whether he would allow the National 
Front to stage a demonstration in support of Salman Rushdie. The police 
representative replied that he would not allow the National Front to demonstrate 
because, in his opinion, this would have led to an escalation in the situation. A 
discussion then developed about the conflicts of competing freedoms that result from 
such an action.  
 
The penultimate part of the scenario related to the business contracts that certain 
British businessmen have with Iran. Robertson asked a representative of these 
businessmen how he would have responded to the affair. He then asked further 
whether the business man would have been willing to aid the British government 
pursue its objectives in Iran. A discussion then followed on the extent to which one 
state should be permitted to interfere with the proceedings of another state.  
 
The final part to the scenario involved a mock trial of The Satanic Verses after the 
blasphemy law had been extended. Akhtar was asked to give the case for the 
prosecution and Dhondy was asked to give the case for the defence. Robertson 
reported the jury as returning a verdict of “Not guilty” and the programme ended 
here. 
 
Everyman, 27 May 1990 
 
Eight individuals were invited from all over Britain to take part in this programme 
which was broadcast over a year after the death threat. They were from different 
cultural, religious and social backgrounds. They agreed to live in a remote house 
where they would live together for four days. They were strangers to each other and 
held opposing views on the subject of the ‘Rushdie affair’. The programme consisted 
of edited versions of discussions that they had together over four days.  
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Of the eight participants, three were practising Muslims: Saima, a university 
undergraduate from Cheshire; Shabbir, from Blackburn; Tahir from Manchester 
where he ran a shop selling clothes. A fourth Muslim was not as practising as the 
others. Peter was a bookseller in Bath. Rashida was a liberal Muslim from London. 
Ray Scott was a Wiltshire businessman and a free-thinking Christian. Sister Dawn 
was a Deacon in the Church of England. John Herand was the discussion leader. 
 
The discussion began with the issue of freedom of speech and censorship. Ray stated 
that it was difficult to define parameters for censorship. This was followed by an 
explanation by Tahir as to the cause of Muslim discontent, and this was then followed 
by a discussion on the different forms of response that are available to the Muslim 
community. They then discussed freedom of speech, and the implications that such 
freedom entailed. This led on to the final part of this section, in which the participants 
discussed some possible underlying reasons that could have precipitated the crisis.  
 
The second discussion began with Rashida altering her stance on the book. She noted 
that after having received some literature from Shabbir she was better able to 
appreciate the Muslim community’s position. They then discussed the death threat 
and whether Muslims supported it. This again led on to the question of how the 
Muslim community should respond to the book. The question was asked whether the 
Muslim representatives would accept the judgement of British law on this topic.  
 
The third discussion revolved around the way the Muslims felt themselves perceived 
in British society. The Muslim representatives gave their account of how they felt 
judged, and then, of how they tried to orientate their actions to take into account such 
judgements. Rashida, here, talked openly about how she felt she would be perceived 
by the other Muslims, and her consequent fears of being judged. 
 
The final discussion heard Peter change in his opinion about stocking the book, 
though the change was not dramatic. The Muslim representatives responsed to his 
change in attitude, all of them positive. The programme then ended with Peter saying 
that he felt he understood the Muslims more after having “experienced a real 
relationship” with them. 
